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T o my teachers, 
Bill Ward and Erik Hornung 

What I have tried to say in this book has been so frequently misunderstood that I would like to restate 
my aims. 
Mark Blaug, 1968 
Economic Theory in Retrospect, p. xi 
T axes are a portion of the produce of the land and labour of a country, placed at the disposal of the 
government; and are always ultimately paid, either from the capital, or from the revenue of the country. 
lf the consumption of the government, when increased by the levy of additional taxes, be met either by 
an increased production, or by a diminished consumption on the part of the people, the taxes will fall 
upon revenue, and the material capital will remain unimpaired; but if there be no increased production 
or diminished consumption on the part of the people, the taxes will necessarily fall on capital. 
In proportion as the capital of a country is diminished, its production will necessarily be diminished; and 
therefore, if the same expenditure on the part of the people and of the government continue, with a 
constantly diminishing annual reproduction, the resources of the people and the state will fall away with 
increasing rapidity, and di$1ress and ruin will follow. 
David Ricardo, 1817 
On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, pp. 186-188 
Speaking broadly therefore, although il is a man's wants in the earliest slages of his development that 
give rise to his activities, yet afterwards each new step upwards is lobe regarded as the development 
of new activities giving rise to new wants, rather than of new wants giving rise to new activities. 
lt is not true therefore that "the Theory of Consumption is the scientific basis of economics." For much that 
is of chief interest in the science of wants, is borrowed from the science of efforts and activities. These 
two supplement one another; either is incomplete without the other. 
Alfred Marshall, 1920 
Princip/es of Economics, pp. 89-90 
When involuntary unemployment exists, the marginal disutility of labour is necessarily less than the utility 
of the marginal product. [ ... ] Pyramid-building, earthquakes, even wars may serve to increase wealth, 
if the education of our slatesmen on the principles of the classical economics stands in the way of 
anything better. [ ... ]Just as wars have been the only form of large-scale loan expenditure which statesmen 
have thought justifiable, so gold-mining is the only pretext for digging holes in the ground which has 
recommended itself to bankers as sound finance; and each of these activities has played its part in 
progress - failing something better. 
Ancient Egypt was doubly fortunate, and doubtless owed to this its fabled wealth, in that it possessed 
two aclivities, namely pyramid-building as weil as the search for precious metals, the fruits of which, 
since they could not serve the needs of man by being consumed, did not stale with abundance. 
John Maynard Keynes, 1936 
General Theory of Employment, lnterest and Money, pp. 1 29-1 3 l 
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PREFACE 
This book was originally conceived as a philological investigation of words translated as 
"tax" (or the like), tobe accompanied by some remarks about my Keynesian interpretation of 
the economy. lnstead, it has become a small treatise on the nature of the Egyptian economy. 
Realizing that the interaction of Social Science and Egyptology decisively influenced many 
views of the world, both ancient and modern, it was necessary to investigate the origins of 
some of the speculation. Thus, aside from considerations related to the philological investi-
gation, it seemed that issues relating to the development of theoretical and historical thought 
also required attention. The result is that the book necessarily contains numerous arguments 
and discussions relating to the nature of the state and economic thought and history that 
reflect the development of the field, quite aside from the historical and philological details. 
Same of these arguments may appear dated to some. In general the discussion has been 
guided by an attempt to include material relevant to the understanding of the argument 
within the book. 
Writing this book has therefore been difficult, and I have had toset limits corresponding to 
what I regarded as germane to the argument. Thus, some will think that I am belaboring 
perfectly obvious points made long ago, while others will be shocked at the brevity. 1 am 
particularly conscious that the discussion of Polanyi is long in comparison with that of Marx, 
yet the central role of Polanyi in the Egyptological debate dictated an imbalance, for otherwise 
the book would have been even longer, and the theoretical discussions would have out-
weighed the philological discussions to an even greater degree. Assmann's Sinngeschichte 
only appeared when the text of this book was complete, and both Grandet, Papyrus Harris 
and Römer, Priesterherrschaft after it was virtually complete. Thus the discussion of these 
books and the results of several unpublished dissertations from the Humboldt University have 
likewise not received the treatment they deserve, but this would have considerably increased 
the bulk of the text without having aided the argument in a significant fasion. 
The selection of Egyptian texts d iscussed and mentioned was limited by the same criteria . 
1 endeavoured to discuss the essential, while selecting a minimum of controversial material, 
and a maximum of clearly comprehensible references on which to base the argument. 
Although some of the texts may appear tobe open to diverse interpretations, 1 need hardly 
mention that I completely omitted dozens of other references which I regarded as even less 
sufficiently grounded for use in an argument. Even so, in revising the text I am conscious that 
the translations provide fertile ground for criticism. 1 realized however that further struggle 
with my limited abilities would probably leave roughly the same scope for criticism, and that 
it would be wiser to recognize that regardless of my efforts, the grammatical experts would 
have something "to tilt at" as Sir Alan put it. 1 hope that better renderings will result, but also 
that some critics will realise that the book is not merely a peculiar collection of quotes and 
translations but actually a single long argument. 
15 
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Although this book betrays my iconoclastic inclinations, 1 am very conscious that it owes 
more to others than can be imagined. lt is inconceivable that anyone could even begin to try 
to understand the economics of ancient Egypt and attempt a work of this type without the 
fundamental basis built up by Sir Alan Gardiner and Prof. Jaroslav C:erny in countless smaller 
and larger works. The author has been conscious on a daily basis of his complete dependence 
upon these two giants, especially as Dr. J. Malek at the Griffith Institute generously helped 
me to browse through C:erny's Notebooksand had a number of photocopies of various texts 
made. 
While Gardiner and C:erny accomplished the groundwork that serves as a basis, 1 invariably 
found wherever I went, Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Helck had already been there, usually with a 
clever analysis, and usually accompanied by Prof. Dr. J. J. Janssen with a divergent interpre-
tation. Drs. E. Bleiberg and R. Müller-Wollermann likewise covered the same ground, and 
thus paved my way. On the other hand, 1 frequently encountered conclusions that had been 
reached by others before I had arrived at a similar point without being aware of their efforts. 
Among these latter, the most important were undoubtedly the works of Drs. M. Römer and 
C. Eyre. The substantial contributions of many others have likewise contributed to my under-
standing or provoked unexpected trains of thought. Without all of these major contributions 
1 would not be in a position to even begin to organize the data or grasp the tasks. 
On a completely different level, the works of Fernand Braudel have gone uncited, but 
readers will sense the role that the law of the "Extension of the Existing" (Erweiterung des 
Bestehenden) played in prolonging the longue duree of incipient capitalism. 
Quite apart from the written sources, a number of people heard me out patiently while I tried 
to explain this interpretation, and their disbelief or dogged questioning led me to repeatedly 
revise my logic as weil as the theoretical presentation of the form of the economy, and 1 
should thank all those beginning with Prof. Dr. E. Blumenthal and the people at the SÄK in 
1989. 1 am also particularly grateful to Prof. Dr. J. Assmann for having arranged for my 
lecture at the Seminar at Heidelberg, and equally appreciative of Prof. Dr. W. Schenkel's 
agreement to provide myself and Dr. Müller-Wollermann with an ideal platform at the 
University of Tübingen. Aside from my students at the University of Berne, 1 would thus also 
like to thank all those students and scholars at the Institutes in Tübingen, Basle and Heidelberg, 
as well as those at the Dept. of Near Eastern Studies in Berkeley, the Oriental Institute in 
Chicago, and the Carsten Niebuhr Institute in Copenhagen for having been interested 
enough to have expressed their criticism, as it has doubttess improved the presentation, even 
if many of the critical readers will not be satisfied with the new improved version. 
In Berlin and $anö'a Fr. A. Würth was not only tolerant and generous with advice, but also 
made herself outrageously indispensable. 
16 
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Likewise outside of the Egyptological world, Prof. Dr. J. Bceck Simonsen, Dr. J. Eidern, 
Prof. Dr. M. Larsen and Prof. Dr. 1. Thuesen generously opened up the doors of the Carsten 
Niebuhr Institute at the University of Copenhagen. They provided a luxurious intellectual 
environment for a retired "Yemen-expert", permitting both the use of their facilities to complete 
this work, and the chance to dismay and mystify them and their students with my theories. 
The Librarian Fr. A. Zeeberg accomplished wonders. lt was in the wonderful atmosphere of 
that institution that this text was conjured up. 
Prof. Dr. J. J. Janssen read parts of the philological study at one of the draught stages and 
made extensive notes, being generous with references and advice. 
For many years Prof. Dr. E. Hornung and Dr. E. Staehelin made the Egyptological Seminar 
at the University of Basle my scholarly home, and I cannot possibly express my appreciation 
for the fashion in which they welcomed me and broadened my horizons. Although the 
subject matter was never close to his heart, Prof. Hornung's support never wavered. 
Markus Wäfler generously welcomed me at the Institute of Ancient Near Eastern 
Archaeology and Languages at the University of Berne, and I cannot thank him enough for 
finding ways where I thought that all was barred . The willingness of Prof. Dr. F. Junge to take 
up the task of critically and carefully reading - at short notice - one of the more exotic things 
that will have crossed his desk was decisive. 1 owe him my thanks for his consent to do so, 
and if the revised version is comprehensible, this can be traced back to Prof. Junge's critical 
observations. This text is basically a slightly revised version of that dissertation submitted to 
the Philosophical-H istorical Faculty of the University of Berne in 1995, and accepted by the 
faculty on the recommendation of Profs. Hornung, Junge and Wäfler. 
The Institute of Ancient Near Eastern Archaeology and Languages at the University of Berne 
is responsible for the final form of the text. The actual workload fell upon the shoulders of 
Mr. D. Dall'Agnolo. 1 doubt that any author has ever received such indulgent treatment in the 
production of his fi rst book. 
In the course of all this work, one fundamental truth has been repeatedly demonstrated: 
"Seek and ye shall find!". lf you look for taxes, you find them everywhere. 1 hope that I have 
distinguished the wheat from the chaff to some extent. lf so, the inspiration of my grandfathers 
Clark Warburton, the economist, and Walter Dorn, the historian, may have played a useful 
role in the creation of this essay in economic history. Bill Ward pushed me critically and 
relentlessly onwards, and, with Erik Hornung, made it possible. 
The unfortunate fa ilings are all mine. 
May 1995 
Carsten Niebuhr Institute 
Copenhagen 
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A PARENTHETICAL NOTE 
According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, F1scAL means "of or pertaining to the 
treasury of a state or prince". 
The Egyptian NEW K1NGDOM (Dynasties XVIII to XX), dates to c. 1550 B.C. -1070 B.C. 
Regardless of the calendar years when the New Kingdom began and ended, the conquests 
which marked its beginning inadvertently led to the beginning of the Lote Bronze Age in 
Palestine, but the lron Age had already begun before its decline was complete. Because of 
the conquests in Western Asia and Africa the Period can also be termed the EMPIRE. Part of 
the Syrian coast which they conquered is now known as Palestine, but parts of it were called 
Canaan when they visited (and only became Palestine because of their failure to ward off 
the Philistines), and other inland areas they called RINW. Their northern military expansion 
was brought to a halt, first by Mitanni, which they called Nahrain, and then by the Anatolian 
Hittites, which they called HA TTI. They learnt to respect both Hatti and Mitanni, having 
made both love and war with them, before both disappeared from the face of the earth, 
leaving Egypt the only surviving Mediterranean power. The Egyptians called various parts of 
Nubia in southern Egypt and the present day Sudan whence they acquired gold and 
other desirables CusH and W~w~T. They established their rule there during the early part of 
Dynasty XVIII and retained control almost until the end of Dynasty XX. They also maintained 
trade relations with another distant land on the Red Sea, which they called Pu NT, and which 
has never since been found. 
The empire was lost by the lotest of the many kings of Dynasties XIX and XX named Ramesses 
who gave their name to the LATE NEW K1NGDOM or the RAMESSIDE PERIOD . Despite 
disagreement over some chronological details, the longest ruling Pharaoh of the period is 
the one whose dates are firm: Ramesses II began his glorious rule in 1279 B.C., praised 
himself endlessly for having suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Hatti in 1274 B.C., 
made peace with Hatti c. 1258, got married to a Hatti Princess in c. 1245 B.C., and 
disappeared into his tomb in 1213 or 1212 B.C. Due to illicit activities in the necropolis his 
burial was renewed in 1075 B.C., at the very close of the period. 
Under the circumstances, where necessary, dates are thus expressed in terms of reigns, 
dynasties and kingdoms because the actual calendar year dates are by no means generally 
agreed upon, so that even if it is now (relatively) certain that the battle of Kadesh took place 
in 1274 B.C., one can also read that it happened in 1285, or in another context another 
date, from sources dating to periods before our understanding of the chronology had reached 
its present level. But it took place in the Regnal Year 5 of the Reign of Ramesses II, the third 
king of the Dynasty XIX, of the New Kingdom. 
Ramesses II was not the only king of that name, and the reburial initiated by the High Priest 
of AMONRASONTHER Herihor in 1075 B.C. actually took place during the reign of the last 
Ramesside Pharaoh, Ramesses XI . In the course of the following work we will constantly be 
referring to the Papyrus Wilbour (P. W1LBOUR) which dates to the reign of Ramesses V, and 
to the Papyrus Harris (P. HARRIS 1) which dates to the reign of Ramesses III. Both documents 
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are rnentioned and discussed in the text, but is not superfluous to note that P. Wilbour is a 
cadaster survey of lands in Middle Egypt, and P. Harris a list of gifts to the ternples during 
the reign of Rarnesses 111. The death of Rarnesses III took place roughly a decade or so before 
that of Rarnesses V, which can be dated to just after the middle of the 12th century B.C. 
The rulers of the Lote New Kingdom followed a tradition going back more than two millennia, 
for the earliest kings of Egypt rnust have been leaders of clans during the fourth or fifth 
rnillennia, terminating the Pre-Dynastic Period with Dynasty O or Negada III, and leading 
into the EARL V DYNASTIC or ÄRCHAIC PERIOD (Dynasties 1-11} at the beginning of the third 
rnillennium B.C. With Dynasty III, the ÜLD K1NGDOM (Dynasties III-VIII) is said to appear, 
and the structures are generally agreed tobe those which can be equated with a powerful 
centralized state, whatever may be said of what preceded. 
The MtDDLE KtNGDOM (Dynasties XI-XIII) is sandwiched between the FIRST (Dynasties IX-X) 
and SECOND INTERMEDIATE PERI0DS (Dynasties XIV-XVII) which followed the fall of the Old 
Kingdom and preceded the appearance of the New Kingdom. lt is generally agreed that 
state and government responsibility were divided during both periods, but it is less clear 
whether the First lntermediate Period witnessed a higher degree of prosperity than the Second, 
although both were clearly less glorious than the periods denoted as Kingdoms, which are 
usually characterized by periods of streng central state control. 
Returning to the New Kingdom, a great deal of the material from the village of DEIR EL-
MEDINEH has a bearing on this work. The members of the GANG that excavated and 
decorated the New Kingdom Royal Tombs (in the Volley of the Kings) lived in the village. 
The place where they worked is called the brand this has been translated as TOMB or 
NECR0P0LIS. When the term "tomb" appears in the text of this volume with reference to 
incorne, employment, etc. in Deir el-Medineh, it can generally be stated that this is short-
hand for The Greatand Noble Tomb of Millions of Years of Pharaoh (L!P!H!) on the Westof 
Thebes which means something like "The Organization Responsible for the Royal Tomb" or 
"The Organization of the Necropolis". Whether the Egyptians actually used the term with the 
same meaning at all times has not been demonstrated. ("Deir el-Medineh" is an anglicized 
spelling of the French transliteration of the Arabic term for the place, and has nothing to do 
with the Pharaonic name). 
Another important institution of the Ramesside Period was the "House of Amun-Re', King of 
the Gods". The Greek rendering of the Egyptian for the name of this god and his epithet 
(lmn-R', nsw nJrw) was ÄMONRASONTHER. The Egyptian word "House" also meant "Temple", 
but in this particular context, it is translated here as "Estate", and the "EsTATE OF ÄMUN 11 was 
one of the most important central official fiscal institutions during the Lote New Kingdom. His 
temple is, of course, the one called Kornak today. 
While the temples were each under the direct control of a High Priest, of Amun ot Thebes 
(HPA}, and of Ptah at Memphis, they had armies of bureaucrats (translated as 11SCRIBE 11 in this 
work) at their command; a great deal of the actual work was delegated to authorities called 
rwgw, translated as "agents" or 11CONTROLLERS 11 • The actual work in the fields must have been 
supervised by ibwty's, tronslated 11CULTIVATORS 11 , and the work carried out by the peasants, 
occasiorially referred to os "cultivotors" as weil, but generally termed men, meaning "men 
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without a title", the most despicable situation known to the ancient Egyptian . These are not 
the same as the nmbw or "private people", but the relationship is not clear, although the 
nmbw seemed to have owed obligations to the Pharaoh and the temples. lt is probable that 
the temple apparatus benefited from the smdt ("sERFs"), a social designation identifying 
people obliged to fulfill obligations of various kinds, and that they were awarded titles as a 
result of their specific misfortune, e.g. "Water Carrier" or "Wood Cutter". The extent to which 
they were attached to individuals or the king is less clear. 
The Egyptians harvE?sted fields measured in sftt. The sj;t is usually rendered with the Greek 
AROURA, and is 2,735 m2. The harvest was measured in KHAR, meaning literally "sack", a 
measure equivalent to roughly 75 litres. In the New Kingdom, the khar consisted of four 
quadruple bqtt, each quadruple bqtt also being termed an OIPE (ipt) . (In the Graeco-
Roman world, the aroura remained the same but the standard measure was an artaba, of 
slightly more than 1/2 khar, or c. 40 litres.) 
Having been harvested, and turned over to the central authorities, and issued to the recipients, 
a KHAR became a unit of value, and thus a measure of income and exchange. Not having 
currency, the Egyptians used several units of value, another being a DE BEN. The khar as a 
unit of value usually referred to a khar of barley, and was generally worth 2 deben. The 
deben was however not a currency, but a weight of c. 91 grammes. Copper deben are 
usually measured in wholes or halves, but silver and gold deben were measured in fractions 
equal to the tenth part of a deben, called KITE. There was a more or less stable ratio 
between the value of gold:silver:copper, set at l :2:200 during the first part of the New 
Kingdom and towards the beginning of Dynasty XX at l :2: 120. A four metre roll of papyrus 
could be purchased for 2 copper deben, equivalent to about l 0-20 per cent. of a work-
man 's monthly wage, or about the same price as a pair of sandals. 
To the maximum extent possible, 1 tried to keep the main text in English . In the notes, 1 have 
been less consistent, occasionally translating and occasionally citing the original language. 
In rendering Egyptian names and toponyms, 1 have tried to follow a system enabling the 
reader to recognize the individual referred to, by remaining as close to the Egyptian as 
possible (e.g ., lmn-btp, Mr-wr) or using a familiar form (e.g ., Amenophis III, Memphis) 
whichever seemed most suitable. 
The correct transcription of Arabic place names is a constant source of exasperation, and 
1 do not believe that the problem can be solved in a manner at once satisfactory to all 
scholars and user-friendly. Familiar place names are left recognizable. 
The Bibliographical Abbreviations at the close of this volume is an alphabetical list of all the 
monographs, collective works, serials, encyclopedias, and all relevant bibliographical 
abbreviations, etc. cited in abbreviated form in the text of the book. 
The Bibliography of Articles is a list of the articles cited in the book, listed alphabetically 
according to author. Articles cited from the Reallexikon der Assyriologie (RLA), Lexikon der 
Ägyptologie (LÄ) and the Cambridge Ancient History (CAH) have not been listed there. 
Neither bibliography lays claim to being a comprehensive survey of Egyptological or Economic 
thought as only those works cited in this book are listed, and many other articles and books 
influenced my thinking but did not find their way into the footnotes . 
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AD. 
B.C. 
c. 
cf. 
e.g. 
f.; ff. 
i.e. 
infra 
I.; II. 
mc 
L!PIH! 
n.; nn. 
N.B. 
p. ; pp. 
p.a. 
pi.; pls. 
rto. 
supra 
s.v. 
vs . 
vso. 
KR/ 1: 47,5 
(2, 1) or 2, l 
(river) 
[Osiris] 
[ .. .. ] 
[ ... ] 
[ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
[ ... Guara ntees ... ] 
[ <khar oipe>] 
[ khar / oipe] 
[(khar oipe2)] 
(2) 
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Common Era dates 
Before Common Era 
roughly 
see 
for example 
following, singular and plural 
in other words 
below (this book) 
line; lines 
measure of corn, where units uncertain (oipe or kha(J 
''Lifel Prosperityl Healthl ", phrase following names of revered individuals 
note; notes 
don't forget 
poge; pages 
annually 
plate; plates 
recto: for papyrus, the technical meaning; for ostraca the beginning of the 
text 
above (this book) 
look under 
against 
verso: complementary to above for recto 
text online 5 of poge 47 of volume l of KR/. 
line 1 of poge 2 of text in original 
logical clarification of text which may have been understood 
clarification which is not in text 
textual loss 
textual omission 
substantial portion of text omitted 
clarification or summary accompanied by textual omission 
suggested restoration, based on signs visible in text or external criteria, usually 
uncertain 
restoration, uncertain 
speculative restoration 
doubt about text or meaning of word 
written in red, used to designate important information (e .g . dates, totals, 
etc.), and emmer in economic texts 
21 

PART 1 
T HEORETICAL CüNSIDERATIONS 

INTRODUCTION 
The explicit object of this study is an analysis of lexical aspects of the input-side of the 
Egyptian fiscal system in the New Kingdom. Fiscal activity is basically state involvement in 
the economy and thus such a study must be accompanied by an attempt to identify the 
political and economic context of the words, while pursuing the purely philological object of 
identifying semantic meanings. Although the world of the ancient Near East did not use 
concepts like "economy" and "state", modern scholars do, with the result that unconscious 
interpretation clouds our understanding of objectively philological questions. This required a 
theoretical discussion which is intended to be no more than an elaborate description of the 
processes involved, which are among the most interesting in human history. This work is thus 
an endeavour to break down the barriers to modern economic and political analysis as 
applied to an early human civilization, while keeping to the philological evidence. 
One of the signal accomplishments of the ancient Middle East was the creation of the state, 
a political entity that had never before existed. The pre-conditions for the emergence of 
stetes were created as a result of the economic effects of the Neolithic, as - according to 
current political understanding - hunters and gatherers did not form states. The effect of 
sedentarization was the ability to store wealth, and the evolution of social relationships 
reflecting the distribution of wealth, rather than, e.g., fertility or hunting prowess. This is one 
of the least well understood developments in human history, and yet one of the most important. 
There can however be no question but that the emergence of stetes in the ancient Near East 
led immediately to the creation of additional wealth, and of an order of magnitude completely 
incomparable to what had existed prior to their appearance. Obviously the state played a 
role in the creation of wealth, and an examination of this issue is imperative, if one is to 
come closer to appreciating the evolution of human society, which is the ultimate goal of the 
social sciences. The goal of understanding this can only be achieved by the examination of 
texts relating to economic policies in the ancient world. While it would be desirable in the 
long term to grasp the economic policies of the earliest periods of state formation, this goal 
is at present virtually unattainable, as despite the great deal of dato available, it is difficult to 
understand and analyze. Therefore, the more readily comprehensible world of the second 
millennium B.C. must serve as the initial vehicle of approach, in order to establish a theoretical 
framework for the understanding of the role of the state in the economy of the ancient 
Near East. 
In an endeavour to approach the fiscal policies of the world of the second millennium B.C., 
material from both Egypt and Mesopotamia is available, and the dato from Mesopotamia 
more complete than that of Egypt. Yet the sheer abundance of the material makes it difficult 
to achieve an overview of potential changes within the system - and there were many 
contrasts, as Mesopotamian civilization was not a continuum. 1 lt was thus decided that the 
Cf., e.g., Gibson/Biggs, Power, Schneider, Kulturwirtschaft, Postgote, Taxation and Ellis, Agriculture, for attempts at 
various aspects of the problem. 
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attempt to study fiscal policy begin with ancient Egypt and proceed to Mesopotamia at 
another stage. This will allow comparisons to be made not only between the evolving and 
disparate systems of Mesopotamia, but also between those systems and Egypt. 
There have been several attempts to deal with various features of the Egyptian economy and 
its overall organization but we still continue to stumble over numerous problems because this 
economy is so very different not only from our own, but from the contemporary economies of 
western Asia, and those economists who have approached the economy have been obliged 
to use the completely inadequate textual material offered by Egyptologists in order to aid us 
in developing a theory of the economy. This remark is not intended as criticism of Egyptological 
endeavors in making the textual material accessible, as some of the greatest have made 
significant efforts . 
One major problem is the evidence itself. The Egyptians were not particularly fascinated by 
economic systems, and thus explicit references to economic problems are not a feature tobe 
encountered frequently in the literature as it is preserved. 2 Their main concern was that the 
economy functioned properly, and they waxed eloquent when it did not (cf. lpw-wr),3 or 
praised their efforts in a general fashion when it did, or at least when they could get away 
with claiming it did (cf., e.g ., the inscription of the High Priest of Amun, lmn-btp).4 The 
modern student is more concerned with the routine functioning of an economy which pro-
duced some of the greatest architectural, artistic, literary and religious creations known to 
mankind. While admitting that the Egyptians may not have had a concept of economy as 
such, their economic system did function. 
Not only did the Egyptians not write economic discourses, but they also erased the records 
from account papyri when the figures were no longer important. Thus, much information was 
already lost three or four millennia ago. Much of what may have survived was lost in the 
intervening centuries, and a good deal of what remains has been read and understood by 
only a handful of scholars, the foremost of whom were Sir Alan Gardiner and Prof. Jaroslav 
C:erny, who were unfortunately not particularly interested in the workings of the Egyptian 
economy. Our understanding of the documents is considerably impaired as the Egyptians 
used the terms and figures being fully conscious of their significance, without finding it 
necessary to make them comprehensible to third parties who were not involved . Original 
documents and economically oriented translations are thus in short supply.5 
Another major problem is that debate about the nature of the ancient Egyptian economy 
began rather late in the history of Egyptology, but long after Egyptologists began to make 
unconscious assumptions and to borrow from other fields without considering the premises 
upon which they were unconsciously speculating . Recent decades have seen the emer-
gence of a secondary literature concerning the economy, but our understanding of the 
economy is still dogged by several serious problems. 
In conlrasl, e.g ., lo the Greeks and the Romans. 
Gardiner, Admonitions. 
Cf. e.g., infra, pp. l 86f. 
W . Helck's Materialien are the major exception , but the material is offered more in the form of a collection of 
elements from lexts, which is neither philological nor economic in orientation. 
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One aspect of these problems is a failure to understand the texts, not merely for philological, 
but also for theoretical and statistical reasons. Were it possible to make a rough estimate of 
per capita GNP for, e.g., Regnal Year 5 of Seti 1, it might have proved valuable to study 
every single document relating to the economy during, e.g., Dynasty XIX, placing the emphasis 
on the actual figures used, working with statistics rather than vocabulary. h however we 
are unable to estimate the population of ancient Egypt, or even the relative importance of the 
various types of economic activity, working with inadequate statistics would not serve a 
useful purpose at the moment. h the point of departure, the principal elements of the system 
were thus sought by traditional philological means: the examination of texts, with a view to 
grasping their significance. 
Another aspect of this discussion is the fact that a series of questions have been posed, and 
yet the solutions proposed have frequently been erected on the basis of assumptions which 
were insufficiently examined. In this particular study, the gool is to clear up the understanding, 
by making explicit statements about economic and political theory, as weil as interpreting 
the texts. Previous discussions about the economy of ancient Egypt have been dominated by 
conscious and unconscious assumptions about features such as price formation, grain 
production, private property, redistribution, temple taxation, temple economies, and economic 
theory, without giving equal attention to both the evidence and the entire train of thought 
implied by the question and the answer. 
The principal element of the approoch here is the attempt to define the objects of study, and 
to identify where interpretation begins. The object of this project is not to force categories on 
the Egyptians, nor to mold the categories according to the Egyptian context, but to identify 
the features which enable an interpretation which is at once appropriate and illuminating. 
Throughout, an effort has been made to identify and explicitly state the basis upon which 
assumptions are made and conclusions drawn. 
METHOD OF PRESENTATION 
Although the goal was primarily political and economic, this study commenced with the 
intention of reviewing the vocabulary of the fiscal system of the New Kingdom, and its final 
form corresponds to the original intent. A search through the literature, ( Urk. IV, KR/, pub--
lished ostraca, the Cerny Notebooks, etc.) revealed that a couple of hundred texts used one 
or more of the words (b;kw, btri, s;yt, smw and tp-g_r~ customarily translated as "tax", "im--
post", "duties", "deliveries", "obligations", "tribute", "booty", etc.6 There were also some texts 
referring to transactions of some kind, which appeared tobe official in nature, but failed to 
employ one of the words in question. Most were simple texts of a couple of lines which did 
not produce very much information, and could only be understood by inference, drawing on 
ldentified and discussed by, e.g., W. Helck, "Abgaben und Steuern," LÄ 1: 3-12; J. J. Janssen, "Prolegomena to 
the Study of Egypt's Economic History during the New Kingdom," SAK 3 ( 1975): 173-177; Römer, 
Priesterherrschaft, pp. 372-4 l l. 
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information gleaned from longer texts. Of the longer texts, excerpts of some 80 were trans-
lated anew, with a view to understanding the workings of the economy. 
Originally the choice of words was restricted to btkw, btri, smw, s;yt and tp-d_rt. lt rapidly 
transpired however that other words such as inw, inyt, biqt, brp and b.rt appeared in the 
same contexts as these, with parallel, but not identical meanings. Of these hiqt, brp and b.rt 
were frequent in public texts but not administrative documents, and the latter two did not 
appear frequently in the Ramesside material, so that they have basically been disregarded 
here, _brtbeing translated looselyas "obligation(s)" or "requiremen~s)" where itwas encountered 
in texts using one of the other terms. As one reason for excluding inw was that it had been 
treated extensively before I began this project, 7 but b ikw was thoroughly discussed while 
doing the project, and it nevertheless remains, it was concluded that it was logical to make 
a few observations about inw in a general fashion as weil. btqt has been treated briefly, as 
it would appear that the word changed its meaning slightly, and the discourse on tp-d_rtwas 
destined to be equally brief in any case. The selection thus covers most of the relevant 
terminology for the understanding of the fiscal process, as far as this is preserved. 
This point of departure is based on the assumption that it would be impossible to make a 
philological and economic investigation of fiscal activity without setting specific limits. The 
inclusion of iconographical material from tombs, and general discussions about the potential 
meaning of some significant texts might well have added considerably to the general 
perspective of the study, but any conclusions drawn would necessarily be based upon 
assumptions which would inevitably render the logic circular in nature, and therefore have 
ultimately defeated the purpose of the study. lt is difficult enough to understand the texts, 
without making speculative hypotheses the very basis of the study. 
Presenting this material with the express goal of studying the Egyptian economy was not 
simple. lt would have been possible to select one of the longer texts, e.g., the Bilgai Stele, 
the Nauri Decree or the Papyrus Harris, and used this as the basis for a lengthy commentary. 
This would however have involved a great deal of extraneous material, and not necessarily 
have achieved the object. 8 lt would also have been possible to simply have chapters on 
"lncome Tax," "Wealth Tax", "Corvee Labour", "Tariffs", etc. Even if this were possible, it 
would have given the conclusions an unwarranted aura of certainty, and conveyed the 
misleading impression that the ancient Egyptian economy was somehow comparable to that 
of mediaeval or modern Europe, while rendering it less accessible to the Egyptological 
audience. 9 
Gordon, inw. 
At the time that these words were written the author was unawore of Grandel, Papyrus Harris, but this work 
illustrates the problem, for even in a study as monumental as Grandet's, there was room for little more than the 
most parenthetical notes about lax vocabulary. 
1 have nevertheless maintained the goal throughout of at least identifying words in English which correspond to the 
Egyptian words discussed. The intention is thus not to deliberately obfuscate by asserting that the Egyptian world 
was so foreign from our own that we should always find some meaningless ward which matches the potential 
significance of the word, or not even try to find one, but to identify several words to correspond to an Egyptian 
one, if this is necessary. The goal is understanding, not to force the Egyptian into the mold of our categories, but 
to try to get the nuances while being able to improve our translations . 
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lt was thus deemed appropriate to organize the material according to the words themselves, 
rather than concepts or documents. The words appear however in documents and treating 
each documentary source under each lexical heading would inevitably involve a considerable 
amount of repetition, as the same text occasionally uses several of the terms. Although a 
certain amount of repetition is inevitable, this is marginally reduced by adducing excerpts or 
summaries of the salient points of certain texts which would otherwise have to be cited 
constantly, and this part of the work precedes the discussions of the words . Some of this 
translation is new, some follows in the tracks of others, but as Sir Alan Gardiner and his 
memory admonish us: we must translate texts, if only to give "the critics something to tilt at". 
Due to the nature of the project, the words which are the object of this study have been left 
untranslated in these translations. The core of the work is intended however tobe the chapters 
on the words themselves, as the documents are only a tool for studying the words . The listing 
of references in each chapter is not comprehensive, as there are many cases where the 
interpretation of the data is either doubtful or particularly open to debate. Only those cases 
where the word appeared to have been used in a fiscal sense which was potentially eluci-
dating have been used .10 As the documents themselves are not all of the same nature, they 
have been classified into several broad categories, and each chapter is divided roughly as 
follows: 
INTERNAL · REVENUE 
Texts referring to sources of income generated from within Egypt. 
Administrative texts. 
This category includes account papyri and letters and judicial records, but also the 
school texts . The school texts will have used the words in the conventional manner and 
thus be philologically relevant if statistically unreliable. lt is also not invariably possible to 
identify a school text as such with certainty. 11 
Private Transactions 
Occasionally private commercial transactions will use words with a technical meaning 
which may or may not be the same as the technical meaning of the administrative 
documents. Oracles do not figure very frequently, but for the Ramesside Period, the texts 
will have used the terms as they were used in daily life, and thus reflect their use in the 
administrative domain, but concern private affairs. 
Private Propaganda 12 
In this category are inscriptions by private persons in their tombs, or on statues or stelae, 
or on ostraca or papyri . lf the text appears to have been written such that the information 
10 And the astute reader will be disappointed at the lock of certainty in many instances. 
11 W . Helck and K. A. Kitchen regard, e .g ., H.O. 81-82 (0. Gard . 86, infra, pp. 143- 145) as an historical text, 
wh ile Sir Alan Gardiner and the present writer assume it to have been a school text. 
12 The word "propaganda'' is used cautiously, due to the absence of a truly suitable term , merely to.emphasize the 
"public" nature of the texts , although using the latter word would suggest conclusions which are unwarranted and 
misleading. R. Müller-Wollermann ("Ein Tribut an die Methode," GM 77 [ 1984 ]: 52-53) tried to define 
categories using "religion", "politics" and "art''. Since these are obviously subjective and not mutually exclusive, 
they are not very useful. lt is an extremely complicated problem to identify useful textual categories which can be 
termed both objective and mutually exclusive. 
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conta ined in it was preserved not as a matter of convenience - such as letters, notes, 
commercial records - but to provide information to a broader public, it was included in 
this category. That the concepts of "truth in advertising" or "honesty in politics" were not 
within the domains of the goddess Maat should be clear to the Egyptological reader. 
Royal Propaganda 
This category uses royal inscriptions of virtually any kind which appear to have served to 
publicize the content of the text, and the aggrandizement of the benefactor of the Egyptian 
people and their gocJs. 
f OREIGN REVENUE 
Texts from within Egypt or outside the country, referring to sources of income from outside 
the borders of Egypt proper, with the same internal categories (administration and propa-
ganda) where applicable. 
The same order is maintained both for the presentation of the documentation, and the 
interpretation of the texts, but the less complicated texts are merely inserted into the discus-
sions of the words, so that these texts do not appear in the presentation of the documentary 
sources, as this part of the work is intended only to facilitate understanding of the discussion 
of the various words. This means that certain categories are not present in every chapter as 
the evidence has not been deemed sufficient to include it, but it was considered completely 
inappropriate to add a note that any given category was not relevant, for a given word, as 
this would lend the appearance of certainty to a very uncertain matter. Within each category, 
the texts are organized more or less in chronological order, but where it was deemed useful 
to present the material from several texts which enhance the understanding of the text in 
question, these break the chronological framework. The implicit assumption throughout is 
that the terms used retained more or less the same meaning during the New Kingdom. 
Paucity of evidence is the main basis for this assumption. lt should be borne in mind that 
some nuances of meaning discussed could potentially be ascribed to a chronological or 
administrative change in the meaning . This could equally easily reflect the disparate unrep-
resentative nature of the sources, and thus an attempt to draw ambitious chronological 
conclusions would be bold . lt should be clear that seemingly objective interpretations frequently 
impl icitly draw chronological conclusions based on comparisons of e.g., Dynasty XVIII 
inscriptions and Ramesside administrative texts. Since Dynasty XVIII administrative texts are 
scarce and Ramesside tombs were primarily decorated with religious texts, comparing the 
two means using completely different and incompatible textual categories as the basis of 
chronological conclusions, which is methodologically unsound. 13 
APPROACH 
lt will be argued in this work that economics is concerned equally with the production and 
allocation of wealth rather than merely its distribution, and that state fiscal policy- primarily 
13 Those familiar with the material can naturally read the relative chronological position of the various texts from the 
citations, as KR/ and Urk. IV have been c ited wherever possible. 
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in the form of "taxation" - was the major generator of wealth in ancient Egypt. The earliest 
fiscal policy was necessarily based on skimming off the cream produced by a minimal level 
of private economic participation, and this minimal level was subsequently raised by the 
very state investment which stimulated surplus production in a fashion similar to taxation. In 
order to study the philological and economic aspects of fiscal policy it is thus necessary to 
cursorily review discussions about economic theory and the nature of the state. 
Before turning to the evidence it has therefore been deemed suitable to establish just what 
we can understand of the Egyptian state and the economy, so that after reviewing the 
evidence, conclusions are drawn concerning the interpretation of the material. The introductory 
chapters attempt to discuss the meaning of the state in Egypt and Egyptology, and to discuss 
prevailing assumptions about the economy. Efforts to study and understand the state have 
revealed that there is no general agreement about what is meant by the term "state". While 
political scientists seemingly dismiss the possibility of using the modern term state to describe 
the ancient phenomenon, those dealing with the ancient world do not share this attitude. On 
the other hand, there is a growing consensus that the economy of ancient Egypt can be 
understood by neglecting modern economic theory, and this is disputed in this work. lt is 
argued that the fiscal system as a whole was the expression of extensive state involvement in 
the economy, and that th is was generally beneficial. The presentation of the philological 
evidence follows, and the conclusions attempt to resume that argument in so far the evidence 
allows. The conclusions are thus not merely philological but also institutional in character 
and the details permit us to recognize that the institutional position of the temples by the end 
of the New Kingdom was a structural anomaly, and it is argued that purely administrative 
problems were exacerbated by the monetarization of the fiscal system, and that this was 
detrimental. The evidence of fiscal activity does however also indicate that ancient Egypt 
cannot be understood as either a redistribution or a command economy, and that it has 
features chmacteristic of a market economy. The point of departure must then be the state, 
as fiscal policy represents state intervention in the economy. 
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W . Helck concluded that the ancient Egyptian language did not have a word for "state", 
and went on to remark that even as lote as the New Kingdom, the Crown lands were the 
state lands. 14 J. J. Janssen suggests that on occasion, the words "Pharaoh" (pr- <g) and "King" 
or "Kingship" (nswt) should be rendered as "state" .15 Yet Janssen also suggests that the 
temples were part of the state, and agreeing with O'Connor, 16 even advocates that the 
temples should actually be aligned as part of the government, 17 not just part of the state. 
E. Bleiberg has endeavoured to demonstrate a clear d istinction between royal income 
associated with the person of the king 18 as opposed to a "wider redistributive system"19 of a 
"temple-centered economy", 20 assuming that "Goods were collected by the temple for 
eventual redistribution to the people," expressing this as a fact which did not require a 
reference. 21 D. Lorton draws conclusions which differ from these, and again suggests a 
completely different approach from one widely taken for granted. 22 
While one of these approaches may be correct, they are collectively mutually incompatible. 
lt is therefore impossible that they can all be correct, and it is more likely that none of them 
reflects an examination of both the facts and the concepts. This suggests that it is essential to 
move beyond general assumptions and specific discussions of the texts in an attempt to 
understand the Egyptian state. On the most general level, even were one to assume that the 
state was only the government and that the government included only the secular authorities, 
merely identifying the Crown lands as the state lands would be a vast oversimplification as 
the Crown lands were not all of the "state" properties in the country, regardless of how one 
defines the state (and it is not entirely clear that all the so-called Crown Lands even belonged 
to the Crown) .23 lt is clear that the fields of the temples were definitely not Crown lands, but 
it would be difficult to suggest that the temples were not part of the state apparatus in ancient 
Egypt, even if one were to contend that they were not part of the government. There is likewise 
little evidence that the temples stood at the center of a redistribution economy. 
On a different level, J. Assmann maintains that all art was rigorously organized, 24 and 
E. Hornung that there were no free peasants before the end of the Old Kingdom. 25 Such 
statements are probably based on the same assumptions that led B. Menu and W. Helck to 
suggest that at the beginning , everything in Egypt belonged to the king, and that the king 
assigned specific products, people and lands to individuals by virtue of his sole title to 
14 Cf. Helck, Verwaltung, p. l . 
15 J. J. Janssen, "b;kw frorn Werk to Product," SAK 20 ( 1993): 94 n. 78. 
16 O'Connor, "New Kingdorn and Third lnterrnediate Period," in Trigger, Social History, pp. 208ft. 
17 J. J. Janssen, "The Role of the Temple in the Egyptian Econorny during the New Kingdorn," in Lipinski, State and 
Temple, II: 509. 
18 E. Bleiberg, "The King's Privy Purse During the New Kingdorn,"JARCf 21 (1984) : 156. 
19 Bleiberg, JARCE 21: 156. · 
20 E. Bleiberg, "The Redistributive Econorny in New Kingdorn Egypt, " JARCE 25 ( 1988): 157. 
2 1 Bleiberg,JARCE21 : 156. 
22 
"What was the pr-nsw and who rnanaged it 2," SAK l 8 ( l 991 ): 309. 
23 For the khato-lands, cf. the rernarks on P. Wilbour in Part II, infra, p. 169. 
24 Assrnann , Ma'af, pp. 52-53 . 
25 Hornung , Einführung, pp. 88-89. 
32 
The Stole 
everything in the country, 26 the corollary being that there were no free craftsmen before the 
First lntermediate Period. 27 Following assertions of this type, a recent introduction to economic 
history characterized the ancient Egyptian economy as a "command economy". 28 These 
radical assessments can however be traced back to analytical premises concerning 
ownership and labour that may not reflect either the original situation or the Egyptians' 
understanding of it. 29 
Even in the Old Kingdom it is documented that wage labourers and craftsmen were paid for 
the construction of tombs and that land changed hands in commercial transactions. 30 lt has 
been alleged that this is part of a long term development which led to the emergence of 
private property and free wage labourers, but the origins have not been investigated. While 
the earliest inscriptions do record that land was sold and labourers paid, 31 the earliest 
inscriptions do not offer evidence of vast royal patronage or temple-centered redistribution 
taking precedence, although precisely the opposite is widely assumed. The evidence from 
the inscriptions demands that the tomb owners had their own income and likewise that there 
were free workers. lt can thus be argued that private property, personal income and wage 
labour existed independent of the king from the beginning, and that the evidence can 
support this interpretation, while the opposite contention remains unproven. 32 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Helck, Verwaltung, p. 1; Menu, Recherches, pp. 1-4. 
Helck, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, p. 106. 
Rider, Economic History, pp. 3-4. 
The assumption of state-sponsered support for the arts and industry has frequently been consciously or uncon-
sciously based on the development of the Prussian state which was the most successful of the small German states 
to have emerged out of the Peace of Westphalia at the end of the Thirty Years War. The logic is the same as that 
applied to the possession of land being modeled on the European feudal model. Both assumptions rest on the 
existence of earlier states which can provide economic, bureaucratic, military and artistic models. Such states did 
not exist at the time that Egypt established the first major territorial nation state in world history. 
lt must be admitted that transactions are more important evidence than the use of the domains to illustrate private 
property. Theoretically there is no reason to assume that the domains actually existed. Merely by virtue of their 
being named and depicted, they could "magically" fulfill the role of provision, without any material existence. This 
would explain the fact that domains of the temple of Nfr-ir-k:-R' are recorded in contemporary private inscriptions 
(contra, e.g., W. Helck, "Tempelwirtschaft," LÄ VI: 416), but that the temple received its actual provisions from 
elsewhere, a fact which drew the acute attention of P. Posener-Krieger ("Les Papyrus d'Abousir et l'economie des 
temples funeraires de l'ancien empire," in Lipinski, State and Temple, p. 139): "aucun de ces domaines ne figure 
dans les papyrus d'Abousir comme source directe ou indirect des vivres utilises dans le temple." She concluded 
that another institution organized the supply through the solar temple (p. 142), "sans pouvoir en apporter une 
preuve decisive". The hypothesis that the domains were fictional is underlined by the actual sources of the victuals: 
the residence and the solar temple. Temples and the Residence will have been. able to maintain themselves, but 
the domains probably ceased to do so at a very early point in time, at which time, "magic" replaced "legal 
authority" (as with M!n), and the records changed. 
E.g., Roccati, lilferature, p. 158. 
For the uninitiated, the point of W. Helck's contribution "Wege zum Eigentum an Grund und Boden im alten 
Reich," in Allam, Grund und Boden, pp. 9-13 is unclear, until one realizes that Helck himself had posited that 
private property did not exist before the end of the Old Kingdom, and that in this final essay he confronted the fact 
that the evidence contradicted this. One part of his argument is based on the assumption that M!n's property 
reflects a situation "kurz vor der absoluten Durchorganisierung des Landes" (p. 10), which allows him to postulate 
that the state somehow swallowed up the private property shortly thereafter, so that it could then reappear in the 
First lntermediate Period. His hypothetical speculations about the nature of private property can not be treated, for 
they go far beyond the essential statements that the evidence indicates that the inscription of M!n reveals that 
several different types of private property existed from the beginning of the Old Kingdom, and that the later texts 
indicate that this continued to be the case. 
lt need be underlined that all of the available evidence indicates that private property existed from the earliest 
period until the lotest, and that the only reason to postulate its repeated emergence and disappearance is on the 
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The contentions upon which the present work is based are that it can be argued that (a) the 
interpretation advocated by W. Helck and followers that the king owned everything is not 
based on the evidence, and (b) that the interpretation by Bleiberg and Janssen that temple-
centered redistribution was a central element of the economy is likewise based on assump-
tions rather than evidence, and that (c) on the contrary, it can be assumed with equal validity 
that the first acts of the emerging state were to requisition or confiscate labour and objects 
from the population, on the assumption that (d) the private sector with individual land owners 
and craftsmen was already producing a minimal quantity and quality of material, and that 
(e) this subsequent demand led to tax or demand-generated state supported growth of the 
economy as a whole, (f) without the regimentation generally assumed, because the state 
was initially primarily engaged in collecting, not producing, so that (g) the private sector 
continued to prosper, until (h) state demand plummeted, when (j) the economy suffered 
across the board, falling to near the pre-state low level of activity. Reunification of political 
and economic power led to an economic revival, and subsequent disintegration to a 
corresponding drop. 
One of the principle corollaries of this argumentation is that economic and political thinking 
has been dominated to a considerable extent by the European model, and has blinded 
scholars to the meaning of the evidence before them. This has meant that modern European 
states emerging out of feudalism, and modern capitalist economics emerging out of mediaeval 
trade fairs have been widely assumed to have been the only cases of the development of the 
state and the market economy. 33 Recent archaeological research indicates that the concept 
of the state must be extended far beyond the birth of the modern world. lt has also become 
clear that the European trade fairs were just a faint reflection of the economic rhythms 
dominating the Indian Ocean a thousand years before the economic awakening which 
preceded the Renaissance. 34 The failure to understand this has been accompanied by a 
tendency to take many records at face value without investigating the context from which 
they came. With the vast quantities of dato and theoretical models available today it is 
entirely comprehensible that the barriers to understanding were not recognized and lifted 
before. The following work is an attempt to identify some of the barriers and to explore the 
dato, and to suggest a new approach. 
CoNCEPT OF THE STATE 
While Egyptologists, Assyriologists and archaeologists have discovered the principle of the 
state in the ancient Near East, political scientists have tended to move away from the 
ossumption thot whenever the stote appeared it swollowed up private property. This is based on the twin ossump-
tions (a) of the Europeon feudal experience, and (b) thot the situation described in the texts is a true reAection of 
society. The opproach employed here assumes that a careful examination of the texts reveols that they can be 
understood in exoctly the opposite sense and that a coherent picture emerges as a result. 
Helck indicates his bios by stoting explicitly that "all possible voriotions were tried, just as in the West" (p. 9, my 
tronslotion), without reolizing thot his whole line of reosoning was unconsciously based on the Western experience, 
which was not only the exception rother thon the rule, but also completely irrelevant. 
33 Cf. Hicks, Economic History. 
34 Cf. Choudhuri, Asia before Europe 
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concept of the state, preferring instead to identify the birth of the term as the genesis of the 
concept, and thus generally date the birth of the state to the 16th century AD., or later, when 
the term "state" began to be used with its modern meaning.35 Superficially, the political 
scientists' principal contention would appear tobe that the Greek city states were not states 
in the modern sense of the word, which is hardly an adequate approach in view of the 
antiquity of the state in the ancient Near East. 36 
ßeing unconcerned about what preceded the Greek city states, the feudal system poses a 
problem for political scientists: the major obstacle inevitably facing them is the lock of a 
relationship between the modern European states of the 19th and 20th centuries AD. and 
the feudal states from which they emerged. Simultaneously, they unconsciously tend to assume 
that politics and the state emerged with the Greek polis, and that no serious political entities 
preceded the polis. lt is clear that the polis did not contribute to the political developments of 
the feudal period in Europe. Since the polis therefore had neither predecessors nor successors 
- according to their logic - the polis did not have a significant role in historical developments, 
and can be conveniently forgotten, as a means of denying that political history preceded the 
Renaissance. 
The narrow view that modern European states are the only real states, and that modern 
European stetes emerged out of the feudal system tends to be emphasized at the expense of 
a wider perspective. This obscures the fact that the scholars and politicians of these early 
European states sought Greek and Roman vocabulary to describe the political entities and 
concepts evolving during the Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment. They clearly 
identified these with Antiquity rather than the Middle Ages. 37 This line of reasoning permits 
political scientists to neglect the fact that the European Middle Ages were not typical in terms 
of human political developments, and provides a justification for maintaining that modern 
states are somehow exceptional. 
At the basis of the assumption that states are exceptional is the logical corollary that states 
are actually somehow alien to social life, which is again an assumption based-consciously 
and unconsciously- on the mediaeval example. 38 This emphasis on the mediaeval example 
35 Cf. e.g. Vincent, State, pp. 5ff.; Barry, Theory, p. 62; In a volume devoted to Political innovation and conceptual 
chan9e, Q. Skinner points out that Milton was familior with the concept of originality, but not the word (Q. Skinner, 
"Language and Political Change," in Ball, et al., Political Innovation, pp. 7-8), yet allows himself to identify the 
emergence of the state tobe associated with the appeorance of the word (Q. Skinner, 'The Stole," in Ball, et al., 
Political Innovation, pp. 90-131 ). In this fashion he follows precisely the logic to which he objected. 
36 Aside from works cited in this discussion, from the wide spectrum of the literature deoling with the issue, the reoder 
is referred to two recent works bosed on the assumption that states emerged long before the Greek po/is: 
G. Stein, Early States; Gledhill, Stole and Society. The term is one of the select few discussed in Mignon, 
Concepts, pp. 307-313. (The literature cited there is useful; in the altempt at a definition the author juggled with 
complex problems in a couple of poges). 
37 For the attitudes of the eorly modern historions, cf., e.g., U. Muhlack, "Von der philologischen zur historischen 
Methode," in Meier, Methode, pp. 161 ff. 
Ball ( Theory, pp. 65-82) virtually makes Machiavelli a kind of pivot by suggesting that Machiavelli was using the 
word virtu with an ontiquoted meoning, ond thus become o kind of Don Quixote of politicol theory. What malters 
is that nevertheless all the thinkers immediotely turned their bocks on the Middle Ages ond sought the forms of 
anliquity: by using the Middle Ages as their point of deporture modern political scientists have erected an artificial 
borrier. 
38 Cf. ~rry, Theory, p. 63. 
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places far too much emphasis on the political backwardness of that peninsula of Asia that 
gave birth to the Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment. Although Europe came to 
play a central role in world history, it was politically an insignificant region once briefly 
included within the Roman Empire before relapsing into political irrelevance. ßecause of the 
role of Europeans in political science, this period of political irrelevance - the feudal or 
mediaeval period - has accidentally come to dominate modern political thought. 
There were state structures in Asia and the Mediterranean area long before the political 
awakening accompanying the Reformation in Western Europe, but these are consistently 
neglected because of the modern Western political bias of those examining the evidence. 
With the exception of Europe, most parts of the civilized world have been incorporated into 
states, so that the European feudal experience is an extremely misleading example. The role 
of the European model with its classical origins followed by feudal developments and the 
emergence of modern European nation states has blinded many modern political scientists 
to the development of the concept of the state beyond Europe. 
Among politically oriented social scientists Eisenstadt is an exception who has made a 
serious effort to bridge the gap. ßy concentrating on the aspects of the bureaucratic empires, 
he succeeds in linking the Habsburgs and the Pharaohs. 39 ßy emphasizing the similar 
characteristics, Eisenstadt showed that these modern anachronisms shared common traits 
with ancient entities. While dissenting in detail, most students of the ancient world would 
assent to his idea in principle. There were however many kinds of states in antiquity, although 
only the empires seem to receive attention. lt thus remains to demonstrate a reasonable 
fashion in which to compare the incomparable, bridging the mediaeval gap, and moving 
weil beyond the Roman Empire and the Greek polis. The degree to which European patterns 
have influenced virtually all speculation concerning the state deserves examination: the 
European experience was ultimately exceptional in terms of human political history, and 
should thus not be permitted to dominate political analysis. 
The only way to approoch these problems is to turn to the primary concepts. Although 
positivism has suffered setbacks in political philosophy,40 a state can be defined quite generally 
as a geographical unit with a population and a recognized legal authority. There are 
numerous other precepts which are generally employed to identify a state, such as interna-
tionally recognized boundaries, a government with a monopoly on the use of force, etc., but 
some of these have been thrown into doubt. 41 ßeyond territory and population, the most 
minimal level demands the presence of either a legitimate government or a body of law as 
the minimum prerequisites for the existence of a state. The existence of a state is not however 
established by the presence of territory, population, laws or government, for these are not 
necessarily interrelated. 42 
39 Cf. Eisenstadt, Political Systems. 
40 Cf. e.g. Ball, Theory, p. 84; Barry, Theory, pp. 61-62. 
41 Cf. e.g. Barry, Theory, pp. 61 ff. 
42 This is based on the twin facts that (a) there are governments in exile which do not claim tobe separate states, but 
rather assert that they are the legitimate government of a certain geographical and demographical entity, which 
may or may not correspond to an existing state; while (6) conversely, today there are no populated geographical 
territories which do not either belong to a state, forma state, or claim the right to become one by separating from 
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Although it predates the supposed birth of the state by almost three millennia, the Ramesside 
State did not emerge out of nowhere: it was built on traditions going back to at least the 
fourth millennium B.C. Thus, not only was the ancient Egyptian state one of the oldest and 
first pristine states in the world, but the New Kingdom state was an evolutionary novelty 
olderthan any existing modern European states, with the possible exception of the Vatican, 
assuming that the Vatican is the successor of the Roman Empire. Only feudal China had a 
similar pedigree, but the history of the political unity of the geographic area known as China 
today cannot possibly be compared to the continuity exemplified by Ramesside Egypt, 
which may have already been an ancient territorial nation state even five millennia ago. lt is 
thus clear that no matter how vague Egyptian ideas about the concept of the state may have 
been, the basic preconditions for the existence of a territorial nation state were at hand, and 
in the form of an extraordinary exception without any parallels, for no other state of equal 
stature and age was based on a pristine state. lt is therefore necessary to review our theoretical 
models and our conceptions very carefully. 
The mainstream approach to the concept of the state has been to emphasize the diversity of 
concepts associated with the word state, and to emphasize that in the modern world the 
word is used loosely in contexts where the state "acts or even thinks".43 The modern meaning 
of the word "economy" is slightly younger than the modern concept of "state", which does not 
date back to before the 16th century A.D. 44 The modern political concept of the state can be 
reduced to several specific meanings, with "state" signifying "government" in the most 
restricted definition.45 The term can also refer to all instances of official and social authority 
collectively, but there are two other specific uses of the term "state" which are not semantically 
the same: one identifies a specific legal entity and the other the general social concept of an 
organism. Students of modern politics object to confusing "state" and "society" in this fashion, 
yet it is extremely difficult to draw a dividing line between the two, except by defining the 
state as a specific legal entity, which inevitably clashes with both popular and scholarly 
usage. 46 At the same time that it is difficult to draw a distinction between the "state" and 
an existing state. lt need hardly be pointed out that in antiquity this was by no means universal: before the fourth 
millennium B.C., there was probably not one single state in existence in the entire world. By the beginning of the 
third millennium AD., virtually every populated territory on the globe will have been assigned to - or be contested 
by - some state entity. The obligatory nature of state structures is new. 
43 C-E. Bärsch, (''Staat, '' in Holtmann, Politik-Lexikon, p. 617, my translation) notes that the 1988 edition of the 
standard German dictionary indicated that the German language possessed more than l 00 words including the 
word Staat, remarking that the Theologians "even" refer to "Gottesstaat", which is choracteristically one of the few 
main word entries in the Lexikon der A9yptolo9ie using the word state. 
44 Cf. the very importont notes to this effect in Finley, Ancient Economy, pp. 17ff. But also here, Bärsch (in Holtmann, 
Politik-Lexikon, p. 618): 'Ob polis, res publico, populus regnum, civitos oder Reich in Antike und Mittelalter 
jeweils mit dem Begriff S[taat] adäquat übersetzt werden können, erscheint äußerst zweifelhaft'' Q. Skinner ("The 
Stole," in Ball, etal., Political Innovation, pp. 90 - 131) argues in favour of an evolution of the concept, identifying 
Hobbes as the first real theoreticion of the state, plocing its origins in the 17th century AD. rather thon the 18th 
os contended by Bärsch . Skinner emphasizes the use of the word in the context of European history, but not the 
concept of the state in the context of universal history. 
lt is worth noting thot Bärsch dates the state to the 18th century, Skinner to the 17th and Vincent to the 16th 
century AD. 
45 Bärsch, in Holtmonn, Politik-Lexikon, p. 618. 
46 Cf. Vincent, Stole, pp. 22-26. 
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"society" on the one hand, it is equally difficult to distinguish between the "state" and the 
"government" on the other. Thus, even if it is maintained that the ancients had states in the 
modern sense of the word, there remain several levels of difficulty. 
At one time - based on the European feudal model - it was widely believed that a simple 
developmental sequence could be posited, with the local community being subsumed within 
a tribal community which became a national government, and this occasionally became an 
imperial government. 47 The rights to private ownership, and the obligations of the members 
of the community were assumed to have risen from a simple level of direct community or 
state possession which was transformed into the tribally based feudal system. A central 
problem with the European feudal model was the absence of a specifically designated 
body which could make law, as it was assumed that the ability to define laws was elemental 
to the state: it was necessarily the absolutist European states which initiated state legislation, 
which ironically led to the development of the concept of rights, as opposed to obligations. 
The interrelationship between the role of the state, the rulers, the ruled and the rights of the 
individual was thus understood to be a clear evolutionary development, with a decreasing 
role for the state in the sense of oppressive government, and a more significant role for the 
state as a social organism with a responsible government. 
This latter concept dominates when Egyptologists consciously refer to the ideology of the 
state referring to the literature of the "lnstructions" or discussing the concept mtt, assuming 
that the term state refers exclusively to the wide-ranging social and political concept of an 
organism, the way that Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel use the term, rather than to a 
specific legal entity. Assmann writes that "the concept of Mo 'at is fundamental to the state. "48 
Assmann posits that man cannot live without mJ't or the state. The state is all : 
The institution of Pharaonic divine kingship is the geometric convergence of the 
human and cosmic spheres. 49 
Legitimacy through justice, and justice through absolute rule is the creed of the state. The 
same broad meaning is implied when the state ceases to exist.50 
Egyptologists discussing the economy use the meaning associated with the legal authority of 
sovereignty and government associated with one of the other meanings, and thus it is not 
entirely clear what significance one can generally assign to the concept of "state" in Egyptology. 
lt is however clear that the ancient Near Eastern states had all of the essential features of 
statehood, including legal legislation. lt should also be clear that although the ancient world 
47 Cf., e.g., M. H. Fried, ''On the Concepts of 'Tribe' and 'Tribal Society'," in Helm, Essays, p. 10. 
lt is worth noting that at least one Marxist scholar has gone so far as lo stale that Marx's paradigm is demonstrably 
correcl for the explanation of all slate developments within the context of the 'Asiatic Mode of Produclion," equally 
valid for Egypt in the fourth millennium B.C. and Africa in the second millennium AD. (cf. M. Goldelier, "La notion 
de 'mode de production asiatique' et les schemas marxisles d'evolution des societes," in Suret-Canale, Production, 
p. 86) . lt need hardly be painted out that establishing facts of this type is quite easy if the papular literature is read 
in the correct fashion. 
48 Assmann (Ma'at, p . 200): "Ma'at ist eine im höchsten Maße staatslragende Idee". [My translation] . 
49 Assmann, Mo 'at, p. 2 1 9. [ My translation]. 
50 Cf. e.g , Müller-Wollermann, Krisenfaktoren. Although the word ''state" figures in the title of her book, she unfor-
tunately failed to define it. Assmann (Ma'at, pp. 219-22) is more paetical about the collapse of the state. 
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did not use and was not familiar with concepts like "economy" and "state", modern scholars 
will not only use these concepts (with the result that their use influences our understanding), 
but will actually try to study them, and therefore definitions are necessary. 
fv\ARX, W1TTFOGEL AND EGYPT 
The Soviet Egyptologist M. Korostovtsev pointed out that it was characteristic of Western 
Egyptology to pursue the feudal model, while the Soviet V. V. Struve had followed the 
Historical Materialist model and was completely convinced that he had demonstrated that 
the basis of Egyptian society was slavery.51 lt is an unhappy coincidence that in each case 
the role of private property was excluded for theoretical reasons, and that the resulting 
interpretations of the texts merely seemed to emphasize different aspects of the same 
phenomena . Ancient Egypt had a centralized government, and slavery did exist, and feudal 
structures could be recognized if sought, so that unconsciously influenced by Marxist theory, 
three different steps of social development (feudalism, slavery, and the Asiatic Mode of 
Production) were perceived tobe characteristic of ancient Egypt, and the categories uncon-
sciously or consciously applied. lt is now possible to perceive that Marx's categories were 
not only not universally applicable, but that they were erected without a complete under-
standing of the evidence in each case. And this means escaping from the unconscious 
application of his theories, but not by simply disregarding all his observations and reflections. 
Marx's category of the Asiatic Mode of Production was an early approach aimed at 
studying both state formation and economics. Marx himself did not do more than place the 
Asiatic Mode of Production as the first step after primitive communism, and define it with two 
characteristics: ( 1) the village structure, and ( 2) the powerful central government. 52 lt was 
only at a relatively lote point in time that Marx realized the significance of private property 
in Indio and China and he never formally incorporated it into his model. In the earlier form, 
he assigned the central state a major role, and assigned the government three main 
departments, 
that of Finance, or the plunder of the interior; that of War, or the plunder of the 
exterior; and finally, the department of Public Works. Climate and territorial condi-
tions [ ... ] constituted artificial irrigation by canals and waterworks the basis of Oriental 
agriculture ... This prime necessity of an economical and common use of water, 
which, in the Occident, drove private enterprise to voluntary association, as in 
Flanders and ltaly, necessitated in the Orient where civilization was too low and the 
territorial extent too vast to call to life voluntary association , the interference of the 
centralizing power of Government ... 53 
51 M . A. Korostovcev, 'Das alte Ägypten," in Heinen, Sowjetische Forschung, pp. 19-45 lt is probably thus not 
occidental thot the Germans Helck ond Assmonn tend to see a stote organized olong Prussion lines. 
52 Encousse/ Schrom, Marxism ond Asio, pp. 8ff. lt will be noted thot Morx's preliminary notes ore very general 
obout the nature of the state and the government, so thot we will gloss over the lock of distinction , without 
odmitting its volidity. 
53 K. Marx, quoted in Encousse/ Schram, Morxism ond Asio, p. 115. The suggestion that Egyption ond Chinese 
civilization were necessorily lower than the levels of medieval Europe must likew ise be noted ond neglected . 
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This is the origin of the concept of Oriental Despotism and contributed to Wittfogel's hydraulic 
civilizations. 54 lt has however been shown that the irrigation system actually emerged aher 
the central government in Ceylon, and therefore that in the only case where the development 
can be followed, that government was not a response to the problem.55 
The evidence [ ... ] runs counter to Wittfogel's assumption that the organizational 
requirements of irrigation provided the main stimulus for the evolution of political 
organization in irrigation society. 56 
The emergence of a political system which brought the petty regional polities under 
the sway of Anurädhapura was not the response to the organizational demands of 
irrigation society.57 
For ancient Egypt, W. Schenkel has advanced the hypothesis that the irrigation system 
organized by the state emerged during the First l11termediate Period, and was therefore 
likewise not related to the emergence of the state.58 He addressed himself specifically to the 
technological innovation of the irrigation revolution. While ßutzer had postulated the existence 
of irrigation for the earliest phases of Egyptian social development, Schenkel pointed out 
that ßutzer neglected the technological aspect, and the use of texts as a source. 
Schenkel employs only non-royal texts from the First lntermediate Period and the Middle 
Kingdom to demonstrate that a technology associated with irrigation was introduced around 
the period of Dynasties IX/X, and that irrigation was practiced thereaher. He correspondingly 
concludes that this chronological situation demonsrrates that state involvement in the irrigation 
system could not possibly have contributed to the early development of the state, and thus 
clearly contradicts Wittfogel, for the bureaucracy could not have emerged as a result of the 
challenge of organizing the irrigation systems which they were not organizing .59 
lt must however be conceded that transport canals existed during the Old Kingdom, and that 
even if - which is not c:ertain - there are no references to irrigation canals during the Old 
Kingdom, irrigation canals are not mentioned later either. This makes it difficult to assert that 
there was either a "technological innovation", or an administrative revolution, for the technol-
ogy and the mobilization of manpower required for an irrigation canal will have been 
virtually identical to thot required for a transport canal. The use may have been different 
(although this can hardly be proven), but socially they are identical, if private people are 
54 Wittfogel, Orientol Despotism. 
55 R. A L. H . Gunawardana, 'Social Function and PoliticaLPower: A Case Study of Stole Formation in Irrigation 
Society," in Claessen/Skalnik, Study of the Stote, pp. 133-154. 
56 Gunawardana, in Claessen/ Skalnik, Study of the Stote, pp. 142-143 . 
57 Gunawardana, in Claessen/Skalnik, Study of the State, p. 148. 
58 Schenkel, Bewässerungsrevolution. 
59 Schenkel (Bewässerungsrevolution, p. 72) states that the agricultural basis of the Nile Volley did not differ from 
that of Mesopotamia, but this is only true at the most superficial level, cf. D. Oates and J.Oates, ''Early Irrigation 
Agriculture in Mesopotamia," in Sieveking, Problems, pp. 121-122. The fundamental differences are greater 
than superficial similarity. 
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obliged to contribute their labour to construct them. The distinction is therefore spurious, from 
0 political standpoint, even if it can be maintained that there are no specific textual refer-
ences to irrigation canals in the Old Kingdom. 
Schenkel thus dates the development of the state sponsored irrigation canals to the First 
lntermediate Period, but admits that there is no contemporary royal evidence, nor any 
evidence from any textual source during the rest of the Pharaonic period - either before or 
after the First lntermediate Period/Middle Kingdom - for state sponsored irrigation. This 
merely suggests that the state did not regard its irrigation responsibilities as significant, and 
thus debunks Wittfogel's relevance for ancient Egypt quite clearly, but leaves the significance 
of Schenkel's discovery unclear. 
The logic behind Schenkel's conclusions is however worthy of further attention, for the 
suggestion that irrigation canals can only be associated with textual references would at 
least logically suggest that they did not exist when they are not mentioned, and thus that for 
the subsequent period during which canals are not mentioned they will have been 
abandoned. Following Schenkel's logic, the fact that irrigation canals and titles do not 
appear in later texts would conclusively demonstrate their disappearance, yet this can hardly 
be his object. 
lt is useful to recall something about the character of Egyptian texts. The ancient Egyptians 
did not hesitate to document having accomplished something for the first time, even if they 
knew that this was not strictly true according to our modern standards of truth and falsehood . 
This is best illustrated by the repeated claims that any particular expedition to Punt was the 
first. lt is also useful to recall that obscure provincial land owners may pursue projects which 
greater kings do not regard as their responsibility, so that state centered royal activity is not 
conclusively demonstrated with provincial evidence. lt is also significant that lesser kings will 
record lesser events that greater ones do not bother to. Schenkel's assertions about the value 
of textual sources are considerably reduced by the meager quality of his evidence, and of 
his wide ranging use of it.60 
The fact that it is not specifically stated in the text at hand that the canal was the first built 
would suggest - at least according to Egyptian historiographical trends - that the person 
responsible for this text was conscious that this was by no means the first irrigation canal ever 
built. The fact that the author was not a major king cannot be used to extrapolate about 
responsibilities of major kings . This suggests that the use of this text is an insufficient basis 
60 lt need hardly be pointed out that, e .g., if nb(b)-land is related to the verb tb(b) - arguably "irrigated'' - then 
logical use of the philological evidence of the canals in Urk. 1:220, 14 ff. could be used to negate Schenkel's 
whole hypothesis of irrigation being a lote development and would give it a royal background in the Old 
Kingdom. 
Schenkel's evidence fo_r the contention that the kinl;) was responsible for irrigation comes from Herodotus (cf. "Be-
und Entwässerung ," LA 1: 780, 782 nn. 46; 47) . The absence of any contemporary Dynasty XII inscriptional 
evidence for the transformation of the Fayum is significant given Schenkel's emphasis on the importance of textual 
dato . 
The shabti-spells - which seem to date from the Middle Kingdom - do hintat some kind of obligatory labour, but 
neiter the nor the texts cited by Schenkel hint at a royal - or state - organized system of irrigation. For this 
Schenkel provides no evidence, and what evidence there is ( Urk. 1: 220: 14 ff.) is earlier than Schenkel's 
revolution, and thus Schenkel's argument is confuted twice over. 
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upon which to base a theory of the emergence of irrigation systems in ancient Egypt. And it 
cannot be used to demonstrate the emergence of state-sponsored irrigation systems either, 
for not only does it not document state involvement, but state involvement in irrigation is not 
subsequently documented. The text in question therefore does not demonstrate either the 
time of the invention of irrigation or identify those responsible for irrigation before or after its 
construction. 
Schenkel's conclusions are ( 1) thus not only oblivious to the fact that the difference between 
a transport canal and an irrigation canal was not very great, but they also (2) fail to demonstrate 
the value of textual sources to prove his point. The logical conclusion to be drawn from 
Schenkel's evidence is that if irrigation was the responsibility of the state at all, then it was 
primarily the responsibility of officials so low in the bureaucracy that they are not mentioned 
(which suggests that they did not exist), and certainly underlines that neither the king nor the 
Vizier were concerned with it. Butzer's argument placing irrigation at the dawn of Egyptian 
civilization is neither proven nor disproven, but it is clear that the introduction of the irrigation 
system cannot be used to illustrate the development of strong government. There is therefore 
no reason to suppose that irrigation does not predate Pharaonic civilization, and no reason 
to assume that the government was seriously concerned with it, contra Schenkel, Marx and 
Wittfogel. 
In a very general fashion, it can however be suggested that Wittfogel's Oriental Despotism 
describes the final ultimate situation of a state which is permitted to develop in this direction 
without interruption, and thus Wittfogel's error is the premise that this was also the point of 
departure. Marx assumed that what has since been termed "the genius of Europe" was 
behind the development of private agricultural projects, and that this tendency was lacking 
in the Orient. lt would appear that Marx's conclusions were likewise based on the final 
development rather than the origins, and that Marx merely assumed that public management 
of canals accompanied public or state ownership of land.61 
While Schenkel has clearly demonstrated that Wittfogel's model was mistaken, the principle 
of private ownership of land in ancient Egypt has not yet been yanked completely out of this 
Marxist model. lt is generally agreed that private ownership of land in ancient Egypt emerged 
after the emergence of the state rather than preceding it. Even the most revolutionary obser-
vation in this respect failed to completely grasp the situation: M. Gutgesell correctly writes 
that "at the lotest, cultivable land could be purchased since early Dynasty IV."62 The meaning 
6 1 The degree to which the assumption has been absorbed without reflection in Egyptology con be read inJ. v. Lapp's 
remark (''Evidence for Artificial Irrigation in Amratian Egypt," JARCE 32 [ 1995]: 20 8), to the effect that the 
Amratian irrigation system was 'probably by corvee labour in much the same monner os was procticed in 
Pharoonic Egypt until recent times". While Wittfogel does use the Egyption Khedive Muhammod Ali os an 
exomple of an Oriental Despot (Wittfogel , Oriental Despotism, p. 25) it is difficult to understand how Muhammad 
Ali could be understood os o Phorooh, although thot seems tobe the sense of the phrose. Evidence supporting the 
early implementotion of corvee lobour for irrigation remoins tobe presented, and thus the logic of the contention 
is unclear. 
62 M. Gutgesell , ''Die Entstehung des Privateigentums an Produktionsmittel im alten Ägypten ," GM 66 ( 1983): 76. 
[My tronslation]. There is o very significant theoretical problem which Gutgesell neglects when he asserts that the 
theoretical conditions for the emergence of private property include a king who rewards people with land ( GM 
66: 68). This is based on the European feudal model, which followed the Egyption development, and therefore 
need not be relevant, because the European feudal model was based on tribes, and it is now considered more 
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of the M!n inscription - the text in question - is however that as far back as the inscriptions 
go, land could be purchased and sold, and that there were legal arrangements to assure 
that this was possible, which has a significantly different ring to it. The fact that the mere 
phrase "law of Pharaoh" sufficed to refer to guarantees surrounding property rights underlines 
that property rights were important in ancient Egypt.63 States collect information about land 
holdings, but this does not mean that they assert the right to possession of that land. The state 
needs to organize information (a) in order to establish government revenues, and (b) to 
assure that property rights are recognized. In general, the government - as the highest 
authority in the land - will have been the ultimate adjudicator in private property disputes. lt 
may also have acquired revenue from holdings, but this does not demonstrate possession, 
any more than that irrigation demonstrates oriental despotism.64 
These conclusions would thus suggest that there is nothing to counter the argument that the 
situation in Flanders and northern ltaly was not that different to the ancient Orient, except that 
agriculture in both European areas emerged out of a feudal model which itself emerged out 
of the remains of the Roman Empire. Although perfectly obvious, it is apparently necessary to 
emphasize that the political and economic developments which led to the emergence of the 
earliest civilization on the banks of the Nile did not emerge on the margins of any other 
economically prosperous or politically successful civilization: they emerged from utter and 
absolute poverty. Nor were the political and economic developments along the Nile 
accompanied by the explosion of world trade and industry which decisively influenced 
developments in Flanders and ltaly. At the very close of this study we will return to the issue 
of trade relations, for the moment however it need merely be repeated that every single 
speculative thought requires re-examination. 
Aside from the detailed criticism disproving Wittfogel's theories in the case of Egypt and 
Ceylon, recent general work on Wittfogel has also tended to criticize his approach, because 
63 
64 
probable that tribes followed the emergence of states as a specific peripheral social organization, and that they 
were preceded by clans, so that the whole logical underpinning of Gutgesell's argument depends upon the 
premise of identical social orgonizations preceding and following the emergence of the state (cf. Fried, Political 
Society, pp. 170-17 4; and M. H. Fried, ''On the Concepts of 'Tribe' and ' Tribal Society'," in Helm, Essays, 
p. 15). In fact, the Egyptian experience seems to suggest that the old aristocracy mointained their rights ond then 
the officials begon to purchase land as weil. The legal framework of M!n's inscription suggests that such tronsoc-
tions were an importont part of life Gutgesell's assumption (GM 66: 71) is that the peosonts began to seil their 
collective land, but this is not necessarily the case. 
Gutgesell's other points (priestly dass and independent troders) indicote mere circular logic based on Mesopotamian 
and Egyption material as interpreted by the philosophers of anthropological history. This is a clossic exomple of 
our own inodequate presenfation of the material returning to haunt us. Fortunately, B. Kemp (Egypt) has now 
provided o solid base for a theory of the state which onthropologists and philosophers con use. 
lt is worth noting that the same confusion hos arisen in the case of the emergence of the stote in China . There, the 
Europeon feudal model has been token, but the situotion is not that reflecting the very earliest state, so much as 
what Confucius speculated about developments during the eorly Shang Dynosty, more than o thousand years 
before his birth. Since the earliest Chinese stetes are not incorporated into this model, the logicol connections with 
feudolism can be justified, but the method is not exactly rigorously scientific, and a comparison with Egypt 
inoppropriole. Cf. T. Pokara, "China, '' in Claessen/ Skalnik, EarlyState, pp. 191-212. 
Cf. J J Janssen ond P. W. Pestman, "Burial and lnheritance in Ancient Egypt, " JESHO l l ( 1968): 140. 
lt will be noted that this paragroph controdicts the entire argument of North, Economic History His interpretotion 
was influenced by those writing obout the economy 
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In his blind political crusade, Wittfogel found hydraulic ghosts in every despot's 
closet. He was not capable of distinguishing between different forms of restrictive 
governments. All oppressive states became expressions of the same forces that gave 
rise to the hydraulically based ancient states of the Middle and Far East.65 
D. Price was however able to refute a large part of the scholarly criticism by demonstrating 
that there was considerable confusion due to the failure to distinguish his hydraulic civilizations 
from his hydroagricultural söcieties, which primarily means that Oriental Despotism is not 
inevitable. Although this does not aid in understanding the Egyptian evidence, it emphasizes 
that even Wittfogel realized that the development was not an evolutionary necessity. 
lt must have been an axiom of Egyptian fiscal economics that the irrigation system had to 
function faultlessly in order to achieve the maximum grain harvest. The Vizier had to be 
notified of the approaching inundation,66 partially because of major land holdings, but also 
because of the necessity of passing on information. There is however an enormous difference 
between recognizing the necessity of collecting and distributing information andin asserting 
responsibility for irrigation, or demonstrating state ownership of land. 
STATE ÜRIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT: ßEYOND MARX 
One tendency of modern Marxist political analysis was specifically designed to overcome 
the complexities of comprehensive theories by dividing the concept of the early state from 
that of the industrial state.67 However, merely by virtue of selecting a set of early states by 
using suitable criteria, early states could come to share one set of characteristics, and 
industrial states another. While defensible, this is not necessarily more than a tautology, for 
the very exclusion of certain groups from the field of analysis tends to limit the number of 
possible variations on the theme. T rying to identify the early state, Khazanov came to the 
conclusion that the level of economic and technological development; continuity with the 
pre-existing system; forms of dependence and exploitation; political organization; 
and civilization were all factors that determined the early state. Superficially, this amounts to 
a mere listing of the characteristics of any state, and does not inform us about the nature of 
the state, either early or industrial. The "Study of the State Conferences" (which resulted in the 
publication of the volumes edited by Claessen and Skalnik) did not tackle Mesopotamia or 
Greece so that a great deal of relevant material was not drawn upon. 
65 D. Price, "Wittfogel 's Neglected Hydraulic/Hydroogricultural Distinction, 'JAR 50 ( 1994): 192-193. This article 
summarizes distinctions that Wittfogel obscured in the course of his later work. 
66 Urk. IV: 1113,4. 
67 Cf. Claessen/Skalnik, Early Stole, passim , esp. the theoretical models, by the editors (''The Early Stole: Theories 
and Hypotheses," pp 3-29), R. Cohen ("Stole Origins: A Reappraisal,' pp. 31-75) and A. Khazanov ("Some 
Theoretical Problems of the Study of the Early State, " pp. 77-92) . 
This endeavour was intended to facilitate the ability of defining the decisive features of the early stote without 
getting entangled in conceptually irrelevant discussions . lt is however a common element of this approach that 
recently documented early states (in, e.g., 19th century A.D . Africa) thus share a chronological position with 
developing European industrial states, and to compare one of the most advanced states of Antiquity with the 
miserable remnants of a failing political uni! in modern Africa does not necessarily aid us in understanding the 
processes which led to the emergence of the most powerful political units that mankind had ever experienced 
some four or five thousand years ago. 
44 
Stole Origins and Development: Beyond Marx 
Political scientists have attempted to define the "formal features of the modern European 
state".68 Vincent's minimal formal features suggest that a state assert legal primacy over all 
other organizations within an identifiable territory with a population. The state's legitimacy 
allows it to determine what is lawful, so that in essence "it is a continuous public power".69 
ßarry emphasized that the power must be public and centralized and have "the monopoly of 
coercive power".7° Khazanov's listing is more detailed, but fails to distinguish any specific 
features of early states not associated with modern European states, while Vincent's "features" 
certainly do not exclude non-modern non-European states. The modern European state may 
differ from other states in the degree to which it actively makes law, but in general these 
criteria could be applied to the ancient Near Eastern empires, the Greek city-states, and 
modern non-European states without exception. There is thus little or no justification for 
classifying states along the arbitrary division separating modern industrial states and early states, 
for the common features in either list inevitably apply to members of both groups.71 
The search for the first states can thus begin with the search for the first cities (which long pre-
dated the Greek polis). 72 For the case of Mesopotamia, R. C. Hunt has created a theoretical 
model summarizing the significance of the emergence of small-scale urban civilization to 
illustrate the formative process which ultimately creates a city-type state. 73 lmposed upon a 
village level subsistence pattern is an hypothetical dass which does not produce, and there-
fore must acquire what it consumes from the productive farmers. The result would appear to 
be a labour shortage, which is entirely logical, as it is precisely labour that has been 
withheld from production, while maintaining the same level of consumption. His assumption 
that 90 per cent. of the population must produce 10 per cent. more is debatable, but in 
principle, his model is based on a single small city and simulates the emerging scheme for 
Mesopotamia during the third millennium B.C. with a pattern of miniature city states, lying 
cheek by jowl across the Jazira. Although developed for the irrigation cultures of southern 
Mesopotamia, it has been claimed to be equally relevant for the rain-fed cultures of the 
north. 
Hunt's model does not however simulate fourth and third millennium Egypt where a single 
political unit was able to impose its rule, and to thereby acquire a right to a proportion of the 
68 Vincent, Stafe, pp. 19-21. 
69 Vincent, Stafe, p . 21. 
70 Barry, Theory, p. 69. lt is very curious that Barry is hesitont about whether a state can be justified in terms of 
rendering life public (p. 67). Barry has evidently not had the dubious pleasure of enjoying life in a society where 
the state is weak. Anyone who hos lived in a society such as that which Hobbes and Louis XIV experienced in 
their childhoods can only yearn for the security of a state - regardless of the justification, as is clear from Hobbes. 
7 1 The most extreme example would perhaps be those modern lslamic states which seemingly deprive themselves of 
the right to legislote by declaring lslamic law to be the source of all legislation, but the mere act of constitutionally 
or legally binding themselves to this provision demonstrates thot these states are also enacting positive law, and 
thus complying with the definition of being modern states. 
lt is clear that the ancient Mesopotamian and Egyptian states would fit into the mold of "modern European states" 
better than many other members of the United Nations. 
72 Cf. e.g. Roof (Mesopotamia, p . 58) who points out that one can argue either way, defining the developments in 
the Near East in the fourth millennium B.C. as relating to urban growth or state formation: the social and economic 
struclures changed decisively, and clearly cities played a significant role in Mesopotamia. 
73 R. C. Hunt, "The Role of Bureaucracy in the Provisioning of Cities: a Framework for Analysis of the Ancient Near 
East, " in Gibson/ Biggs, Power, pp. 161- 192. 
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surplus production and surprisingly the surplus labour from numerous villages and towns 
throughout Egypt. The fact that the hypothetical constraint in Hunt's model is labour indicates 
that Egypt's Old Kingdom part-time bureaucrats and craftsmen were part of an economic 
and political anomaly in economic history. There can however be little doubt that it was the 
ideology of the state with its determination to create enormous funerary monuments that 
created the demand. With different religious motives, but similar economic constraints, the 
same development also ultimately took place in the latter part of the third millennium in 
Mesopotamia. ldeology would appear tobe strenger than the elasticity of löbour, but more 
probably this can be attributed to economies of scale.74 
An expressly non-Marxist approach75 attempts to combine the emergence of the state and 
government with the appearance of civilization, and uses Egypt as an example. Based on 
the premise that "chiefdoms" served as an intermediate stage between segmentary egalitarian 
society and the state, Service views the Badarian as the formative period, with "a growing 
population and increasing craft specialization."76 He assumes that the nomes were not 
urban centres in this early period, but that they were religious centres with temples and 
divinities, which however failed to inspire local resistance to external domination and 
unification. 
In certain respects the new united Egypt was ruled by the simple addition of a kind 
of Sumerian temple chiefdom on top of the scattered smallish nomes. lt could even 
be argued that as a government Pharaoh's temple was no more than an elaborate 
chiefdom that somehow, for peculiarly local reasons, was able to hold in thrall a 
hinterland that was tremendous in size for a chiefdom. 77 
He perceives Old Kingdom Egypt as a theocracy, with "no clear separation of powers of the 
theocracy until the Fourth Dynasty, when a grand vizier was introduced as a kind of chief 
justice and prime minister."78 The bureaucracy dominated by the royal family ruled up to that 
point, and he follows Woolley, Childe and Frankfort in assuming that the Pharaoh was 
responsible for all distribution, and all trading missions to acquire the necessary products. 
Service concludes that there was no real social stratification or classes in the Marxist sense 
of the word, and is unable to decide whether the state was repressive or merely bureaucratic, 
while realizing that evidence for a standing army does not exist. He identified the political 
stability with the monolithic bureaucracy, and its ideology, based on a monumental obsession 
with death, which required the organization of labour, and led to the emergence of heredi-
tary guilds of craftsmen. 79 
74 Individual impressive monumenls can be overwhelmingly awesome, and yet the labour involved need not require 
more than an insignificanl percentage of the total available: the problem is management. Clearly, the geometrical 
mathematics involved in pyramid construction were far more intricate than that of organizing labour on this scale, 
and therefore not an obstacle. 
75 Service, Origins, pp. xii-xiii; xvi. 
76 Service, Origins, p. 228. 
77 Service, Origins, p . 229. 
78 Service, Origins, p. 230. 
79 lt will be noted that Wittfogel ( Oriental Despotism, pp. 250-251) drew completely different, but equally erroneous 
conclusions, based primarily upon work by Kees. Wittfogel's discussion of the importance of laxalion and the 
monumentality of the architecture bears repetition (e.g ., Oriental Despotism, pp. 39-44; 71 ), while his emphasis 
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lt is clear that the employment of such dato as Service had at his disposal would impel him 
to provide an internally contradictory interpretation (e.g ., the existence of guilds, a division 
of labour, and a bureaucracy, but the absence of social stratification), and one at variance 
with the emerging understanding of events. Given the available dato, he could not ovoid 
failing to recognize not only that (a) there were many early cemeteries indicating social 
hierarchies and private wealth, but also failed to understand (b) the social significance of the 
massive tomb structures in Saqqara, Abydos and elsewhere which do not have sociological 
parallels in the Sumerian city states. He did however identify two unique features of the 
Egyptian state in its formative period: the lock of a military machine, and the seeming 
irrelevance of any potential aspirations for local independence in any of the cities, if there 
were any. 80 Although it is clear that his interpretation of the nomes as religious centres was 
exaggerated at best, and erroneous at worst - given the architectural and textual evidence 
that rural divine temples prior to Dynasty XII were not demonstrably significant- it is interesting 
to observe that any potential urban character seemingly did not give rise to aspirations for 
independence, comparable to those frequently experienced in Mesopotamia and early 
Greece. 
Regardless of the errors of differing magnitude, it should be evident that when non-
Egyptologists turn to the existing literature and develop views of state development based on 
their readings, these theories rise to prominence in discussions about the emergence of 
states and civilization . Not only do implicit and unconscious Egyptological assumptions 
influence global interpretations of political and economic development, but it is these theories 
which return to us as "received truth". This places the fundamental basis upon which the 
discourse takes place at risk of being amateur at best, for our own theories return to us in an 
unrecognizable form, having been developed in comparison with the European feudal 
experience and anthropological examples from modern Africa, combined with a superficial 
review of popular Egyptological literature. The theoretical models available to Egyptologists 
for use in explaining state structures are thus derived from a faulty understanding of the dato 
published in popular form where Egyptologists have been unconsciously evolving interpreta-
tions since the birth of the science. These interpretations - conscious and unconscious -
have been given prominence and credibility by popularization, and these popular works 
are the only basis with which political scientists, anthropologists, historians and philosophers 
on the fundamental injustice of the system would appear tobe exaggerated if applied to Egypt, (e.g., Oriental 
Despotism, pp. 71-74), and the importance of the army certainly contrasts greatly with his other examples (e .g., 
Oriental Despotism, pp. 59-67), drawing the carpet from beneath his categorizotion of Egypt as fundomentally 
misruled by an enorrnous military machine. For the later periods of Egyptian history these tendencies do becorne 
stronger, and this may be an essential part of grasping the argurnent. 
80 R. Müller-Wollermonn ("Präliminierungen zur ägyptischen Stadt," ZÄS 118 [ 1991 ]: 48-54) suggests that the 
problem is one of definition, but also of purpose. She asserts that Amoma can only be used with reference to 
itself, · but it is seif-evident that Akhenaten cannot have simply invented and founded a city in Egypt without some 
models in view, dernonstrating that for Akhenaten a capital city had to have temples, tombs, residential areas, 
and workmen 's' villages, as weil as offices. The very concept suggests that such were the typical essential 
elernents of a city in ancient Egypt, otherwise Akhenaten could hardly have had the idea to build something that 
resembles a city, not only to a city planner, but to any urban-dweller without recourse to lengthy discussions about 
def in itions. 
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can work. And their theories are thus based on their interpretation of what they have read. 
This can only lead to faulty circular logic. 
A NEAR EASTERN PERSPECTIVE 
In southern Mesopotamia early large territorial states were centered on major cities with 
large populations and requirements far exceeding the limited radius of the agricultural land 
surrounding them. This was the principal feature of developments commericing in the fifth 
millennium, leading through a transformation and increase in the number and size of 
settlements, followed by a decrease in the size of the individual settlements at the end of the 
third millennium. These early south Mesopotamian states decisively influenced political and 
economic developments far beyond their own borders, with direct economic influence reaching 
well into Anatolia and the Susiana, as weil as Egypt. Although developments in northern 
Mesopotamia are subject to debate, virtually every model would postulate that the earliest 
states there were first city-states. These were necessarily peripheral to the southern states, 
and a multi-polar world can be postulated for Mesopotamia at the start of the third millennium 
B.C. Although large territorial states and empires followed thereon, during the middle of the 
third millennium B.C. small city states dominating a limited circle of agricultural land about 
them were typical of the political structures at the time. 81 
The "state" thus experienced several interrelated forms in Mesopotamia while at virtually the 
same time, a relatively stable form was established and maintained in Egypt, where evolution 
rather than revolution became the rule. The case of Greece suggests that the polis was the 
basis of the political order from some time in the second millennium and that individual city-
states voluntarily joined confederations, or were militarily defeated by other states, but that 
the political community was formed by numerous independent city-states, and that most of 
the city-states remained independent, at least nominally, until making the decision to join or 
remain with one of the larger confederations in the fifth century B.C. In each case, however, 
the striking feature is the extent to which urban centres are associated with state formation. 
Egyptologists have frequently attempted to deny an urban basis for Egyptian civilization, 
and this has been derided, and yet the institutionalized dynamic behavior of political 
development in Greece and Mesopotamia does not appear to have been a characteristic of 
Egyptian history where unification was the rule rather than the exception.82 
81 For northern Mesopotamia, most recently, cf. T. J. Wilkinson, "The Structure and Dynamics of Dry-Farming Stoies 
in Upper Mesopotamia," CA 35 ( 1994): 483-520. For the South: cf Nissen, Grundzüge. Given the circular 
logic employed - observing a ceiling in site size for the third millennium and then examining the possibilities of the 
agricultural surplus for the same period - Wilkinson's analysis primarily confirms the validity of Central Place 
Theory for the northern Jazira given political equilibrium, and the logic can be extended into the second millen-
nium. His analysis does not however account for the decline of Titrish Hüyük at the end of the third millennium, nor 
the enormous size of sites in the Khabur plains during the fourth millennium, so that the relevance of political dato 
must be drawn upon. 
82 Cf., e.g., J. Wilson, "Egypt through the New Kingdom: Civilization without Cities, " in Kraeling, City lnvincible, 
pp. 124-136. The reasons for this may be sought in the ethnic diversityof West Asian culture, or in the importance 
of cities, on in a thousand other potential criteria, including interest rotes and access to the sea. Before endeavoring 
to compare, the quantifiable facts should be established. (Harnmond, City, repeats much of what Wilson said, 
and indicates the dangers inherent in failing to investigate). 
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Assyriologists have made several serious attempts to organize their immense quantities of 
data83 in terms which can be grasped by students of state formation. In one case, the origins 
of bureaucracy in the ancient world are contrasted with those of the modern world, which 
employed bureaucracy to overcome feudal structures, while the Sumerians allegedly 
employed it to "organize economic activity" and the Egyptians to assure "territorial unification 
and the mobilization of resources", whi le Neo-Assyrien bureaucratization essayed to "enhance 
centralized power at the expense of local authority". 84 
In each case, the goal is the concentration of power in terms of economic resources, but the 
alleged contrast is missing as these efficient bureaucracies all arose long aher the emer-
gence of the state, while the development of writing as an administrative tool testifies to the 
existence of the bureaucracy before or accompanying the emergence of the state. lt is 
difficult to judge the extent to which the half-urban half-agricultural world of early Egypt or 
Sumer was feudally governed, although the logical extension of the primitive accumulation 
of wealth during the Neolithic would virtually demand this supposition, and thus the origins 
of bureaucracy in the modern world would be identical to the origins of bureaucracy in the 
ancient world, and the development in fact parallel, with the burgeoning bureaucracy following 
the state. The implications of the above quoted example reveal that even among the experts, 
there is a tendency to lump centuries or even mi llennia of early history together, condensing 
developments, without separating the importance of the formation from the perfected form. The 
result is that purely circular reasoning is subjected to criticism, and then a seemingly contrasting 
position established, without even establishing exactly what is being argued. In this case a 
feudal model is unconsciously postulated and contrasted at the same time. 
In contrast to this diachronic analysis, Michalowski points out that the "administrative reforms 
were not brought about by the founders but by the consolidators. "85 He also points at, and 
edges around, but does not highlight a virtually insurmountable problem in the history of 
Mesopotamia: are the various ruling powers to be regarded as dynasties founding new 
states, or are the various dynasties which succeed one another in territorial units of differing 
size to be regarded as mere changes of government? T o what extent is it justifiable to speak 
of the emergence of a new state when significant members of the bureaucracy are the same 
people who served the previous government286 In Egypt, there is little contention about the 
role of the state and the government, but there are nevertheless potential problems. 
Amenemhat I moved from bureaucracy to royalty, changing the government, but not the 
83 One estimate pul the number of published administrative documents from the Ur III Period in 1983 at more than 
25'000 items: M . Civil , "Ur III Bureaucracy: Quantitative Aspects," in Gibson/Biggs, Power, pp. 43-53. 
84 M . Morony, "'In a City without Watchdogs, the Fox is the Overseer': lssues and Problems in the Study of 
Bureaucracy," in Gibson/ Biggs, Power, p. l 0 . 
85 P. Michalowski, "Charisma and Control, " in Gibson/ Biggs, Power, p . 60. 
86 Cf. Michalowski, in Gibson/ Biggs, Power, pp. 59-60. He also suggests, e.g ., that "there is even a possibility 
that the cult of the deceased rulers of Ur was continued under the lsin kings ." Michalowski, in Gibson/ Biggs, 
Power, p. 57. 
The distinction between state and government is not always clear cut. Political scientists would doubtless agree 
that the United Stoies of America is a distinct state from the United Kingdom, despite the fact that many civil 
servants served both governments in the 18th century A.D. The independent Rhodesia was also a separate state. 
from the United Kingdom, but describing Zimbobwe as a different state from Rhodesia. merely because of a 
change of government and name is a less persuasive argument. 
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state. The power of government to rule in Egypt was divided, e.g., during the First lnterme-
diate Period, but did the state remain? 87 
N. Postgote has attempted to approoch the problem distinguishing between the early forms 
of empire which "could be as different from later ones as a pristine from a secondary 
state. "88 Assuming that each stage of the development in Mesopotamia du ring the formative 
millennia is characterized by a different form of successor state, and that there is a vast 
difference between the borders of cultural regions and political entities, he demonstrates the 
disparity of civilization and polity, identifying a key problem facing prehistorians endeavoring 
to grasp an intangible in the material detritus of culture. His logic suggests positing a similarity 
between tribal structures of the first millennium B.C. and the third millennium B.C., which fails 
to address his own recognition that pristine and secondary states need not be similar, and 
runs counter to Fried's logic that tribal structures are precisely a feature dependent upon the 
previous existence of states in order to come into their own. 89 His emphasis on urban 
architecture as an expression of domination or political presence probably strikes at the key 
feature of the earliest ancient Near Eastern states developing towards, from or around urban 
centres, i.e., city states. The primary difficulty with this specific level of analysis is the contra-
diction concerning the primary nature of a city as being far more than a mere expanded 
version of a village, for cities tend to be associated not only with the extraction of surplus 
and services and the division of labour, but specifically with trade, being located at nodal 
points.90 lt is thus clear that assumptions about the significance of tribes and the nature of 
cities can cloud the logical path leading to a clear understanding of developments. 
1. G. Gelb stood at the forefront of another approach, emphasizing the role of the family 
and private property rather than the administration. His studies did not advance to the stage 
of providing a global picture of the Mesopotamian state, at least partially because the 
discontinuity inherent in the history of Mesopotamia suggests that the state underwent numerous 
variations. Mesopotamia cannot be conceived globally and the relevant dato are still not 
completely understood. Gelb's object was primarily however to discredit the concept of the 
temple-economy as the basis of civilization and economy in ancient Sumer, and although 
his view has not yet been clearly understood and adopted, the goal is significant, for the 
Sumerian temple economy has widely been postulated as a model for understanding the 
Egyptian economy, as was clear from the quote from Service, supra, p. 46. 
The danger is that inadequate, inappropriate or disproven models - such as the feudal 
system, redistribution, or the Sumerian Temple State - are assumed to be facts. The 
87 Assmann (Ma'at, pp. 219-22) finds m:'tin the First lntermediate Period (Ma'at, p. 228) while the sage finds that 
the lawless "have despoiled the land of kingship" (Gardiner, Admonitions, p. 54) . This seems tobe a fundamental 
paradox: m J'tshould be fundamental to the state and kingship, and yet the lawless exercise m;'twhen the divine 
state has ceased to exist2 
88 J. N . Postgote, "In Search of the First Empires, " BASOR 293 (1994): l. 
89 Cf. Fried, Politicol Society, pp. 170-17 4; and M . H. Fried, "On the Concepts of 'Tribe' and 'Tribal Society'," in 
Helm, Essays, p. 15. 
90 The earliest large Mesopotamian cities may have been Irade centres as much as administrative centres. This 
particular development may distinguish the Egyptian and Mesopotamian civilizations, and requires extensive 
investigation. 
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"evidence" from Egypt is then understood as conforming to the invalid model. This logic is 
sufficient to create a standard model for the emergence of the state in the ancient Near East 
which is based on the model itself and does not correspond to any known facts. 
A W10ER PERSPECTIVE: T HE GENERAL T HEORY OF WAR, CusmM AND T ECHNOLOGY 
These theoretical and historical problems suggest that it is necessary to at least attempt to 
define and elaborate a general explanation for state behavior which avoids excluding some 
states, while allowing the potential identification of individual groups of states. Rather than 
seeking to label these as "early" or "industrial", it may be more useful to identify specific 
groups within the community of states according to criteria which leap from the resulting 
compilation. 91 
The simplest fashion to approoch the problem is to assert that the concept of the state does 
evolve, and that sovereignty and the division of powers tend to become more differentiated 
over time, but to assume that there is in fact a set of all states as members of the group which 
must fit into a definition, rather than to exclude certain societies as "merely tribal", and others 
as "industrial" and therefore ineligible, as this inevitably reduces the subset of eligible states 
to the point that the definition, typology and shared characteristics are identical. The state is 
a political entity seated in a geographically specific location with a human population with 
its own social structures, and therefore any theoretical discussion must accept the premise 
that it must explain why any particular state is the way it is. The issue of sovereignty does not 
necessarily have to have precedence, but it must be assumed that sovereign but not equal 
entities are being compared.92 As a rule a military conquest precedes the creation of a state, 
so that the emergence of the state is dictated by the military environment, and not the 
reverse. 93 Custom, as observed by the local population prior to the conquest, in law, religion, 
tradition, social hierarchy and other common features of human life decides the social level 
which prevails following the military conquest. The level of technological efficiency is to a 
certain extent affected by the role of custom, but the level of technology is decisive for the 
91 As our intention here is merely to identify some criteria that will aid us identifying what might be meant by the 
ancient Egyptian state, it is not the goal here to discuss the definitions of states, but ultimately it may be possible 
to distinguish such forms as "military empires", "commercial states", "ideological states" and to associate specific 
criteria with each uni!, and then ultimately to conclude whether the primary features of the "city-states" of ancient 
northern Mesopotamia and Greece suggest that this become a specific category, or whether, e.g., the Greek city 
states should be aligned with the commercial states of the Levantine coast, and the city states of northern Meso-
potamia be simply classified as a dwarf category of the southern Mesopotamian territorial states. 
92 lt is a very curious thing that there were no "summit conferences" of the greatest powers in the Bronze Age world, 
while encounters between kings of the second and third rank were a frequent event in many periods, the implica-
tion being that sovereignty was not among equals, and therefore that not all states were equal, as in the modern 
world as weil. The suggestion that Thutmosis III meta Babylonian King (E. Cassin, "Babylonien unter den Kassiten,'' 
in Fischer Weltgeschichte 3: 19) is merely due to a misunderstanding of the source material. Although it is 
improbable that the Hittite king traveled to Egypt, the evidence is slightly more substantial (cf. Kitchen, Pharaoh 
Triumphant, pp. 90-91), and - should it have occurred - this would have been symptomatic of the changing 
world at the end of the Bronze Age. 
93 Egypt again illustrates this simple and yet improbable principle, as military people were not in evidence in high 
positi6ns during the Old Kingdom, even though the King was ideologically forever smiting his enemies. 
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fundamental characteristics of a state. T aking this approach one can conclude that all politi-
cal development can be explained in terms of the interaction of these three features: War, 
Custom and Technology. 
At any given point in time, the state thus reflects a dominant military, normative and techno-
logical constellation. lt has frequently been averred that the military role appears after the 
emergence of the state, or that the state is the endeavour of a wealthy ruling dass to 
maintain their rule, but in fact, the military decision precedes the emergence of the state, and 
the wealth only really begins to accumulate after primitive state formation is established, so 
that while a sociai hierarchy reflecting previously existing relations might determine the 
direction in which the state develops, it is more probable that a new hierarchy emerges with 
the formation of a state, rather than preceding it (although the individual members of the 
highest level of the hierarchy may be the same people, their social role changes subtly). The 
technological level of any given state is determined by general factors, but these factors play 
a decisive role in the ability of the state to function. Although conscious and unconscious 
normative decisions have a decisive impact on the degree to which technology is permitted 
to affect the social structure, technology nevertheless plays a significant role of its own, as 
witnessed by the very fact that all early states are primarily dependent upon agriculture and 
only secondarily on industrial production, hunting or trade. 
lt will be noted that the interrelationship of these factors has always been historically decisive 
regardless of the level of civilization, economic sophistication, or indeed geographical 
position, and thus that the key to understanding political developments, both ancient and 
modern, can be found in what we will term the General Theory of War, Custom and 
T echnology, which endeavors to classify every political entity or system as resulting from the 
combination of these three factors. All political evolution is dependent upon variations in the 
relationship between the factors. 94 The interplay between these factors will permit us to 
grasp the ancient Egyptian state.95 
This approach allows a more generalized approach to the analysis of historical political 
evolution, so that states need not be assigned to pre-conceived categories, such as early, 
modern, industrialist, slave-holding, feudal, capitalist or socialist. lt is clear that the states of 
94 lt is weil known , e.g., that when the Manchus conquered China, they themselves adopted Chinese culture, such 
that the Chinese civilization enveloped the invader, and the same inverse cultural developments took place in 
Mesopotamia whenever the nomads from the steppe and the desert were able to seize political power: their 
subsequent behavior corresponded to the political norms of the pre-existing civilization. Social norms of ancient 
Rome failed to encourage the application of industrial inventiveness to production for economic purposes, although 
the state made considerable expenditures to improve its military and Irade positions. On the other hand, when the 
Portuguese, Dutch and British traders appeared in the Indian Ocean with their unique religious and intellectual 
attitudes combined with their advanced military technology, they were not only able to completely transform the 
world of the Indian Ocean without the necessity of conquest and comprehensive military victory, but also may 
have introduced production-oriented economic models lo the West transforming the political and economic face 
of the world, merely through interaction. The field feil gradually into their hands, and they modeled the local states 
according to their liking - not necessarily adapting local tradition, and therefore substantially morginalizing the 
ability of these early anthropological examples to serve as reliable sources for dato on the slate. 
95 This principle was developed before reading Fried, Political Society, pp . 226ff. The primary difference in the 
approach offered here is the attempt to highlight what a slate is in the widest sense and what a government is in 
the widest sense, and to not confuse the two concepts, but to explore the role of the government within the state. 
lt is evident that Fried's poth and mine diverge only on this track. -
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the ancient world evolved in many different directions, and that the states of the modern 
world are very diverse, although all are classified as modern states today. Thus, the elements of 
each state at a particular point in history can be plotted onto the diagram of the General 
Theory of War, Custom and Technology, and then the various categories can be identified, 
rather than being assigned. lt can be assumed that different types of state configurations 
existed simultaneously at different points around the globe, and that similar states existed at 
different times in different places. 
lt is dear that this interpretation appears to represent a synthesis of the approach developed 
by J. Haas, in contrasting the "conflict" and "integrative" approaches.96 One of his primary 
postulates concerning conflict is however that the conflict took place as social conflict within 
a single "politicalll entity, rather than between two different political entities: 
In a situation of unequal access to basic resources, the relationship between unequal 
social groups is predicted tobe one of conflict, expressed in some degree of sustained 
hostility and antagonism within the society. 97 
While reflecting the Leninist and Marxist assumption that the state was an instrument of dass 
oppression, this fails to take account of the basic assumption that states emerge in geographical 
territories with homogeneous ethnic populations, and assumes that the social antagonism 
within society outweighs ethnic competition between two neighboring societies, a postulate 
which was disproved by the behavior of the working dass at the outbreak of the First World 
War, and for which there is no more evidence in prehistoric times. 
Haas states clearly that the collection of revenues depends upon the implicit use of force 
within the society, and correctly obseNes that the actual resort to force need not take place 
frequently, if the implicit capacity of the ruler to carry out the threat is widely recognized.98 
This naturally implies co-operation among the elite, and the ability to enforce their collective 
will, and thus an inherent instability in the hierarchy of social relations, but is hardly indicative 
of more than the use of military force to carry out ordinary primate social behavior. This same 
typical behavior which Haas ascribes as a seemingly unique aspect of human behavior in 
96 
Marx introduced an artificial division belween a superstructure and an infrastructure The border belween the lwo 
cannot be found because it does not exist: legal culture or religious thought cannot be separated from economics 
or technology in any of the ancient Near Eastern societies. Without the legal guarantees surrounding land 
ownership, ancient Egyptian society would be inconceivable, and without the pyramids it would not be ancient 
Egypt. Viewed in Marxist terms, the superstructure must be sought in a dozen discrete places identified by the 
General Theory of War, Custom and T echnology, dependent upon the coefficients of the infrastructure: society is 
a vast web of relationships, and cannot be split neatly into lwo. 
Chaudhuri (Asia before Europe, p. 5) quotes Braudel as remarking that 'structure' correspanded to the "social , 
economic and cultural reality, as part of the 'longue duree'". The General Theory of War, Custom and T echnol-
ogy provides a type of Braudelian structure for the Stole. 
Haas, Evolution, passim. 
97 Haas, Evolution, p. l 07. 
98 Haas, Evolution, p. l 15. lt is interesting that Sir John Hicks (Hicks, Economic History, p. 17) developed a theory 
likewise bosed on an initial military occupation, followed by exactions, but that he expressly stated that it was not 
necessarily necessary to resort to force, and that the impositions could be made voluntarily. 
53 
The Stole 
the context of the state also takes place among baboons without reference to the possession 
of wealth: 
The baboon group is organized around the dominance hierarchy of adult males. 
The nature of this hierarchy varies between groups according to the constitution of 
each group. The simplest form of organization is probably that of groups in which 
one, and only one, adult male is conspicuously dominant.99 
Thus a male's dominance status was a combination of his individual fighting ability 
[ ... ] and his ability to enlist the support of other males [ ... ]100 
This evidence contradicts the whole train of thought employed in studying the distribution of 
wealth as the key factor in state development. 101 lt is logical that the emergence of wealth 
combined with the presence of force and the ability to employ that force to express superiority 
can result in the acquisition of wealth through coercion, but this does not indicate that the 
social inequalities are due to the existence of an unequal distribution of wealth or that this 
identifies the role of the state as an element of human society. 102 The state thus becomes 
merely the ultimate human expression of ordinary primate behavior, which is a tautology, 
and therefore not the explanation of the phenomenon. The use of force within the community 
merely corresponds to the prevailing cultural norms, and expectations (custom and tradition), 
and therefore integration and conflict always play a role in human society, but the ultimate 
conflict of any significance will always take place between two societies or states rather 
than within any given society. 
The same criticism can be applied to the warfare and trade theories of the origin of the state, 
as these again depend upon the logic of economics - scarcity of land and resources - as 
the overriding motivation for expansion or consolidation. lt is the variables in combination 
that contribute to the nature of the state. Just as mere economic compulsion cannot explain 
heroic initiative, the high social appreciation of glory is an insufficient explanation for the 
conquest of neighboring regions. Conquest may be a catalyst, but it is not necessarily the 
determinant factor of events either prior to or following the emergence of the state. 103 A 
specific level of economic and social development combined with certain norms and tech-
nological innovations following a conquest determine the course of events. Thus, seeking the 
explanation of the state as either the unequal distribution of wealth or the evolution of a 
99 K. R. L. Holl ond 1. DeVore, "Baboon Sociol Behovior," in DeVore, Primate Behavior, p. 54. 
100 K. R. L. Hall and 1. DeVore, "Baboon Social Behavior, '' in DeVore, Primate Behavior, pp. 62-63. 
101 Cf , e g , M. H. Fried for social stratificalion preceding the slale: "The Stole and the Chicken and the Egg; or 
What Came First2", in Cohen/ Service, Origins of the Stole, pp. 35-47. 
102 C. W. Gailey ("Culture Wars: Resistance to Stole Formation," in Patterson/ Gailey, Power Relations, p. 35) 
unconsciously recognizes this feoture, but pursues an argument centered on the assumption that rejection of 
exploitative relations and repression after reconquest are primarily motivated by economic relations and that these 
are structurally relevant lo the formation and evolution of the state. lt should be evident that the appropriation of 
weolth by the rulers of the stale reflects their acquisilive instincts, but thot the behavior is not dictated by the desire 
for ocquisition so much os an expression of superiority and power once attained. 
103 Khazonov, ''Problems," in Claessen/Skalnik, Early Stole, p. 83: "The conquest theory of the origin of the state [ ... J 
is unable to convince us. Conquest could mark the origin of the early states [ ... J But the relevant internal condi-
tions, i.e., a sufficienl level of development [ ... J also had tobe present for this." 
54 
A Wider Perspective: The General Theory of War, Custom and T echnology 
Security 
D 
Foreign 
Wars 
Interna/ 
Wars 
Participation 
Education Art/ Architecture 
CUSTOM 
WAR TECHNOLOGY 
Figure 1 . The General Theory of War, Custom and T echnology 
Technique 
D 
Energy Materials 
Following the catalyst of a military event of any kind - a defensive war, a coalition forced by 
neighboring powers, a conquest, etc. - a new political and social configuration emerges, which is 
necessarily different from what preceded, and yet emerges from it. Both external and internal influences 
can play a role, but the decisive feature is the ability of the new government to dictate its terms, the 
constraints being dictated by the technological level, and customary expectations. lts choice of 
methods for improving its economic position depends upon the technological and cultural 
configurations. 
Each subsidiary triangle is linked to a potentially infinite set of subsidiary triangles. 
The Participation triangles will, e.g., identify the level of political and economic participation, etc. 
The Education triangles will devolve to law, philosophy, literature, ideology, etc. The Art and 
Architecture triangles will devolve to various types of art, architecture, and ritual, etc. 
Security can devolve to police, guardians, etc., but need not, for security is sufficient to identify the 
instrument of repression employed by the government to mobilize the resources necessary to realize its 
acquisitive goals. The Foreign Wars triangle devolves to defense, imperialism and offensive war. 
The lnternal Wars triangle devolves to rebellion, civil war and unification. 
The Technique triangles indicate the level of technology available. The Energy triangle necessarily 
leads to the use of manpower, water, traction, etc. The Materials triangle leads to Irade, quarrying 
and production. 
To establish monuments of a corresponding degree of sophistication, a ruler mobilizes the educated 
classes to devise both plans and a suitable ideology and organize by coercive force the manpower 
required at the technological level to achieve his desires. The monumentality of the architecture may 
correspond to the level of political participation, and legitimacy: fewer !arger monuments with low 
levels of participation requiring justification for legitimacy, and more smaller monuments where 
participation is more open and legitimacy in less need of justification (cf. Wittfogel, Oriental 
Despotism, pp. 44-45) . 
The role of the government, the official legal arm of the state, is determined by the balance of 
achieving basic goals, by exploiting the possibilities of participation and force while observing 
custom, and maintaining legitimacy. 
55 
The Stole 
social hierarchy are inadequate, since these preceded the emergence of wealth and the 
state by millions of years. 
Although unable to define a state, Egyptologists wax eloquent about the ideology of the 
Egyptian state. During the Middle Kingdom the "lnstructions" were one of the forms in which 
the ideology of rule and the governing of the state were defined, in the context of the 
obligations of a ruler to his people. During the New Kingdom, m;ctbecame one of pillars of 
state ideology. The King would smite the enemies of order in a chariot104 in order tobe able 
to institute m;cf. This royal ideology was the expression of the principle of the General 
Theory of War, Custom and Technology. There were in fact at least two ideologies: one 
was the application of m;cf within the borders of Egypt, but the other was the assumption 
that Egypt had the right to govern the rest of the world, insofar as this was worth attempting. 
lt is clear that this ideology goes far beyond that of the baboons, as far as the latter has been 
grasped, and therefore some concept of "justice" as opposed to "dominance" must play a 
role in the concept of the state, being subsumed under the rubric "custom", as the concept 
evolves through time. 
An attempt has been made to illustrate the principles of the theory in Figure 1. Any given 
state will have a balance between War, Custom, Technology and individual Features 
contributing to each of these rubrics are each determined by an infinite series of subsidiary 
triangles. In terms of absolute relevance, it is probable that the technologically low early 
states will have had proportionately fewer germane subsidiary triangles concerning war 
and technology than those pertaining to custom, which is the expression of human culture, 
and therefore the key element. Under Custom appear not only literature, art, architecture, 
philosophy and other purely cultural traits, but also the level of participation, measured in 
political and economic terms. The role of War in society can be reduced to its primary 
Features of internal relations and external relations, whereby a distinction is required dividing 
the ordinary use of force within the state, "repression", from the military use of force to quell 
rebellions, incite civil war, or merely to unify. The most important aspects of technology are 
the sources of energy and the provision of resources. 
The most important Feature of the system is however to grasp the message that the ability to 
mobilize resources for the execution of specific monumental projects does not demonstrate 
that the authorities control the entire society in a "command economy": it merely demon-
strates that they are able to take possession of a certain proportion of the fruits of economic 
success, and that they can oblige subjects or citizens to work on projects of their choice. 
For what is so characteristic of empirical states is political inequality; the existence of 
a public set of rules that authorize some individuals to perform actions not permitted 
104 Using o composite bow to fire orrows with ormor-piercing tips from o choriot was the highest of hif,Jh-tech ot the 
time. Cf. the representotion of Phorooh shooting from o choriot through the copper ingots. Decker (Leistung, pp . 
101-102) osserts thot the ingots of three fingers thickness were not used, but rather wooden torgets. Mcleod 
( Composife BoVYS, p. 37) recognizes thot the Cypriote ingots were the targets octuolly employed , but foils to 
occept the verocity of the representotions (p 37 n. 3). Loter Mcleod (Seif Bows, pp. 21-24) discussed the orrow-
heods, but did not eloborote on performonce. Trials indicoted thot while these orrow-heods moy not have pierced 
the ingot, they will hove penetroted into it. The shott will noturolly hove broken os o result of the shock, ond 
therefore it must be conceded thot the representotions connot be token ot face volue. [C. Bergmon, pers. comm.] 
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to others, the authority to tax, conscript individuals into an army, and perhaps more 
significantly, to make law. 105 
The key element is thus the legitimacy- and not the power - of those in a position to make 
law and to coerce those who are subject to their will. 
LEGITIMACY 
The entire collection of attributes amounts to the state as a whole in the sense of a living 
organism. The role of the government appears as an interface, employing war or repression 
to mobilize resources (energy as manpower and actual materials) corresponding to the level 
of economic and political participation, in order to carry out its program. This program can 
include dominance of cultural activities (e.g ., literature, art and architecture) through law, 
justified in terms of ideology, but it need not. One implication of this could be the suggestion 
that there is an inverse relationship between the level of political participation and monumental 
architecture as a significant feature of all known architecture, i.e., the more restricted the 
level of participation, the more monumental the architecture, the more open the level of 
participation, the less monumental the architecture (or the less the contrast between the 
proportions of public and private architecture). Such developments have clearly occurred 
throughout human history, and this has an impact on the reading of the level of economic 
participation, which is ultimately the source of government wealth for the achievement of its 
projects, for only the restrictions on private wealth enable the government to increase its 
resources, and thus, an increase in private participation must lead to a proportionate 
decrease in monumental public architecture. The same logic applies to literature 
(e.g., development from Pyramid Texts to Coffin Texts), statuary, etc. until a completely 
different level of participation is realized. These parameters are decisive for altering the role 
of government within the state, by increasing political and economic participation. 
lt is clear that legitimacy emerges from a constellation of variables, based upon the ability to 
threaten repression and buttressed by ideology. ldeology can be expressed in terms of 
philosophy, law, architecture, etc. The general tendency of ideology as an expression of 
justice has only recently (18th century AD.) been extended to include popular participation 
in the formation of policy as a source of legitimacy. 106 if divine right is the source of legitimacy, 
as expressed through the will of the gods and the worship of the gods, the religious appa-
ratus is a key element of the right of the ruler to govern. lnsofar as the gods are drawn into 
105 Barry, Theory, p. 63 . 
i0o J. Hobermos (''Some Ouestions Concerning the Theory of Power: Foucoult Agoin, " in Kelly, Critique and Power, 
pp. 83-84) opposes Foucoult in his interpretotion of punishment: "The octuol tosk of the obsolutist theory of the 
stote is not so much to legitimize human rights os to ground the concentrotion of oll violence in the honds of the 
sovereign." The point is significont, but it is curious thot the problems of popular legitimocy are even conceived to 
hove arisen in the context of the Europeon obsolutist stote. Hobermos hos likewise reveoled the internally inconsistent 
logic of legitimacy in the context of the democrotic capitalist state (cf. Vincent, Stole, pp. 38-39). Surprisingly, 
legitimocy does not ploy o significant role in modern political theory (cf. e.g. the indices of Ball, Theory; Barry, 
Theory, Bellamy, Theories; Vincent, State). 
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questions of legitimacy and government, parts of the religious apparatus must be associated 
with the government. There are however two caveats which must not be forgotten . 
( 1) Popular cultural activity also pays heed to the gods, and plays a role in ideological 
activity, but does not necessarily express the same sentiments of legitimacy as understood by 
the rulers. (2) lnsofar as the gods are a source of legitimacy, they cannot be assumed to be 
part of the government. Correspondingly the religious apparatus reflects popular tradition 
and political power, but need not be assigned to the government as such. 
The concepts of legitimacy and economic participation are inextricably joined, as the 
legitimate right of the government to levy taxes or to oblige individuals to corvee labour are 
related to the level of economic participation, and the requirements of legitimacy can also 
significantly influence trade relations, even more than mere economic requirements might 
imply. lf contact with foreign states is regarded as recognizing their legitimacy, there may 
be ideological obstacles to popular participation in trade relations, while the actual articles 
acquired through trade may ultimately be destined for the religious apparatus or monuments 
related to the expression of legitimacy. Thus, the level of economic participation is determined 
by the variables of custom, rather than technological development, and the role of government 
is influenced by the requirements of assuring legitimacy, and carrying out ideological 
functions. Political and economic participation can differ widely. While including some 
groups in, 
Every state known to history has had a physical apparatus for removing or otherwise 
dealing with those who failed to get the message.107 
Thus, the authorities need to include as many groups as possible into those that recognize 
their legitimacy, and they need to have abilities to put pressure on those who fail to recognize 
their legitimacy. Divine support can best be exploited in favour of authority if separate from 
the system of government, while reflecting state interests. 
lt is frequently assumed that state and government are one, but it thus transpires that the 
government is one of the official organs of the state. In the early states, the distinctions 
between the significance of "official" and "informal" elements within the state may have been 
more diffuse than at other times, and thus it may be futile to explore this issue profoundly, 
while recognizing its existence. On the simplest level, it is clear that the government of the 
state is that body which is regarded as the legitimate representative of authority throughout 
the geographical extent of the state. Even if its source is ultimately divine right, legitimacy 
implies that the government functions with the consent or support of the people. The key 
feature of legitimacy is that it guarantees that the question of succession is resolved before 
the expiration of the term of office of that person or group who represent the leadership of 
the state. 108 
lt is possible that questions of legitimacy in most early states were resolved by recourse to the 
gods, through divine right. Divine support was necessary, but it is useful to recall Napoleon 
107 Fried, Politicol Evolution, p. 231 . 
108 In his review of Müller-Wollermann, Krisenfaktoren, N. Strudwick (Bi0r48 [1991 ]: 94) agreed that legitimacy 
in Egypt "comes down to the acceptance of kingship and the royal succession." This is one of the few points 
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who said, "Remember that the god of war and the god of success are marching alongside 
me," 109 and remarked that he would depose the pope if he did not behave. 110 Innovative 
political leaders will have bent the rules, transforming themselves from leaders to rulers and 
the gods will have allowed themselves tobe swayed rather than face irrelevance, so that a 
government in clear military control of its entire territory is more likely tobe able to resolve 
questions of succession without consulting parties they do not desire to include within the 
decision-making process, but there is invariably a decision-making process whenever the 
innovative leader's term of office expires, either due to temporal limits or death. lf the gods 
desire to participate in this process, they must compromise. 111 In New Kingdom Egypt, the 
Pharaoh was the High Priest of all the Gods, and his chief minister, the Vizier, was respon-
sible for the priests of all the gods. This would imply that the gods were not only the ultimate 
source of the legitimacy of the ruling pharaoh's right to rule, and to guarantee that he was 
able to influence or indeed decide upon the choice of his successor, but also that he was 
ultimately responsible for appointing and arranging that the salaries of the leading religious 
officers be paid, if not all of the priests in the land. 
EARLY EVOLUTION OF THE EGYPTIAN STATE 
The relationship between the king and the gods has far reaching implications for our under-
standing of the concept of the state according to the normative view of the ancient Egyptians, 
but these theocratic features are evident at an advanced stage, not the primary stage. The 
earliest political organization which preceded the Egyptian state must have emerged out of 
the chaos of clan disputes in the Nile Volley or Delta during the fifth or fourth millennium ß.C. 112 
Whatever this organization was or did, it created a military vehicle which eventually enabled a 
single person to assert that he did not have to share the prerogatives of kingship with another 
mortal within the territory of the T wo Lands: this person was the "King of Upper and Lower 
where Egyptology and political science see eye-to-eye; cf. the quote used by Müller-Wollermann, Krisenfaktoren, 
pp. 21-22. 
Legitimacy, religion and government have not been established as particular items on the chart because they 
combine various attributes from disparate sectors, and the emphasis at the present moment is on identifying the 
breadth of the state and the role of the government. 
109 Herold, Mind of Napoleon, p. 269. 
110 Herold, Mind of Napoleon, p. l 09. 
111 Napoleon noted that the popes opposed both him and the Bourbons (Herold, Mind of Napoleon, p. l l 0). Philip 
II of Spain faced the sagacious opposition of an obstinate pope in his endeavors to subdue England. Despite their 
success, these efforts reveal that a marginalized religious institution is reduced to obstruction rather than decisive 
influence. 
112 For this development, cf. e.g., Andrassy, Staat and Endesfelder, Staat. The subject is very complex. 
Using words like "feudal" and "tribol" is unwarronted, os the evidence indicotes thot "tribal" structures emerged on 
the fringe, ond after the establishment, of stotes, and therefore thot they could not - by definition - precede the 
emergence of stotes (cf. Fried, Politicol Society, pp. 170-17 4; and M. H. Fried, "On the Concepts of 'Tribe' ond 
'Tribal Society'," in Helm, Essays, p. 15) On the one hond, this completely marginalizes the relevonce of the 
evidence of the feudal development in Europe where the tribes contributing to the origins of the feudal order in 
medieval Europe moved into the vacuum of diminishing ond weak Roman control (in the some woy that the 
Aromoean kingdoms of the first millennium cannot reflect an earlier development), but it also obliges speculotion 
tobe couched in terms of "chiefdoms' the meoning of which is vogue, so thot the terms should not be understood 
with their modern significonce, but merely as indicotors of whot was possibly part of the emerging sociol structure, 
which we connot define. 
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Egypt". 113 This person clearly owed enormous debts to those who supported him, more than 
to the divine powers, for it was the recognition by the people of his right to govern legiti-
mately that decided his position, not the divine support. 114 Eventually the divine powers 
were obliged to sanction his right to sole rule. This person or his successors thus eventually 
evolved a mythical origin of kingship which implied that this person was the successor of the 
very gods themselves as the King of Upper and Lower Egypt. However, 
lt takes time for a king to become a god. 115 
This closed the circle, making it clear that kingship was divine, and that authority was 
derived from the legitimacy awarded by being the successor of the gods. So much is 
undisputed, regardless of the extent to which the king was a divinity or a mere human being 
performing a divine mission. That the king was the high priest of the gods suggests that 
during the New Kingdom at least, the king was responsible to the gods. 
The emergence of a single militarily powerful legitimate ruler of the Two Lands does not 
however imply that previously existing social structures disintegrated, or that they were over-
thrown by the pre-eminence of a single player in the political spectrum. 116 The economic 
potential of the land would be increased os a result of the new king levying obligatory tribute 
payments, but this does not mean that the new king regarded himself as the sole owner of 
113 Cf. T. Schneider, 'Zur Etymologie der Bezeichnung 'König von Ober- und Unterägypten','' ZÄS 120 ( 1993): 
166-18 l. The conclusion that the title refers to a leader is at least logically compelling. 
114 lt will be noted that this interpretation diverges from Frankfort (Kingship and the Gods, p. 18) at this point. 
Frankfort recognized the key political event, but gave it spiritual overtones that are ex post facto correct, but do not 
necessarily correspond to the actual understanding. Part of the reasoning is based on his dating of the Memphite 
theology, for which a later date has been suggested, cf., e.g., Schlägl, Tatenen, pp. 110-117. 
Not only does Frankfort ascribe particular significance to the theological aspects of kingship, but he also extrapo-
lated the divine essence of a monotheistic god to divinity in Egypt: "But there seems no doubt that Pharaoh's 
predicate 'god' found its correlate in his absolute power over the land of Egypt and its inhabitants." (Kingship and 
the Gods, p. 51 ). There is no evidence that Frankfort was justified in regarding any ancient Egyptian divinity as 
possessing a priori "absolute power", let alone the king. He cites Kees for claims that the king could revoke 
property rights, but the inscription of Min, e.g., does not indicate any particular recourse to the king for his 
purchases or sanction thereof. 
11s Fried, Political Society, p. 231. 
116 J. J. Janssen ("The Early Stole in Ancient Egypt," in Claessen/Skalnik, Early State, pp. 215-216) points out the 
military victory may not even have been among the sedentary people of the Nile Volley but in defense against 
marauding Bedouin, making the idea of "conquest' and expropriation very improbable. This point is of signal 
import however because of the use of symbols denoting conquest in the royal ideology of ancient Egypt, and thus 
underlines that even if it is not the key to defining the territorial extent, social make-up or population ultimately 
included within the boundaries of a state, the appearance of overwhelming military power is essential for the 
ideolof;JY of a state. 
Helck ( Wirtschaftsgeschichte, p. l 04) writes that at the beginning of Egyptian History, "das ganze Volk als 
'Hörige' organisiert und wahrscheinlich im pr-mgUan der Residenz registriert [war ... ]". One wonders not only 
whether this was possible, but how the new rulers could possibly have developed such an idea, and how they 
could possibly have accomplished this in the face of opposition, without having developed an extremely effective 
weil armed constabulory and military machine. Such an effort was reputedly attempted by the lncas, as the 
culmination of nearly three millennia of political and economic development, but not at the start, and the lnca state 
was destroyed within a century from without, just prior to its crumbling from within, revealing that the stress factors 
on this form of domination are phenomenal and fail to promise longevity. Such a phenomenal transformation was 
also accomplished in China in the 20th century A.D. where it was the result of a civil warwith the social reformers 
armed with both Marxist philosophy and machine guns, but even so its duration can be subject to serious doubt, 
and it was built on the basis of an existing bureaucratic state. 
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eve,ything in the country, it merely means that he had the right to rule the country. This is the 
crux to understanding developments in the following millennia, for modern thinking has 
tended to assume that divine right and military conquest automatically rendered the material 
wealth of a country the property of the king who had won the victory. This is in fact a very 
modern thought. When the British Empire was expanding, one commentator wrote: 
Their gain shall be the knowledge of our faith, 
And ours such riches as the country hath . 117 
The victory of the new sovereign was however merely a political event which determined the 
right to rule, and the right to determine a successor. We cannot even estimate the degree to 
which his "rule" actually infringed on the people at all, and it did not necessarily entail the 
title to possession. 118 
Unless it can be demonstrated thGJt the newly formed Egyptian state actually deliberately 
confiscated private property at unification in order to re-create it three Dynasties later, and 
then abolish it again, to let it emerge a couple of Dynasties later, it is more logical to 
11 7 Cited without attribution by Walker, British Empire, p. 8. The fact is however that the British Empire did more for 
the expansion of Indian Ocean Irade than any palitical development in the preceding three millennia. Stability is 
good for Irade. 
118 B. Menu ("Le regime juridique des terres," in Menu, Recherches, pp. l-2; n. 5) cites Yoyotte, Moret, Seid!, Erman, 
Revillot and Kees to demonstrate the absolute right of the king to the passession of all the lands in ancient Egypt 
at all times, but not one single Pharaonic text. Her translation of the M!n-texls dealing with the land transactions 
(B. Menu, "La notion de propriete privee des biens fonciers dans l'Ancien Empire egyptien," in Menu, Recherches, 
pp. 56) is at variance with several of the alternative translotions (e.g ., Gödecken, Meten, p. l l; Roccati, 
Litterature, p. 86), and seems tc> be more influenced by her assumptions than by the !ext. R. Müller-Wollermonn's 
remorks ("Warenaustausch im Agypten des alten Reiches," JESHO 28 [ 1985]: 147-148) indicate that the only 
other alternative for transloting isw in the sense implied by Menu would imply thot M!n was being paid by the 
nswtyw, and if one were to ossume thot the king ossigned the field to him by virtue of being an office holder, he 
would probobly indicote thot the king ordered the payment, and not thot some nswtyw were paying him. 
Therefore, the initial impression thot her interpretation preceded the translation oppears tobe confirmed, os the 
generol impression that he purchosed the fields from private people who were in passession, and then registered 
them ot the royal offices seems compelling. 
D. Kessler ("Tempelbesitz," LÄVI: 369) states that the fields not listed in P. Wilbour "must be state lands". As these 
missing fields make up some 96 per cent. of the cultivable land in the region , it is slightly more realistic to state that 
the temples had full passession of perhaps 2 per cent. of the land in the area in question, and that another 2 per 
cent. was occupied by tenants using the land on generous terms, and this statement is quite different to demon-
strating that the state owned all the land in Egypt. Whatever limitations there may have been on the right to "own" 
land, as either "passession" or "property", most of Menu's evidence is derived from P. Wilbour, which covers only 
a small propartion of the land in question, and her assumption thot the nmhware the holders of the appartioning 
paragraphs (Menu, Recherches, p . 30) is illogical and self-contradictory as she says that the nmhw are those 
without titles ("depaurvue de resources propres provenant notament de l'exercice d'une chorge," Menu, Recherches, 
p . 29), while the holders mentioned in P. Wilbour include priests, stable-masters, scribes and soldiers, etc., and 
are therefore beneficiaries of the state system. In any case, Wilbour seems to be a temple document, and 
payments associated with nmbw are to Pharaoh, not the temples, in the Horemhab Decree (1. 31 , cf. Kruchten, 
Horemheb, p . 118) as in P. Valencay 1 (Gordiner, RAD, p. 73, l-2) so that Menu's whole train ofthought on this 
issue is ungrounded and inconsistent. The evidence that the nmbw would own land seems to emerge from the 
evidence (cf. infra, pp. 139f; and the "Stele d'apanage", G . Legrain, "Deux steles trouves a Karnak," ZÄS 35 
[ 1897]: 13-16) but it is equally unwarranted speculation to suggest that the nmbwowned the remoining 96 per 
cent. of the land not listed in P. Wilbour, and certainly not my contention. 
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interpret the evidence of the extensive legal guarantees surrounding private property - as 
evident in the inscriptions of M!n - to suggest that the existence of private property was one 
of the first things guaranteed by the state, and that personal royal, state, government and 
official property had to come from the holdings available at unification, and that the initial 
victory was thus followed by concessions, guarantees and agreements. This suggests the 
logical conclusion that the very existence of the state was conceived by compromise, the 
population awarding sovereignty to a single individual in return for, e.g., security. Security 
of person and security of wealth and property are two of the fundamental requirements 
which would attract the individual to abandon his own sovereignty, and therefore the con-
cept of abandoning wealth to the ruler as a result of his victory would in fact effectively 
negate the value of voluntarily participating in the new state structure. 119 This logic would 
indicate why military activity need not be associated with rule after unification, and why 
urban resistance was minimal, which are two of the most distinctive features of post-
unification Egypt. 120 
In terms of social relationships, the most significant result of the Neolithic was the accumulation 
of wealth, 121 but this was a slow process, and not notably successful in comparison with the 
creation of wealth that followed the appearance of the first states. Regardless of how wealth 
was distributed - and the available genres of dato make it impossible to judge the matter in 
an intelligent fashion - the fact of distribution is evident, for a failure to distribute the wealth 
created would have resulted in the death of the system. lt is impossible to judge in a sincere 
fashion whether the earliest farmers decided to render their wealth directly to the gods or to 
an emerging ruler, and it is unlikely that we will ever know. The next step is virtually impos-
sible to follow for it can be equally logically contended that either ( 1) private property was 
119 lt is curious that M!n (Cf. e.g., Roccati, litterature, pp. 83-98) asserts that he purchased land from nswtyw, for the 
concept has been associated with the idea that these were the "king's men", and it is of course precisely the 
"king's men" who would gain the most from such a hypothetical compromise, as they might acquire large parcels 
of land where security had previously prevented cultivation. K. Gödecken's thought (Helck, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 
p . 70) is quite close to this, but this is pur-e speculation, on my part and on hers . R. Müller-Wollermann's ('sw.tjw 
Bauern als Kolonisatoren," VA 3 [ 1987]: 263-267) interpretation is only marginally different, as presumably the 
stale will have made colonization or homesteading possible. 
M. Gutgesell's ("Die Entstehung des Privateigentums," GM 66 [ 1983 ]: 72) note that these nswtyw were the last 
'Freibauern" makes little sense. He states that cultivable land could be purchased since Dynasty IV at the lotest 
( GM 66: 7 6) when what he means is that as far back as our inscriptional material goes, land could be bought 
and sold. He then ascribes the development of the aristocracy to the possession of land acquired by purchase, 
rather than the opposite, which is what the evidence would imply, i.e., that through the sale of land to officials, 
the aristocracy contributed to its own downfall. This is however all speculation. 
120 lt bears repeating that a great deal of the theoretical thought about private property arises because of the Marxist 
model which omits an early stage of wide-spread private ownership of land, and this is the origin of belief that the 
emergence of land ownership must follow the European feudal model . This logic is not relevant in view of the facts 
of ancient Egypt. 
121 M. Atzler (Herrschaftsformen, pp. l 23ff.) reads the evidence such that a complex economy with a social hierarchy 
and a division of labour was a feature of the Gerzean period which resulted initially in co-operation, and 
subsequently in a central government, and even assumes predynastic scarcity of labour (pp. 141-145). His 
assumptions seem however to be based on irrigation systems controlled by "state" authorities, for which we have 
no evidence, cf. supra, p. 40ff. 
Atzler carefully avoids using the word "state" for any of the Pre-Dynastic or Early Dynastie entities, seemingly 
reseNing the term for the fully fledged developed state of later firnes (p. 217). 
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the inevitable consequence of the Neolithic or (2) that wealth belonged exclusively to the 
legitimate ruler(s) of the community, by virtue of his (their) political role. 122 
The evidence from the tombs of Neolithic Egypt and forly Dynastie Egypt suggests the 
existence not only of private property but also the slow development of social stratification. 123 
Although this cannot be argued very far, B. G . Trigger is doubtless correct in asserting that 
before the end of the Gerzean, "the need to integrate and manage this new economy 
probably contributed to the breakdown of the relatively egalitarian tribal structures". 124 The 
evidence from Abydos certainly confirms that there were differences in the social and 
economic positions of the rulers and the ruled, and suggests that wealth and political rule 
went hand in hand, but the differences were not yet vast. The evidence from Saqqara and 
Helwan can be understood as underlining this fact, or it can be used to suggest that political 
power and wealth were in fact divided, that there were extremely wealthy members of the 
community who were integral parts of the state system, and yet independently wealthy. The 
tombs can also be understood as expressions of power which was not necessarily reflected 
in the political process: private property on a vast scale. 125 Assuming that the first King of 
Upper and Lower Egypt had won a series of military victories which placed temporal power 
in his hands without destroying the privately wealthy, the disparity between the various 
cemeteries is precisely what one would expect, and does not confirm that the new ruling 
king claimed the right to the possession of all of the property in the land of Egypt, either in 
theory or in practice, but it does suggest that the Egyptian state had its origins at the close of 
the lote Pre-dynastic Period. 
Assmann 's concept of mJ ct as "vertical solidarity"126 underlines the fact that part of the 
legitimization to rule was the obl igation to respect other peoples' rights to life, limb and 
property. lt is typical that one weil known legal case from the New Kingdom citing a 
precedent refers to the so-called "Law of Pharaoh" guaranteeing the right to inherit property.127 
The fact that the mere phrase "Law of Pharaoh" suffices to describe this underlines that 
Pharaoh was able to make law, and that one of Pharaoh's primary responsibilities was to 
guarantee the possession of private property. This did not mean that he did not tax his 
122 lt may be extremely important for speculation to recall that the initial shortage wi ll have been seed-corn rather 
than land at the beginning of the Neolithic, and thus that access to grain rother than land may have been decisive 
for the first lwo thousand years o f the Neolithic, but this is purely speculative. 
123 Cf. Atzler, Herrschaftsformen, passim; B. G . Trigger, ''The Rise of Egyptian Civilization, " in Trigger, Sociol History, 
pp. 33-36, cf. e .g ., the assertion of the centralized manufacture of patteryduring the Gerzean culture. This would 
have been big business at the time. The evidence from Ma'adi likewise supparts the hypathesis of independent 
commercial activity (Trigger, Sociol History, pp. 25-26). 
124 Trigger, in Trigger, Sociol History, p. 4 8 . 
125 This is precisely what w ould lead to the relations of Figures 3.4 . and 3 .5 in E. Cruz-Uribe, "A Model for the 
Political Structure of Ancient Egypt," in Silverman, For His Ko, p . 48 . As the fami lies switch from an independent 
position to one of contributing to the ideological and administrative build-up of the state, their position coalesces 
around that of the king . 
126 Assmonn , Mo'of, passim . . 
127 Cf.J.J. Janssen and P. W . Pestmon, "Burial and lnheritance in Ancient Egypt,"JESHO 11 ( 1968): 137-170. This 
particular case is particularly interesling becouse it is specifically stated that the one who buries has the right to 
inherit the property of the deceased. As both Egyptologists and non-Egyptologists are constantly amazed at the 
quantities of material goods that were placed into, or spent on, tombs and burials, it is extremely significant that 
despite the costs , there was enough to inherit to justify the expenses . 
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subjects, but it suggests that the basis of his power was the right to "taxation" which in turn 
implies that people had their private property, and their "free labour power" and that this 
was exploited, rather than going to the trouble of creating a "command economy". 
The immense armies of labourers required for the construction of the tombs of the kings and 
the leading members of society may have been obliged to serve as corvee labour, or they 
may have received rations in exchange for work, or they may actually have been paid for 
the effort. lt is unfortunately a mere matter of speculation, but it is not inappropriate to assume 
that some form of obligations may have prevailed, whereby the people of any given "leader" 
will have owed that leader obligatory services, and that leader may have owed the king 
services, so that the king could benefit from corvee obligations on a vast scale. 128 This does 
not however necessitate central registration of all individuals across the country. 
W. Helck suspects that the Dynasty III transformation changed the political landscape of 
Egypt completely. Whereas during Dynasty I the royal court was badly understaffed and the 
supply system not weil organized, 129 Helck suspects that the Egyptian state really emerged 
when Djoser began to assure regular supplies for the royal court, etc. 130 lt is precisely in 
attempting to distinguish a particular date when a "chiefdom" is transformed into a "state" 
that one faces a serious problem of definitions. J. J. Janssen points out that the quantities of 
copper implements increased during Dynasty 1, and suggests that "it may have been rather 
the result than the cause of Egyptian civilization" going on to remark that the use of writing 
indicates the development of an incipient administration, underlining the argument that the 
origins of the Egyptian state lie in the Pre-Dynastic period, and that the increasing wealth 
was the consequence of the emergence of the state. 131 B. G. Trigger notes that "by the end 
of the Early Dynastie Period most of the principal elements of the court culture of the Old 
Kingdom were already well established," 132 suggesting that the Egyptian state of Dynasty 1 
which emerged out of the Neolithic is the logical beginning for the study of the Egyptian 
state - as the Egyptians themselves maintained. 133 
The tombs of the Old Kingdom are decorated with the personified domains delivering their 
goods to the owner of the tomb, 134 and in some of the tombs inscriptions specifically state 
128 lt is difficult to judge the political and economic significance of the Phyles, but certainly Roth, Phyles has identified 
the most important properties of the system centered around the king. 
129 
"In der Tat kann man Ägypten in dieser Zeit noch eher als ein Häuptlingstum als ein wirkliches Reich ansprechen." 
W. Helck, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, p. 30. 
130 Helck, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, pp. 30-31. 
131 Janssen, in Claessen/Skalnik, Early State, p. 217. 
132 Trigger, in Trigger, Social History, p. 66. 
133 lt is evident that- if the logic expressed here is correct- the primary importance of expropriation and acquisition 
of wealth ascribed to the coercive structures of early states does not apply to Egypt, and thus suggests that the 
creation and appropriation of wealth followed the emergence of the state, and that the state was not an instrument 
of crass dass oppression, although it must have been dominated by a dominant social stratum which appreciated 
wealth and power, as reflected in the construction and equipping of their tombs. The state thus provided the 
opportunity for acquisition, but not the motivation. 
134 Jacquet-Gordon, Noms, passim. 
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that the owner paid the workers, 135 or that he has, e.g ., been given a sarcophagus or false 
door by the king, 136 which necessarily implies that (1) the king had some authority over the 
granite and limestone quarries, and (2) that the owner paid for the remainder of the tomb, 
which again supports the concept of the maintenance of private property on a vast scale, 137 
and the existence of a labour market. B. J. Kemp has however noted that despite his own 
impression that private commerce and manufacturing were widespread during the Old and 
Middle Kingdoms, 138 one of the principal concerns of the state administration was the 
transfer of produce to the court, and that the explosive growth of state employment could 
potentially have produced "serious pressures on the agricultural surplus ."139 
Royal decrees of the Old Kingdom partially exempted temple land from royal interference, 140 
but we have no idea of the quantities of land which came into the possession of the temples. 
lt is this protection from royal interference that provides us with the earliest references to fiscal 
activity in a developed sense. 141 These decrees are also among the most significant sources 
concerning divine temples during the Old Kingdom, for most of the temples preserved as 
ruins date from the following Middle and New Kingdoms, or are dedicated to the funerary 
cults of the kings of the Old Kingdom. 142 lt is certain that the kings founded, built, expanded 
and provided for the divine temples and for the gods during the Early Dynastie Period and 
135 Cf. e.g., Roccati, Lilferature, pp. 146; 152 
136 Cf. Roccati, Lilferature, p. 91: "II s'agit de personages du plus haut rang, des vizirs notament [ ... ]" 
137 Helck (Wirtschaftsgeschichte, pp. 73ff.) suggests a change from a period when the King supplied officials with 
tombs during Dynasty IV to a reversal in Dynasty V when the official had to provide for the tomb himself, but it is 
possible that this can be traced back to the limited quantity of dato available. Even where tombs are allegedly 
assigned, this does not mean that the construction was paid for by the king, as specific sites can be awarded as 
an honor, upon which the official would have to erect a tomb at his own cost. All this is however highly 
speculative, and it is simply fair to conclude from the documentation that most of the recorded cases indicate that 
the owner paid for the tomb, where the matter is recorded. lt is equally logical to contend that tomb owners were 
always as a rule obliged to pay for their tombs, and that only exceptionally did the King provide entire tombs, 
although he may have provided a number of high-quality items as a matter of course. 
138 B. J. Kemp, "Old Kingdom, Middle Kingdom and Second lntermediate Period," in Trigger, Social History, p. 81 . 
"Furthermore, the archaeological record suggests a complex and extensive marketing system, [ .. . ] and makes it 
hard to accept that this was entirely, or even largely, the responsibility of a closed government redistributive 
system ." 
139 Kemp, in Trigger, Social History, p. 176. This is - of course - not logically consistent, for consumption will have 
only risen gradually with slow demographic growth: the labour necessary to produce sufficient corn therefore 
remained the same, but the size of the labour force was diminished, as the division of labour removed workers 
from subsistence production. The constraints will have been the surface area of cultivable weil watered land and 
the work force. 
140 Goedicke, Königliche Dokumente, p. 2, item 1. 
141 The earliest references to census-type activilies combined with exactions belong to a very early stage of social 
and economic development, and it is purely speculative to assume that we can draw reliable conclusions 
concerning ancient Egyptian perceptions of the existing social relationships using modern vocabulary. 
142 This is one of several logical conclusions tobe drawn from the Abu Sir papyri. P. Posener-Krieger (in lipinski, State 
and Temple, pp. 139-140) has been cited supra (p. 33 n. 30) for her interpretation of the logic, but it is equally 
plausible lo argue that the kings sei up divine temples to supply their funerary temples (as would be the logical 
conclusion following Winter (apud Posener-Krieger), because they knew the supplies would be more reliable. 
Thal the kings of the New Kingdom incorporated their funerary temples inlo the domains_ of the wealthy Amun 
- rather than the penurious Osiris - is probably not an accidenl of geography. 
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the Old Kingdom, 143 but it is not certain to what extent support for the divine temples was an 
important aspect of economic activity as a whole, or in terms of royal expenses, or in terms 
of temple support. 144 lt is not certain that the temples had their own means enabling them to 
pursue major construction works, and it is possible that our evidence is representative in 
indicating that the traditional deities of Abydos and Coptos were still among the most 
important outside the domain of the royal monuments, but this is difficult to judge. 
According to Helck's understanding, it was the event of liberating certain parts of the temple 
bureaucracy and above all the employees of the royal mortuary temples during the final part 
of the Old Kingdo~ that eventually led to the existence of a class of skilled craftsmen in 
search of work, for which they could receive remuneration in the private economy.145 This is 
based on the supposition that a bureaucratic development had dominated the market for 
most of the Old Kingdom. lt would however be far more "logical" to assume that quality 
craftsmen were only beginning to appear on the market in large numbers at this point, and 
that it was the very existence of this group that led to the creation of the finely decorated 
tombs of Dynasties V and VI (both private and royal), as weil as to the construction of 
temples, which were themselves only beginning to. get a firm footing in the economy at this 
point. 
143 Cf. Helck's notes ( Wirtschaftsgeschichte, pp 54-55) on the limited dato concerning ternples, and above all his 
observation that before Dynasty V, the ternples probably did not have much land (Wirtschaftsgeschichte, p. 54). 
While probobly valid, his deduction is merely based on the fact that the kings did not donate very much land to 
the ternples before then . This may be related to the amount of land that the kings had at their disposal, the extent 
to which they supported temple independence, and the (unknown) holdings of the temples themselves. lt merely 
underlines the point that royal support for the temples was limited during the Early Dynastie peri~ and the early 
part of the Old Kingdorn. The same conclusion emerges from D. Kessler's notes ("Tempelbesitz," LA VI: 366-367). 
H . Goedicke ("Cult-ternple and 'State' during the Old Kingdom in Egypt," in lipinski, State ond Temple, pp. 113-
l 31) likewise draws attention lo the paucity of informalion about temples during the earlier period, but makes an 
important dislinction between full-time and part-lime temple employees, and associales part of the growth of 
temples with official cults associated with the stale and kingship. He also suggests that the systematic exemptions 
of temples became a substanlial financial burden by the end of the Old Kingdom and contributed to ils fall. 
A. M. Roth ("The Organization and Funclioning of the Royal Mortuary Cults of the Old Kingdom in Egypt," in 
Gibson/Biggs, Power, pp. 138-139) indicates that the part-time staff and lock of competition among the 
mortuary temples during the Old Kingdom left the field free for the provincial officials when the power of the 
central government of the Old Kingdom began to decline. This would !end to contradict Goedicke's assumptions 
as the temples should have become independently politically important if resources were increasingly available to 
them . As both the temples and the governrnent were eclipsed in the subsequent phase, it would appear superfi-
cially that the precarious hold on power rnaintained by the provincial authorities was bosed on a lock of power 
at the cenler, and not a diffusion . 
144 Aside from the Solar temples of Dynasty V, indications of royal construclion on a !arge scale are rare. Reused 
blocks narning earlier kings and occasional statues are found (e.g Pepi I at Hierakonpolis), but this does not 
demonstrate that major construction projects were carried out exclusively by the king . 
145 Helck, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, pp 103_-106. Helck ('Tempelwirtschaft," LÄ VI: 417) perhaps unconsciously 
c:ontradicted this position in suggesting that the temples were assuming a progressively rnore important economic 
role in the economy towards the end of the Old Kingdorn , but neither inter.pretation corresponds to the evidence. 
The evidence presented by R. Müller-Wollermann ("Warenaustausch im Agypten des alten Reiches,'' Jf5HO 28 
[ 1985]: 121-168) can be used to demonstrate the opposite of her hypothesis of the non-existence of a labour 
market. The reason prices were not inscribed on tombs could be merely that one did not want to contesf with the 
gods the value of the work. lf the craftsrnen were content, that sufficed . Mentioning precise prices would complicate 
the religious (!Spect. For this tricky matter, cf. D. A. Warburton, "Same Remarks on the Manufacture and Sole of 
Shabtis," BSEG 9- l O ( 1984-85) : 345-355. lt is very probable that the failure of the expense to match the 
expectations meant that people were wary of recording specific figures in such contexts in the event that they be 
regarded as insufficient in the eyes of some responsible official in the Netherworld or the Beyond. 
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R. Drenkhahn has approached the problem from a different angle, assuming that the craftsmen 
were merely a professional group which found employment in various different branches. 
She concluded that the majority of the craftsmen must belong to some kind of establishment: 
Their various affiliations can be expressed in the captions, by adding a pr-g.tor pr-
\ nswt, wcb.t. There are also numerous references to craftsmen who only have a 
professional title, without additional details, which renders a precise identification 
difficult or impossible. For it appears inadmissible in advance to recognize their 
identity as an independent group, which is not obliged to either a private person or 
the state. 146 
Thus, the dato is understood to indicate that a large group of independent craftsmen may 
have existed, but to recognize this fact is impermissible. She then proceeds to postulate that 
the presence of the royal specification should be understood as indicating a rise in stature, 
without assuming that it would be equally possible to interpret this as meaning that a private 
craftsmen had merely performed in the royal service, and adopted the corresponding title 
(cf. e.g., "By appointment to Her Majesty", a claim found on products of private enterprise). 
Drenkhahn's section entitled "Craftsmen in- the Service of the State (King)" speaks for itself. 
Linder this heading however, she writes: 
This involves the title extensions pr- c;, pr-nswt, nswt, wcb.t as weil as the indication 
of belonging to a temple. 147 
An - accidental - peculiarity of the sources is that craftsmen working in the temple 
workshops are not mentioned in the Old or Middle Kingdoms, but appear in the 
New Kingdom. 148 
Not only does she seemingly assume that royal and temple service is identical in being that 
of the state, but she also assumes that the specification implies constant employment, and 
uses this argument to dispute H. Junker's interpretation in one case, where it is in fact merely 
the juxtaposition of two interpretations of the significance of the specification, 149 neither of 
which is compellingly correct, given the nature of the sources. C. Eyre suggests that Hmwt-
pr- <; are to be understood as "state craftsmen" in the Old Kingdom, and should be 
distinguished from others. 150 
lt is clear that thinking along the lines of Drenkhahn's arbitrary conclusions contributed at 
least indirectly to Assmann's absolute conclusion: 
The role of art and craftsmanship is therefore even more significant. In Egypt art and 
craftsmanship were state monopolies and virtually militarily organized. 151 
146 Drenkhahn, Handwerker, p. 134. My translation . 
147 Drenkhahn, Handwerker, p. 142. My translation . 
148 Drenkhahn, Handwerker, p. 154. My translation . 
149 Drenkhahn, Handwerker, p. 146. My translation . 
150 C. Eyre, "Work and the organization of Work in the Old Kingdom," in Powell, Labor, p. 13. 
151 Assmann, Mo'ot, pp. 52-53. [My translation]. According to Sir John Hicks's theory of economic development. 
(Hicks, Economic History, p. 23), these craftsmen must have belonged to the royal entourage, and thus we see 
the inHuence of Egyptology directly affecting economic history. 
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Assmann constructs his vision of the Egyptian state on the assumption that even Drenkhahn's 
assumption that some craftsmen were attached to private people was bold. Both Assmann 
and Drenkhahn fail to accept the ultimate implications of the evidence for private enterprise 
within the state: even for the Lote New Kingdom, when temple craftsmen are recorded, both 
those of the temple of Amun and the craftsmen at Deir el-Medineh sold their wares on the 
private market, despite their "state" affiliations.152 Both Drenkhahn and Assmann also disregard 
the evidence of the individual tomb proprietors in the Old Kingdom who specifically stated 
that they paid the workers who built their tombs. 
R. Müller-Wollerma~n has shown that independent craftsmen building private tombs probably 
voluntarily negotiated their remuneration in advance, and that they were paid in bread and 
beer which they then used to exchange for other products at local markets. 153 A. M. Roth 
has tied the phyles into the social and construction system of early Egypt, both private and 
royal. 154 She has also plausibly suggested that not only the value of bread and beer, but 
also that of cloth was used "as compensation for labor" "with well-known values". 155 
lt would thus seem that there are no indications of temple craftsmen during the Old Kingdom 
- and contra Drenkhahn, by no means accidentally- but that craftsmen are associated with 
(1) the royal sphere, and (2) private foundations, and that (3) alongside these is a pool of 
craftsmen and manpower attached neither to the king nor private people, accompanied by 
(4) the phyles as the vestige of the ancient clan system, representing a social net, including 
both private and royal leaders. The basic significance of this is to underline the appearance 
that (a) royal projects and (b) tombs and mortuary cults were the primary sectors of the non-
subsistence construction and service parts of the economy, and that their existence 
contributed to the stimulation of both service and article exchange markets. 
We thus perceive that the Old Kingdom experienced the emergence of a differentiated 
economic structure, positing (1) royal and (2) crown lands; along with (3) temple lands; 
(4) private funerary domains; (5) private land holdings; combined with (6) a labour market; 
probably including (7) private commercial trade; 156 and (8) the sale of land, as weil as 
(9) the assertion of the royal right to a proportion of the non-royal holdings, i.e. income, use, 
and wealth taxes, probably supplemented with corvee labour, which is a kind of tax in kind. 
152 Cf e.g., D. A. Warburton, "Some Remarks on the Manufacture and Sole of Shabtis," BSEG 9-10 ( 1984-85): 
345-355; eg., Giornale, Verso 8 (Botti/Pee.t, Giornale, pi. 40; KR/ VI: 590ff; Allam, HOP, pp. 331-335) 
153 R. Müller-Wollermann, "Warenaustausch im Agypten des alten Reiches," JESHO 28 (1985): 145-146. 
154 Roth, Phyles, passim. For the labour force, composition and context, cf. C, Eyre, "Work and the Organization of 
Work in the Old Kingdom," in Powell, Labor, pp. 5-47. Although excellent, his interpretotion is marred by 
attempting to weave contradictory evidence together, while the opprooch used here is to follow a more logical 
line. 
155 A. M. Roth, "The Proctical Economics of Toml:rßuilding in the Old Kingdom," in Silvermon, For His Ka, p. 236. 
156 While the Old Kingdom kings were definitely intimately involved in Irade with foreign countries, it is curious that 
the direct connections across the Sinai came to an end with Dynosty II at the lotest. This con be interpreted in a 
number of ways, one of them being the severonce of private Irade with the strengthening of the Egyptian state, 
and thus the passibility of the invocotion of royal prerogatives in international Irade from the beginning of the Old 
Kingdom, or the simple result of the development of economic muscle, which mode the private Irade ceose tobe 
lucrative. lt is however clear that whotever international Irade existed during the Prolo-Dynastie and Eorly Dynastie 
periods moy hove been private: whether this continued on a lorge scole after Dynasty III is probably impossible 
to answer decisively. -
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Thus, while some scholars of the ancient Near East have pursued a definition of the state far 
beyond that consciously employed by political scientists, other scholars have been unable to 
break the bonds of political theory, and consequently assume that the Egyptian state with its 
public and private property, legal guarantees, legitimate ruling bodies, etc., must have 
emerged out of a feudal post. These conclusions must be lined up with the assumptions of 
those political scientists who contend that the state did not exist before the 16th century AD. 
Very few Egyptologists would consciously agree that there was no concept of the state 
before the Greek polis. The result is that some elements of modern Egyptological theory are 
based on self-contradictory circular logic: logic based on conscious and unconscious 
assumptions. The fact that there was a state structure can hardly be used as evidence for 
feudal relationships having preceded it and molded it. The degree of private 
enterprise demonstrated by the records stands in clear contrast to the absence of any 
recorded "redistribution" on a large scale. The state was collecting and constructing, but it 
does not seem to have been redistributing, primarily because the population had their own 
sources of income in the private sector. 
Regardless of what preceded it, by the end of the Old Kingdom, the Egyptians most assur-
edly had a form of state which political scientists would have difficulties in discounting. The 
Egyptian state recognized several categories of participant in the process of law: the king, 
his princes and officials, clans and clan leaders - potentially as local officials, the population 
at large, the gods, their temples and their priests all had their proper place in society. The 
rights of each were defined by virtue of the relations between them. The strength of the King 
vis-a-vis god and man during Dynasties III and IV is clear, and the growth of that power 
during the preceding period is as clear as its decline during the following period, but for the 
situation of the Old Kingdom, much of our speculation in detail is purely guesswork based on 
hypothetical analyses of fragmentary sources of uncertain and debatable significance. 
The state was however clearly decisive for the social and economic development of the 
land. The number of important structures increased explosively, and the cemeteries of the 
private people are grouped around the tombs of the most important kings. The kings had 
enormous temple complexes constructed, for themselves and to a lesser extent, the gods. lt 
was their officials who constructed huge tombs (although these need not have been funded 
out of their professional income). lt was clearly the advent of the Old Kingdom state which 
emerged out of the nascent lote Pre-Dynastic and Early Dynastie State that created this 
wealth, transforming a largely clan dominated sedentary Neolithic culture, albeit with long 
distance trade connections with Palestine and Mesopotamia. 157 The security derived from 
legitimate government contributed to economic growth, and the legitimacy derived from 
ruling and recognizing individual property rights also authorized the legitimate rulers to 
"expropriate" goods and "conscript" services. 
157 Fora reviews of evidence and references, cf. T. E. Levy, et al., "New Light on King Narmer and the Protodynastic 
Egyptian Presence in Canaan,'' BA 58/1 (1995): 26-35. and A. P. Largacha, "Relations Between Egypt and 
Mesopotamia at the end of the Fourth Millennium," GM 137 (1993): 59-76. 
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During the Lote New Kingdom, a thousand years after the end of the Old Kingdom, the state 
was still probably the single most important economic player in the T wo Lands, and thus it 
was the activity of the state that assured that demand would increase, and therefore production, 
wealth and prosperity. During the New Kingdom, we are not however obliged to turn to 
speculation about the relationships between the institutions and the people. Legal specifica-
tions delineated the rights and obligations of the state and also both directly and indirectly, 
the rights and obligations of the subjects, and the rights and obligations of the officials . 
Assuming that the state existed and that it was an evolving organism, we can turn to the 
actual documentation in order to return to our theoretical considerations about the role of the 
state in ancient Egypt. One of the most decisive points is however the emergence of powerful 
divine temples in the thousand years separating the Old Kingdom from the New. 
On the one hand, the architectural remains testify to the extent of divine construction during 
the New Kingdom, but the absence of temple workshops and craftsmen during the Old 
Kingdom suggests that the interpretation of the architectural remains need not be ascribed 
merely to accidents of preservation and re-employment. The temples played a different role 
during the New Kingdom than during the Old, but it is difficult to quantify a difference based 
upon the hazards of preservation. The material permits certain observations to be made 
about the New Kingdom which contrast with the impressions of the Old Kingdom. Docu-
ments relating to land ownership are in short supply, but it is possible to demonstrate that the 
agricultural land of New Kingdom Egypt was in the hands of the King, the temples, officials 
and private people. The exact rights under which officials and private people could "own" 
land are however the crux of the problem . 
The Egyptian Pharaoh of the New Kingdom was personally wealthy, and responsible for 
Crown lands, and the ultimate High Priest of all the gods and head of state. 158 The primary 
difference between the Old and New Kingdoms was in the development of politically and 
economically apparently independent temple organizations and we will return to this point 
in the final chapter, after having examined the economic structure of the United Kingdom of 
Upper and Lower Egypt, and the evidence of the texts relevant to state involvement in the 
economy. 
158 This makes his position analogous to that of the Queen of England who is one of the richest people in the world, 
but receives an allowance from the government to carry out official functions, and the head of the Church of 
England when in England, and the Church of Scotland when in Scotland, and also head of state of the United 
Kingdom and many states of the Commonwealth. Just as the New Kingdom Pharaoh had viziers to manage 
government affairs, the Queen has prime ministers to head the various governmenls of the slates, and thus in 
Britain, there is no question that the Church of England is part of the state, and that it is less arguably parl of the 
government, as the apex of the state hierarchy is one level above the apex of the government structures. 
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Yvan Koenig explained that the papyrus he published was a palimpsest because demand 
far outstripped supply during the Ramesside Period, 159 citing Sir Alan Gardiner, who noted: 
There is good reason for thinking that, in the Ramesside period, the demand for 
papyrus as a writing material far outran the supply. T o this state of affairs the very 
frequent employment of potsherds and fragments of limestone bears witness [ .. . ]160 
Viewing the same evidence, J. Cerny concluded 
These frequent palimpsests can best be explained if we assume that papyrus was a 
relatively expensive material. 161 
After going over the evidence and concluding that ready made papyrus rolls were not 
expensive, J. J. Janssen cites Cerny, indicating that in fact, 
papyrus appears to have been far from scarce in the Village [ .. . ] Though of course 
ostraca, being quite without value, were cheaper still, one can hardly say that 
papyrus was expensive. 162 
R. Caminos took issue with this assertion . His reasoning was that because they re-used 
papyrus, it must have been expensive, asserting that Janssen's 
view that papyrus was not expensive rests on weak arguments that no court of law 
would admit as evidence.163 
lt should be clear that the logical sequence linking the use of ostraca and palimpsests with 
scarcity and high demand led to the assumption that papyrus was expensive, based on the 
assumption that the Egyptians viewed things through a functional competitive market-type 
mentality. That even Janssen associated the facts that papyrus was cheap and abundant 
indicates that he implicitly assumed that prices were formed as a result of demand and 
supply, although he explicitly denies that this assumption has been demonstrated .164 When 
Janssen defended the evidence of the prices, he withdrew the argument for abundance, but 
like Caminos, he did not do so with strong support of the evidence, and primarily because 
he had perceived the logical inconsistency in his stance, and sought to correct the error of 
making the association .165 A roll cost about the same as a pair of sandals, but rolls do not 
appear to have been as abundant as sandals. This makes it uncertain whether sandals were 
159 Y. Koenig, "Livroisons d'Or et de Galene au tresor du temple d'Amon sous lo XXe Dynastie," Hommoges Sauneron, 
p. 190. 
160 
'3ardiner, P. Chester Beotty /, p 2. 
161 Cerny, Paper ond Books, p. 23 . 
162 Janssen, Prices, pp. 447-448 . 
163 
"Same Comments on the Reuse of Papyrus, " in Bierbrier, Papyrus, p. 52 n. 23. 
164 Janssen, Prices, pp. 560-61 . 
165 J. J. Janssen, "The Price of Papyrus,' DE 9 ( 1987): 33-35 . 
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comparatively expensive or papyrus comparatively cheap, but confirms that abundance 
and demand and supply do not seem to have been as relevant to price formation as some 
scholars would be inclined to conclude.166 
We should hesitate before drawing perfectly "logical" conclusions about "economic" behavior. 
The tendency to make economic assumptions which contradict the evidence remains with 
us, as there is a lot of similar involuntary economic reflection in the Egyptological literature. 
The following notes may appear tobe slightly longer - and more tedious - than required, 
but it is useful to review the discussion before embarking on a study which is avowedly 
economic in orientation. 
C ON SUMPTION VS. PRODUCTION 
While an unconscious misunderstanding of the relevance of market rules has dominated 
much of the peripheral discussion of the economy, the term "redistribution" has dominated 
much of the conscious discussion of the economy. lt should be emphasized that not only is 
there room for doubt about the relevance of the laws of supply and demand, but that there 
is also room for doubt about the relevance of the term redistribution. Regardless of how 
important the term is, fundamentally "redistribution" does not by itself account for production, 
for the origins and development of wealth. The wealth acquired - in order tobe "redistributed" 
- was acquired by taxation : the surplus is produced by the farmers . And insofar as this 
surplus was "redistributed", it was given to a different dass: the dependents of the state. lt is 
therefore a question of circulation. 
The father of modern neoclassical economic theory, 
[ ... Alfred] Marshall maintained that the theory of supply and demand was not the · 
scientific basis of economics. The central problem of economics, according to him, 
is not the allocation of given resources, but rather how the resources became what 
they are. 167 
Exploration of the significance of the demand which created resources in ancient Egypt is 
the central point of the present work. The object of this work is thus not to demonstrate either 
the existence of unemployment or surplus production, but to examine the economic implications 
of those elements of the economy which we can grasp. 
166 1 cannot follow J. Baines's logic, for he states bluntly "that it was never very cheap" but cites Janssen , whose dato 
apply only to the New Kingdom and thought that he had demonstrated the opposite (cf. J. Baines, "Literacy, 
social organization, and the archaeological record : the case of early Egypt," in Gledhill , Stole and Society, p . 
196). 
167 Screpanti/Zamagni , Economic Thought, p. 180 . 
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APPROACHES TO EcoNOMIC HISTORY 
Our object is alien to the Egyptian way of thought, since the Egyptians very probably never 
tried to understand their economy in the way that they consciously created at least one state 
ideology. Understanding the economy is however of fundamental interest not only for its 
own intrinsic attractions, but also because it influences us in interpreting the evidence (cf. supra, 
p. 71 ). Enthusiasm has however been restrained and the level of debate limited, at least 
partly because the sources are elusive, and the terrain unfamiliar. 
During this century, the interpretation of the economic history of the classical world has 
undergone a revolution. The Graeco-Roman world had a passionate love for stories, 
biographies, inscriptions but also figures and dato, and Rostovtzeff employed this 
dato effectively to create an economic and social history of the ancient world. 168 His inter-
pretation was not consciously biased, and concentrated on social history in the light of 
economic and technological improvements, all in the context of a clear understanding of the 
basic historical trends of the ancient world. Following the publication of his works and 
numerous similar studies, Sir Moses Finley postulated that the ancients could not possibly 
have understood economics in the current sense of the word. Thus he sought to find illuminat-
ing sources in classical texts with no apparent bearing on the economy, and developed a 
theoretical model for the Graeco-Roman world corresponding to our own image, and yet at 
variance with it. 169 His view has since been assailed as slightly paternalistic, and current 
work suggests that the economy of the Graeco-Roman world was much more in accord with 
Rostovtzeff's view than was widely thought as a result of Finley's work, so that for the world 
of classical antiquity there is an increasing tendency to return to standard methods and 
approaches. 170 
The entire history of classical Egyptian civilization stood however on the other side of the 
chronological and psychological divides separating the Bronze Age from the lron, the 
monetary economy from the non-monetary, and therefore no theoretical assumptions can be 
taken for granted, no concept unexamined. The ancient Egyptians stand magnificently apart. 
lt is a challenge to approach an unfathomable aspect of a distant society of whose very 
existence the ancients were not conscious. 
lt is important to face the obstacles and study the economy as our interpretation of a society 
depends upon our prejudices, and it is obviously imperative to identify the parameters by 
which we view any society: either consciously or unconsciously, virtually every scholar has 
168 Rostovtzeff, Hellenistic World and Roman Empire. 
169 Finley, Ancient Economy. 
170 Cf. e. g., Kloft, Wirtschaft, Rathbone, Economic Rationalism. lt is worth noling that Finley's selective exploitation 
of sources allowed him to distort the interpretation of basic economic dato. Finley cited the case of Trimalchio to 
demonstrate that the ancient world thought exclusively in terms of self-sufficiency (Ancient Economy, p. 36), and 
concluded: 'he was openly delighted with his wealth and boastful about it, and he was equally pleased with his 
self-sufficiency". lt should however be noted that Andrew Carnegie boasted "that he could fish in his own lochs, 
drink milk from his own cows, eat grapes from his own greenhouses, [ ... J and allow his guests to shoot over his 
own moors' (W. Newlands, "Rich Treats await at Carnegie's old home," W FT[5/6 August 1995]: IX). Thal 
Carnegie was the greatest industriol copitalist of his oge underlines thot such boasting con be directly ossocioted 
with the acquisition of wealth for its own soke, ond cannot be used to orgue obout entrepreneurial motivotion. 
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an interpretation of the Egyptian economy. lt is however dangerous to theorize about the 
economy and then conclude that the economy was the most important thing in the world, as 
it was only part of the basis of the civilization, not the civilization. Realizing this however 
does not negate the obligation to examine the issue, but to enhance our understanding we 
must define many institutions, as economics is about social relations, and human society is 
made up of customs and institutions. And we cannot be certain about the appropriate 
weight to assign to any given method of approaching the subject. 
Traditionally, and practically, the most significant approach is and will remain the study of 
texts in and of themselves. This must however be supplemented with other methods. One is 
the employment of advanced statistical analysis. 171 Another is the use of ethnographic material. 
The methods of economic history should also be drawn upon. And economic theory must 
also be included, and interpretations and conclusions examined in the cold light of theoretical 
observation. 
Using ethnoarchaeological methods anthropologists, archaeologists and other scholars draw 
on information gained from existing primitive economies to understand conditions in the 
ancient world. While valuable for providing insights about the use of technology and about 
the quality of life in Palaeolithic times, and informative about the nature of village and rural 
life, it does not prove anything: it merely illustrates. Anthropologists deliberately seek out the 
poorest parts of the world and study the habits of the natives there, but even there, techno-
logically, many of these peoples are actually above levels achieved in the ancient world, 
and yet they reflect a different type of society. We must be wary of employing such dato as 
economics represents the study of aspects of social relationships and not the level of techno-
logical achievement, so that the mere use of identical technology cannot permit conclusions 
about economic relationships. The ancient Egyptian economy and state were created by social 
and political innovators, and even if the methods that they used were technologically primitive, 
their social and political accomplishments were not. Their state was millennia ahead of 
many of the African and Asian societies sought out by anthropologists in search of ethno-
archaeological parallels, and therefore such parallels must be used with caution, and only in a 
context where they can throw light on a specific type of social constellation. 172 
The study of economic history and the study of economics are two different fields, using 
different methods. Vastly oversimplified, economics is a new science dominated by the study 
of the laws governing the functioning of modern capitalist economies, for the science of 
economics grew up with the industrial revolution, and has been primarily concerned with the 
development of the capitalist world, with its system of production for markets and trade 
171 S. Katary applied statistical methods to the study of the Wilbour Papyrus, and achieved results which would have 
been inconceivable without computer-aided analysis (Kotary, Land Tenure). lt is cleor that we must increasingly 
think in terms that enable our dato tobe fed into computers, but computers do not enable us to infer and draw 
conclusions: they can only aid in dato management, and statistics ore in short supply given the existing structure 
of our science. lt is only by Aexible approoches and original thoughts that computers can be used effectively: the 
approaches must be identified and attempted. In this domain the study of the ancient Egyptian economy is still in 
its infancy. 
172 Janssen (Prices, p. 540) notes that the very items still traded today in Africa are those recorded in his volume: 
"Clearly not much has changed in Africa over three millennia." 
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based on profit and comparative advantage. Economic history is a field which uses traditional 
historical methods and approaches to pose questions from an historical viewpoint, and is 
generally more closely allied with history and social history than with economics. 
One reason for the divergence of economic history from economics is the fact that originally 
the primary concern of economics was the distribution of goods in an economy dominated 
by scarcity. Needless to say, industrial economics today are no langer dominated by the 
scarcity of goods (for industry can apparently produce in virtually unlimited quantities), but 
by the twin scarcities of consumer credit and employment. Scarcity of goods was however 
the primary feature of human experience since the emergence of the first hominids, and 
therefore economic history is dominated by the fashion in which goods were distributed 
among the various social groups which made up any given society. Economic history and 
social history are thus mutually related, but only in a more distant fashion to the science of 
economics, which is today dominated by financial problems. 
lt is important to grasp the extent to which our models of ancient Egypt have contributed to 
a slightly imbalanced understanding of economic history in the larger context. lt is very rare 
that economic history and theory are combined in a single werk. 
The distinguished economist Sir John Hicks did however mention Egypt several times in his 
A Theory of Economic History, leading to the conclusion that Egypt could be no more than 
a Revenue Economy. 173 His assumption is that the specialization of labour preceded the 
emergence of the market. Although he does indicate in one reference that a market may 
have existed at a very early date, he then logically excludes it, by suggesting that the 
bureaucracy was predominant. lt is however difficult to understand how a revenue economy 
with craft specialization can emerge without being globally primarily either a redistribution, 
market, or command-economy. The revenues must be levied on some group, and therefore 
the assumption that a revenue economy can function weil in a pre-market environment is 
difficult to integrate into a comprehensive theoretical model. 174 
Sir John was doubtless conscious of these problems, but the dato available to him did not 
reveal that the evidence for an early form of market economy existed . In defining the emer-
gence of the market, Sir John identifies two significant features. One is the existence of 
craftsmen who produce for a market. The second is the existence of contracts dealing with 
commercial transactions. Since both of these items clearly existed in ancient Egypt, a market 
economy existed according to his own definitions. He failed to recognize it however, be-
cause the dato was not clearly presented. 
A far more sophisticated presentation of the Egyptian economy is presented by North in his 
Structure and Change in Economic History. 175 His analysis is however based on the as-
173 Hicks, Economic History, pp. 18-24. 
174 One of the primary difficulties is that people tend automatically to assume that the mere possession of a title meant 
that the person holding the title was exclusively an office holder, and that this was his primary source of income, 
as in the case for bureaucrats today. This was not necessarily the case in ancient Egypt where the members of the 
Gang worked on free lance projects, and in Roman Egypt it is clear that entrepreneurial gentlemen farmers bore 
official titles (cf. Rathbone, Economic Rationalism, passim). 
175 North, Economic History, pp. 97-99. 
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sumption that property rights were limited, and that the centrally organized command-economy 
apparent from the texts and presented in the conventional histories is the only economy. His 
entire argument is based on the redistributive model for Ancient Egypt. The assumption that 
problems related to property rights were the principle barrier to economic development in 
antiquity is derived from the interpretations of the economy currently available. Since it can 
be argued that the guarantees were specifically stated by M!n at an early stage of historical 
development, and that these guarantees were so widely taken for granted that they never 
appear again - except implicitly in economic activity and explicitly in the "Law of Pharaoh" -
then the entire basis of his argument rests on an interpretation of the evidence which is 
certainly not comprehensive. 
lt should thus be clear that presentation of the data mixed with interpretation can lead 
scholars from other disciplines to fail to recognize the difference between interpretation and 
presentation. The use of the theory should thus be clearly marked, and the actual sources 
clearly identified. The assumption that it is possible to work without theoretical models is 
difficult to accept, for preconceptions always influence one's conclusions, as we saw in the 
case of the price of papyrus mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. 
VALUE oF EcoNOMIC T HEORY 
Economic theory can be applied to pose questions concerning factors potentially influencing 
relationships between social groups to throw light on ancient economic activity. The use of 
modern economic theory to elucidate long term economic trends does not imply the assump-
tion of economically "rational" behavior - it is merely a tool used to enhance understanding. 
There is however no agreement on the value of theory. J. J. Janssen writes that familiarity with 
modern economic thought can actually be an obstacle: 
[ ... ] odd as it may seem tobe, profound knowledge of the modern market-directed 
economy proves to be of little value to the egyptologist and may even be obnoxious 
since it tends to blind him to the fundamental difference between the modern 
Western world and ancient Egypt. 176 
This objection to the use of market-oriented thought would appear on the surface to be 
entirely justified, but there are three reasons which suggest that the judgment is premature. 
On the one hand, (1) modern economic thought is not the solid mass of logically coherent 
and consistent theory it is often perceived to be, and (2) scholars of the ancient world are 
generally unaware of theoretical developments, but even more serious is the difficulty posed 
by (3) those selecting alternative theories. 
One of Janssen's main contentions is that anthropological material can contribute to under-
standing ancient Egyptian society. This point is important and weil taken. ßut it need not be 
relevant to the use of modern methods of economic analysis. In his study of Commodity 
Prices, Janssen indicates that he has avoided theoretical discussions because he regards this 
176 J.J.Janssen, "Prolegomena tothe Studyof Egypt's Economic Historyduring the New Kingdom," SAK3 (1975): 131. 
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as premature (p. l ), and yet proceeds to discuss the theory of prices in anthropological terms 
(pp. 556ff.), because: 
these prices do not have the precise meaning that prices are supposed to have in 
our society. 177 
With this statement Janssen draws two conclusions: (1) that the word price has a "precise 
meaning [ ... ] in our society", and (2) that the prices in Deir el-Medineh were somehow not 
normal, according to this standard. This was however accomplished without discussing any 
standards defining what a price is "in our society". Having avoided modern theoretical 
discussions of price formation by asserting that his approach was not theoretical, Janssen 
was justified in declining to discuss modern economic theory. His preference for the use of 
anthropological examples is likewise methodologically consistent, as the use of anthropo-
logical examples is not theoretical, and they can illustrate behavior patterns . In themselves 
however, anthropological parallels do not constitute a proof of the validity of an alternative 
theory, nor can they disprove a theory against which they are not measured. There are two 
different categories involved. One is modern theory, and the other is anthropology. 
Merely claiming that modern theory is insufficient to understand Egyptian prices does not 
alone demonstrate the inadequacy of modern theory. Nor does it provide a methodological 
justification for using anthropology as an alternative to modern economic theory. There 
should be no doubt whatsoever that in studying a society such as ancient Egypt anthropology 
can - and should - supplement economic theory. Janssen himself was and is conscious that 
the two are not the same, and has frequently avoided theoretical discussions, as he regards 
this as premature. Janssen understands the logic of his procedure, and is aware that the path 
he chose was that followed by anthropologists like Dalton and not necessarily that of Polanyi. 
This has not widely been recognized however: 
Following the scholarship of J. J. Janssen, for ancient Egypt, most scholars have tried 
to build on the models of pre-market economies devised by Karl Polanyi. 178 
The basis of this approach is the assumption that modern theory cannot be used, rather than 
the demonstration that it is either unsuitable or incorrect. Eichler has argued that the mere 
relevance of Polanyi renders the use of modern theory inadmissible, and thus reveals that the 
methodological system employed by Polanyi 's adherents does not share traditional scientific 
attitudes towards investigation and demonstration .179 
lt is contended here that modern economic theory can provide aid, if properly employed. 
Modern theory has several different price theories, so that the problem is not that the theory 
is inadequate for the ancient world . There is no complete agreement on the issue. Nor has 
modern theory managed to provide a comprehensive theory of profit. 180 This is an obstacle 
177 Janssen, Prices, p. 515 . 
178 E. Bleiberg, "The Economy of Ancient Egypt," in Sasson, Civilizations, p. 1375. 
179 E. Eichler, "Polanyi - Keynes - Warburton," GM 13 l ( 1992): 25-3 l. 
180 Cf. Obrinsky, Profit Theory, passim, and Screpanti/ Zamagni, Economic Thought, pp. 255-256. 
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to the assumption - widely held among Egyptologists - that understanding of ancient 
economics demands that one emphasize the lock of understanding of profits in the ancient 
world. As modern theory has no comprehensive theory of profit, it is not justified to assert that 
modern theory is based upon profit. Profit may be a significant aspect of the modern economy, 
and it may have been a feature of the ancient economy, but the significance of this is not 
certain, and profit theory is certainly not an essential aspect of modern theory. Thus, the 
problem is that economic theory is difficult to grasp, but this alone does not demonstrate that 
it is an obstacle to understanding. 
Related to this is the third problem : that of the use of "alternative theories". The primary 
bastion here is that built around Polanyi's opposition to theories based on exploitation. This 
has led several scholars to model their conclusions according to that theory, rather than 
either modern theory or the evidence, without realizing that Polanyi did not produce any 
economic theories. 181 lt is however not clear that Polanyi's message has been widely grasped. 
Despite the seeming assertion that Polanyi provided "adequate tools of analysis" 182 there is 
some confusion about how Egyptologists should understand this . Although allegedly an 
adherent of the Polanyi approach, E. Eichler specifically argued in favour of redistribution, 
stating at the same time that the possession of land was a source of prestige in ancient 
Egypt, and maintaining simultaneously that the state ruthlessly abused its citizens. Polanyi 
maintained however that private property was one of the basic features of an exchange 
economy, and that justice played a central role in the redistribution economy. Eichler's lock 
of familiarity with the principles of Polanyi's system thus led him to make statements implicitly 
and unwittingly discrediting the entire "theory", and is thus an unusually valuable illustration 
of the dangers of the failure to grasp theory.183 E. Bleiberg has attempted to deny the profit-
motive in ancient Egypt, asserting this as a fact, based on Polanyi . Polanyi made no such 
claims however. 
R. Müller-Wollermann has attempted to disavow the evidence of a market in favour of 
reciprocal trading, influenced by Polanyi's categories, and this has led her to theoretically 
far reaching conclusions. 184 Among her conclusions is the claim that in view of Polanyi's 
theory, market exchange is excluded by evidence of the presence of reciprocity and redis-
tribution. She has also speculated that redistribution is a kind of reciprocity. These are clearly 
theoretical possibilities with great potential, and suggest a system which can serve to under-
stand economic and social patterns. 
181 Cf. D. A. Warburton, "The Economy of ancient Egypt Revisited Yet Again," GM 146 ( 1995) : l 03-111 . 
182 J. Renger, "On Economic Struclures in Ancienl Mesopolamio, " Or. 63 (1994): 165. 
183 E. Eichler, "Polanyi - Keynes - Warburton, " GM 131 ( 1992): 25 -31. 
M. Gutgesell has also endeavoured to use economic theory at a high level. In conlrasl to some other participanls 
he suggests that the use of theory be recognized, on the assumption thot market economic assumplions be 
avoided (cf. "Wirtschaft," lÄ VI : _ _1277 n. 3) . His familiarity with theory is howe~er unfortunately incomplete . Cf. 
D. A. Warburton, "Keynes'sche Uberlegungen zur altägyplischen Wirtschaft,' ZAS 11 8 ( 1991) : 78 n. 12. In the 
example cited there he refers to the failure of prices to fall as a demonstration thot the economy was determined. 
In fact however, one aspect of Post-Keynesian economic onolysis is the recognition !hat prices do not necessorily 
fall, although they do rise, so that his demon~trotion reveols only his own distance from the theoretical bose. 
184 R. Müller-Wollermonn, "Warenaustausch im Agypten des alten Reiches, " JESHO 28 ( 1985): 121-168. 
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lt is not clear however that Polanyi contended that one could argue by using evidence of 
redistribution to el iminate the possibility of market exchange (andJanssen certainly does not 
cloim this). Equally, according to Polanyi, redistribution was determined by asymmetrical 
sociol relations and reciprocity by symmetrical relations. Ultimately, therefore, Müller-
Wollermann's conclusions defy integration into Polanyi's system, although the assumption of 
the validity of his system was her point of departure. 
Grandet interpreted P. Harris I in terms of Polanyi's theories, and thus permitted his philological 
conclusions to be influenced by his economic assumptions . More seriously however, he 
ultimately placed the implementation of the concept of "redistribution" into question, and thus 
implicitly undermined the "theory" that he thought he was applying. 185 J. J.Janssen repeatedly 
found evidence confirming the market, yet denies the validity of the evidence by asserting 
the primary nature of the redistribution system . Janssen has also suggested that the tools 
issued to the Gang were given to them in the context of the redistribution economy, although 
this is not really part of redistribution in an economic sense. 186 
lt would seem thus that Polanyi's system (1) has been insufficiently weil understood, so that 
those applying it failed to agree upon the meaning, or that it (2) is inadequate. This alone 
indicates that Polanyi 's system has certainly not been demonstrated tobe the "best available 
tool of analysis". 187 These cases demonstrate that premising any kind of conclusions with 
theoretical presuppositions is not a problem limited to the unconscious application of market 
economics. They throw doubt on the scientific value of Polanyi's "theory" and certainly show 
that it is not very weil understood. They clearly demonstrate that the use of any theory is in 
and of itself dangerous, if used without undue caution. These cases certainly cannot be used 
to justify the suggestion that modern theory is unsuitable: they merely advise caution. 
Objection to the use of modern theory also neglects the fact that there are major debates in 
the field of modern economic theory and policy concerning state-interventionism vs. laissez-
faire, protectionism vs. free trade, and about the various theories of the origin of value and 
price . Several alternatives are available with theory wrestling with the very problems 
concerning the role of the state in the economy, and the role of the market, and the origin of 
value, that are extremely relevant to ancient Egypt. The objections to spurning the choice of 
subtle theory in favour of Polanyi, merely because he disputed the relevance of the market 
exchange system do not warrant repetition. 188 By renouncing the use of modern economic 
analysis - even as a simple means of verification or testing - Egyptologists are distancing 
themselves from mainstream thought, and actually hindering communication with economic 
historians who might be interested in the dato, which can only lead to a greater gap 
separating Egyptologists from economics. lnterpreting dato without theoretical analyses and 
presenting this material as "uninterpreted dato" to the social and economic historians does 
185 Grandel, Papyrus Harris . 
186 Cf. Janssen, Marktop de Oever;J .J.Janssen, "An Exceptional Evenlat Deirel-Medina (P. Turin 1879, Verso II)," 
JARCE 31 ( 1994): 93 : "[ ... ] the workmen, being at the receiving end of the redistribution system, were provided 
w ith copper for the tools they needed for their work in the royal tomb." 
187 Renger, "Economic Structures," Or. 63 : 165, quoling Silver. 
188 Cf. D. A. Warburton , "The Economy of ancient Egypt Revisited Yet Again, " GM 146 ( 1995): l 03-111 . 
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not render a service. lt is essential to separate the material from the methods and the interpre-
tations, so that historians can judge for themselves. 189 
Another objection to theory is the interpretation of the role of the market in modern economics, 
particularly capitalist economics. Dobb has suggested that capitalism requires not only 
production for the market, but middlemen acting on the profit motive.190 Marx maintained 
that the relevant criterion was merely the existence of wage-labor. Weber suggested industrial 
production associated with rational accounting. Polanyi maintained that the crucial step to 
the exchange economy occurred with the emergence of markets for land and-wage labor.191 
Wallerstein has characterized capitalism as being intimately associated with the state, with 
the state bearing the losses, and private entrepreneurs making the gains. 192 
We noted above that the ancient Egyptian economy had the basic criteria tobe a market 
economy according to Sir John Hicks. These other sources suggest that the ancient Egyptian 
economy could even be classified as a kind of nascent capitalism, for we have wage-
labour, a market for land, production for the market, and state involvement. There is no 
evidence of rational accounting in the earliest periods or of an organized credit system, but 
peculiarly, banking does not appear tobe regarded as an essential feature of capitalism. lt 
would thus appear that ultimately the only objection to the use of theory is the mere intention 
of a separatist approach. lt is however difficult to justify on any sound economic 
or epistemological basis. 
Even if modern theory was directly applicable however, one great obstacle to a thorough 
economic · analysis of the ancient Egyptian economy is the fact that we are inevitably 
interpreting when discussing the most basic dato. The Egyptian economy was based on the 
use of grain. Grain was collected as "taxes" or "rent" and paid out as "wages" or "rations", 
and used as a medium of exchange. lt was harvested on both (a) large plots which belonged to 
king, the temples, the government and - possibly - powerful individuals and (b) small 
holdings, yet we have no idea about the proportion of GNP 193 consumed by government 
expenditures and income, not to mention the total GNP, so that a sectoral breakdown is 
virtually impossible. Thus we have no way of judging things on a micro level, and this would 
ordinarily prevent further speculation, but the field of macro economics exists to aid in this 
gap: we do not need to grasp the way an individual firm or government department operated 
in order to be able to provide an outline suggesting the conditions under which they made 
their decisions. 
This does not discredit the use of theory, but does advise caution in making assumptions 
about what theory is. Economic theory is a far more subtle tool than is apparent at first sight. 
189 As J. J. Janssen and R. Müller-Wollermann did in exemplary fashion in their studies of commodity exchange. 
190 Dobb, Capitalism, pp. 4-11 . 
191 Polanyi, livelihood, p. l 0 . 
192 Wallerstein, World-System, 1: 348. 
193 Gross National Product (GNP) is equal to the financial value of the total quantity of goods and services involved 
in transactions in a given country annually. 
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PREVIOUS USE OF THEORY 
Economics defines relations within a system, with the emphasis on social relations, rather 
than technological arrangements. lt is not the intention here to suggest that Rb-mi-R' and 
Thutmosis III discussed, e.g., monetary policy or unemployment as such, but they will have 
discussed arrangements for income, and improvements in organization to increase the yield. 
Obviously their ability to run an economy working in concrete terms is a worthy object of 
study, as it was enormously successful. Prosperity was not only the basis of their success, it 
was also the result. Theory may help us to understand how, although it can not help us to 
understand why. 
When Wolfgang Helck published his Wirtschaftsgeschichte, in 1975, he explicitly stated 
that it was nearly impossible to produce such a book as he himself had written, 194 and 
abstained from an attempt at economic analysis. Yet six years before, Siegfried Morenz 
had bravely produced a pioneering comprehensive interpretation of the ancient Egyptian 
Economy using Thorstein Veblen's Theory of the Leisure Class. 195 Prestige-Wirtschaft im alten 
Ägypten effectively explained the entire economy of ancient Egypt in a convincing fashion, 
based on the principle of consumption. From the purely economic viewpoint Morenz's 
approach was ill-founded, as Veblen's approach emphasized (1) that society was being 
transformed through technological development and (2) that rentiers were social parasites 
making money off industry and consumers. There is no evidence to substantiate the provision 
that technological development was the cause of Egyptian economic activity (rather than the 
result), and there is no evidence of a rentier dass, because the administrators who organized 
the economy can certainly not be termed primarily parasitic (at least until the final developments) 
and traders are not conspicuous enough to indicate the particular subspecies of rentier 
postulated by Veblen. An historian of the ancient Egyptian religion, Morenz had however 
captured the spirit of economic activity, and identified the most crucial and central feature of 
the ancient Egyptian economy: the circulation of goods. 196 
lt sounds like a mere tautology, for economics is about the study of the circulation of goods, 
but Morenz successfully demonstrated that the central administration played an important 
part in this circulation, which was dominated by the royal and temple economy, the temples 
being the "repositories for the revenues from the empire". 197 This feature of circulation or 
194 Helck, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, pp. vii. 
195 Although Helck did state that his work was not theoretical, he took an extreme position on Morenz's book: "Die 
letzlich von Morenz ins Spiel gebrachte Vorstellung von der Prestige-Wirtschaft kann als unanwendbar außer 
Ansatz bleiben, schon weil die grundlegende Vorstellung von einer ägyptischen Primitivkultur nicht paßt - genau-
sowenig wie die Vorstellung einer leisure dass in altägyptischer Zeit, da eine solche in einer Wirtschaft ohne 
Geld und einer Gesellschaft, in der Vererbung mit der Ausführung des gleichen Amtes verbunden war, unmöglich 
ist." (Helck, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, p. 203). The simplicity with which these thoughts are expressed is admirable. 
196 Morenz, Prestige-Wirtschaft, pp. 36ff. 
197 J. J. Janssen ("The role of the Temple in the E~yptian Economy during the New Kingdom," in lipinski, Stole and 
Temple, II: 509) quotes D. Redford. Morenz (Prestige-Wirtschaft, pp. 34-35): "Es muß die Feststellung genügen, 
daß die Tempel faktische Verfügungsgewalt über Arbeitskräfte, Ländereien und auch Produktionsmittel gehabt 
haben. [ ... ] Im Ganzen kann man davon ausgehen, daß die Tempelwirtschaft allermeist auf Dotationen der 
Könige beruht [ ... ]" 
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"redistribution" through a central administration had previously been allegedly identified as a 
key feature of the contemporary economies of Western Asia, where it was emphasized that 
the market did not fulfill the function of accelerating circulation of basic goods, although 
commercial trade was significant for a number of strategically significant articles, such as 
copper and tin . 
The other significant element of the economy that he effectively identified was the vast 
wastefulness involved in manufacture and construction for the Beyond, which he characterized 
- after Veblen - as "conspicuous consumption" . Klaus Baer made the same point about the 
ultimate destinatio~ of the money - going into tombs - but conspicuous consumption was 
not a mode of production, as it only accounts for one part of the equation: consumption. 198 
And one should not be misled by the quantities of objects in the tombs, for the "Law of 
Pharaoh" implies that it was weil worth going to the trouble of providing for a proper burial 
for another person, merely in order to acquire that person's property, which means that the 
greater part of it must have remained above ground. 199 
Strongly influenced by the assumption that price fluctuations are a significant indicator of 
any economic system, M . Gutgesell has endeavoured to provide several mutually contradictory 
explanations of the Egyptian economy, including the suggestion that the principal element 
was its determined nature. 200 By employing a single variable to justify the choice of an 
explanation for the economy, he undermines the potential relevance of his conclusions. 
There is an enormous difference from understanding why a particular variable behaves the 
way it does, as opposed to employing a single variable to understand a system. 201 The 
resilience of economic and ideological continuity- at a reduced level - during the so-called 
lntermediate Periods when political power was fragmented suggests a priori that a determined 
economy could not survive such an event. 202 lt has been pointed out elsewhere that the use 
of the Keynesian theory using the variable of infinitely elastic demand can account for the 
continuity of activity on a reduced level, but we will return to this infra (pp. l 22ff.). 203 
198 K. ßaer, "An Eleventh Dynasty Farmer's Letters'', JAOS 83 ( 1963) : 17. 
199 Cf J. J. Janssen and P. W Pe,stman, "Burial and lnherilance in Ancient Egypt,'' JESHO 11 ( 1968): 137-170. 
200 M . Gutgesell , "Wirtschaft, " LA VI : 1275. Gutgesell fails to note that not one single planned economy suNived for 
anyvvhere near os long as the Egyptian cult-oriented system. To take but a few examples, the lnca Empire, the 
Spanish and Portuguese overseos imperial systems, the French mercantilist state, both the Dutch ond English East 
Indio companies, the Soviel Union, and the Ur III centralized system were all (respectively) eclipsed within some 
!wo and half centuries, some in considerably less time . 
201 This point in particularly important as Gutgesell used price stability to demonstrate that the ancient Egyptian system 
could not have been a market economy, while we will ultimately establish that this price stability can be explained 
in merket terms, and therefore one musl clearly distinguish the methods of reasoning (cf. infra, pp. 329ft) 
202 lt hos been shown that certain provincial areas were actually capable of improving their situotion when freed from 
central administration, through an intensification of social relationships centered on individuals just below the 
apex of the political structure: cf. S. Seidlmayer, "Wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Entwicklung im Übergang 
von Alten zum Mittleren„Reich, '' in Assmon.~, Problems, pp. 175-217. 
203 Cf. D. A. Warburton, "Uberlegungen," ZAS 118 ( 1991 ): cf. pp. 78 n. 12; 79-85. One principal problem of 
modern economic developments is the absence of a tendency for prices to fall, while they do rise, so that 
M. Gutgesell 's position is untenoble, cf. p. 78 n. 183 supra . 
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Several serious attempts have since been made to analyze the Egyptian economy and to 
understand its basic features, and these are also supplemented by a great number of marginal 
remarks about the economy, that suggest that the authors have an interpretation in mind, but 
do not express that interpretation clearly. One of the most important of the theories consciously 
employed was based on the work of the Hungarian economist Karl Polanyi. 204 
PolANYI 
The term "redistribution" appears as one of four types of interchange identified by Polanyi 
whose argument was that modern capitalist mechanisms were not available in antiquity. 
According to him, an important element of historical understanding was the assumption of 
the lock of a market which created demand which led to production, and therefore that the 
greater part of economic activity consisted of demand being heavily influenced by supply, 
and that supply did not necessarily react to potential demand in the market. And that 
therefore, the existing financial arrangements encouraged acquisition by trade rather 
than production, and that trade was likewise primarily dominated by demand rather than 
supply, and promised greater profits than production in any case. And that trading profits 
were made without taking risks. Based on these assumptions, Polanyi developed an approach 
which posited the existence of four different types of economic category, as opposed to the 
single - market - category which had been uncritically and unconsciously applied before 
Polanyi approached the issue. 205 
Polanyi therefore distinguishes "household", "reciprocity", "redistribution" and "exchange" as 
primary forms of economic integration. Not only did he never provide an economic analysis 
of the mechanisms by which the ancient Near Eastern redistribution economies functioned, 
but his very postulate for the importance of the term redistribution was based on controversial 
evidence and conclusions. ßased on preliminary interpretations of the evidence from Kültepe 
(which have since been contradicted), 206 Polanyi argued that the appearance of an individual 
who could participate in market behavior on several levels was a recent phenomenon, and 
therefore that market behavior was a recent development. 
This argument led to two other related contentions. One was that one of the significant 
events in economic and social history was the moment when wage labour appeared, and 
land became an asset which could be bought and sold, for his logic interpreted this as 
204 Polanyi himself was familiar with the Graeco-Roman material (as demonstrated in the posthumously published 
volume, livelihood), but he also endeavoured to co-operate with others more familiar with the ancient material, 
cf. Polanyi, Trade and Market. 
205 This paragraph has been used virtually verbatim in D. A. Warburton, "The Economy of Ancient Egypt Revisited Yet 
Again," GM 146(1995): 105. 
206 K. Veenhof (Trade, pp. 356ff.) demonstrated the erroneous basis of Polanyi's use of this dato (K. Polanyi, 
"tv\arketless Trading in Hammurabi's Time," in Polanyi, Trade and Marke!, p. 19). Polanyi's posthumous volume 
(Polanyi, livelihcxx1/ repeated the arguments as if they had gone unchallenged (pp. xl-xli); cf. Polanyi, livelihood, 
p. xxx; Polanyi, Trade and Market, p. viii. J. Gledhill and M. Larsen ('The Polanyi Paradigm and a Dynamic 
Analysis of Archaic Stoies" in Renfrew, Theory, pp. 197-229) effectively demolished the relevance of Polanyi's. 
theory as presented in the final work (Polanyi, livelihood) to Mesopotamia and Mesoamerica, so that a great part 
of the'evidence upon which the theory was built has now vanished. 
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meaning that man and nature became mere objects in the market-place, and that this was 
the decisive event transforming the world from reciprocal exchange arrangements to the 
market dominating life. 207 The other was that the "distinctive feature" of redistribution is the 
poltern of "rights and obligations", 208 asserting that the system was based on reciprocal 
obligations, and that the cynical market-oriented interpretation did not take the propaganda 
seriously. 209 
The assumption of the validity of Polanyi's "theory" has however not been accompanied by 
either a complete grasp of it nor general agreement about it. Bleiberg has stated that 
redistribution in Polanyi's model is the most suitable system for understanding Egypt, and that 
the profit-making motive was absent in ancient Egypt. 
The absence of money as a means of obtaining wealth was paralleled by an 
absence of a profit motive and price-making markets in the Egyptian world view. 210 
Janssen stated however that 
nobody as far as I know ever made the unlikely statement that in ancient Egypt 
people were not interested in accumulating wealth. 211 
Polanyi himself did not dispute the profit motive. His claim was not that the profit motive did 
not exist, but rather that trading was risk-free: 
In effect, participation in business is participation in profits. 212 
The mere fact that the tombs were robbed for their precious materials makes it clear that the 
ancient Egyptians were conscious of the fact that in their economy silver and gold were 
money equivalents, and confirms that they were interested in accumulating wealth: The 
teaching of Ani specifically admonishes investing wisely. 213 While correct in asserting that 
according to Polanyi price-making markets were absent, Bleiberg's short sentence thus still 
contains three fundamental errors concerning: (1) Polanyi, (2) the Egyptian economy, and 
(3) the Egyptian mind. 
Similarly, Bleiberg assumed a division in the economy of ancient Egypt, trying to fit inwand 
b1kw into categories. 214 He concluded that the inwwere the king's personal "income", and 
that this consisted of "gifts". R. Müller-Wollermann also discussed inwand likewise concluded 
207 Polanyi, Livelihcxxi, p. 10. 
208 Pearson, in Polanyi, livelihood, p. xxxiv. 
200 Polanyi, livelihcxxi, p. 15. 
210 Bleiberg, "Economy", in Sasson, Civilizations, p. 1382. 
211 J. J. Janssen, "Debts and Credit in the New Kingdom,' JEA 80 ( 1994): 136, n. 35. 
212 K. Polanyi, ''tv\arketless Trading in Hammurabi's Time," in Polanyi, Trade and Market, p. 21. 
213 Cf. Lichtheim, literalure II: 138 "lf wealth is placed where it bears interest, lt comes back to you redoubled''; 
11: 139: "Do not be a mindless person, Then your god will give you wealth." Quack, Ani, p. 101: 'Besitz soll 
zinstragend angelegt werden, Damit er vermehrt zu dir (zurück) kommt"; p. 105: "Stell dich nicht töricht an, Wenn 
dein Gott Vermögen gegeben hat." 
214 E. Bleiberg, "The Redistributive Economy in New Kingdom Egypt: An Examination of BJk-.0t),"JARCE25 ( 1988): 
157-168. 
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that it meant "gifts". 215 Although they agree about the meaning, both inadvertently neglected 
texts which might have suggested other conclusions, and thus both reached conclusions 
suggested by Polanyi, but failed to take account of additional evidence which might not 
have led them to the same conclusions. This certainly does not demonstrate the theoretical 
value of Polanyi's method. 
The Assyriologist J. Renger has rushed to the defense of Polanyi's arguments, which were 
assailed by the economist M. Silver. 216 lt is to Renger's credit that he dealt with this, for 
Silver's book is not only a serious challenge, but filled with errors revealing that its author 
was not at home in the ancient Near East. Renger confirmed that Silver amassed an extraor-
dinary amount of dato concerning ancient Near Eastern economics in the endeavour to 
disprove Polanyi, but Renger demonstrates that Silver's command of the dato is itself wanting . 
Silver alleges that Polanyi made 14 critical points against the market economy, and Silver 
assumes that he has demonstrated that Polanyi is in error. While demonstrating that Silver's 
claims are exaggerated and methodologically questionable, Renger's own arguments in 
favour of Polanyi remain unconvincing. 
Renger dismisses the Old Assyrian trading colonies by remarking that "they clearly represent 
an exceptional case". 217 He then states: 
Scholars of several disciplines have thus recognized the principle of redistribution as 
a major economic, social and political determinant in the lnca state and have claimed 
that it played a decisive role in parts of the history of ancient Egypt, and could also 
be observed in ancient Cyprus, Crete, and the Mycenean states on the Greek 
mainland. 218 
In the lnca state, there does not seem to have been much "redistribution" : primarily, it was a 
system based upon the appropriation of labour, but included both private property and 
collective ownership. While it may have been what Hicks termed a Revenue Economy, or a 
"command-economy", "redistribution" was not its fundamental feature. 21 9 
In the Aegean, it is probable that exchange played a very important role . In view of the 
increasing evidence that the Aegean was not really comparable to the supposed redistribution 
"dato" from Egypt and Western Asia, one group of scholars recently withdrew the contention 
that the Aegean evidence corresponded to a "redistribution" economy : 
2 15 R. Müller-Wollermann, "Bemerkungen zu den sogenannten Tributen," GM 66 ( 1983) : 81-93 . 
21 6 J. Renger, "On Economic Structures in Ancient Mesopotamia, " Or. 63 (1994): 157-208 
217 Renger, Or. 63: l 64, n. 12. 
218 Renger, Or. 63 : 177. 
2 19 Cf. Mason, Peru, pp. l 80ff. Mason notes that 'Heavy tribute in the form of labour was demanded from the 
peasants, who profited very little from it' (p. 180). lt is significant that although grain production was not collectivized 
to the same extent as wool production , private ownership of llamas existed, so that even the redistribution of wool 
was not exclusively "redistributive" in character. Since the redistribution of wool was not based on need but by 
family size, there was no justice (because those in possession of llamas received just as much wool as those who 
had none), which reduces the relevance about Polanyi 's claims concerning "rights and obligations' to a superfi-
cial meaningless phrase. 
Being preliterate, lnca society is an ideal candidate for circular argumentation confirming theoretical reasoning , 
so that other outhorities can doubtless be found with different arguments. 
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In this paper it is suggested that the best source for analogies is anthropology, and 
not Mesopotamia, the Levant or Egypt which reached a higher level of centralization 
than societies in the prehistoric Aegean ever did. 220 
Aside from the mere assumption of its relevance, the ergument in favour of applying the 
"redistribution" system to ancient Egypt is partially based on the "evidence" from Mesopotamia. 
Needless to say, this evidence from ancient Egypt is being contested in this book, and the 
evidence for Mesopotamia is rapidly being reduced to the period of the Third Dynasty of Ur, 
to which Renger repeatedly refers. lt may ultimately prove to be the case that the Ur III period 
is the only known case illustrating "redistribution", and it remains to be seen whether this 
cheracterized the entire economy. 221 
The logic in adducing additional examples is thus demonstrated to rest on a circuler basis of 
repeated repetition demonstrating the claims. A different kind of circuler ergumentation was 
employed by Dalton two decades earlier, based on the claim that Polanyi's critics had failed 
to provide a convincing alternative structure. The "alternative structure" is the "imperfect merket" 
which is the basic assumption of all economic analysis. 
The request that an alternative structure must be sought lies therefore upon the assumption 
that the validity of the "imperfect merket" has somehow been thrown into doubt. The doubts 
themselves have however only been created by Polanyi's proposed alternative system. Dalton 
pointed out that 
Polanyi ergued forcefully against the use of merket theory to analyze nonmerket 
economies. 222 
and claimed that Polanyi's 
peradigm also comprises a special set of real-world processes, special concepts, 
and analytical conclusions reached by using the concepts to analyze the process.223 
The first line of reasoning thus places critics who reject the categories in the position of being 
in error merely by virtue of rejecting the categories, which is a very simple device, but 
irrelevant, if the very relevance of the categories is in doubt. 224 This is especially significant 
since traditional economic historians can contend that the "imperfect market" is a valid 
category, which can incorporate all of Polanyi's fundamental points into modern theoretical 
thinking without difficulty. 
220 S. Voutsaki , ''Value,'' in Gillis, Trade and Production, p. 14. Cf. also B. Sjöberg, "The Mycenaean Economy: 
Theoretical Frameworks," in Gillis, et al., Trade and Production, pp. 19-3 2. 
22 1 lt should be noted that the size of the Ur III empire is also being progressively reduced the "evidence" from Tell 
Brak in northern Syria has been shown to have been the result of hasty conclusions, which were in error; cf. D. 
Oates andJ. Ootes, "Tell Brak: A Stratigraphie Summary, 1976-1993,' lraq 56 ( 1994): 167. 
222 G. Dolton, "Karl Polanyi's Analysis of Long-Distance Trade and His Wider Paradigm, '' in Sabloff, Trade, p . 68 . 
223 G . Dalton, "Karl Polanyi's Paradigm," in Sabloff, Trade, p. 71 . 
224 This seems to have been at the heart of E. Eichler's argurnent in "Polanyi - Keynes - Warburton, " GM 131 
( 1992) : 25-31, and was certainly part of rny response, D. A. Worburton, "The Economy of ancient Egypt 
Revisited Yet Again," GM 146 ( 1995): l 03-111. 
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The second contention seemingly raises Polanyi's arguments to a higher sphere, since it 
asserts that there is "real-world" evidence and that the tools are of demonstrated value. 
Polanyi's theory was however based on assumptions which were later demonstrated tobe 
erroneous, so that the "real-world process" is lacking - but has nevertheless since been 
assumed to exist. As clearly stated above, the concepts - as used by Polanyi's adherents 
with regard to the Egyptian economy- have not been understood, and they have not aided 
the development of understanding. The value of the analytical tools has thus not been 
demonstrated, so that both the actual application and the whole theoretical framework re-
quire reexamination. 
At the same time, the role of the market has unfortunately been pushed out of the discussions, 
since Polanyi assumed that it did not exist, while Silver seems tobe persuaded that a market 
operating under conditions of demand and supply did exist in the ancient world, and that 
there was no "unsuperable barrier to price-making markets" .225 
The evidence from the Near East does not suggest that price-making markets comparable 
with today's global market existed at any point in time until quite recently. 226 Renger is 
therefore justified in rejecting Silver's approach on that level, but the potential lock of a 
price-making market does not eliminate the possibility of market level exchange activity. lf 
the market system was capable of allocating goods, then the market performed its modern 
role, regardless of the extent to which price formation was influenced by potentially irra-
tional features . Such a market determined by requirements and wants (including not only the 
desire to acquire, but the desire to increase wealth) would serve to distribute goods in an 
economy, and therefore the factors influencing the regulation of transfers may not have been 
prices. Thus one argument against the application of market laws is removed. 
There is however evidence of markets related to profit and price fluctuations in ancient 
Mesopotamia227 to which Renger does not assign signal importance, but this view is not 
widely shared: 
Study of Old Assyrian trade has refuted notions of the economic historian Karl Polanyi, 
who thought that markets and entrepreneurial activity did not exist in the ancient 
Near East. [ .. . ] Neither the venerable model of the progressive stages from 
redistributive to market economies nor the world-system theory of Emmanuel [sie] 
Wallerstein can account for the nature of the Old Assyrian System. 228 
lt was precisely with this dato that Polanyi developed his system, so that Dalton's "real world" 
evidence has been conclusively rejected. These markets may not establish the universality of 
the principle of price-making markets. There can however be no doubt whatsoever that 
225 1 quote Renger ( Or 63: 160), quofing Silver refuting North. 
226 Cf., e.g., Chaudhuri, Asia before Europe, pp. 76-77. The types of profits possible in the pre-modern world 
virtually preclude modern price calculations. 
227 lt is obvious thot the evidence from Mesopotamia does demonstrate that price-moking markets existed os weil: 
cf. J. Gledhill and M. Larsen, "The Polanyi Poradigm, " in Renfrew, Theory, p. 204ff. lt is quite interesting that 
Renger prefers not to approach Larsen's arguments directly. 
228 N. Yoffee, ''The Economy of Ancient Western Asia, " in Sosson, Civilizotions III: 1393-1394. 
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market mechanisms played a significant role in ancient Mesopotamia, potentially along 
with redistribution (but this has not been demonstrated). The evidence available from Egypt 
is insufficient to establish that market mechanisms functioned as effectively as in Mesopotamia, 
where price fluctuations could be exploited to make profits. 229 The existence of imperfect 
markets can however be postulated. 
Price Theory and Polanyi 
Examining prices in Deir el-Medineh, Janssen questions whether they were determined by 
supply and demand. 230 T aking comparative dato from modern Africa, he cites examples of 
prices determined neither by market value nor production costs to illustrate possible sources 
of apparently irrational price formation and incompatible expectations. 231 While this 
approach does not correspond to the labour or production theory of value arid pricing, it is 
entirely compatible with the principle that prices ultimately represent the disutility of labour 
and can be understood using marginal utility analysis, i.e., that a price is whatever a person 
is willing to sacrifice in order to acquire the good in question, or whatever he is willing to 
receive to part with it. 
The labour theory of value belongs to the Marxist school, and can hardly be assumed tobe 
a modern economic tool. J. Schumpeter was generally correct in asserting that Marx's real 
mentor was David Ricardo, 232 and Schumpeter pointed out that Marx's labour theory of 
value was lifted from Ricardo, and that, "Everybody knows that this theory of value is un-
satisfactory", 233 and that the labour theory of value "does not work at all outside of the case 
of perfect competition". 234 Needless to say, perfect competition can hardly be assumed for 
ancient Egypt or any other country, and thus the labour theory of value has been discarded, 
in favour of its predecessor. 235 
229 Cf. Veenhof, Trade, pp. 356ff, or my quotes in "The Economy of ancient Egypt Revisited Yet Again ," GM 146 
(1995): 104 n. 2. 
230 Janssen, Prices, p. 559. Janssen (Prices, p. 515) notes that "these prices do not have the precise meaning that 
prices are supposed to have in our society", but does not specify what this "precise meaning'' is. There is no 
"precise meaning" for price in modern economic thought, and this betrays that Janssen was not familiar with 
economic theory before dismissing il. 
231 Janssen, Prices, pp. 540-542. 
232 While Schumpeter emphasizes Marx's theoretical abilities in a chapter entitled "Marx The Economist,'' 
( Capitalism, etc., pp. 21 ff .), A. Brewer has nothing but contempt for Marx's economics ("A Minor Post-Ricardian? 
Marx as an Economist, " HPE 27 [ 1995]: 111-145). Both are agreed on the Ricardian influence. 
233 Schumpeter, Capitalism, etc., p. 23. 
234 Schumpeter, Capitalism, etc., p. 24, cf. pp. 22ff. 
235 lt is worth pointing out that Carl Menger described the labour theory as an ''error" as early as 1871 (cf. M.enger, 
Grundsätze, pp. l l 9ff.). Menger's own theory- based on an equilibrium position with imperfect competition -
is completely compatible with the prices in Deir el-Medineh (cf. A. M. Endres, ''Carl Menger's Theory of Price 
Formation Reconsidered,'' HPE 27 l 1995]: 261-287) . 
For some reason archaeologists continue to believe that economics relies on unsophisticated theories of labour or 
demand and supply, as, e.g., S. Voutsaki, ''Value and Exchange in Pre-Monetary Societies: Anthropological 
Debates and Aegean Archaeology," in Gillis, et al., Trade and Production, p. 7. lt is even maintained that ''labour 
in pre-<:apitalist economies is not a commodity" (p. 9), although this is not only irrelevant, but also mistaken. She 
terminales her argument asserting that: "In this paper it is suggested that the best source for analogies is anthropology, 
and not Mesopotamia, the Levant or Egypt" (p. 14). lt would seem that insufficient familiarity with theory appears 
to be a motive for selecting anthropological parallels. One should compare Janssen's remark in 1961 : "the 
88 
Polanyi 
Ricardo's predecessor, the founder of the science of economics, Adam Smith observed: 
The real price of every thing, what every thing really costs to the man who wants to 
acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it. What every thing is really worth to 
the man who has acquired it, and who wants to dispose of it or exchange it for 
something eise, is the toil and trouble which it can save to himself, and which it can 
impose upon other people. 236 
While the labour theory of price has been discarded for more than a century, 237 marginal 
utility analysis is not only one of the current notions, but can also be traced back to the 
origins of economics. 
lt could be maintained that the prices recorded in Deir el-Medineh might not be compatible 
with Walras's general equilibrium analysis, or even with Marshall's partial equilibrium analysis. 
They can however be understood in terms of Jevons's marginal utility analysis, and are 
readily comprehensible in view of the "marginal disutility of labour" and Jevons's "law of 
indifference". 238 This means that Janssen's statement- that the prices in Deir el-Medineh are 
not normal in modern terms - refers only to his own personal interpretation of the role of 
prices in our society, and that his statement is invalid when confronted with modern economic 
theory. Having stated that knowledge of modern economic theory is "obnoxious" he has 
absolved himself of the necessity of studying it. This does not however demonstrate that the 
prices in Deir el-Medineh cannot be accounted for using modern theory. 239 
Janssen's endeavour relies on the claim that the workmen of Deir el-Medineh were "target 
traders" and that one can find anthropological parallels in modern Africa. This however fails 
to take account of the fact that virtually all modern consumers - in the western world and the 
third world and the socialist block- are also "target-traders", with the difference that they use 
"money" instead of articles to acquire other articles. A "target-trader" is basically someone 
who seeks to acquire specific articles through trade, and must be opposed to the entrepreneur 
who only uses the acquisition or production of articles as a means of acquiring wealth, as 
opposed to the articles. 240 The fact that retail prices differ widely in the modern world, and 
bear little relation to wholesale prices suggests that the behavior of traders, manufacturers 
Egyptologist may find it useful to turn his attention for a moment to the so-called 'primitive' peoples, who form the 
subject of cultural anthropology' (Ship's Logs, p. 98). Plus eo chonge ... 
236 Smith, Weolth of Nations, p. 47 (Book One, Chapter Five). lt is significant that Kemp (Egypt, pp. 250ff.) 
confuses the issue of price formation with the premises of a subsistence labour price coupled with supply and 
demand, neither of which can be shown to have had a decisive impact on price formation. The prices are 
precisely those anticipated in any economy withoul a morket mechanism. 
237 Screpanti/ Zamagni, Economic Thought, pp. 152-153. 
238 Cf. Pribram, Reosoning, p. 284. For the "law of indifference", cf. Jevons, Politicol Economy, pp. 136-139. lt is 
worth noting that Jevons's theory of the origin of value is disappoinling, cf. p. 184. 
239 lt will be noted that at the close of this study we will conclude that Walras's 'general equilibrium analysis' does 
account for the prices, cf. infra, pp. 329ff. There is naturally no contradiction between Jevons's prices and 
Walras's prices, because the two reflect different aspects of the same system. 
240 lt is very curious that M. Römer whose insights ore otherwise very valuable foils to understand that Wen-Amun 
cannot be understood to be an entrepreneur: he was an emissary dispatched with the object of purchasing very 
specific articles, and thus a "torget-trader" if one will, but definitely not an entrepreneur; cf. M. Römer, "Der 
Handel und die Kaufleute im alten Ägypten," SAK 19 ( 1992): 284. 
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and consumers cannot be categorized in the same fashion, and that prices mean different 
things to different people in the modern world. 
Modem economic theory has failed to produce a comprehensive theory of prices signifi-
cantly different from that advocated by Adam Smith two centuries ago. Smith's theory can 
certainly be applied to modern anthropological conditions without alterations. Janssen's 
contention concerning prices is therefore economically speaking incorrect, as the prices 
from Deir el-Medineh can be understood using modern concepts of price theory. 
Modem economic theory in striving to account for a comprehensive concept of economic 
behavior, applicable to the modern world, has stumbled upon the key to understanding the 
ancient world as weil, and it is hardly accidental. 241 Janssen's methodological approach 
does not suggest that it will enhance understanding to reject economic theory out of hand. 
Rather than withdrawing certain economies from discussion, theory should be expanded to 
include them, and they should be permitted to contribute to theory. 242 
In a modern economy, supply, demand and production costs as weil as marketing strategies 
influence prices far more than they did - or could have - in Deir el-Medineh. With marginal 
utility analysis, however, modern economic thought has incorporated a tool which can 
explain price behavior in Deir el-Medineh and in the modern world. This suggests that 
theory can serve a useful role, and that knowledge of it is not superfluous, especially before 
condemning it. The issue is not that facts should be obliged to correspond to the model, but 
rather that using the theory should lead to improved understanding. That the economy of the 
village at Deir el-Medineh can be understood by viewing behavior in peasant societies is 
not in dispute. lt should be clear however that peasant societies can also be seen to observe 
economic laws, and - far more importantly - the Egyptian state was neither a mere village 
writ large nor a mere consumer and it is advisable to have recourse to every available tool 
to understand this. 
Among the basic points of the Polanyi school is to emphasize that minor factual errors in 
Polanyi's model should not deter one from grasping the purpose of the system. 
lt seems - and this certainly applies to the discussion among Assyriologists - that the 
critique of these [factual] errors [in Polanyi 's work] has distracted attention from 
Polanyi's basic concern, namely that ancient economies operated under rules other 
241 M. Blaug points out (Economic History, p. 132) that Smith 's theory of value was ultimately behind the system 
employed to compare the economies of the US and the Soviel Union (before the demise of Communism), 
underlining the fact that it is ultimately the only reliable means of making economic dato comparable . 
The implications of the theory of the disutility of labour are necessarily that prices are whatever the market will 
hold, and that fluctuations only occur under conditions of competition, which responds to demand. Thus demand 
and supply are decisive, with the critical feature of competition, rather than the objecl of profit-making being the 
missing element, in contrast toJanssen's assumption (Prices, p. 561 ). lt is worth noting that under Walras's system, 
the profit-seeking entrepreneurs failed to win because their competilion evened out prices so that, according to 
Walras, the consumer won. Thus profit-seeking and competition are not necessarily compatible, and they should 
be distinguished in studying the economy, but since neither was an all pervasive element in ancient Egypt - in 
contrast to China and Mesopotamia - the point does not require elaboration . 
Fora theoretical discussion about prices, cf. P. C. Dooley, "Value, " in Creedy, Foundations, pp. 124-158. 
242 The analogy to the situation of withdrawing the early states from comparison with modern states in order to 
account for differences, and thus lump together quite different entities should be evident. 
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than those of our modern market-oriented economy, and therefore require a set of 
analytical tools different from those derived from the analysis of a modern economy. 243 
The argument is thus that the ancient economies were different and that different tools are 
necessary. Prices are extremely important in this argument because the pivotal feature of 
Polanyi's system is the assumption that 
the fundamental difference between our modern economies, governed by price-
fixing markets, and those economies - traditional and non-industrial, ancient as well 
as mediaeval - [was] the social embeddedness of the economy determined economic 
activities and behavior. 244 
The debate between Renger and Silver seems thus to have become fixed on the issue of 
price-fixing markets. Renger states that "Silver's premise is the applicability of the economic 
laws of the price-fixing market and neo-classical economics" .245 
Economists say however that "the principal mechanism used by the market system is a set of 
prices". 246 This confirms that prices are a result of market activity, but not that the purpose of 
markets is to establish prices. lt also confirms that current theory holds that there are "sets of 
prices". Above all however, it underlines the fact that prices are a mechanism of exchange: 
the purpose of markets is not to not fix prices, it is to allocate goods. lf ancient markets 
allocated goods, then ancient markets will have been markets in the modern sense. Polanyi's 
contention is that the redistribution system outweighed the market system in exchange, and 
thus Polanyi's market related contentions are ultimately based on twin assumptions: that the 
market did not function and that one can recognize this failure to function in the absence of 
price setting markets. These are however two separate assumptions. The role of the market 
is a matter of macro-economics, prices belong to micro-economics. Polanyi has confused 
two separate economic categories (and his adherents have added to the confusion by 
confusing the problems of money and profits). 
Leftwich states that price theory is part of micro-economics, and not part of macro-
economics. Price theory according to Leftwich is about behavior: 
Price theory is somewhat abstract. We may as well face this point at the outset. 
Difficulties will be encountered in this respect, but if we recognize the nature of the 
difficulties they will seem less formidable. Primarily, we shall find that price theory 
does not give a description of the real world. [ ... ] 
Price theory is abstract because it does not and cannot encompass all the economic 
dato of the real world. [ ... ] Consequently, the function of the theory is to single out 
what appear tobe the most relevant dato and build an overall conceptual frame-
work of the price system in operation from these. We concentrate on the dato and 
principles that seem tobe the most important in motivating most economic units.[ ... ] 
We should make theory our tool and not our master. 247 
243 Renger, Or. 63: 184-185. 
244 Renger, Or. 63: 164. 
245 Renger, Or. 63: 166. 
246 McKenna, Price Theory, p. 1. 
247 Leftwich, Price System, p. 10. 
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We thus note that price theory is a domain of micro-economics relating to one particular 
mechanism used by the market, and that this particular mechanism is very theoretical. lt is 
however clearly stated that price theory must be based on "what appear to be the most 
relevant dato" . This makes it clear that there is no such thing as a "precise meaning" of price 
"in our society", asJanssen put it. This counters the whole logic of bothJanssen's and Polanyi's 
arguments, since it is evident that there is no reason why price theory cannot accommodate 
any particular behavior or motivation. Polanyi's contentions about embeddedness can be 
incorporated into modern theory as "non-production related variables influencing price", 
and simply be considered one of many factors influencing price formation. Thus, Polanyi's 
approach to price formation need not be regarded as a barrier to the use of modern 
econom ic theory. 248 
lt is evident that price-fixing markets are not at the core of modern economic theory, and that 
Janssen's alleged anormal prices are completely compatible w ith modern theory. The mere 
absence of price-fixing markets does not however demonstrate that people did not seek 
profits or to accumulate wealth , which counters contentions expressly raised by several of 
Polanyi's adherents, although Polanyi himself did not dispute this . Thus price theory can be 
Polanyi compatible, and thus the emphasis of the Polanyi model as an alternative to modern 
theory cannot be built on the issue of price formation . 
At the same time, Polanyi specifically stated that the advent of the market exchange economy 
appeared when land and labour could be sold . Therefore, the presence of wage labour 
and transactions involving the sale of land defy integration into Polanyi 's model if a post 
market redistribution model is selected, so that even without the additional details concerning 
the role of markets, the very basis of Polanyi 's contentions has disappeared . 
In sum, Polanyi's assumptions about irrational behavior can be incorporated into modern 
price theory, and the formation of prices does not effect the role of the market in society. 
Price mechanisms are micro-economic and markets are macro-economic. Therefore, price 
mechanisms cannot be used to argue against the validity of market theories . At the same 
time, the presence of markets in ancient Egypt is demonstrated according to Polanyi's own 
definition. 
Redistribution 
Redistribution is a way to reallocate to the producers the products of the labour of a 
society which are collectively produced, centrally collected and stored. 249 
This is Renger's summary of what Polanyi meant with "redistribution". With in Polanyi's system, 
the implications of "redistribution" are (1) that it is a labe! which is part of a !arger model and 
not a theory in itself; (2) the basic premise of which was that the market did not function; 
248 Renger (Or. 63 : 205) points out that this aspect of Polanyi's system can be appl ied within the context of modern 
society with profit, cf. infra p. 108 n. 294. 
249 Renger, Or. 63 : 177. 
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(3) that it represents a reciprocal relationship between the ruler and the ruled, (4) permitting 
producers to receive the products of their production back again; (5) in a society where land 
could not be bought and sold, (6) before the emergence of wage labour. 
Renger notes that it is difficult to convince the peasants to over-produce, and asserts that 
redistribution can "occur in a variety of political systems". 250 Speaking in the name of Polanyi, 
E. Eichler maintained that "no ancient government ever attempted to persuade the peasants 
of the necessity" to over-produce grain, stating that repressive measures were the only manner 
of compelling the peasants to comply with the wishes of the state. 251 Polanyi however stated 
that the basis of the redistribution system had to be the rights and obligations of the participants 
in the state apparatus. 252 Therefore Renger's statements imply - and Eichler's assume - that 
this basic element of Polanyi's model was faulty, and that Polanyi was in error, and yet 
nevertheless proclaim the validity of the system as a whole. 
Applying Polanyi's approach to the economy of ancient Egypt thus involves not only assuming 
that Polanyi's fundamental assumption was invalid, yet also that the evidence should never-
theless be understood in terms of the theory. The application of the Polanyi system demands 
that ( 1) things were collectively produced and redistributed in an economy (2) without private 
property (3) before the development of wage labour because this type of activity is 
incompatible with Polanyi's paradigm. The evidence confirms that as far back as the 
inscriptions go, land could be bought and sold, and that there was wage labour. The 
evidence for redistribution on a massive scale - demonstrating that the greater part of the 
economy depended upon collective production - remains tobe produced. The assumption 
of the relevance of the Polanyi paradigm thus denies the relevance of that dato which is 
available, and assumes that the dato confirming the theory exists. This is bad methodology, 
effectively preventing the examination of evidence of inefficient market behavior, what econo-
mists call "imperfect markets". This alone signifies that the unexamined use of Polanyi's theory 
is methodologically unsound. The fundamental political element of Polanyi's system is re-
jected by the adherents, and thus in principle, the evidence indicates that both the economic 
and political basis of Polanyi's system cannot be assumed for ancient Egypt, given repres-
sion and private property. 
Describing the ancient Egyptian economy, Grandet writes: 
lt is thus probably advisable when analyzing an economy conforming to this type of 
integrative model to employ terms like "requisition", etc. rather than to use terms like 
"imposition", since- on the theoretical level at least-the entire productive apparatus 
250 Renger, Or. 63: 177. 
Renger claims that the existence of real estate trading does not demonstrate the wide spread sale of land, and 
therefore that the scarcity of Old Babylonian documents documenting the sale of land deserves emphasis. This is 
a blatant misuse of the evidence, for the sale of factories and fields in the modern world is far less common than 
the sale of goods and real estale, so that his comparison fails to achieve the goal (cf. Or. 63: pp. 180-188). 
251 E. Eichler, "Polanyi-Keynes-Warburton," GM 13 l ( 1992): 26. [My translation] . 
252 Cf. quotes in D. A. Warburton, "The Economy of Ancient Egypt Revisited Yet Again," GM 146 (1995): 106-
107. 
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legally belonged to the powers-that-be or their representatives, and that everything 
that had tobe redistributed (or left at the disposition of the producers) can be assimilated 
to wages. 
lt is however necessary to remark (and we will return to this) that in practice, the 
double movement of collecting and redistributing which is characteristic of such an 
economy was frequently impractical (given geographic distances, economic actors, 
problems of rations, etc.) and that simple administrative measures could be 
employed instead. The powers-that-be could thus, by arrangements of vörious kinds, 
directly assign the goods produced by one producer to a specific consumer, 
authorizing its direct acquisition by the latter. 253 
The indication that administrative expediency could substitute "redistribution" with a measure 
simply leaving a proportion of the produce in the hands of the producer denies the existence 
of "redistribution" . Ultimately, it assigns the economy to a type of "command-economy". 
Renger indicates that in the Old Babylonian Period that the entire production was not actually 
collected and circulated through the system, but rather that merely a part of the surplus 
collected. 254 This implies that "taxation" or "rent" is a far more appropriate fashion of describing 
the situation, and that "redistribution" is misleading, if not erroneous. A similar situation can 
be argued for Egypt. 
Extremely relevant for the understanding of the Egyptian economy is that there is in fact little 
evidence of "redistribution" as such. lt is contended that the king or the temples redistributed 
the income which was collected, but there is a great deal evidence of collection, yet precious 
little of wide-spread redistribution. The workers of the Gang responsible for the construction 
of the Royal Tombs must have been one of the smallest, most compact, best established, 
most state-dependent groups in the entire country, yet even they did not get paid regularly. 255 
J. J. Janssen has even advanced the thesis that the Lote Ramesside state was actually obliged 
to turn to the free market in order to purchase the grain in order to pay the Gang.256 lf the 
state could not even provide for some of its most important direct employees, it is clear that 
the redistribution system was not a significant feature of the economic system in the Lote 
Ramesside period. 
lt is probably symptomatic of the argument that even if one could demonstrate that the 
workers of the Gang were regularly paid before the Lote Ramesside period, it would not 
confirm the existence of "redistribution" according to Renger's definition as given above. 
253 Grandel, Papyrus Harris II : 56-60. [My translation]. lt is interesting to note that in Sir John Hicks's theory of 
economic development, precisely this type of maneuver is the precursorof feudalism (cf. Hicks, Economic History, 
p. 18). 1 would propose that one of the reosons for which the system proposed by Grandel did not lead to 
feudolism was morket distribution, which subverts administrative power. 
254 Renger, Or. 63 : 179-180. _ 
255 Cf. e.g, J. J. Jonssen, "The Year of the Strikes, ' BSEG 16 ( 1992):4 1-49, where he concludes that strikes were 
frequent. 
256 This is the only possible conclusion following from Jonssen 's contention thot the personal copper of the workmon 
was being collected in order to purchase groin in order to pay their (undeserved) wages, cf. J. J. Jonssen, "An 
Exceptional Event ot Deir EI-Medina,"JARCf 21 (1994): 91 -97. His interpretation of the text is however open to 
doubt. 
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Renger's definition implies that the goods must be collected and returned to those who gave 
them - literally "redistribution". Since the Gang were not farmers, but mere civil servants -
and thus not producing anything of value to anyone - demonstrating that they were paid 
regularly would only demonstrate that civil servants were paid, which is characteristic of modern 
society (except when the US Federal Government runs out of funds occasionally). 
Janssen's conclusion that the Lote Ramesside authorities actually had recourse to the market 
in order to pay the workers is thus particularly striking because the greatest part of the wages 
of the gang were paid in grain , and the one commodity which the state should have had in 
surplus was grain. lf Megally's interpretation of P. Louvre E 3226 is correct, during Dynasty XVIII, 
the state was exchanging surplus grain for other articles which it did not have.257 lf Janssen's 
interpretation is correct, by the end of Dynasty XX, the state had no income whatsoever, 
while the market was functioning far more effectively than the redistribution system (and 
Janssen seems convinced that metal was the active ingredient of this economic activity). Th is 
certainly discredits the argument that redistribution emerged to meet needs which the market 
could not, which is the basis of Polanyi's argument for the significance of the term . To take 
an outside observer's interpretation: 
Joseph collected all the food produced in those seven years of abundance in Egypt 
and stored it in the cities. [ ... ] When famine had spread over the whole country, 
Joseph opened the storehouses and sold corn to the Egyptians, for the famine was 
severe throughout Egypt. (Gen. 41: 48-57). 
The text states that Joseph "collected" the grain and then "sold" it back: he did not purchase 
it and sell it, or collect it and distribute it. He collected it and he sold it. Since this would 
correspond to the evidence of P. Louvre E 3226, Renger is completely correct to state that 
th is "story has an added value for us since it conveys the notion the authors of Genesis had 
about a storage economy. "258 
Even more importantly, however, Janssen has also demonstrated that the texts can be under-
stood as implying that even under ordinary circumstances, the products of the temples were 
physically taken to the villages, and sold at market, and not transferred by administrative 
decree (as suggested by Grandet) . Observing the character of this market, he states 
however that 
lt is not really probable that in a redistribution-economy like the Egyptian one that the 
market played more than an insignificant role . 259 
Thus, the relevance of a market to allocate goods is explicitly denied, while the existence of 
the market is openly recognized. The assumption of the validity of Polanyi's theory is the only 
reason to belittle its importance. The formal denial is curiously based upon a theoretical 
interpretation, but the details upon which the theoretical interpretation are built are also 
257 Cf. Megally, Recherches. 
258 Renger, Or. 63: 178. 
259 Janssen, Markt op de Oever, p. 2 3. [ My translation ]. 
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rejected by bothJanssen and Grandet. Omitting the repetitive use of the word "redistribution", 
it can be argued equally easily that the economically significant expenses of the "redistribution" 
economy hitherto demonstrated can be accounted for in terms of market exchange and 
wages. And that the state employed the market successfully, for its own purposes, based 
upon dato published by scholars who allege the relevance of Polanyi's models. 
Assuming the absence of private ownership of land maintains precisely that fragment of 
Polanyi's theory which defies that evidence which virtually everyone tacitly recognizes. In 
adapting the evidence to the theory, the role of the market as a means of allocating goods 
is denied, although clearly present. Assuming repression refutes Polanyi's political argument. 
Rejecting the evidence of the market in favour of redistribution, while conceding its existence, 
involves repeatedly denying the relevance of those market elements which have been 
established. The use of Polanyi's methods has thus not eliminated confusion or contributed to 
understanding . Ultimately, in combination with Janssen's claims, Grandet's statement effec-
tively eliminates the value of Polanyi's theory for the study of ancient Egypt. 
As in the case of price theory, we find that there is confusion about the potential value of the 
redistributively relevant "analytical tools" offered by Polanyi's theory, especially when this 
theory is accompanied by assumptions which fail to take account of the evidence, and 
therefore imply that the evidence is less valuable than the theory. 
Polanyi and Theory 
In the absence of proof that Pharaoh actually tried to apply or failed to apply justice in the 
form of m;cf across the board, we must respect Polanyi's assertion for the reciprocal nature 
of the relationships between the ruler and the ruled. As Polanyi's use of prices does not have 
any effect on the interpretation of the market as an exchange regulator, the relevance of his 
reflections on pre-market activity lose their value. As Polanyi's system of redistribution has 
been denied by Grandet, the only remaining elements of his fundamental theory depend 
upon the assumption of the absence of private property, which defies the evidence. 
As the evidence indicates that materials were in fact not redistributed as understood by 
Renger and Polanyi, but rather transferred through the market as indicated by Janssen, the 
problem comes down to the theoretical implications of the label, and discussions concentrating 
on the evidence itself. The contradictions and inadequacies brought to light reveal that the 
theoretical role of his model is virtually useless, as it has been shown to have been employed in 
a mutually contradictory fashion by his adherents, most of whom neglect the evidence. 
lf the theory had any value for the specific understanding of particular phases or aspects of 
economic development, it could still be considered to offer a broader perspective, and it 
might be maintained that its real value has been neglected in this respect. 
Even though Polanyi emphasized repeatedly that this basic conceptual scheme 
involving three modes of integration - reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange -
must not be seen as representing an evolutionary pattern, there is a clear tendency in 
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some of his writings to link these modes with specific stages of societal 
development. 2w 
Although Polanyi and Janssen indicated that the various types of economic activity could 
subsist simultaneously, 261 it has also been contended that while the categories of reciprocity 
and redistribution were compatible and existed simultaneously, they are not compatible with 
the market economy. After reviewing the evidence of the transactions recorded in tombs of 
the Old Kingdom, etc . R. Müller-Wollermann concluded : 
"Supply and demand appear" indeed, but only in the general sense, and not in the 
sense of an economic system, as there was no clearly perceived labour market 
where these factors and the wage rotes could be widely disseminated. 262 
There is no evidence for this contention either way, but the mere fact that wages were not 
recorded on the walls of tombs cannot be taken as prima facie evidence that the rotes were 
not known. The evidence contradicts the assertion that there was no labour market, as the 
mere increase in the number and size of private tombs in the course of the Old Kingdom 
suggests that the market was expanding . Her parallel conclusion that there is no evidence 
for the development of trading markets is likewise contradicted by her evidence, as she 
herself concludes that the workers were paid in bread and beer, and therefore forced to go 
to the market to acquire by exchange the other articles they desired .263 Based on this 
interpretation of the evidence, she concludes theoretically, 
A market economic system cannot be demonstrated for the Old Kingdom, but its 
absence cannot be proven either. The evidence of the economic categories 
of reciprocity and redistribution render its existence improbable however.264 
Thus, the simultaneous parallel existence of all the three modes is hypothetically excluded, 
although the evidence from Mesopotamia has effectively demonstrated that redistribution 
and market economy may have existed in parallel, and although J. J. Janssen had already 
stated that all three forms could coexist simultaneously: 
Of course in every developed society all three systems are present, but it is their 
relative importance which may widely differ. Just as market exchange is the dominant 
factor in the western world, so redistribution was in Egypt, a relatively large part of 
the production of the country being collected by the state through its various organs 
260 J. Gledhill ond M . Larsen, "The Polanyi Paradigm, " in Renfrew, Theory, p. 203 . They eile three types becouse 
general presentalions of the theory do not usually mention "householding" becouse it was not fundamental to the 
system, but to neglect it would be unjust to Polanyi , and to omit it fails to accounl for one type of interchange 
which exists in modern market economies lo this day, where, e.g ., household labour is widely taken for granted 
and not measured or remunerated at market rotes . 
261 Janssen, Prices, pp. 558-562. 
262 R. Müller-Wollermann, 'Warenaustausch im Ägypten des alten Reiches," JESHO 28 ( 1985): 146. Her quote is 
from Helck, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, p. 106, cf. infra, p . 125. [Mytranslotion]. . 
263 Müller-Wollermann, "Warenaustausch," JESHO 28 : 146-147. . 
264 Müller-Wollermann, "Warenaustausch,"JfSHO 28 : 165. The evidence she employs is slender. [My translation]. 
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in order tobe redistributed among a fairly large number of categories of its servants. 
lt is from this sphere that most of our documents come [ .. . ]265 
lt is important to note not only that our documentation skews our impression of the relation-
ships, but also that this evidence only indicates that some proportion of that part of the 
surplus - and not production -documented in official records was redistributed. Our evidence 
does not touch upon production in general, or upon the nature and distribution of that part of 
the surplus which did not move through the state sphere. 
Using her own dato, Müller-Wollermann could have argued that the existence of a market 
effectively rendered the existence of a redistribution economy improbable, for Polanyi's 
basic criteria for a market economy were presented by her. According to Polanyi's system 
the redistribution system emerges because the market does not function, and therefore the 
existence of a market could refute redistribution just as easily as the reverse. Therefore it is 
more logical to accept Janssen 's judgment that all three exist in parallel, and the categories 
are not mutually exclusive, which does not make them analytically fruitful. 
Müller-Wollermann also cites Polanyi to the effect that reciprocity is based upon symmetrical 
social relations, while redistribution is based on asymmetrical social relations. The social 
imbalance existing in a system with both reciprocity and redistribution is greater than that 
necessary to accommodate redistribution and market exchange since both are compatible 
with asymmetrical social relations . 266 
The logical conclusion is that this merely raises Polanyi's categories to types of interchange 
which exist in parallel in any economy, and therefore negates the analytical value of his 
categories for economic analysis, which probably explains why economic laws were never 
establ ished according to the various categories. lt should also be clear that any relationship 
between a tomb-owner and the workers making it must be per definitionem asymmetrical, 
that of employer and employee, and it can not be described as redistributive if the satisfaction 
is expressed in terms of payment for services rendered . lt is therefore evident that these 
transactions do not correspond to Polanyi's categories, even if other transactions (such as 
those in Deir el-Medineh) might. 
lt has thus been established (1 ) that Polanyi's social behavior can be included within modern 
price theory and that the prices from ancient Egypt can be analyzed using modern theory 
without Polanyi and (2) that the characteristic feature of the modern economic system is not 
"price-fixing markets", but that prices are merely mechanisms regulating exchange, and that 
even modern price theory is so abstract that it has nothing to do with the real world . lt has 
265 Janssen, ''Prolegomena, " SAK 3 : 184. 
266 Cf. Müller-W ollermann, "Warenaustausch, " JESHO 2 8: 125. Despife the necessary dialectical confradicfion, 
she even suggests that redistribution be classified as a special type of reciprocity (JESHO 28: 130). For an 
approach based on asymmefry as the principle elemenf of Egyptian society, cf. J. Baines, "Resfricted Knowledge, 
Hierarchy and Decorum," JARCE 27 ( 1990) : 1-23. This would reinforce the logic suggesting that osymmetrical 
relations - redistribution and market - were the primary aspects of macro-economic activity, and that reciprocal 
relations dominoted only in the villages. -
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also been established that (3) redistribution as defined by the Polanyi system need not be 
assumed for ancient Egypt, and (4) that the market appears to have been far more effective 
than generally consciously recognized. lt has likewise been established (5) that not even 
Polanyi's adherents maintain that the political basis of the redistribution system was in 
evidence. 
lt has also been established that Polanyi's analytical tools do not aid in understanding the 
facts. The system has not contributed to understanding ancient economics because there is 
so much disagreement among his adherents about what they actually mean. The system also 
has no overarching value, for its individual categories are not mutually exclusive, and cannot 
enhance understanding of the significance of any particular piece of evidence. At no level 
of micro- or macro-economic analysis can Polanyi's system be regarded as a useful analytical 
tool. 
This is however only one half of the argument. 
Even if there was any justification for maintaining the economic significance of either redis-
tribution or reciprocity in ancient Egypt, there is also a priori no reason why any theoretical 
approach cannot be compatible with Polanyi's labels because the one describes the external 
features of a system, while the other examines the internal mechanisms; especially as Polanyi 
himself did not provide the theory. 267 Polanyi's theory is not an economic theory so much as 
a social model describing relationships. In studying economic questions, the object is to 
identify and isolate the variables, and to study the potential effect of the interaction of the 
variables. "Redistribution" merely accounts for part of consumption, for the re-circulation of 
previously existing wealth, and not production, so that the economics of redistribution cannot 
be accounted for simply in terms of "reciprocity" with the workers of the land rendering 
services unto Pharaoh in return for which they receive grain and fish from him. 
Those products must be acquired by Pharaoh, in order for him to deliver them to the workers, 
and it is conventional wisdom to assume that these were acquired through "taxation". And 
the evidence indicates that the articles acquired are maintained by that sphere of society 
which does not produce, and not "circulated" through the society on a vast basis. In the 
previous chapter, it was shown that when examining the emergence of a city state with a 
division of labour, Hunt established that the first constraint in the system was not land or 
grain, but labour, and that increasing the labour supply was the weak link in the economic 
and political chain. 268 lt is evident that his model assumed that part of the production was 
rendered up to the city, and that most of the production stayed in the rural areas, i .e., a form 
of taxation to support the non-productive part of the population, and not a system of redistri-
bution to return produce back to the producers. Nevertheless, his chief contention was that 
a labour shortage was the major problem. Yet, both ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia were 
able to overcome this constraint to a considerable degree and create civilizations which 
were unique and still command our admiration today. lnvestigating this is thus the primary 
priority. 
267 Cf. Pearson's note (in Polanyi, livelihood, p. xxxv) to the effect that only the framework was erected. 
268 R. C. Hunt, "The Role of Bureaucracy in the Provisioning of Cities: a Framework for Analysis of the Ancient Near 
East," ih Gibson/Biggs, Power, pp. 161-192. 
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PEASANT SOCIETIES, TAXATION, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND T RANSACTIONS 
lt is relatively logical that even if Polanyi's economic and political system is rejected, 
Egyptologists would nevertheless contend that Egypt was not merely an example of Oriental 
Despotism. As noted before, the available economic theories come from either the socialist 
or the capitalist world. Some socialist approaches to the ancient world emphasized the 
dogmatic application of Marxist theories developed for application based on the European 
model. lt was observed however in the preceding chapter that this lype of circular logic was 
not restricted to Marxist circles. 
Although Marx did begin to develop another theory concerning the Asiatic Mode 
of Production, Egyptologists might also take issue with Marx's basic orientation, as he natu-
rally discounted the importance of the various features of the state, basically lumping all of 
the financial roles into one "government" department, while virtually all states had financial 
arrangements on several levels, parallel in the relations of government and temple, and 
hierarchical in the distribution of responsibilily down to the villages. The most significant of 
the "government" financial departments requiring further examination is that of the temples, 
but equally relevant is the picture of the countryside, with its hierarchical distribution of 
responsibilily based upon financial exactions from the villages. 
lnitially Marx was unaware of the extent of private properly prevalent in village societies, 
and he was obliged to ad just his theoretical constructs to account for this. 269 On the theoretical 
plane, although Marx eventually realized this, Polanyi did not. Polanyi's system was based 
on the assumption of a development similar to slave or feudal sociely, so that the existence 
of private property undercuts the very basis of the principle of redistribution, as it is rendered 
irrelevant as the primary feature of the economy. Marx's basic system proceeded from tribal 
property to common properly to feudal property to bourgeois sociely, without an intervening 
phase of widespread private ownership of land prior to the societies of classical antiquily. 
Since he maintained that the principal feature of land ownership in feudal sociely is that 
possession is transferred not sold, a phase of development during which private ownership 
of land was a principal element of agricultural sociely does not figure in the models devel-
oped by Marx or Polanyi. lt is equally probable that neither Marx or Polanyi ever grasped 
the significance of the introduction of metallic money, as they had no means of assessing 
what preceded what was familiar to them. 
Nevertheless, Marx's view that the Asiatic Mode of Production was distinct from the European 
experience and based on village sociely is not without interest. A glance at the economy of 
"feudal" China might aid in grasping the implications of what Marx thought. At the time of 
the revolution, the Chinese economy was based on a system of land tenure, with a concen-
tration of wealth through large land holdings (in an unusually egalitarian village, 7 per cent. 
of the population controlled 31 per cent. of the land; and 53 per cent. owned 24 per cent.). 
"The only thing left to invest in was land. Land was safe, but. the returns were small when 
269 lt will be noted that Polanyi faces the same difficulty, in initially assuming the absence of private property, and 
defining the beginning of the market economy with the emergence of the sale of land, and the sale of laoour. 
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compared with those from usury becouse scarcity drove land prices ever upward. "270 Prevailing 
interest rotes were denominated in metal (silver at 50 per cent. o month), but metal, grain 
and salt could be hoorded os commodities or stores of volue, and both metal and grain 
were used as units for calculating volue. Confucion teaching kept the peasants in thrall. A 
wealthy landlord had easy occess to unpaid but lucrative positions in the religious world 
and the local government. 
As far os the higher authorities were concerned, the main purpose of the village 
government was the collection of taxes, the supply of manpower for public works, 
and the conscription of soldiers. As long as the extremely heavy quotas in these three 
spheres were met, no one cared how they were distributed.27 1 
Assigned the obligation to collect taxes, a landlord could conceal part of his own holdings 
and squeeze peasonts to produce the balance, aside from having the opportunity to alter 
the records. Obliged to organize public works, a landlord could ease the load on his own 
tenonts, and place it on others . 272 Given public commissions he could seil the government 
his own products. T o a considerable extent, this appears to be compatible with a view of 
ancient Egypt. 
Although apparently insignificant in itself, as metal accompanied grain and salt as monetary 
units, the mere use of coins and the influence of the use of money can be related to artificially 
exaggerated fluctuations in prices, potentially contributing to the price of land being driven 
up, combined with usurious interest rotes, neither of which is in evidence in Egypt. 
K. N . Chaudhuri cites a curious case of dissidence agoinst a policy of taxation in money at 
the Chinese court some thousand years ago. 
The critical document pointed out that human lobour combined with the natural 
fertility of the soil produced such useful things as grain and silk, while money in the 
form of coins was an artificial index of value and an official monopoly. A wealthy 
merchont may possess stocks of money but farmers normally organize their activities 
in a different woy. Even a rich farmer normally evaluates his welfare in terms of 
enlarging his land-holdings in order to harvest more crops, repairing or building 
270 Hinton, Fonshen, p . 35 . This thumbnail portrait is derived from the summary in the first part of this volume. 
lt will be noted that Wittfogel (Oriental Despotism, pp. 80-8 l ) implies that large landholdings w ere decimated. 
According to Hinton (Fanshen, p. 27) the Communist Party figures indicated that l Oper cent. of the population 
owned 70-80 per cent. of the land, as weil as most of the draught animals. 
271 Hinton , Fanshen, p. 49. 
272 This feature could be very relevant to understanding ancient Egypt. lt is generally assumed that the people we 
know with titles carried out tasks associated with those titles and thus figured as part of the "redi stribution" system , 
but it is entirely possible that an independently wealthy individual could carry out a function which would be 
mentioned prominently in his tomb, which function he had received because of his w ealth, rather than the other 
way around . And it is assumed that water carriers always carried water, but why could they not simply be 
ordinary people detailed to carry out specific tasks on a regular basis2 
Thal the water-corriers in Deir el-Medineh frequently remain anonymous (S. Eichler, ''Untersuchungen zu den 
Wasserträgern ," SAK 17 [ 1990]: 146) would correspond to the idea that the work is the important activity, 
rather than just who carried it out - while offic ials at the higher level will necessarily have perceived things in 
exactly the opposite fashion where their own "responsibilities" were concerned. 
101 
The Economy 
houses, or owning his own oxen so that he need not borrow from others. As for the 
poor farmer, he has barely enough to eat and wear. He may even be a share-
cropper, toiling hard just to fend off starvation. Such people have little opportunity of 
seeing any copper coins, let alone of owning them. The enlightened governments in 
the post had taken into account the reality of agricultural production in the Celestial 
Empire and collected taxes in grain, silk and labour services. [ ... When the Sung 
emperors succeeded in oblig ing peasants to pay in coins, the commentator noted ' .. . ] 
After a bumper harvest when the price of grain is low, they have to seil their crops at 
one-third of the normal price in order to raise enough cash to pay the government. '273 
Thus, the effects of this policy may have economically transformed the Chinese landscape. 
The collection of taxes in kind, corvee obligations, the ideological situation, and the fact that 
landlords appear as officials, 274 etc. remain as parallels with ancient Egypt. The documentation 
is insufficient to demonstrate that the introduction of taxation in coins created the vast 
economic discrepancies which left the social structure intact, but led to a concentration of 
wealth and ownership, reflected in urban exploitation of rural areas, which seems to have 
been the rule in both Mesopotamia and China, so that vast differences are perceived 
driving wedges between the various elements of the ancient oriental systems of government, 
rendering Egypt seemingly unique as a member of this dass. As the economic role of 
exchange, silver and interest rotes were greater in ancient Mesopotamia, and the economic 
value of land and money-lending greater in China, quite different economic structures emerge 
when reviewing the evidence. 
In terms of Marx's Asiatic Mode of Production, he misjudged the role of irrigation, was slow 
to grasp the significance of private property, and probably failed to realise the effects of the 
introduction of metal currency so that his system cannot be applied without extensive revisions, 
which can only be undertaken after establishing the Facts of the ancient world of Egypt, 
Mesopotamia, Indio and China . 
273 Chaudhuri, Asia before Europe, p 82. lt is probably significant that price Auctuations not only follow the introduction 
of the obligatory use of symbolic metal money, but that both fluctuations and prosperity followed the introduction 
of the first paper money. However much it may facilitate exchange, the influence of coins is not a precondilion for 
market exchange, but il clearly can serve to change the social dislribution of the ownership of property by 
undermining poor peasants, as noted by the implicalions of purchasing coins atter a bumper harvest, as mentioned 
in the quote. 
A curious parallel can be found in the Americas shortly atter the conquest, when peasants deliberately selected to 
pay their obligations in metals rather than goods, cf. Frank, Copitalism, p. 127. 
274 lt is important to note here that the analysis of the Heroninos archive by Rathbone (Economic Rotionolism) has not 
only demonstrated that the estates concerned were operated with the express objective of making a profit, but 
also that the owners of those estates were councillors at Alexandria, and would thus appear in the official records 
under that title, rather than the profit-minded gentlemen farmers that they were. The evidence certainly 
demonstrates that Sir Moses Finely was in error concerning Graeco-Roman economic motivation, but it is rash to 
suggest that it be used to suggest that the economy of ancient Egypt was similar. lt would be mistaken to neglect 
this emerging evidence, and to exclude the possibility that many of the officials whose titles are preserved may in 
fact have been pursuing "economic rationalizalion " on their estates in a ruthless fashion , and that this was their 
primary business concern, rather than administration . The improbability of private individuals participating in 
the international grain Irade of the second millennium B.C. would however suggest that il was not in the inlerest 
of private individuals to compete with the state in grain production, which had decisive financial, economic and 
social implications. 
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Marx's comprehension of the relevance of village structures should however not be 
neglected, for the related characteristics of the peasants' way of life is very relevant to 
ancient Egypt. 
The materials from Deir el-Medineh indicate a kind of village mentality, even though the 
workers were civil servants. The system of reciprocity and the market system common among 
peasant societies are not the same. The conventional system used in ancient Egypt was 
based on general prevailing price levels, which is typical of peasant societies, where there 
is little room for real discussion. In modern Middle America, activity at the markets (and not 
in the villages) follows set rules: 
The price prevails until there is some change in the supply and demand factors . 
ßargaining in any single transaction reflects the state of the market place as a whole, 
and the market place as a whole reflects the operation of the entire regional and 
national markets. [ .. . ] What makes these economies different from a modern, 
dynamic economy [ ... ] is thus clear. They do not lock economic rationality [ ... . ] 
What is lacking is the social organization [ ... ] dedicated to and organized for 
economic activity. 275 
The principle of prevailing prices is occasionally violated in the texts from Deir el-Medineh, 
but by and large, the same basic rules apply. lt could be that other social obligations linked 
the two participants in the transaction of, e.g., 0 . Petrie 14, or that the price simply 
corresponded to the number of items lying on the ground at the end of the transaction, but 
the generation of the price in certain documents is not at all clear. 276 On the whole, however, 
prices were generally defined by the conventional rules of the market mechanism, either 
capitalist or pre-capitalist. The behavior is to all intents and purposes economically rational. 
On the micro-level, the village mentality of the ancient Egyptians was far more influenced by 
the world of peasant societies than that of market dominated economics, but economically 
the distinction between the two worlds is one of scale rather than intent. The market always 
decides the prices, on whatever basis, based on the principles which can be accounted for 
with Jevons's "law of indifference" and marginal utility analysis. The workmen of Deir el-
Medineh were an unusual group - full-time life-time employees with (more or less) regular 
income, but their origins lay in the villages of Upper Egypt which surrounded them, and their 
activity reflected their origins. 
275 M. Nash, "Market and Indian Peasant Economies, " in Shanin, Peosonts, pp 170-171. 
276 Cf. HO 45, l; Allam (HOP, p . 231) suggesfs that the fwo participants are partners, but this is hardly the only 
possible explanation . The price is not only not round, but also was not attached to a specific donkey, and 
therefore the specification of the price - and a low one - is peculiar, especially as the purchaser expects a good 
donkey. 
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T HE "T HEORY OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE" 
In order to understand the basic principles of ancient Near Eastern markets, it may be useful 
to return to the Aegean . In defending the use of Polanyi's paradigm, Renger referred to the 
potential evidence for redistribution, and S. Voutsaki was cited as suggesting that parallels 
be sought in anthropology instead (supra, p. 86). While anthropological examples might be 
useful for illustrating the fashion in which transactions take place, to understand the transactions 
themselves it would be advisable to turn to David Ricardo. 277 The "Theory of Comparative 
Advantage" governs markets, and indicates that in a modern economy it is always in a 
nation's interest to produce that good in which it has the greatest market superiority, regardless 
of whether it can produce other goods more cheaply than other countries. In Antiquity, 
Anatolia possessed both tin and silver, but tin mining was given up during the second 
millennium while silver production continued . At the same time, Anatolia was importing tin, 
and tin was being exported around the Mediterranean.278 This clearly demonstrates that the 
ancient Anatolians completely grasped the "Theory of Comparative Advantage" . They could 
have produced tin , but selected instead to import it, to put their energy into silver mining . At 
the same time, this also effectively tied the entire ancient Near East into a market economy, 
because the Anatolian silver was being used in transactions throughout the ancient Near 
East. 
This influenced the kind of market dynamics that we should expect in the ancient world. 
When supplies were limited, price fluctuations may have been wild, but in general, the 
tendency was for Babylonian textiles to flow North and Anatolian silver to flow South. 
Obviously the price-setting competition took place between Cypriote copper and Omani 
copper, or Cornish tin and tin from Central Asia . Since prices were denorninated in rnetals 
throughout the East, it is difficult to establish when the price of rnetal was fluctuating, and 
when there was inflation or deflation. This means that prices cannot be used as a gauge of 
econornic activity on their own, but that the market decided the prices, in two completely 
separate ways. The value of silver decreased in Egypt after peace was made with the 
Hittites, who controlled the si lver supplies, suggesting that more silver was flowing in the 
relaxed political climate. 
The evidence from Anatolia thus indicates that the "Theory of Comparative Advantage" was 
actually grasped, and applied by the Anatolians, with consequences for the whole ancient 
Near East. lt has not yet been appreciated that the same phenornenon rnay have dorninated 
Egyptian mining activity as weil. Keynesian theory would suggest that the search for precious 
metals was important in ancient Egypt, and that gold-mining led to an increase in production. 
lt is known that tin was in the Eastern desert yet not exploited. lt could be argued that the 
Egyptians were technologically unable to exploit this tin. The copper in Sinai was definitely 
exploited , but it is unclear that it was exploited by the Egyptians. 
211 Ricordo, Principles, pp. 527-537; Somuelson, Economics, pp. 834-835. 
210 For the evidence of the tin Irade, cf., e.g., Veenhof, Tmde or J. Gledhill,and M. Lorsen, "The Polanyi Poradigm 
and a Dynarnic Analysis of Archaic Stoies" in Renfrew, Theory, pp. 197-229. For the evidence of third millennium 
tin rnining , and second millenniurn Irade, cf. M .-H. Gates, "Archaeology in Turkey," AJA 99 ( 1995): 223-225 . 
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J. J. Janssen noted that "the econom ic aspects the gold production are still largely obscure, "279 
but went on to state that "so far as we know the Egyptians themselves did not mine copper 
in the Sinai during the NK", 280 citing the note familiar from the lnscriptions of Sinai: 
In the face of all this evidence [of copper slag in Sinai] it would be idle to attempt to 
deny that copper was mined and smelted in the Sinai peninsula probably at an early 
period. At the same time there is not a scrap of evidence for believing that the miners 
were Egyptians. Had this been the case we should confidently have expected to 
find in the vicinity of the workings some monumental evidence of these visitors who 
left such complete records of their enterprise in mining the turquoise. 281 
Since then, a building has been found, which has been called the "Egyptian Mining Temple 
at Timna", and should thus be the monument which Cerny was seeking. 282 The evidence 
supporting the contention that this was an official Ramesside copper mining temple consists of 
a number of fragments of Egyptian pottery, some objects naming Ramesside pharaohs, 
several heavily damaged pillars, some fragmentary Sphinxes, and a graffito of Ramesses III 
smiting the foes of Egypt. 283 Together this evidence definitely implies that the presence of the 
Egyptians in the area of the temple was more than accidental, and that a shrine to Hathor 
the Lady of T urquoise was built under the auspices of one of the Ramesside pharaohs, but 
the actual context of the discoveries suggests that it is impossible to reconstruct the temple as 
it originally stood and the association of the temple with official Egyptian copper mining is 
simply lacking. 284 In other words, an Egyptian copper mining temple has not yet been 
discovered. Although copper-related activities associated with a temple of The Lady of 
T urquoise have been discovered, the Egyptian context of this copper working is completely 
lacking. Although Ramesses III does mention Hathor, the Lady of T urquoise, in P. Harris just 
after the references to copper missions, it would be difficult to interpret the passage in the 
manner advocated by Rothenberg. 285 There seems to be no reason to revise Cerny's 
appraisal. 286 
279 Janssen, "Prolegomena to the Study of Egypt's Econornic History during the New Kingdom," SAK 3 ( 1975): 153. 
280 Janssen, SAK 3: 156. 
281 lnscriptions of Sinai II : 7 
282 Rothenberg, Temple. 
283 A. R. Schulrnan, "Catalogue of the Egyptian Finds, " in : Rothenberg, Temple, pp. 1 14-147, with figures and 
plates. 
284 There are several problems involved. ( 1) The architectural remains do not suggest the dimensions of an official 
Egyptian temple: 1 Ox 15 metres is more like a shrine than a temple (cf. Schulman in Rothenberg, Temple, 
p. 1 14). The actual architecture as preserved does not resemble any Ramesside Hathor temple. The Hathor-
heads preserved on the pillars do not necessarily match those of an Egyptian Hathor more than her Levantine 
analogues. The sphinx however does bear a much closer resemblance to Levantine styles than Egyptian, and 
Hathor is not associated with sphinxes. (2) The stratigraphy as published indicates that fragments of an Egyptian 
faience jar were found in the layers otherwise dated to the Chalcolithic, so that the absolutely ravaged state of the 
temple suggests that it is unwise to conclude that the smelting equipment arrangements were actually in use during 
the Ramesside period. (3) Nothing in any way indicates that this building was an official Ramesside structure: 
there are no lengthy texts or large stele. (4) Nothing indicates that were it to have been officially recognized that 
it was related to Egyptian participation in the copper mining industry, and in fact the expected reference to 
turquoise is not missing: Eg. Cat. 21, p. 118. 
285 Cf. infra, p. 216 n. 691 . 
286 Grandel (Papyrus Harris II : 261-263) assumes the validity of the archaeological reports which are thrown in 
doubt here, and thus understands developments in an alternative fashion. 
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On the basis of the archaeological evidence hitherto produced, it is entirely reasonable to 
suggest that the Pharaohs did not deliberately engage in copper mining in Sinai. lt is not 
clear that they established a monopoly on copper imports, and therefore, copper from Sinai 
may have been acquired from entrepreneurs. Given the logic of the "Theory of Comparative 
Advantage" it could be argued that the Egyptians did not exploit the tin in the eastern desert 
or the copper in Sinai because their comparative advantage was in the production of gold, 
which was worth far more than copper or tin or silver. 
In Mari and Assur, the gold:silver ratio was roughly 1 :4, while on the Levantine coast 1 :3 
was known. In Egypt, a ratio of gold:silver:copper of 1 :2:200 demonstrated that even when 
the ratio feil to 1 :2: 120, Egypt was still in a favorable position purchasing silver (which it did 
not have) with gold (which was in demand and which it did have), in order to purchase 
copper. 287 Ricardo drew the logical conclusions from such a situation at the beginning of 
the 19th century A. D. : 
All that I contend for is, that it is the natural price of commodities in the exporting 
country, which ultimately regulates the price at which they shall be sold, if they are 
not the objects of monopoly, in the importing country. 288 
This would suggest that every single price from ancient Egypt was itself a reflection of the 
"Theory of Comparative Advantage" because they were all denominated in either silver or 
copper and there was a competitive market for copper with producers in Cyprus, Anatolia 
and Oman competing with the Sinai producers. The evidence for both tin and copper thus 
corresponds to an economic incentive - and not a technological barrier - dictating the 
priorities. This can only imply that all prices were ultimately the result of market forces. 289 
EGYPTIAN EcoNOMICS AND EcoNOMIC CONCEPTS 
In ancient Egypt it was absolutely essential to have your name inscribed in a Book of the 
Dead in order for it tobe of any value. lt is therefore evident that Books of the Dead in which 
the names were accidentally not filled out suggest that the book was written first, and that the 
names would be filled out when the sale was consummated . The shabti funerary figurines 
placed in the tombs likewise required the name of the deceased in order tobe able to aid 
him or her in the Netherworld, and therefore the missing names on such figurines must be 
287 Cf. D. A. Warburton, "Keynes'sche Überlegungen zur altägyptischen Wirtschaft, " Z45 118 ( 1991 ): 81-82 
n. 21. lt would appear that a ratio of 1 :8 or 1 :9 for Anatolia rests on dubious references, and this should be 
disregarded. 
288 Ricardo, Principles, p. 530. lt need hardly be pointed out that this would throw some doubt on North's contention 
that price-making markets could not have existed in Antiquity (North, Economic History, p. 42) . 
289 Cf. the remark by E. M . Brumfiel ("The Economic Anthropology of the Stole: An lntroduction, " in Brumfiel, Stafe, 
p. 2) : "The logic of slate economic policy is the logic of power rather than the logic of the market. " lt will be noted 
that the political power of Egypt extended to the Nubian gold fields, which rendered the economic comparative 
advantage of mining copper in the Sinai marginal. Since the Canaaniles did not have access to gold, but did 
have access to copper, they mined it and sold it to the Egyptians. Both observed the laws of power - but their 
actions were determined by the market. All too frequently it is assumed that power can ovoid the market, but 
ultimately the market decides, or least it has since the third millennium B.C. 
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sought in negligent commercial activity. These phenomena demand that there was production 
which was not intended for specific customers and clients, i.e., production for the market. 290 
In the same way, it could be contended that those who manufactured small bronzes and 
figurines likewise produced without orders. lt is equally fair to assume that tool-makers and 
basket-makers and potters were likewise in the position of being guaranteed customers, and 
could therefore produce without orders from specific clients. But the low level of general 
economic activity would imply that it is more probable that builders, furniture-makers and 
other craftsmen made goods or carried out commissions to order. The implication being that 
the producers sold their own goods, and that others carried out commissions so that merchants 
or traders were relegated to a role in carrying out exchange transactions of a marginal 
character, and this would suggest that traders are not merely lacking in the documentation 
because it is skewed in favour of the bureaucracy, but also because of the structure of the 
economy: the bureaucracy and the state were significant. 
The market thus determined the general underlying tendency, but when Morenz sought to 
define the economy in ideal terms, he hit upon the key to understanding the system: the 
circulation system. While there may be some doubt about the interpretation of the significance 
of specific elements of the Egyptian economy, there can be no doubt about the role of 
circulation: it is a key, as Polanyi and Morenz indicated. Although proposed models cannot 
be tested against the data, let alone confirmed, the certainty of circulation remains paramount. 
The economic historiansJ.J. Janssen and R. Müller-Wollermann preferred Polanyi's approach, 
based on redistribution and reciprocity: the national economy of Upper and Lower Egypt 
operating as a reflection of the village or small city-state economy writ large. 
B. Kemp suggests that the Egyptians had a basically acquisitive mentality, and this is 
undisputed: the issue is the means available to realise the goal, and state employment will 
have been among the most attractive possibilities. Avarice in acquiring a surplus in order to 
create monuments, etc. generated the income which was redistributed, and thus the surplus 
was created by taxation, not redistribution . Polanyi's objections to the concept of surplus 
prevented the school from examining the theoretical implications of the surplus. lt must be 
noted that there is a fundamental economic difference between the economic production of 
goods for the market with a view to making profits, and merely making trading profits, and 
most are agreed that the second was a common feature of ancient civi lization, while there 
is disagreement about the relevance of the first. 291 
The significance of the economically rational behavior has been interpreted in vastly different 
ways . Some contend that the evidence from Deir el-Medineh suggests that the economy was 
embedded in social life, and that understanding can only be achieved through comparison 
290 Cf. e.g ., the evidence for shabtis, where there is no middleman: D. A. Warburton , "Some Remarks on the 
Manufacture and Sole of Shabtis, " BSEG 9- l O ( 1984-85): 345-355. 
291 This point becomes even more significant in the absence of a generally recognized comprehensive modern 
theory of profit, as this fact merely underlines that both ancient and modern societies were complex, and that 
identifying the key features of modern economics is more difficult than is generally assumed. Cf. Obrinsky, Profit 
Theory, passim. 
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with peasant societies, 292 while others contend that this is the "birth of economic man". 293 
Janssen has recently pointed out that the two are not contradictory, but merely underline the 
rule that the social organism adapted to the market is missing, which is quite evidently the 
case. 294 
The Gang was not only joined to upper Egyptian villages through sociological and psycho-
logical links, they also received "rations" or "wages" from the Egyptian state, through the 
redistribution system identified by Morenz, and discussed by Janssen. This redistribution 
system collected revenues from fields and marshes across Egypt, and turned them over to the 
employees of the state: grain, fish, dates, fire-wood, and many other items were ultimately 
delivered to the employees of the state, and it is this aspect of the economy that is the central 
subject of this work. 
The following interpretation of the Egyptian economy is based on the premise that despite 
the paucity of dato, a macro-economic model for the economy can be proposed, reflecting 
a pre-capitalist market economy. A very imperfect market- as familiar from the world of the 
"peasant economies" - allocated goods, but the role of the state in economic activity was so 
great that it had an effect on the laws of supply and demand to the extent that we are unable 
to recognize all the principles in every case. In general, however the basic principle will 
have been the tendency to even out economic behavior, but there will have been tendencies 
in various directions. 
In The Ancient Economy, Sir Moses Finley suggested that the basic terms in Marshall 's 
Principles of Economics, "such as labour, production, capital , investment, income, circulation, 
demand, entrepreneur, utility" "cannot be translated into Greek or Latin" .295 Although one 
could quibble, the basic idea is correct. Taken word for word, one might not doubt Sir 
Moses's opinion, but examined differently, "work" was known, if not labour, "money" but not 
capital, "hoarding" but not investment, "profit" and possibly "income", "scarcity of coinage" 
but not circulation, "supply" but not demand, "trader" but not entrepreneur, "value" but not 
util ity. lt would seem that their analytical faculties were not very weil advanced but they did 
understand their problems: how to build a bigger tomb, raise a bigger obelisk, conquer a 
!arger country. These problems were the ones they faced and solved. 
The differences between the two vocabularies testify to the role of exchange in society, and 
social attitudes towards exchange and those who carry it out. In the absence of a clearly 
defined market in which objects could be manufactured on the assumption that they would 
be purchased, entrepreneurial activity would be primarily oriented toward trade rather than 
production. lf traders acted on the principle of making a profit through the acquisition and 
292 J. J. Janssen, Prices, pp. 556ff. 
293 ß. Kemp, Egypt, pp. 232-260, esp., pp. 241 -248 . 
294 J. J. Janssen, "Debts and Credit in the New Kingdom," JEA 80 ( 1994): 136 n. 35 . 
This line of thought neglects a supremely important aspect of modern economic behavior, where a state of 
equilibrium can arise with high underemployment, and an economic imbalance dominated by a tendency to 
increase supply for a market which is already saturated, implying that the modern economy has economically 
significant irrational elements, cf. Dreze, Underemployment Equilibria, passim, esp. pp. 15-27. 
295 Finley, Ancient Economy, p . 21 . 
108 
Egyptian Economics and Economic Concepts 
sale of objects, or through hoarding in order to release products onto the market when they 
were scarce, this implies that they implicitly understood the effects of supply and demand, 
but that they would necessarily attract the universal hatred or contempt of mankind as a 
result. Finley emphasizes that this was the case in classical antiquity, and the evidence from 
ancient Egypt is similar. 296 
The position of trade and manufacturing as respected professions only emerged in more 
recent times, 297 but this does not mean that wealth could not be acquired in this fashion: it 
was just not respectable, landed, wealth. Through history, landed wealth has frequently 
tended to pay serious attention to social responsibilities and activities. The sense of respon-
sibility resulting from having several families dependent upon the estate must have induced 
many an ancient subject or citizen to feel a similar responsibility for the general welfare of 
his homeland, and to contribute to its political destiny. A weil managed estate also guaranteed 
that they were free of cares and had the time to do so, and that they could make profits 
effortlessly, and therefore not be obliged to pursue the creation of wealth as a goal in itself. 
Therefore, those who merely pursued wealth were worthy of contempt, and endeavoured to 
make themselves respectable as quickly as possible, by marrying into the right families and 
taking over the necessary social obligations. Prestige did not derive from wealth, but wealth 
could lead to the acquisition of prestige through participation. This ability of society to 
gather in the capable meant that there was a constant renewal of the human resources at the 
service of the state throughout history. This gave the role of the state an added importance in 
light of the fact that the administration of the agricultural resources was the sine qua non for 
the ability of the economy to leap beyond subsistence. 
Returning to the economic sphere, and the role of redistribution in light of these social and 
political givens it is perhaps useful to return to the fundamental issue raised by Hunt, that it is 
the job of the bureaucrat to assure the surplus production necessary to maintain the level of 
overall employment based on the division of labour, which by definition however effectively 
reduces the level of agricultural employment, while endeavoring to maintain output. lt is the 
peasants who must produce the difference, and this has resulted in widespread distrust: "The 
peasant looks upon outsiders (including officials) as his enemies."298 Resenting interference, 
the individual independent peasant land-holder strives to seek his own economic balance: 
Thorough empirical studies on peasarit farms in Russia and other countries have 
enabled us to substantiate the following thesis: the degree of seif exploitation is 
determined by a peculiar equilibrium between family demand satisfaction and the 
drudgery of the labour itself. 299 
296 Cf., e.g., M. Römer, "Der Handel und die KauAeute im alten Ägypten, " SAK 19 (1992): 282-284. 
297 At the beginning of the 20th century A.D., "[ .. . S]he considered herself very broadminded because she had 
allowed her son to marry into 'Irade'. 'As Sir Hugh was a multi-millionaire I was not very impressed,' observed 
Bertrand Russell in later years. " (From Winstone, Bell, p. 21 ). 
298 F. G. Baily, "The Peasant View of the Bad Life," in Shanin, Peasants, p. 308. 
299 A. Chayanov, quoted by B. Kerblay, "Chayanov and the Theory of Peasantry as a Specific Type of Economy," in 
Shanin, Peasants, p. 153. 
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While independent peasants can afford to make these decisions for themselves, those who 
are part of a vast feudal economy dominated by temples, landlords and exploitative middle 
peasants view things in a different way: 
Unused resources, wasted manpower, declining production - these were the fruits 
of a system that in the long run could only bring disaster on its victims and beneficiaries 
alike. 300 
This landscape was the result of deliberate but inefficient exploitation, and varies signifi-
cantly from that represented by Hunt, where labour shortages rather than "wasted manpower" 
were the problem. Hobbes described the situation preceding the emergence of the state: 
In such a condition there is no place for industry because the fruit thereof is uncertain, 
and consequently no cultivation of the earth, no navigation and the life of man nasty, 
poor, solitary, brutish and short. 301 
In many modern states of the Third World, a different situation prevails as prices for local 
products are kept low so as to permit an impoverished under-employed urban population to 
purchase foodstuffs. Low prices necessarily reduce the production incentives in agricultural 
areas, and production stagnates. Underemployment in both urban and rural areas rises, 
and foreign imports rise, so that the essential elements for stagnation are there. lf demand for 
production is reduced to the minimum level, savings are reduced to nil, and investment fails 
to take place. 
In each case, the assumption is different: ( 1) a free choice against over-indulgent self-
exploitation, (2) the consequences of multi-faceted feudal exploitation, (3) the absence of a 
central authority guaranteeing security, and (4) a mere neglect of the politically amorphous 
rural population, but in each case the result is the same agricultural inefficiency and poverty 
on a vast scale. 
On the one hand, Hobbes assumed that a government guaranteeing security was the lacking 
element, while in feudal China, it was not the lock of authority, but the inefficiency of the 
system of myopic exploitation that prevented development.302 On the other hand, Hunt 
suggests that the labour shortage was the problem, which was no where in evidence. 303 
Certainly, one key to understanding the system is demand: the great English economistjohn 
Maynard Keynes pointed out that in a pure laissez-faire economy, in the event of a decline 
in demand, investment and production would sink to a level of poverty where savings would 
300 Hinton, Fanshen, p. 36. 
301 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 13, p . 62 (original edition). 
302 Despite all the horrors, it would appear that the formative Egyptian state bore a strong resemblance to the 
Chinese feudal system based on a small group of land-lords controlling not only most of the draught animals and 
land, but also the unpaid official and semi-official posts. 
303 Cf. Chaudhuri, Asia before Europe, pp. 84-85 : "A great many people, members of the different civilisations of 
Asia, were notengaged in growing their own food or raising their own livestock. Farmers[ ... ] who [ ... ] had no 
wish or incentive to feed any one eise other than their own families and extended kinship groups, nonetheless 
provided food to classes without direct involvement in its production ." 
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be reduced to zero, which is precisely the situation described by Hobbes, so that the state 
is one theoretical actor in the equation, but demand must be another. lf the market alone is 
unable to correct the situation, intervention is necessary, and only the state has the power to 
intervene, transcending the individual micro-economic problems of the economy as a whole. 
Despite these theoretical constraints, ancient Egypt, a technologically primitive society, 
developed an economy sufficiently sophisticated to produce literary, philosophical, artistic 
and architectural wonders which still command the attention of the world. Assuming that the 
temples and the government were the primary factors in increasing demand in ancient 
Egypt, these powers will have exercised an extraordinary influence on the economy. The 
theoretical aspect of state intervention in an economy in order to stimulate, and thus 
increase, demand was carefully studied by Keynes, who showed that state intervention 
could call into existence demand which was hitherto not present, in order to shift the economy 
to a new level of equilibrium, with a higher level of prosperity than that previously prevailing. 304 
KEYNES 
These facts suggest that many aspects of the Egyptian economy can be elucidated using the 
Keynesian approach, so that the value of the model exceeds the mere imposition of an 
unwieldy construction upon the flexible administrative methods of the ancient Egyptians, but 
actually contributes to the understanding, as weil as the explanation of the Egyptian economy. 
This approach has been selected as the fiscal system can serve to define the essence of an 
economy as a whole, especially if that economy is defined in terms of "redistribution". The 
Keynesian interpretation of the Egyptian economy is merely a refinement of the redistributive 
model, designed to enhance understanding, by joining the principle of demand with the 
market and "redistribution" .305 
Much of the theoretical background to the study of the economy does not and cannot 
contradict other interpretations, it merely emphasizes certain distinct points. The key element 
is that the employment of Polanyi's categories has not improved the level of discussion, as 
the prescribed social relationships are violated by applying all elements of his approach to 
ancient Egypt, and the dato has been twisted to match his model rather than the reverse. The 
lock of theoretical mechanisms accompanying his model likewise makes it inappropriate to 
reject analytical approaches to the mechanisms of the economy which can only aid compre-
hension. In a very general way "redistribution" is certainly a key element in the fiscal system 
of any state, and therefore the employment of Keynesian theory to illuminate "redistribution" 
cannot be dismissed, unless the interpretation of the variables is erroneous. Keynes himself 
put it quite simply: 
304 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, lnterest and Money (London, 1936). 
305 The theoretical interpretation of the economy presented here was presented as a lecture at the annual meeting of 
the German Speaking Egyptologists in 1989, after which Dr. Blumenthal 9.rranged for itto be published: D. A. 
Warburton, "Keynes'sche Uberlegungen zur altägyptischen Wirtschaft," ZAS 118 ( 1991 ): 76-85. 
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Ancient Egypt was doubly fortunate, and doubtless owed to this its fabled wealth, in 
that it possessed two octivities, namely pyramid building as well os the search for 
precious metals, the fruits of which, since they could not serve the needs of man by 
being consumed, did not stale with obundance.[ ... ] Two pyramids [ ... ] are twice as 
good as one [ ... ]306 
This passage terminates the chapter on the "Marginal Propensity to Consume", where Keynes 
discusses the difficulties of increasing demand, os there are very few products for which the 
demand curve is infinitely elastic. Consumption is dependent upon abstaining from investment, 
and thus requires liquidity, in order to acquire. lncreased consumption increoses demand, 
which increases aggregate demand in an expanding economy, but creates competition 
between sectors in a stable or diminishing economy. Aggregate demand can only be 
increased inelastically if both liquidity and consumption are permitted to increase with 
competition for scarce resources excluded. On the one hand, liquidity is usually unable to 
sustain indefinite demand stimulation, and demand itself is usually insufficient because it 
flags. According to Keynes this unusual constellation was the key to growth, rather than 
investment as such. Put simply, an infinitely elastic demand curve is one where demand is 
unlimited. Normally, any product that can be consumed reaches a saturation point on the 
market, and demand flags, with the result that the price falls, and production and employment 
stagnate. Keynes thus drew upon the example of pyramid construction to illustrate the principle 
that if something is absolutely useless, and yet infinitely desirable, demand for it will not 
slacken, meoning that investment and employment will continue to increase. 
In the modern capitalistic world however, those investing in such products would inevitably 
distort the interest rate structure such that their production would continue to flourish, while 
other sectors declined, until a new equilibrium was reached. Keynes's theory of price formation 
was based not only on supply and demand, but also interest rotes, so that price stability 
would be virtually unattainable with fluctuating interest and wage rotes, which are the 
necessary repercussions of the massive concentration of investment and demand in one part 
of the market. In the modern world, state intervention would have the same - or even worse 
- consequences as the state is responsible for the currency as weil as fiscal policy, so that 
state financed demand would either result in (a) inflation, (b) distortion of the interest rate 
structure, 307 or (c) excessive taxation. Each of these would necessarily have a negative 
impact on the overall economic structure, so that driving away the unemployment problem 
would merely create other acute difficulties. In the General Theory, Keynes was particularly 
concerned that interest con suppress demand for investment and thus the whole series of 
demand curves, ond thus threatens to maintain an economic equilibrium at a low level of 
prosperity indefinitely, unless the demand can be stimulated in another way, for demand is 
the key to increasing prosperity and employment. "Aggregate effective demand", 
306 Keynes, General Theory, p. 131 . Superficially the reference to mining might not appear compelling, but in terms 
of providing an additional motive for expeditions into the desert and the conquest of Nubia, mining had an 
enormous impact on prosperity and employment in ancient Egypt. 
307 Government bonds are the most certain type and thus preferred by investors wanting to ovoid risk. 
112 
Keynes 
the "propensity to consume", and the "marginal efficiency of capital" are the decisive factors 
which could potentially leave an economy atan equilibrium of absolute poverty. The primary 
difficulty as Keynes perceived it, was to stimulate demand, while balancing off the various 
evils, in order to achieve an equilibrium at a higher level of prosperity. In the modern world 
there is virtually no way to ovoid the choice of the lesser evil, but the ancient world was 
governed by a different situation, as the understanding of the details of currency fluctuations 
and market mechanisms had not yet penetrated into every aspect of the economy. 
Keynes himself was interested in the ancient world, and wrote some papers (which remained 
unpublished during his life time) about the economies of Greece and Mesopotamia which 
1, S, C 
E 
C+ I' 
C+ 1 
C+I' C 
C+I 
C s 
I' I' 
Fig. 2. The Keynesian Model3°8 
The leftvertical scale represents investments, savings and consumption (1, S, C); the bottom horizontal 
scale is the income level (Y). In the classic Keynesian paradigm, investment is stable at a low level 
of equilibrium (1), with a stable growth of consumption (C) but minimal savings (S) as people only 
save when income grows, as from Ye (income at first equilibrium) to Y' (income at increased equilibrium) 
after new investment (1') demand stimulates the economy, with increased Consumption and Invest-
ment (C+I'). The ideal equilibrium line (E) is the ideal situation where income equals investment, 
savings and consumption, so that all available means are re-circulated within the economy. Only in 
the ancient agrarian world where government income and expenditures could be measured in grain 
and usefully employed without the danger of debt was this a realistic possibility. 
308 This was taken from Screpanti/Zamagni, Economic Thought, Fig. 7, p. 233. 
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were dominated by interest rate structures,309 in contrast to ancient Egypt, although this was 
not known at the time. The critical role of interest rotes was thus assumed to have been a 
prevalent problem in the ancient world, and so it is not surprising that Keynes did not direct 
any further energies to the study of ancient Egypt, and did not realize that ancient Egypt was 
an ideal case for illustrating his theory. Keynes's primary concern was however the modern 
world in any case. 310 
Keynes was confronted with the situation of the depression and the inability of the capitalist 
system to rescue itself, as it must have according to the premises of the laissez-faire 
economists who assumed that equilibrium with lower unemployment would be achieved by 
lowering wage rotes. 311 Keynes pointed out that aggregate demand would not increase by 
lowering wages, as effective demand had more or less peaked in any case. Thus, knocking 
down wage rotes would not increase employment if demand was flagging, for liquidity 
would not be increased, and therefore effective demand would stagnate. 312 lf effective 
demand did not rise, investment would not rise, and the economic situation would continue 
to be bleak (as it had been for millennia). lt was thus only by external stimulation that the 
economy could be spurred on to a higher level. lt is the "marginal efficiency of capital" (by 
which the interest rate structure is meant) which thus determines the level of prosperity. lf 
interest rotes sink to zero, 
the position of equilibrium, under conditions of laissez-faire, will be one in which 
employment is low enough and the standard of living sufficiently miserable to bring 
savi ngs to zero. 313 
lt should be eminently clear that the construction of pyramids, tombs and temples was an 
absolutely ideal method of increasing demand, and thus that the reference to Keynes' 
General Theorycan be largely justified on this basis alone, but many of the basic problems 
of modern capitalist production as perceived by Keynes were already surmounted in ancient 
Egypt several millennia ago. These problems concern demand, consumption, savings and 
investment, as each of these has an influence on the other, with the result that the equilibrium bet-
ween these factors determines the state of any economy at any given moment in time. 
309 Cf. Keynes, Works XXVIII, pp. 223-294. 
310 When he died, he was working on the creation of the post-war economic system symbolized by Bretton-Woods, 
which led to one of the most successful economic transformations in world history, and thus it was probably more 
valuable for humanily that he did not devote himself to scholarly pursuits. Cf. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Oiplomacy. 
In passing we might note that the interpretations of economic development in the second half of the 19th century A.D. 
offered by Keynes (Consequences) and Polanyi (Transformation) do not differ widely. lt was only their interpretation 
about what should be done in future that did. 
311 They did not realize that mankind had lived for millennia with a high proportion of involuntary unemployment, and 
that there was no reason why this had to change, cf. Fig. 3, p. 119 infra. 
312 Say's law dictated that demand would rise to meet any supply, and therefore that equilibrium was inevitable. The 
general assumption of the economic communily was that equilibrium would inevitably be reached, and thus the 
failure to realise that the realizalion of Say's law required placing financial power in the hands of those seeking 
to acquire, and that it would only then therefore be possible to establish a new equilibrium at a higher level. 
313 Keynes, General Theory, pp. 217-218 . 
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In an agricultural economy, without external stimulus, production will equal consumption, 
with a high level of unemployment or underemployment, as over-production would not result 
in an increase in consumption, and thus there is no incentive to produce above the 
necessary minimum. The price structure and investment possibilities virtually assure this. In 
ancient Egypt, the land itself could practically guarantee that a minimum of labour input 
would produce the maximum consumption level, so that demand would not increase without 
artificial stimulus. 
The state provided the artificial stimulus by (1) obliging the farmers to over-produce, by 
means of fiscal measures, (2) creating a dass of craftsmen employed full time on temple and 
tomb construction and maintenance, thus withdrawing this dass from significant agricultural 
production, (3) paying for the major construction projects with the surplus withdrawn from the 
farmers, and (4) creating a bureaucracy which also required maintenance. These measures 
alone guaranteed that demand was stimulated beyond the subsistence minimum. 
Demand stimulus as the explanation for the success of the Egyptian economy as the funda-
mental element enabling the redistribution system to function superficially contradicts Hunt's 
analysis. lt is generally agreed that the state redistribution system collected grain (and other 
products) from one part ofthe community, turning them over to another part of the community. 
This was possible as corn production promised incredible yields. 314 Since the labour input 
was the weak variable here, the only way to increase secondary and tertiary employment 
was to drastically reduce agricultural underemployment, increase the overall level of 
employment for individuals, taking people off the land, employing them in the construction 
and service sectors, maximizing agricultural production with heavy rent and taxes. Removing 
people from agricultural production forced those who were left to produce more than was 
being produced per capita before, in order to pay the recipients who were employed in the 
other sectors. lncreasing the demand stimulated production, so that the two variables were 
related. The fact that the Romanempire was able to produce sufficient quantities from Egypt, 
to maintain not only the population of Egypt, but the plebs at Rome as weil, suggests that 
Pharaonic pragmatism overweighs Hunt's theoretical scheme, and that the real problem in 
agricultural economies around the world is under-employment, rather than a shortage of 
labour, i.e., that the system is closer to that suggested by Chayanov and described by 
Hinton than to Hunt's postulated restrictions. 315 The investment increases employment 
producing temples, tombs, boats, etc. 
The fact that the measures employed for increasing production were fiscal in nature guaranteed 
that state investment would not have a negative impact on private investment, because the 
314 Cf. Gardiner, Wilbourll: 71; Rathbone, Economic Rationalism, pp. 242-244. Modem records indicate yields of 
5-15 khar/ arouro. 
315 lt should be evident that references to the finite limits of the agricultural surplus are inappropriale, as the increased 
workload was spreod over a diminished workforce, but demographic growth proceeded slowly, meoning that 
overall demand for grain remained constant until the population began lo change, which was a much more long 
term development, and even here the evidence indicates that the limil was demand rather than supply, so that 
neither the workforce nor the actual quantity of grain which they could produce are relevant variables . 
115 
The Economy 
interest rate structure was not affected, signifying that there was no competition between the 
state and private sectors for scarce means. The private sector was thus left untouched by the 
fiscal (as opposed to) monetary solution of the problem. 
In fact however, the monetary solution (using inflation or interest rotes) was excluded from the 
outset by the fact that Egypt neither had a currency, nor an all-pervasive system of interest 
rotes. 316 Money is assumed to possess three basic attributes, as ( 1) a unit of value, (2) a store 
of value, and (3) an exchange value. In ancient Egypt, the copper deben was a unit of value 
and evidently a store of value, but it was not normally employed in transactions, and thus 
fails to meet all thre~ criteria.317 The khar of grain was used both as a unit of value and a unit 
of exchange, but storing grain is not a realistic method of keeping one's savings, so that it 
likewise fails to meet all three criteria.318 ßeds and other articles could be used for exchange 
purposes, and perhaps as a store of value, but they could not be regarded as a unit of 
value. In any case, there was no government controlled money or currency, which could be 
used as a tool of monetary policy, 319 and thus the monetary inflationary alternative was not 
available. 320 
lncreasing grain production was inflationary, but so long as ( 1) the excess production could 
be absorbed by diverting state employment into non--agricultural sectors and (2) the resulting 
"inflation" did not damage private sector entrepreneurial investment, the situation was one in 
which inflation played a positive rather than negative role. This is crucial for the Keynesian 
316 Cf. J. J. Janssen, "Debts and Credit," JEA 80: 129-136. The evidence adduced certainly corresponds to that of 
the famous purchase of the slave-girl (cf. A. H. Gardiner, "A Lawsuit Arising from the Purchase of two Slaves," 
JEA 21 [ 1935 ]: 140-146), and suggests that among themselves, the workmen had access to a credit system 
which was not in[~rious to their we<:J_lth, in great contrast to, e.g., feudal China. 
317 Cf. Warburton, "Uberlegungen," ZAS 118: 81, n. 21; p. 82; Janssen, "Prolegomena,"SAK 3 ( 1975): 177. 
318 lt could be contended that grain was the equivalent of money, for the wealthy could afford to maintain !arge well 
insulated silos, and the poor had few resources anyway so that the roden! problem in Egypt should not be taken 
so seriously. (lt was however the situation after the inundation that was used as an illustration for spontaneous 
generation, where mice supposedly appeared spontaneously once the water began to subside). Grain is listed 
among the things lent to others in Janssen, "Debts and Credit," JEA 80: 129. 
lt should be noted that for the purposes of the Keynesian interpretation of the economy setting grain as a true 
equivalent to money is not an obstacle, but actually a corollary of the argument, so that the contention that money 
did not exist in Egypt is intended more as a realistic appraisal of the situation than a dogmatic statement of 
position. Inflation through the grain standard is impossible, and increased production will only lead to economic 
growth and prosperity. 
319 The supply of precious metals cannot have fulfilled the same investment and income roles as grain which was the 
essential component of public investment, being primarily determined by access to grain. Thus, precious metals 
may have performed all of the utility roles demanded of money, but they could not be employed to alter grain 
production, which was the basic source of wealth. Cf. Warburton, "Überlegungen," ZÄS 118: 81, n. 21; p. 83, 
n. 24 for remarks concerning the purist Keynesian approach to the role of precious metals. lt must however be 
noted that the production of gold did have at least a marginally significant influence on employment - by diverting 
labaur from the market place (and thus decreasing unemployment), and increasing the necessary grain production 
to pay the workers involved. 
320 This whole paragraph appears to force the Egyptian economy into the theoretical framework, but the purpose is 
exclusively to identify and analyze any possible implications of the roles served by the articles in question, and not 
to create the impression that the Egyptians thought of pots and pans as their savings. 
lf Janssen's ("Debts and Credit,'' JEA 80: 129-136) understanding of the evidence of the references to materials 
belonging to one person but in another person's possession is correct, and this is a form of credit, it will be noted 
that precisely the items assigned a partial monetary role here appear in these texts, including a bed as an article 
which could be loaned. 
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theory as inflation in capitalist economies can have an extremely detrimental impact on both 
employment and investment, by rendering certain industrial undertakings uneconomic. 
lt is extremely advantageous for a growing economy to have sticky wages, i.e., wages 
which remain stable or rising while prices rise or fall. lf wages were not in money they might 
not remain stable in money terms, but if grain demand stays high and constant, and wages 
are paid in grain, and taxes collected in grain, and grain a medium of exchange the threat 
of negative economic repercussions is avoided. lt is only through increasing effective demand 
through high wages or income that the private sector can contribute to the economic growth 
stimulated by the government program, as the income can be absorbed through production 
leading to transactions and the generation and accumulation of wealth. 
That the state was collecting grain meant that increasing demand was a more or less 
automatic process, and that demand here had a positive effect on employment. The same 
was true on the investment side, as the employment in the temples, etc. increased both 
aggregate employment, and aggregate income, without taxing the capital markets. And 
without inflation. Without a currency, the danger of inflation was avoided, since inflation 
occurs when the government consumption exceeds government income - and the whole 
basis of the program was to maximize state income. Thus many of the basic elements of the 
Egyptian economy are logically ideal forms of implementing a cyclical development which 
would spur demand and employment, underlining the relevance of the Keynesian theory for 
understanding the process. Keynes himself has come under attack for various faults of the 
theory, some of which arose from conscious application of the theory, such as the shift of the 
Phillips curve. Since the Egyptians were doing this unconsciously, they did not face this 
danger either. 
lt is quite clear that the Phillips curve was pushed to the right in the l 970's and l 980's, to the 
extent that people doubted its relevance, but the curve only claims to establish a statistical 
relationship between inflation and unemployment, not to explain the entire economy. 321 Not 
only does the interest rate have an influence on investment, and the investment curve effect 
consumption, so that even with income and prices steady, a change in the consumption 
curve will have an effect on the demand for labour, and thus unemployment, but conscious-
ness of the assumed relations encourages people to change their expectations. Such a 
change will naturally effect the Phillips curve as the increased demand in consumption will 
drive up prices, especially if it had a negative impact on investment, and this will seemingly 
influence unemployment. In the end the problem is demand, as an increase in demand can 
lead to an increase in supply, one of the major constraints being money, and another labour. 
The lock of a money or currency also eliminated the possibility of the impact of the interest 
rate structure from having a detrimental impact on investment and thus production. Investment 
curves in the capitalist world are determined by interest, as the expectation of profit must 
321 The Phillips cuNe offers lwo challenges: ( l) that in statistically identifying the relationship between inflation and 
unemployment, investors can anticipate inflation, and act accordingly, which creates a seif fulfilling prophecy; 
and (2) no one knows why the relationship exists, for it is a mere statistical reality, cind therefore the relationship 
need not be based upon direct connections, increasing the danger that ( l) threatens to make a statistical relation-
ship into a real one. Cf., e.g., Holler, Arbeitsmarktes, p. 32. 
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exceed the anticipated interest rate, otherwise investment subsides until the interest rate has 
fallen. lf the interest rate is zero, investment will also be zero unless stimulated. 322 The fact 
that there may have been agriculturally related interest rotes had the opposite effect, and 
was precisely the same as the state's role in skimming off agricultural production, as the exaction 
of interest for grain resulted in the incentive to produce more grain than was necessary for 
consumption .323 These private sector interest rotes will thus ( l) not have had a negative 
impact on the economy, actually spurring it on, and (2) the conflict between the state and the 
private sectors for scarce resources will have been reduced to a minimum. 324 
Aside from industrial investment, land ownership is one of the most enticing means of investing 
excess capital in the modern world, and in most of the Mediterranean world throughout 
history. The state may have been one of the major land owners in ancient Egypt, but this did 
not seem to have increased demand for private land to the extent that the price was driven 
upwards, as K. Baer has shown that the price of land in ancient Egypt was comparatively 
low. 325 This meant that capital investment would not be directed to the mere possession of 
land, but to using the land for productive purposes, i.e., increasing the grain supply, and 
thus being able to maintain a large household. 
322 Since no one will lend funds to another for entrepreneurial purposes withoul an incenlive. 
323 There would appear to be very little evidence on interest rotes in ancient Egypl, and it is anticipated that another 
study musl be devoted to the subject. The interpretation of the ljq:-nbt papers permils the conclusion that inleresl 
existed, supported by other sources, but interest could not have played an important role in the economy as we 
understand it. This is one of the greatest points of conlrast between contemporary Egypt and tv\esopolamia. 
For ancient Egypt, we have no firm dato on inlerest rotes of any kind, but repayment of grain related loans, at e.g . 
100 per cenl. p.a. for seed corn would equal 20 per cenl. of the crop, with a ten-fold harvesl. There is nö 
evidence of metal-related interest. In ancienl Mesopolamia interest rotes of c. 33 per cenl. in grain and 20 per 
cent. in silver were usual. 
lt is perhaps interesting to nole that rotes of 32 1 / 2 per cenl. were usual in 16th century Holland. In feudal China 
50 per cent. a month in silver was not unknown. This would indicale that in early and feudal agricultural and 
trading communities relatively high interest rotes were the rule . In the ancient world there is no evidence for 
decisive falls in interest rotes, as opposed lo the simple cancellation of debts. 
lnteresl rotes feil decisively in Holland so that by the end of the 17th cenlury they were al 2 1 / 2 per cenl. The 
value of silver feil decisively during the same cenlury, as the Chinese market was saturated (cf. D. 0 . Flynn and 
A. Gircildez, "Born with a 'Silver Spoon' : the Origin of World Trade in 1571 ,' JWH6 [1995]: 201 -221), but 
the drop in interest rotes is the opposite of what would be normally anticipated with a drop in value, and was 
certainly far grealer than the drop in the value of silver. lt thus appears reasonable to suggesl that interest rotes 
were the decisive factor enabling the industrial revolution, as low rotes permit profits lobe made with manufac-
turing, whereas high rotes not only result in high debts and ultimately the concentration of agricultural lands in the 
hands of a small elite, but they also encourage enlrepreneurs to pursue profits through Irade rather than produc-
tion . lt is unclear why interest rotes feil. 
Thal the rotes feil at precisely the moment when Europe began to overtake the Indian Ocean - and not when silver 
from the Americas began to flood the European market - is however clear, and that the economy of Europe was 
industrially transformed immediately thereafter is equally clear. This would suggest that low interest rotes and 
banking are significant crileria for modern capitalism , and that lechnology and precious metals play less of a role 
than would be expected. 
324 Aside from the fact that most of the wealthier land holders will probably have been state officials, but this is 
irrelevant at the moment. 
325 Cf Warburton "Überlegungen," ZÄS 118: 84, n. 26; K. Baer, "The Low Price of Land in Ancienl Egypt, " 
JARCE l ( 1962): 25-45 . 
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Y, 1, C 
Fig . 3. Unstimulated Low Investment in Subsistence Economy 
The left scale is the level of income, investment and consumption, against the bottom scale of time. 
Without growth, investment stagnates at a minimum level: an equilibrium at the poverty line . lt is 
possible to have economic activity and even the production of luxury goods in such an economy, but 
prosperity is not wide-spread. 
Y, 1, D 
D 
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Fig . 4. The Simplified Keynesian Theory Appl ied to Ancient Egypt 
Investment (1) is stagnant at subsistence level, with lncome (left scale) stable over Time (bottom 
scale, T). The level of investment is such that no significant changes can be achieved without 
substantial changes in the demand structure, i.e., artificial stimulation. This is accomplished by the 
governrnent artificially raising demand for woin (taxes), which is irnrnediately paid out in wages and 
rations, i.e ., Demand (D) = Investment (1 '), until private demand likewise increases as a result of 
stimulation (through new government investment [1'], creating new stirnulated Demand curve [D']). lt 
is noted that with private investment, demand has risen considerably, but it is dependent upon the 
state investment (1 ') without which it falls, to a little way above previously existing level, because it is 
dependent upon the increased level of state dernand . (This graph presumes that during the First 
lntermediate Period - right end of graph - general prosperity dropped across the country, which 
does not suggest that the new equil ibrium eliminated wealth or the distribution of prestige goods) . 
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Egypt was thus basically on the grain standard, and this particular commodity was the basis 
on which the entire economy flourished. lt was the grain which was used to pay the workers 
who built the monuments of the land, and by withdrawing labour from the agricultural sector, 
demand was actually increased, along with employment. 
lt will be observed that this whole study is devoted to the fiscal system, or the means by 
which the government increased demand for numerous products, and that it was thus 
primarily concerned with the role of the state. The private tombs may well have been built 
with private means, for the most part, as during the Old Kingdom, which renders it probable 
that a private sector flourished along side the state sector. lt is also possible that the temples 
were actually purchasing part of their necessities from the private sector. The workers in Deir 
el-Medineh spent part of their spare time engaging in outside work, making funerary 
equipment for the wealthier segment of Theban society. 326 The private sector did thus exist, 
and thus the economy will have been a mixed economy, with the state potentially taking the 
lion's share of the surplus economy, but obviously not impinging on the private sector, as 
otherwise there will not have been so many private stele and tombs made on private contract 
by private craftsmen for private people. The enti re economic system was thus oriented 
towards consumption and investment, as the potentially negative influence of interest rotes 
and savings were effectively negated, and the "propensity to consume" given free rein. lt 
was merely the state fiscal system which guaranteed an equilibrium at a high level of prosperity 
for all. 
The ideal feature of temple and tomb construction is that the demand is infinitely elastic: the 
law of the "Extension of the Existing" (Erweiterung des Bestehenden) indicates that one can 
always make a large tomb or temple, one can always employ more priests, encourage 
additional services, and all this without negatively effecting the rest of the economy. The 
state did not hamper individuals in their own investments. 
ELABORATION OF VALUE OF THE LJsE OF KEYNESIAN T HEORY 
This analysis has been disputed on several levels. One approach contends that the Egyptians 
did not do it deliberately and that the relevance of Polanyi's redistribution system is clear, but 
that of Keynesian theory less so. Another objection has been the assertion that the logic is 
purely circular . The intellectual validity of using Keynes to analyze a non-monetary economy 
has likewise been thrown in doubt. 327 
The only purpose of the theory is to provide parameters for comprehending the variables, 
and therefore the relevance of the theory can only be used to analyze situations, and to 
compare its value relative to other theoretical frameworks. Viewing Mesopotamia, ziqqurats 
appear to be comparable to pyramids, and thus it is tempting to equate the two systems, but 
interest rotes and trade played significant roles in Mesopotamia, so that when the economy 
326 E.g., Botti/Peet, Giomole, pls. 40-41. 
327 Cf. e.g., E. Eichler, "Polonyi-Keynes-Warburton," GM 131 ( 1992): 25-31; D. A. Warburton , ''The Economy of 
ancient Egypt Revisited Yet Again," GM 146 ( 1995): 103-111. 
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faltered, not only tax exemptions were proposed, but also the cancellation of debts. In 
Egypt, tax exemptions lead to a decline in the economy, as demand is reduced. lt is difficult 
to understand the significance of this gesture, as it is automatically assumed that if the 
institutional obligations to pay are reduced that the income will automatically fall into the 
private sector, or that it fails to make a difference. In fact, once an administrative construction 
project came to a halt, it was normal for the fields responsible for the grain supplies for the 
workers involved either to cease production, or to be transferred to another project. The 
mortuary temples of the new Kingdom pharaohs are a case in point. lt is assumed that the 
reigning pharaoh was wrongfully misappropriating the goods of his predecessors when he 
transferred certain of their fields to those of his own funerary temple. In fact, according to the 
theory that one continued to build as long as one was olive, one also stopped when one 
died, and the mortuary temple ceased to be a construction site and became a divine 
temple, with the result that the construction workers previously engaged at the temple were 
no longer employed for construction at that temple, and thus that they no longer received 
wages. The newly ascended pharaoh promptly re-organized things, sought out a site for his 
new tomb, and transferred the workers from the former royal tomb to the new royal tomb. 
The same event also applied to the mortuary temples, but here the administrative machinery 
had tobe slightly revised, as the function of the temple changed, whereas the construction 
in the royal tomb came to a halt and was stopped, and it was a mere detail to re-assign the 
Gang to continue work at the new tomb. The mortuary temple was transformed, and therefore 
administrative measures were called for. lf however, in other cases, land was withdrawn 
from the domains at the disposal of the private or public sectors in order to guarantee a 
given project, then that land and its production was no longer at the disposal of the state. lf 
the temple construction project came to a halt, and the workers were laid off, and the grain 
continued to be collected by private individuals, the demand situation would remain stable. 
lf however, the workers were cut off from the economy, and the grain no longer collected, 
demand had slackened, and the state system had suffered a set back. 
The assertion that the logic is circular fails to understand the basic purpose of the theory. The 
theory is merely an elaborate detailed description, and therefore the description should 
match the situation it endeavors to describe. lf the theoretical description is correct, then it 
not only describes the economic situation, but allows conclusions to be drawn from the 
premises, permitting inferences concerning things which are not known. Thus the theory must 
be "circular" insofar as it depends upon describing a situation, but its value lies in the next 
step, which involves inferences, such as conclusions concerning price behavior or the role of 
grain which relate variables which have hitherto been unrelated. 
A more sophisticated objection is that Keynes's system was designed for monetary economies 
and that it therefore cannot be applied to the non-monetary Egyptian economy. lf however 
it serves the purpose of a model, then it is worth using. But the fundamental features distin-
guishing monetary from non-monetary economies have not yet been identified, and the 
nature and importance of money is not clearly defined. Economists are agreed that money 
is an absolutely essential part of the modern economy and that a money economy can be 
either perfect or catastrophic, which is as much as saying that money is simply another 
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variable in a complex series of equations . Economists are also not in agreement about what 
money is.328 Economists are accustomed to assert that money is a difficult problem, and that 
the total money supply is very important, and then to use either M 1 or M3 because they can 
measure it, and they are unable to measure the real quantities, let alone velocity. Money is 
apart of any major equation, but money is just one element, with investment, employment, 
consumption, demand etc.329 
From a Keynesian standpoint, money has several features. On the one hand, anything that 
can act as a bridge between the present and the future can serve as money, but Keynes did 
point out that money has two other fundamental features unrelated to paper: zero elasticity 
of supply (as far as the entrepreneurs are concerned) and zero elasticity of substitution. Thus, 
although most people interested in Egyptian economics would not claim that Egypt had 
money, many economists could be persuaded to believe that emmer and barley were in fact 
money, because they would match the definition of being a link between the present and the 
post, have zero elasticity of substitution, and could only minimally have their supply altered 
by the private sector. 330 lt is futile to dispute whether Egypt had money or not, and therefore 
the key features is that the effects of the use of the articles that did serve as money was such 
that the main dangers implied by Keynesian theory could be avoided. 
In economic terms, the ultimate effect of artificially stimulating an increase in grain production 
was the equivalent of deficit spending, insofar as it increased prosperity. As it did not 
hamper overall production by distorting demand and interest rate schedules, it did not have 
the negative effects commonly associated with deficit spending, such as inflation. This merely 
underlines that it is necessary to grasp the basic principles of the economy and economics 
rather than to become overly attached to concepts or words. 
The best counter to objections to the use of the theory is however to point out that many 
modern economic textbooks bear traces of Keynesianism, yet Keynesian theory can be applied 
only to closed economies while most modern economies are not closed, so that this would 
be a seeming misuse of the theory, yet the authors find it useful. The key question is thus 
whether the theory can be shown tobe of value for ancient Egypt. B. Kemp suggests that 
Any economic system that we propose for ancient Egypt has tobe able to account 
for the apparently successful adjustments which local communities made to changes 
of different magnitudes within a relatively crude state system of economic direction. 331 
328 As can be seen from the different measures of money used by economists, M 1, M2, M3, etc. 
329 For our purposes, the case of China is extremely relevant, for the mere effect of introducing metal coins may have 
transformed ownership patterns in the course of a millennium, while leaving the social relations and much of the 
political and economic system intact. But it is also possible that the economy adjusted to the introduction of money 
and reached a slightly different equilibrium and that the influence of Irade as a major factor had a decisive 
impoct. 
33° Certainly far less than private banks can alter the money supply today, so that this definition is no longer relevant 
to the modern economy, if il ever was. 
331 Kemp, Egypt, p . 240. 
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Assuming the relevance of this statement, and leaving Polanyi behind, we can turn to examples 
of unconscious economic interpretations which have been offered, such as that mentioned 
at the beginning of the chapter. Another case concerns the tomb robberies: 
Viewed economically the frequently regretted tomb robberies are desirable, as 
unproductive capital is brought into circulation. 332 
lt is clear that this thought is inspired by an economy in which gold and silver can be 
exchanged for products in such a fashion as to stimulate economic activity. The main value 
of gold according to the Keynesian economic model is to (1) increase employment through 
prospecting and mining, and (2) withdrawing it from circulation. Virtually any economic 
model would suggest that it should not leave the tombs, and that it should be followed by 
more, as this increases production. In detail, following the interpretation of Keynes offered 
above, it can be concluded that ( l) the employment effort in exploiting the tombs was 
negligible in comparison to that of occupying Nubia and prospecting for gold there, and 
(2) that increases in the gold supply would not have the magnitude of economic significance 
of increases in demand in the agricultural sector. Therefore increased military activity and 
gold production and agricultural taxation were vastly more valuable than the increase in 
gold in circulation, and thus it is not surprising that the decline of the economy at the end of 
the New Kingdom was not inhibited by increases in the supply of gold (due to removal from 
the royal tombs), as the administration failed to increase grain production and this led to a 
decline in the economy, as posited. 333 Therefore the economic argument in the passage 
332 L. Stöck, "Gold," LÄ II: 728. [My translation]. 
333 K. Jansen-Winkeln ("Die Plünderung der Königsgräber des Neuen Reiches," ZÄS 122 [ 1995]: 62-78) has 
argued that the royal tombs were deliberately exploited as an easily accessible mine during Dynasties XXI and 
XXII. On a purely hypothetical level of Keynesian analysis, it must be pointed out that the economic effects will 
have been limited because of (a) the role of grain in the economy, and because of (b) the ease with which it was 
accomplished, which did not increase employment. lnsofar as the exploitation of the Volley of the Kings was not 
a ringing economic success, the scenario confirms the Keynesian theory presented here, as the economy did not 
grow as a result. 
While agreeing in principle with the suggestion that the Royal Tombs were officially emptied, it must be noted that 
Jansen-Winkeln's interpretation involves lwo separate internally contradictory arguments. 
( l) lt is asserted that the Volley of the Kings was weil protected ("Wir wissen zwar nicht allzuviel über die 
Geschichte der 21 . Dynastie, aber allem Anschein nach hat es sich um ein recht straffes Militärregime gehandelt, 
derartige Zustände [gemeint sind Plünderungen] sind sicher nicht anzunehmen', p. 65), while simultaneously 
maintaining that security problems were the reason for moving the mummies around. Although the logic behind 
moving the mummies disappears, this does not effect either the logic of the argument as a whole or the Keynesian 
si~nificance of events. 
(2) The reference in LRL 47, 3-5 is translated as signifying that the workers should accomplish a task "zu der ihr 
noch nie ausgezogen seid", rather than "a task to which you haven't gone yet", with the suggestion that this is the 
beginning of the exploitation of the Volley of the Kings. The letter in question is however addressed to P;y- 'nb as 
High Priest of Amun, and thus contrary to the prevalant assurnption that he inherited the job from Herihor, and 
Herihor reburied Ramesses II and Seti I in Year 6 of the Renaissance-era (= Regnal Year 25 of Rarnesses XI, 
approxirnately 1075 B.C.; cf. Kitchen, Third lntermediate, p. 252), so that the richest tombs in the Volley must 
already have been exploited before this letter was written, so that Jansen-Winkeln's translation cannot be used to 
illustrate thefts beginning at the end Dynasty XX. 
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cited is based on reasoning which can be seen to be unsound in Keynesian terms, and 
historical developments bear out the Keynesian interpretation. 334 
On the other hand, W. Wolf partially attributes the decline at the end of Dynasty XY- to 
construction projects: 
lf during Dynasty XY- a continuous decline in the economy began, which eventually 
led to the catastrophe, a whole catalogue of reasons can be given. There were the 
bloody wars against the Libyans and the Peoples of the Sea, which were carried out 
almost exclusively by mercenaries; there were the monstrous stete construction projects 
in the entire land, including Nubia, which exhausted the state finances; there were 
the inestimable donations to the temples [ ... ]335 
In view of the Keynesian theory, it was not the costs to the state that resulted in the decline in 
the economy, but the fact that major construction projects were no longer attempted, that the 
massive projects of Seti I and Ramesses II at Abydos, Heliopolis, Avaris, Karnak, etc. were 
given up, and instead of massive temples across the land, minor constructions were main-
tained, and efforts concentrated on Medinet Habu, and useless reserves turned over to the 
temples, which were not employed to expand construction. lt was precisely the administrative 
laxitude that led to the decline of the economy, and not the projects. All the projects of 
Ramesses III cannot begin to be compared with the glorious stimulation to demand that 
Cheops and Snofru made, which led to one of the golden ages of Egyptian history. 
J. Baines lists the contemporary major cemeteries of the officials and the royal monuments, 
but points out that 
Against this, not a single provincial tomb of consequence is dated to the 4th dynasty, 
and virtually no cemeteries of simple graves have been assigned to the period . In the 
mortuary record, which is almost all that is available, provincial Egypt is a blank for 
the period. Vast amounts of labour were brought to the capital to construct a rigidly 
defined and regimented setting for the aftermath of a small group of people [ ... ]. 
Those who provided that labour were so impoverished that they could not bury 
themselves appropriately for an afterlife of their own, while those who supervised 
334 The claim that it was returned to the tombs is patently erroneous, asJansen-Winkeln (245 122: 62-78) points out, 
for the gold definitely came into circulation - but had no positive economic effects because of the Keynesian 
economy. 
The necessary logical corollary of this contention is that the development of a grain market would necessarily have 
adverse effects on the economy, as it would become a kind of capital market and indicate that the state was not 
carrying out its obligation to create, collect and redistribute the surplus, and thus unable to guarantee prosperity. 
This likewise evidently took place towards the end of the New Kingdom, and the economy only recovered with 
the emergence of the Mediterranean grain market in the middle of the first millennium. 
335 Wolf, Kulturgeschichte, p. 345. [My translation] . This financial exhaustion is occasionally expressed in terms of 
bankruptcy and this is financially and economically incorrect, as the lock of a credit system rendered this impossible. 
The purpose of demand is to remove items from circulation so that more can be acquired, and thus this is not a 
form of exhaustion. lt is bizarre that mercenaries should be an indication of expensive woste, os their initial 
oppearonce seems to have been during the First lntermediote Period, ond therefore - occording to conventionol 
logic - they cannot have been thot expensive. 
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their labors either belonged to the group buried in the monuments in which case their 
values were centred on the capital, or they were themselves impoverished .336 
lt is evident that the complete absence of simple cemeteries could be used to demonstrate 
that life-expectancy increased such that mortality was eliminated during Dynasty IV, but to 
assert that there are no cemeteries at all cannot be used to claim that people were 
impoverished. 337 Dynasty IV was a period of consolidation, involving religious, 
political, administrative and economic transformations, but developments during Dynasty V 
certainly suggest that impoverishment was not the principal problem. 
Demand stimulation, and not financial burdens was the problem. 
[ A]lthough monumental tomb construction and burial of riches is an obvious feature 
of ancient Egypt, its effects are still not properly understood. Explanation for the First 
lntermediate Period has sometimes been sought in the idea that continued pyramid-
building exhausted the country. However, this may have been true only in so far as 
it stood in the way of growing demand amongst the official dass, bearing in mind 
the finite limits of the agricultural surplus. [ ... ] The role of strong central government in 
raising the general level of prosperity is shown by the way in which during the First 
lntermediate Period, and even probably during the lote Old Kingdom, the level of 
consumption of men of power, as indexed by their tomb sizes, seems to have declined. 
Yet they were now no longer in competition with a lavishly endowed court. 338 
B. Kemp has identified the key indicators here, in relating the fact that the decline in royal 
construction projects accompanied by the decline in private undertakings revealed that state 
economic activity had not been able to increase the level of economic activity such that 
private sector demand was sufficient to release the capacities of the private sector to take 
responsibility for demand stimulation. W. Helck has indicated that precisely this development 
took place: 
This led to a completely new development in Egypt, as the bureaucratic regimentation 
of the population dissolves.[ ... ] Free craftsmen appear who [ ... ] seil their labour. 
Supply and demand appear in place of the planned system of labour. The power of 
the bureaucracy is broken [ ... ] The planned economy is replaced by the market 
economy in a few areas by certain very limited groups. 339 
336 J. Baines, "Literacy, social organization, and the archaeological record: the case of early Egypt," in Gledhill, 
State and Socief'f, p. 20 l. 
337 The logic is purely circular, as is Baines's equally bizarre contention that writing on papyrus for administrative 
purposes was not widespread, while simultaneously conceding that urban Memphis - which is where one would 
expect to find administrative records - has not been found. This is quite aside from the fact that administrative 
records on papyrus do not survive as weil as cuneiform tablets, so that his comparison with Ur III is completely 
spurious: Baines himself completely relativizes his conclusions in the final paragraphs by pointing out that admin-
istrative documents were written on perishable material and the admission that the proportion of the population 
affected by the obligatory labour "cannot be known" (cf J. Baines, "literocy, social organization, and the 
archoeological record: the case of early Egypt," in Gledhill, State and Society, pp. 196; 207-208). 
338 B. Kemp, "Old Kingdom, Middle Kingdom and Second lntermediate Period," in Trigger, Social History, pp. 176-
177. 
339 Helck, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, p. l 06. [ My translation ]. 
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Helck was misled from understanding that the collapse of the economy led to the craftsmen 
seeking work. The private craftsmen had been active since before the advent of history, and 
the state sector had merely contributed to an increase in quality and numbers, so that when 
the economy began to suffer as the state reduced demand, the craftsmen had merely become 
more numerous, but their private sector activity had been expanding since the end of 
Dynasty IV. The dissolution of the state affected the aggregate demand structure: the key 
factor in the major state projects of Dynasty IV was not the employment of craftsmen, but 
mere labourers, and it was here that the economic repercussions of the demand crisis 
became manifest. Kemp may exaggerate the wealth of small communities during the First 
lntermediate Period, but the principle of infinitely elastic demand can explain the entire 
system: whether expanding or contracting, government expenditures did not impinge on the 
private economy because it had a completely different base, meaning that the stimulation 
did not have a negative impact, as implied by Kemp's remark about the competition between 
private and royal tomb construction. Despite a certain limited private prosperity, and poten-
tially production, there can be little doubt that the private economy was not up to the task of 
replacing royal demand, when this declined. The craftsmen continued to find employment: 
it was the toiling masses who reverted to underemployment as investment declined: the 
return to Keynes' equilibrium at the level of poverty (cf. supra, Figs. 3 and 4, p. 119). 
This reveals the role of demand - as opposed to redistribution - in economic stimulation, 
and Kemp only errs in suggesting that the finite nature of the agricultural surplus was the 
obstacle, as this was not the problem, if one examines the millions of cubic metres of stone 
involved in construction projects initiated by Cheops and Snofru, indicating beyond doubt 
that the grain which fed Rome almost three millennia later was equivalent to the resources 
available, and thus that only demand was lacking. 340 And, the possibility of erecting tombs 
in provincial areas, from Aswan to Dakhla at the end of the Old Kingdom meant that 
demand was present, and that the transport of grain to the center would not have been 
necessary, and yet the economy faltered because of declining state economicactivity, as the 
private sector could not collect the revenues, i.e. stimulate demand on the same scale. 
Of the properties of money enumerated by Keynes, the only significant aspect which did not 
necessarily correspond to the Egyptian reality was the condition of zero elasticity of supply 
as far as the private sector was concerned, in so far as private farming could conceivably 
have increased the supply, and yet the failure of the state to maintain its construction projects, 
with the consequent decline in the collection of revenues led to an overall decline in the 
economy, because the private sector was unable to actually make up for the lock in demand. 
This implies that grain could arguably be held tobe money, and unfortunately confirms that 
the high level of equilibrium was dependent on state intervention. 
Another feature of money that has attracted a great deal of attention is the price stability of 
ancient Egypt, where prices changed very little over hundreds or perhaps even a thousand 
years. 341 lf the price of an object is considered tobe merely an expression of Jevons's "law 
340 Cf. n. p. 115, n. 315 supra . 
341 Cf. M. Gutgesell, "Wirtschaft," lÄ VI: 1275. 
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of indifference", and traditional prices are the ones to which one is accustomed, in a market 
with a limited degree of latitude in supply and demand, then price changes need not be 
expected, but Keynes made not only wage rotes, but also interest rotes a key feature in his 
price theory, and therefore the lock of interest plays a key role in the economy, and could 
likewise explain the lock of price fluctuations. 
Another key feature that arises from the entire train of logic is the fact that prices did not 
fluctuate despite enormous changes in the supply of precious metals, not just enormous 
variations between the quantities available during the Old Kingdom and the New Kingdom, 
but there were also enormous variations through the course of the New Kingdom, which 
failed to be reflected in prices, which indicate that the grain standard was again the true 
measure of economic activity, and that this economic activity can best be understood in 
terms of Keynesian theory. 
These theoretical considerations appear to be speculative, but one of the purposes of the 
use of the theory is explain the workings of the economy, and another is to identify the 
distinctive differences between the Egyptian economy and other economies, and here, the 
Mesopotamien economic structures led to price fluctuations, which were influenced by 
both interest rotes and supply and demand. lt could be maintained that this is part of the 
explanation. 
lt was noted that Polanyi's classifications of transactions in terms of reciprocily and redistribution 
did not lead to theories of price formation or demand, so that the implication that prices 
determined by tradition Üevons's "law of indifference"), which can be analyzed in terms of 
marginal utility, provides a theoretical underpinning not present in Polanyi's analysis. The 
additional evidence that price fluctuations did occur in Mesopotamia, and that interest 
played a significant role in the economy there, while it did not in ancient Egypt (but that it 
did in feudal China) suggests that the Keynesian model in combination with modern theory 
can be used analytically to gain a greater understanding of the Egyptian economy, as a 
unique case. The same applies to the economic implications of the demand for grain 
indicated above. lt is thus possible to assign Polanyi's system of categories a role as indicators 
of social, but not economic, significance. 
According to Helck, the entire population was registered at an early point in Egyptian 
history in order to serve as corvee labour. lt .is likewise widely believed that the king had sole 
title to all the land in ancient Egypt, and that private individuals could not therefore own 
land. 342 These widely accepted assumptions led to the presupposition that ancient Egypt 
was a hydraulic civilization and therefore a case of Oriental Despotism. Polanyi likewise 
accepted the premise, but drew the opposite conclusion, that the redistribution system in 
ancient Egypt represented a just system without private ownership of land, and the rule of 
justice on the basis of rights and reciprocal obligations linking the king and his subjects. The 
assumption of wide-spread state involvement in irrigation (relating to the corvee labour 
presumably) led Schenkel to conclude that its absence in the documentation prior to the 
342 1 have not been able to establish a Pharaonic source for this wide--spread belief, cf. supra, p. 61 n. 118; pp. 33-
34 n. 32; p. 60 n. 114 and pp. 42-43 n. 62. 
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Middle Kingdom - because, being sponsored by the state, it must be reflected in our 
records - meant that it was in fact absent, and therefore that it appeared after the emergence 
of the state, and used a single unreliable text to align himself against Butzer's interpretations 
based on archaeological evidence and environmental analysis. 
One of the great ironies of placing Polanyi and Wittfogel as potentially providing explanations 
for Egyptian society and economy is that Polanyi's tendency is to emphasize that the Pharaohs 
must have been just rulers, while Wittfogel's whole argument is based on the assumption that 
the hydraulic civilizations inevitably led to despotism, so that although both assume 
asymmetrical social relations, Wittfogel's reading of the is quite at variance with that of 
Polanyi. Along the same lines, Müller-Wollermann's affirmation of the veracity of Polanyi's 
unfounded and unelaborated theoretical reasoning led her to neglect the fact that part of her 
evidence actually contradicted her conclusions, rendering non-existent theory more powerful 
than fact. M. Gutgesell has taken the opposite approach, attempting to induce general 
principles from isolated and doubtful facts, without aligning them within the framework of a 
theory. 
Thus, involuntary and weil thought-out interpretations supplemented with a tendency to merely 
posit facts, and repeating them, have created several different - mutually incompatible -
interpretations based upon the same non-existent evidence. The quotations concerning 
papyrus cited at the beginning of this chapter implied that economic debate has been 
widely ignored by those scholars not explicitly interested in economic activity, and that it 
is necessary not only to develop a liaison with the economic theories of the other states of 
early antiquity, but also to make the relevance of economic theory to the understanding of 
ancient Egyptian civilization evident to all scholars, as our own involuntary assumptions 
cloud our interpretation of material which is quite foreign, and represents a form of economy 
which cannot be grasped with pre-conceptions. lf this lengthy introduction can be justified, 
it is certainly in terms of expressing the hope that laying explicit theories and interpretations 
before the reader enables a dialogue with general agreement on what exactly is fact, 
theory, extrapolation or interpretation. 
SufvVv\ARY OF SAUENT POINTS 
lt was shown that Polanyi's theory has seriously influenced the interpretation of the material, 
but that the use of the theory did not demonstrate its value, and that the categories of 
"redistribution", "reciprocity", etc. are not mutually exclusive, and therefore cannot be used to 
demonstrate the absence or presence of market activity. We have also seen that Polanyi's 
principles are not incompatible with market analysis, and that we can understand the dato 
from the ancient world in terms of market analysis. 
lt was shown that the principle feature of economic activity in ancient Egypt was a market 
functioning with a low level of activity, and that the state may have contributed to an increase 
in overall economic activity by pursuing a policy similar to taxation, based on the premise 
that this taxation was a kind of demand stimulus. Thus, the economy was not interpreted as 
a "command-economy" in which all economic activity was commanded by the state, 
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because the evidence does not support this. At the same time the term "Revenue Economy" 
seemed inappropriate, because the revenues ultimately came from private production, implying 
that a type of pre-capitalist market economy existed. The role of the state in this economy 
was to increase demand through the collection of revenues. 
Regardless of whether the payments made to the temples were "taxes" or "rents", the net 
effect was to take surplus production and place it at the disposal of a powerful bureaucracy 
which used it for investment projects, such as temple, tomb and palace construction . This led 
to an artificial increase in demand, and removed workers from the agricultural sector, 
increasing overall employment, and itself spurred demand, by increasing aggregate income, 
and thus aggregate expenditure and investment. 
These seemingly simple Keynesian measures were combined in a setting which corresponded 
to Keynesian theory, in so far as 
( l) inflation was avoided by the absence of a currency which could be debased; 
( 2) the grain standard meant that income resulted in immediate expenditure, which inevitably 
involved employment, and the marginalization of non-subsistence related employment; 
so that 
(3) demand was restricted only by the capacity of the state to limit it, and thus contributed to 
secondary and tertiary employment; while 
(4) interest rotes failed to impede investment because of their irrelevance to the overall 
economy, and increasing investment and income did not negatively affect the interest 
rate structure; since 
(5) the possession of agricultural properties did not signify unproductive investment for prestige 
reasons, but actually increased income directly by 
(6) generating private sector employment, which benefited from state aid to training; and 
(7) guaranteed that the private sector could take up some slack when state demand 
slackened. 
The most important element of the construction of temples and palaces and tombs was that 
demand was effectively "infinitely elastic", implying that this demand stimulation measure did 
not have an adverse effect on other economic sectors, the construction could contract, although, 
if state contraction was related to demand contraction, the economy suffered. 
The effect was thus equivalent to "national debt" in the modern world, but far superior 
because (a) the demand curve could not exceed the available resources, while (b) guaran-
teeing that resources were not wasted, and the economy stimulated. Thus the effects could 
only be positive, and could not be negative, because there was no system of credit to which 
the rulers could turn. 
The whole system worked because Egypt was basically a closed economy, but the 
increased income did permit the stimulation of imports, and generated considerable wealth 
as far away as South Arabia, without hindering the development of local industry, as the 
greatest part of the local demand stimulation was spent on temples and palaces, which 
cannot easily be imported, although minor items of temple services such as incense can be. 
The result was that jobs were not exported, although it was possible to spend surplus income 
abroad, which increased local agricultural employment, and prosperity. That the state 
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investment policy failed to have a negative impact on the distribution of resources meant that 
the private sector could flourish, as far as demand would allow, which was generally at a 
higher level than that of any other country until weil into the second millennium AD. 
This would explain the tendency for expensive tombs and temples during periods of decline, 
and the presence of wealth in cemeteries of the intermediate periods, and provide the 
model requested by Kemp, accounting for the economy in a comprehensive fashion. 
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SouRcE DocuMENTS 

A ÜISCUSSION OF THE SOURCES 
Although the objects of this study are particular words, these come from a textual context, 
and many different categories of text contributed sources for this work. The vast majority of 
these texts have little immediate economic relevance, and have been adequately published 
in the literature, so that mere remarks about the reading of specific details are required, 
while others deserve longer treatment, primarily to provide a perspective on the sources, but 
also to emphasize certain points and draw attention to details, or to provide a suitable 
context for discussion. 343 The selection of the translations and/ or commentaries (which follow 
this introductory chapter) is intended to provide insights into this source material, discussing 
or presenting selections from the school texts (0. Gardiner 86), administrative texts (the Turin 
Canon Tax Lists, the P. Wilbour, the Turin Taxation Papyrus, P. Greg and the Giornale), 
private propaganda texts (the lnstructions for the Vizier, the Bilgai Stele and the Rewards of 
lmn-btp) and royal propaganda texts (the Horemhab Decree, the Nauri Decree and P. Harris 1), 
prefaced by these short remarks about some of the other texts and genres consulted. With 
the exception of the selection from the Giornale, all of these texts have been selected 
because of the use of the words which are the core of this study, but other texts provide 
germane information without the actual employment of the words, and therefore the following 
remarks are intended to provide a general background to the context of the source material. 
INTERNAL REVENUE 
Administrative texts, including School Texts or Miscellanies and Letters 
Although many of the original administrative texts are extremely fragmentary, certain of the 
texts called school texts or miscellanies are better preserved, and may use the terminology in 
a representative fashion, although the figures should be used with caution if at all. 
Probably the most widely known344 Egyptological fiscal text is the miscellany extolling the 
privileged position of the scribe, preserved in P. Anast. V and P. Soll. 1, etc. 
Lo, dost thou not recall the plight of the cultivator at the time of registering the smw, 
when the snake has seized half the corn, and the hippopotami have eaten the rest? 
The mice abound in the fields, the locusts descend, and the herds devour. The 
sparrows take lock to the cultivators. The remains which are upon the threshing floor, 
they are seized. lts hoof-in-ore is gone and the team dead from threshing and 
ploughing . The scribe moors at the riverbank, and goes to register the smw, the 
porters bearing sticks and the Nubians palm branches. They say, "Give (us) the 
343 lt was only at the very final stage of the preparalion of this text that K. Kitchen's own translations of his KR/ began 
to appear, and thus there will be a certain omount of seemingly unnecessary overlap by the time the published 
!ext of this work appears. 
344 The !ext will even be found cited by Chaudhuri (Asia before Europe, pp. 90-99), where it is both chronologically 
and culturally outside the scope of the work. (But curiously appropriale as an illustration of a popular view of 
Oriental Despotism and the Asiatic Mode of Production). 
133 
A Discussion of the Sources 
grain !" But, there is none. They strike with fury. He is bound and thrown into the well, 
where he gets a good watering. His wife has been bound in his presence, and his 
children are in fetters. His neighbours have abandoned them and fled. Their corn 
departs. But only the scribe who controls the everyone's bJkw has no btri, (for) his 
b Jkw is counted in writing. He has no sJyt. Take note of this . 345 
This text is unusual in that several of the words with which this study is concerned appear 
together, and it is important as it implicitly states that the smw, bJkw, btri and sJyt were 
various kinds of dues of a comparable nature, at least insofar as the "victims" were concerned, 
and that these could conceivably all be different designations for exactly the same thing-the 
grain from the peasant to be collected by the scribe - the difference being exclusively 
administrative. 
lt is however typical of the texts serving as sources for this work that the text fails to state what 
the bJkw or the sJyt were, or to whom they were paid or why. That it implies that the smw 
was a grain impost is also typical, as this is one of the few things that is rather well known 
in any case. Equally typical is that bJkwfigures twice in P. Sallier 1, which fails to mention the 
btri used in P. Anast. V, where bJkwappears once, while bJkwand btriwould not otherwise 
appear tobe synonymous, but rather complementary, so that an elaborate logical structure 
cannot be built on this text. 
Also typical is the fact that a single phrase in this text which does not use any of the words 
involved in our study has been interpreted with diametrically opposing implications for the 
significance of the text and Egyptian Economy. p; cgw.f n bu Jqw346 means literally "his 
hoof-of-ore has perished ." Texts347 using the phrase have been interpreted as referring to a 
"hoof tax", 348 but other authorities have asserted that this is impossible, and that it must refer 
to the "hire" of cattle, 349 although it is only used explicitly of donkeys and swine. 350 As the 
term appears virtually only in administrative texts, it is thus at least more likely tobe administrative 
than private, but the evidence is insufficient for any firm conclusions. There is however 
clearly a great gap separating the impl ication that the text can be understood as suggesting 
either ( l) that the ordinary peasants mentioned rented cattle in order to carry out "taxable" 
345 LEM, pp. 64-65; Caminos, LEM, pp. 247-250. This translation is slightly freer than usual, as the author has 
doubtless taken some poelic license, and this should be reflected in the translation, but also because the lwo 
important parallel texts diverge in central poinls. 
346 LEM 64: 15 ; 83 : l 0. P. Anast. V uses "his hoof'; P. Soll . 1, 'her hoof" / "their hoof'. 
347 P. Cairo 58071 , l (,= P. Bulaq XII , W . Spiegelberg, "Varia, " RT 15 [ 1893 l: 141-145, esp. 142-143); P. Cairo 
(G Maspero, "Notes sur quelques points de Grammaire et d'Histoire," ZAS l 9 [ 188 l ]: 116- 13 l, esp. 119); 
P. Cairo 58057 (Wente, Letters, pp. 112-113; /v\öller, Lesestücke, 3 : 8) . 
348 W . Müller, "'Ein Terminus des Verwaltungswesens,'' ZÄS 32 ( 1894): 131; W . Müller, ''Viehsteuer, " ZÄS 34 
( 1896): 167-168. 
349 Sir Alan Gardiner, "'Ramesside Texts Relating to the Taxation and Transportof Corn, '' JEA 27 (1941): 19, n. 3; 
Caminos, LEM, pp. 247-248. 
350 This excludes the apparently logical interpretalion that it would refer lo some kind of metal 'cow-shoe" pul on 
cows when threshing . The references to "teoms" of cattle follow the reference to the "hoof-in-ore", so that it is 
impossible to be certain that the cattle are in fact meont, whereos the references to donkeys and swine are cleorly 
linked to the use of the phrase. There is also the grammatical element of identifying just who or what is meonl by 
the suffix, cf. n. 346 supra. 
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activities, or (2) advancing the conclusion that the cattle were privately owned by small time 
farmers, and taxable in themselves, from (3) the clear evidence that it is used specifically only 
in administrative texts relating to donkeys and swine, and that it is associated with the btkw 
as an obligatory state administered payment. As in many other cases, this study cannot 
propose a definitive solution to this very relevant question, and thus we will try to throw light 
on the various questions from as many sides as possible (but, cf. infra, p . 240 n. 823). 
P. Sallier 135 1 is a letter purportedly from a chief archivist of the treasury of Pharaoh to a scribe 
relating that a stable master was given 30 arouras of land for official purposes, but that it 
was appropriated by the steward of a mortuary temple, and the recipient of the letter is 
instructed to return the land to the stable master. The letter goes on to specify various properties 
of pharaoh: estates (pryvv), places, cb: mint fields, smw, domains (rmnyt), instructing the 
recipient to make the re-allotment separate from these various properties. 
There are thousands of administrative notes from Deir el-Medineh (DeM), the town in which 
the Gang ("The Crew of the Great and Noble Necropolis of Millions of Years of Pharaoh") 
who made the royal tombs lived. 352 These notes inform us that they received pay in grain 
and in various commodities. Their grain income should have been 5 1/2 khar/ month of grain 
for the foremen, and 4 k/Jor/ month for the ordinary workers. 353 They also provide information 
about their working week, and private transactions. P. Greg has been included below as an 
example of the type of text Deir el-Medineh has yielded up. 
Many of the remaining published administrative texts of New Kingdom date are so fragmentary 
that it is impossible to judge their value, and others leave considerable leeway for interpretation, 
so that they must be used judiciously. Papyri from the Turin Museum and Gurob in Egypt are 
employed to illustrate the types of administrative material available. Letters are among the 
useful sources, in that they can be taken at face value, and occasionally include information 
that is otherwise not at all clear. Typical is however P. Anast. VIII referring to silver, fish and 
wool, but in a context that does not permit any logical interpretation which is compelling . 354 
In P. Bologna 1086, 355 a Scribe of the offering Table writes to a Prophet confirm ing that 
"three men and one youth makes 700 khar" (1. 21 ), noting that he told the archivists in the 
granary that the three cultivators were "to soldier in this year" (1. 23) . The obl igation of two 
hundred khar from each worker (and one hundred from the youth) is defined as Jsw-prt 
(1. 21) . lt is not at all certain what obligations are implied by this - sowing or harvesting, 
35 1 LEM, pp 87-88; Carninos, LEM, pp. 326ft. 
352 Cf. e.g., Allarn, HOP; Cerny, Community, Dernaree/ Janssen, Gleanings; Gutgesell, 0atierung;Janssen, Prices; 
McDowell, Jurisdiction; Valbelle, Ouvriers; Ventura, Cily. 
353 Helck, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, p. 232. Thal regular and cornplete deliveries of their goods was the exception 
rather than the rule should be clear to those farniliar with the literature. As the bosic measuring uni! for corn during 
the New Kingdom, the kharwas roughly 75 litres; as a uni! of value, it was equal to roughly 2 deben . For these 
and other details, cf. Janssen, Prices, pp. l 09-11 l; 455 ff. 
354 Cf. KR/III : 499-504; Wente, Letters, pp. 120-122. 
355 KR/ IV: 78-8 l; W . Wolf, "Papyrus Bologna l 086," Z.!\5 65 ( 1930): 89-97; G. Möller, Lesestücke III: 9- l l; 
A. Gardiner, Wilbour II : 115. 
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field-work or responsibility, but the figure or 200 khar is identical to that in 0. Gardiner 86 
(cf. infra, pp. 144 n. 408). 
P. Berlin 3047 356 relates a case potentially concerning the failure of tenants to pay their rent 
to a human owner, assigned the land to assure income for himself, and his brothers and 
sisters (1. 9). 357 In Regnal Year 46 of Ramesses II, the Chief of the Granary of Amun Ni! and 
the Royal Scribe of the Offering Table Nfr- c !bt had a civil suit concerning income from land 
before the highest officials of the Estate of Amun, the High Priest of Amun, ß;k-n-ljnsw, some 
prophets of the temples of Amun, Mut and Khonsu, the Steward of the Estate of Amun, and 
fjwy the Municipal Court Accountant. 358 Nfr- c;bt claimed that Ni; and his brothers and 
sisters had managed a piece of land assigned to him and his siblings, "without giving me my 
apportionment" (1. 10). Ni; confirmed this, but protested that they were turned over to the 
temple of Mut. A lacuna interrupts the statement, but it seems that at one time he received 
goods from the plot, while at another he did not. 359 The Prophet of Mut then tonfirmed that 
he had received and ploughed the land (II. 18-19). More than l 00 arouras are then divided 
up among the brothers and sisters, following which is the concluding statement of the Court: 
Statement of the Court Auditors, by the prophet of the Temple of Mut, Wnn-nfr (32): 
"As for these three years which the Chi[ <ef of the Gra> ]nary Ni; was eating the fields 
together with his sisters, the (33) Royal Scribe of the Offering Table Nfr-';bt ploughed 
them not, his servants ploughed them! [ ... ] Statement of the Royal Scribe of the 
Offering Table (34) Nfr-';bt, to the Prophet of the House of Mut, Wnn-nfr, "Look to 
my fields! You shall plough them, and you (35) will give to me a fraction of their 
harvest in corn and greens." Statement of the Prophet of the Temple of Mut, Wnn-nfr, 
"I will do it! Behold, 1 shall indeed do it, and more than its like!" 
This text makes it clear that there were lands managed by individuals associated with the 
temples which "belonged" to private individuals by virtue of assignment, and not inheritance, 
which could however be inherited . 
Another rare example is an extremely valuable text which fails to employ the vocabulary of 
this study, but does provide some insight into fiscal behavior: P. Valenc;:ay 1, "a letter addressed 
by the Mayor of Elephantine to no less a personage than the Chief-Taxing-master:"360 
[ ... ] To this effect: Ptunteamun, the scribe of the House of the Adoratress of Amün, 
has come, he has arrived in Elephantine to demand the corn which has been fixed 
for the House of the Adoratress of Amün, and he said, "Let 100 sacks of barley be 
given"; so he said to me, but there are no fields bearing that amount. And he said to 
356 KR! II 803-806; W. Helck, "Der Papyrus Berlin P. 3047,"JARCE2 ( 1963): 65-73 ; A. Erman, 245 17 ( 1879) : 
71-76. 
357 lt is important to note that even in court, the plaintiff did not hesitate to point out that income which might 
theoretically be due to him by virtue of his official function (a quasi salary) was destined for his family. 
358 Clearly hsb and not khar. 
359 Or epigraphically, it could be that he received goods from one part of the plot, but not from another. This reading 
is contradicted prima facie by the Ni i's agreement that it was true that Nfr-'!bt did not receive anything. And 
there is no reason to suspect it. 
360 A. H. Gardiner, ''A Protest Against Unjustified Tax-Demands," RdE 6 ( 1951 ): 115; Gardiner, RAD, pp. 72-73 . 
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me, "They are being demanded from you on account of a holding of Kha(n)to-land 
in the gezfrah of Ombi", so he said to me, though, 1 had not cultivated (any) holding 
of Kha(n)to-land in the gezfroh of Ombi. [ .. . ] lt is a holding of some private persons 
who pay gold into the treasury of Pharaoh which those private persons have cultivated, 
and they regularly (?) hand over its gold to the treasury of Pharaoh, and I have never 
touched (any) holding there. 361 
The significance of this text is multi-fold, for it ( l) suggests that these private persons (nmhw) 
are not the types of individuals associated with the apportioning domains of P. Wi lbour, 
i .e., the beneficiaries of the state apparatus; 362 (2) that these nmhw paid their "taxes" (gold) 
directly to Pharaoh as the tax on their land (and not via the Mayor of Elephantine - a key 
point in considering EK 3, the tomb of P~-bry, infra, p. 138); and that (3) the income of a 
piece of khato-land managed by the Mayor of Elephantine can be claimed by a scribe of 
the Adoratress of Amun. This clearly means that the nmhw were the primary titular holders of 
the land, and clearly not Pharaoh ; and that income from khato-land could be indisputably 
assigned as temple income. 
Private Propaganda 
Of the two lengthy texts of particular relevance which belong in this category, excerpts of 
both the Bilgai stele and the record referring to the rewards of the High Priest of Amun, lmn-
btp, are presented below. 
On the walls of many private Theban Tombs are depictions of scenes involving the collection 
of tribute or taxes, but for the most part the space provided for the captions does not 
compare favourably to the generous surface awarded the visual image, so that epigraphic 
evidence is more of an anecdotal quality. 
The tomb of the Vizier Rb-mi-R' (TT l 00) contains not only one of the most complete versions 
of the "lnstructions of the Vizier"363, but also depicts the payment of various forms of dues to 
the Vizier, as the head of government, both from internal sources and external sources. There 
can be little or no doubt that as the representative of the government, the Vizier received 
income, and that this is depicted in the tomb. The mayors and district heads assembled on 
the walls of his tomb delivered objects of wood, animals, metal, beads and similar exotic or 
valuable articles. 364 Corn appears seldom in the lists from the districts South of Thebes, 365 
and more frequently for those to the North .366 While the Vizier "receives" the offerings of the 
foreign people, he merely "counts" those of Egypt. 
361 Gardiner, 'Tax Demands," RdE 6: 11 7. 
362 Contra B. Menu ("Le Regime juridique des terres," in Menu, Recherches, pp. 29-30). Cf. infra, pp. l 65ff. for 
relations between khato-lands and apportion ing paragraphs. 
363 Treated in a separate chapter, infra, pp. 178 ff. 
364 Urk. IV: l 119ff. 
365 E.g., Urk. IV: 1124,5; 1127,3; 1128,3. 
366 Cf. e.g ., Urk. IV: 1130,9; 1131, 10-12; 1132,6; 1133, 1; 6 ; 1134, 15-17, etc. 
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Among the tombs outside Thebes, scenes from daily life are well preserved on the west wall 
of the tomb of P;-bry 367 (EK 3). One set of scenes shows the preparation of the fields, 
sowing, harvesting, threshing, winnowing, counting, collecting and storing grain, with an 
inscription noting that P;-bry stood viewing work in the fields of the Southern District. Another 
set of scenes shows scribes carefully counting livestock, and the inscription suggests that P;-
bry was responsible for doing the sums, as other scribes are involved in detail work. Another 
set of scenes shows ships being laden with grain, and scribes counting gold rings, and the 
inscription relates that he was receiving the gold. 
The scenes relating to the fields specify that P;-bry was not only Mayor of el-Kab, but also a 
"scribe of counting of grain", but the authority with which he was associated in this profession 
is not defined.368 The scene with the counting of animals suggests that this was done in his 
capacity as overseer of the fields of the Southern district. 369 The inscription accompanying 
the expert of grain and the receipt of gold rings may have recorded the place where the 
viewing took place (it is defaced), but does not indicate more than the generic title of mayor, 
without naming the city of el-Kab, or any other. 370 Another inscription indicates that he was 
- probably ex officio - also an Overseer of Prophets, 371 but we have no reason to believe 
that P ;-bry was part of the temple administration. Several references emphasize his relationship 
to the ki ng. 372 
lt would be difficult to assert that the activities represented in this tomb were not administrative 
and fiscal, but the only reference to a fiscal term in the scene is the use of the word bJkw by 
a worker who allegedly desires to "make an excess of bJkw for the official". 373 The reader 
should be conscious that the philological and iconographic material are complementary, 
but not intimately linked, and therefore the fiscal argument cannot be based on icono-
graphic evidence, which should be borne in mind. 
367 Tylor, Paheri, pi. 3 . 
368 The inscriptions (Urk. IV: 124,5-10) merely relate that P:-bry viewed the activities in the fields according to their 
various seasons. W . Helck ( Verwaltung, p. 235) remarks that "der Abtransport des Steuergetreides [ . .. ] stellt z .B. 
Pt-Min seinem Grab als seine wichtigste Sorge hin" citing this reference. However, the main inscriptions do not 
refer to the transport of the grain - only the labels - and the word smw does not appear in any of the main texts, 
except in a mere phrase of a primarily religious !ext (Urk IV: 116, 15). lt should be noted that the implications of 
the references in P. Valen<;:ay and the Mes lnscriptions are that the provincial officials were not involved in the 
collection of income for the King . Far rnore important to P:-bry than the transport of the grain was the counting of 
gold in the relevant scene. The suggestion that this is a Irade transaclion - grain for gold - should not be 
excluded, but it is by no means the only interprelation. 
369 W . Helck (Verwaltung, p. 172) understood this such that the counting of the herds was for lax purposes, and yet 
concluded, ''hier handelt es sich also um die 'staatlichen' Herden ." Either the herds belong to the state or they are 
being taxed, but the probability that the state would lax its own herds laxes the imagination excessively. lt is by 
no means clear whom the herds belonged to, or why the counting was done. 
370 W . Helck ( Verwaltung, p. 81) asserts that P:-hry "von sich behauptet, er 'erfreue das Herz des Schatzmeisters bei 
der Südfahrt,'" but- in contrast to Helck, P:-bry does not relate this to the grain (or the gold for that matter). Even 
if the translation is correct, it would be peculiar for the official in question to see the grain in el-Kab, as it is 
transported away from el-Kab, but this is another matter. 
371 Cf. Helck, Verwaltung, p. 220. 
372 E.g., Urk. IV: 118, l O; 119,2. We have little reason to speculate that his "lord" was other than the king. 
373 Tylor, Paheri, pi. III, rniddle register. This possion with "excessive" payment of "laxes' was not restricted to field 
workers. lt appears in the Bilgai stele (infra, pp. l 82ff.l and is even attributed to an overly zealous Roman 
governor of Egypt (cf. Wallace, Taxation in Egypt, p. 31 
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The inscriptions in the tomb of Mes appear to reproduce court records concerning the 
transfer, transmission and inheritance of property. One detail which arises from the court 
proceedings is a reference to records: 
The lands of Neshi, although originally a gift of Pharaoh, were not exempted from 
all taxation : they had to contribute grain to the royal Granary, and other products to 
the royal treasury. [ ... ] The register of the Treasury was preserved in the Treasury 
itself, while that of the Granary was preserved in the "office" of the Granary [ .. . ] We 
might have expected to find that the census-lists dealing w ith the lands of Neshi 
were preserved in the local Treasury and Granary of Memphis: on the contrary, they 
were kept at Per-Ramessu. 374 
This indicates that the lands awarded to Neshi and inherited by Mes were obliged to make 
regular payments to the Crown, and not the temples, with a curious confirmation of the 
reference to the payments to the Royal Treasury, explicitly mentioned in P. Valen<;:ay 1, 
although the produce of land would presumably have been grain. 
Excursus on Land Ownership 
Having cited several relevant sources on land ownership, it is worth summarizing some 
additional evidence as well. Although it does not all come under the private propaganda 
heading, it is logical to slip it in here. What can be termed private land is known from a 
number of sources. 375 The lnscription of Min-msw indicates that he was rewarded for his 
efforts on behalf of Pharaoh with land and serfs to work it. 376 The inscription of the sailor l'b-
ms in EI-Kab indicates that he too was rewarded ~ in a far more modest way - with land 
and serfs or slaves. 377 The lnscription of Mes indicates that such officially ordained awards 
could be inherited, and that records of "ownership" were maintained at the treasury, so that 
it may be assumed that they owed payments to the treasury. 378 The lnstructions of the Vizier 
indicate that boundary lines of sdw-plots were officially recognized. 379 
In P. Valen<;:ay 1, the scribe notes that a piece of land "belongs to some nmhw who carry 
gold to the treasury". In the Horemhab Decree, the nmhw are specifically identified as being 
obliged to render up the htri and btkw payments, but that they are to make the payments 
themselves, and that Pharaoh's officials do not have the right to confiscate these payments 
for their own credit. In the stele d 'apenage, land is purchased from the nmhw-n '. Thus, part 
of the population enjoyed the use of the produce of pieces of land awarded them , and they 
could inherit and seil this land, along with the obligations set upon it, while another part 
374 Gardiner, Mes, p. 39. 
375 Cf. W. A. Ward, 'Some Aspects of Private Land Ovvnership and lnheritance in Ancient Egypt, ca . 2500-
1000 B.C', in Khalidi, land Tenure, pp. 63-77; W . Helck, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, pp. 235-236; K. Baer, 
'The Low Price of Land in Ancient Egypt', JARCE l ( 1962): 25-45 . 
376 Urk. IV: 1441 -1445, II. 25 -26. 
377 Urk. IV: l l, l. 
378 Gardiner, Mes, p. 39. 
379 Urk. IV: l l l 1,8 ff. Cf. infra pp. 179-180, with nn. 537, 543. 
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seemed to have had rights of ownership, likewise associated with payments. This indicates 
that these payments were either a type of "rent" - if actual possession remained with Pharaoh 
or the temples - or a tax - if the actual possession of the land was transferred from Pharaoh 
or the temple to the individual. 
One reference380 starts stating that the King Ramesses III was on a visit to the temple "Wsr-
M~'t-R', beloved of Amun (L!P!H!) illuminating Heliopolis", 381 and goes on to list various 
military professions (1:A 4, soldiers, weapons bearers, sailors), before referring to "ploughing 
the great khato-lands of Pharaoh", which appear to have been managed by military scribes 
but within the administration of a mortuary temple. In the following section, there is a refer-
ence to an otherwise unidentified treasury, if Kitchen has reconstructed the text correctly. 
Part of the population did not however enjoy direct access to land, and they were provided 
for by the state, to some extent at least. The workers at Deir el-Medineh presumably lived off 
their income as state employees, but they also earned money by manufacturing grave goods 
on the side, and may have owned small plots of land, which provided a supplement to their 
income. There were however people who were less weil off, and a badly preserved letter of 
Ramesside date382 records a statement terminating with 
"the bread which is given to me from the Granary, (5) l live from it, since I do not 
have a field in Egypt." Take note of this . 
Give it to him, bread 5 [ ... ] 2. 
The state of the letter discourages further speculation, but this confirms that at least for the 
person in question, it was worth stating that he did not possess a field, implying that others 
- possibly including those of his dass - did. 
(End of Excursus) 
Royal Propaganda 
The inscriptions of the kings of Dynasties XVIII to XX constantly refer to inw and btkw taken 
from foreign countries and Egypt, but three royal texts are slightly more generous in the use 
of terminology, and these are treated at the close of Part II. 
38° KR! VII: 268-273; P. MIM 3569 + P. Vienna 38[3934/3937] + 9352 a/ b. 
381 This is similar to the beginning of P. Gurob, 2, l l-2, 13 (RAD, 14-18), where the presence of the King is 
signaled, followed by the btri. lt is eviden_tly an official record, and not the jottings on a slip. 
382 A. Erman, ''Ein Unterstützungsgesuch," ZAS 38 ( 1900): 151-152. 
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FOREIGN REVENUE 
Administrative Texts 
The excavations at Lachish in Palestine brought to light a fragmentary bowl with two hieratic 
inscriptions (one inside, one outside) dealing with smw from a regnal year 4. 383 The object 
has been dated to the reign of Merneptah, and it has been asserted that the name Lachish 
was written on the bowl. 384 The toponym is definitely not Lachish (r-ty-st, not r-ky-sJ), while 
the reign is probably correct. The payment was definitely expected in wheat, but the units 
and quantities and the time frame are not specified . 
The excavations at Tell Serac in southern Palestine have produced several additional frag-
mentary hieratic ostraca of a simi lar nature. One refers to 460 khar of grain, and is dated to 
regnal year 22 . 0 . Goldwasser correctly refrained from even considering reading the first 
sign as part of bJkw, and so no term is attached to the context. Another inscription mentfons 
2000 khar of grain, but likewise without context. 
The import of these texts is clearly not equal to their lamentable state of preservation and the 
information contained, for the proof that Egyptian administrators were actively maintaining 
records of fiscal activities relating to the transfer of grain in Palestine is invaluable in indicating 
the degree to which Palestine was incorporated within the empire. lt is not however clear 
whether the grain was transferred to Egypt, or whether it was intended for local consumption 
by the local Egyptian authorities. 
Goldwasser likewise emphasizes that these administrative notes may have been written on 
complete bowls, which substantially increases their intrinsic interest, as it is not at all clear 
why this would be done. His conclusion that they were votive in character must not be 
dismissed out of hand, but the motivation is not at all clear. 
Private Propaganda 
Many New Kingdom private tombs - at Memphis, Thebes and Amarna - are adorned with 
scenes in which foreign "tribute" is collected, both with and without the royal personage. 
These scenes show the products of foreign countries, and provide stereotype depictions of 
the foreign peoples. According to the Egyptian view of the world , even if "trade" or 
"exchange" was involved, this was not necessarily emphasized, and the "foreign trade 
delegations" were regarded as rendering tribute, iconographically. 
In the Tomb of the Vizier Rb-m i-Rc (TT 100), the introductory text accompanying the depictions 
of the foreigners from Punt, Syria, and Crete, identifies the objects as inw and bJqt. 385 A 
383 KR/ IV: 39, 10-12.;J. C:erny, "Reporton lnscriptions," in : Tufnell, Lachish IV: 133; pls. 44, 47. Cf. 0 . Goldwasser, 
"The Lochish Hierotic Bowl Once Agoin," Tel Aviv 9 ( 1982): 137-138; 0. Goldwasser, "Hierotic lnscriptions 
from Tel Sero' in Southern Conoan, " Te/Aviv 11 (1984) : 77-93. 
384 Ahituv, Toponyms, p. 130: "a reading of the name os Lochish is not improboble". Cf. M. Weippert, "Lachis," 
RIA VI : 412 for doubt. 
385 Urk. IV: l 094,6-10. 
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d istinction is made in that the countries which are named deliver inw, in contrast to the "btqt 
of every foreign country" presented by the undelineated others. 386 The text makes it clear that 
even though termed inw and not btqt, the deliveries from Punt are made because "of the 
power of his victorious majesty". 387 Their offerings are lapis lazuli, silver, gold, 388 myrrh and 
electrum, etc. 389 The tribute of Punt ends with a note that the Vizier is delighting himself and 
his master in "receiving the inw of every foreign land, brought because of the power of his 
majesty. "390 This juxtaposition seems to suggest that inw and btqt are used interchangeably 
and loosely in this context, and without any particular significance. That said, it is stated that 
the btqt is dedicated to Amun, in a context indicating that the conquered territories of Nubia 
are meant, 391 potentially suggesting that certain objects of the inw were retained by the 
king, as opposed to some of the real btqt which is rendered unto Amun. 
Royal Propaganda 
The Kings of the New Kingdom acquired various products from the defeated peoples of the 
empire. At Beth Shan in Palestine, Seti I set up several stele commemorating military activity. 
The smaller one of those preserved relates the reaction to an incursion, which brought the 
immediate delivery of btkw, prisoners and btqt because of the strength of the royal father, 
Amun-Re'. 392 
386 Urk. IV: l 094, l 0. 
387 Urk. IV: l 097, 16. 
388 Urk. IV: 1098,3-10. 
389 Urk. IV: l 096, l 0-16. 
390 Urk. IV: l 099,4-5. 
391 Urk. IV: 1102, l l -1103, 2. 
392 KR/ 1: 16, 14-15. 
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81, 1 The Royal Scribe and Superintendent of the Treasury [ <of the Lord of the Two Lands 
Pi-n>]b-sy394 who is in the <northern> district [ ... . <addresses himself to the Prophet 
81 , 2 ob] Amun in Thebes (nwt rsyt), ~ri: in L! P! H ! This sending is to inform you about 
t[<he> ... .. (situation?)]395 of the 
81,3 Estate of Amun396 which is here under my authority in the northern district, which 
extends from the Porte of [1mhotep? 397 ..... (to the?)] 
81,4 Ends398 of Lower Egypt, with the three streams, namely the Great River, [(namely the 
Western Arm and)]399 
81,5 namely the Stream of Avaris,400 with the documentation (.svvyt-) 401 of all the people of 
the Estate of Amun in [ ? ... ] 
393 KR/ III : 138-140; H.O. pls. 81-82; Helck, Materialien, pp. 467-468; Wente, Letters, pp. 118-119. 
394 Cf. KR/ III : 136-140; and W . Helck, Verwaltung, p. 408 for the personal dato concerning Pi-nhsy who is 
assumed to have flourished during the reign of Ramesses II. While the present writer follows Sir Alan Gardiner 
("The Geography of the Exodus,"JEA l O [ 1924 ]: 92) in assuming that this text is a model letter, neither K. A. Kitchen 
nor W . Helck have cast serious doubts on the value of the letter and its relation to Pi-nbsy. There is no reason why 
a fictitious letter could not have been attributed to a living person. lt is even possible that the content of the letter 
reflects a real situation, but this should not be assumed. 
395 W . Helck has restored "den [Besitz des] Amuntempels" (Materialien, p. 467), following Sir Alan Gardiner 
(JEA l 0 : 92), who was however less sure of the restoration . 
396 The fact that lmn precedes pr in 81,3 while the usual order appears in 81,6 would suggest an inexperienced 
hand, but the characters bel ie this. 
397 Cf. Urk. 1: l 02, 17 (A. Roccati , litterature, p. 194), where Wnni assembles his troops by the Sbt-n-ly-m-btp. This 
must be located in the northeastern extremity of the Delta, cf. Helck, Beziehungen, p. 18. Although the evidence 
is admittedly temporally somewhat removed, it is perhaps spatially admissible to restore the text thus. 
398 lt is difficult to judge whether pbvvy (''the Ends of Lower Egypt', as written) or pbw("the drainage systems of Lower 
Egypt") are meant. Sir Alan (AEO II : 154 *-155 * ) points out that each nome had its own pbw, and that these 
were perhaps stretches of the Nile which flowed through the res~tive nomes. M . Bietak (Tell ed-Dab'o II : 137) 
identifies them as "wohl Entwässerungssysteme und Seebecken [ ... ], die sozusagen das von Flußarmen gespeiste, 
an der Oberfläche bei Depressionen auftretende Grundwasser abziehen". lt is perhaps best to understand the 
word here with its literal meaning, "end", following A. H . Gardiner (JEA 10: 92), supporting the interpretation 
that the preceding restoration is indeed justified . 
399 The size of the lacuna is not large, but as Sir Alan Gardiner (JEA l 0 : 92) has pointed out, the "name of the 
second of the three Nile-bronches" is missing. This would be ' le fleuve de l'ouest" according to P. Barguet ("Tod: 
Rapport des Fouilles de la saison fevrier-avril 1950," BIFAO 51 ( 1952): 101, n. 4) and M . Bietak (Tell ed-
Dab 'o II : 118): "Der Westliche Fluß war vielleicht_ der unleserliche Name auf dem GARDINER-Üstrakon ." 
400 This is possibly otherwise known as the Stream of Pi-R', which flowed by Avaris/Tell el-Daba'a, cf. M . Bietok ( Tell 
ed-Dab'a II: 119-120): "Mon muß sich also offenbar damit zufrieden geben, daß hinter jedem dieser [sechs] 
Namen ein eigener Flussarm anzunehmen ist, ausgenommen vielleicht die mögliche Identität des Wassers von 
Auaris mit dem Wasser des Re', was ober noch näher zu prüfen wäre." lf our restoration is correct, the area under 
discussion would thus hove been virtuolly the entire Delta . lf however, the second Nile-branch was not the 
"Western River", but rather the "River of Amun" (cf. M. ßietok's maps, Tell ed-Dab'a II : 120 ond Abb. 23), then 
the outhor would perhops hove been responsible for only the eastern Delta. This interpretation does not however 
fit his reference to "the three branches" (81,4) , which seems generolly to imply the entire Delta . 
40 1 Although unclear in H. 0. 81 o,5 (where KR/ III : 138, l l hos correcrly added the second - quite superfluous -
papyrus roll determinative), the word is also clear - although damoged - on the versa, H.O. 82o,2 . Our ability 
to recognize its meaning is however not enhonced by this second oppearance. W . Helck (Materialien, p. 467) 
has "die Gesamtheit aller Leute" . And E. Wente (Letters, p. 118) suggests "occupotions(?) ". Neither appear 
however to be philologically satisfying. The context suggests a kind of "list" . Prof. Jonssen has drown my ottention 
to the word pJ swt in P. BM l 0373, vso. 6 (Janssen, lRlC, pp. 43-47; pls. 27 -30, esp. p. 45 n 18.), ond it 
would appeor thot if p; swt can be tronslated os a "(legal) document", then n swyt could be understood as 
"(officiol) documentation". 
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81,6 consisting of herdsmen of all the animals in the fields belonging to the Estate of 
Amun in the Southern City, with [here under my authority? ..... ] 
81,7 namely: cattle herdsmen, goat herds, shepherds, swine--keepers, [.] 
81,8 donkey grooms, ptrw-animal402 tenders, bird-keepers, fishermen, 
81,9 fowlers, vintners, salt-workers (?), 403 natron workers, papyrus 
81, l 0 [ ..... ] gatherers cutting in the thicket, rope makers, mat-makers (?) [ .... . ] 
81, 11 [ ... ] 1 have brought their name list, each of them [ ..... with their wives?] 
81, 12 , and together with their child[ren]. 404 This name list was[ .. .. . 
81, 13 <in the bureau of>] the Estate of Ti (L!) in the Estate of Amun [ .. .. ].405 1 ha[<ve found 
them and>(?) ..... ] 
81 , 14 1 have btri as siw. t, 406 and fou[ <nd> ..... ] 
8 l , 15 [ .. . .. ] people [ ... .. ] 
82, l [ ..... ] in Regnal Year 24, 1 smw 21 under the Majesty of the King of Upper and 
Lo[ <Wer Egypt, Ramesses lb ...... ] 
82,2 [do>] let the Prophet ~ri know them, each man according to its documentation 407 
the summary [ .... . ] 
82,3 [cultiv>]ators, 8'760 men, each one of them under the obligation of 200 khar; 408 
cattle herdsmen, men bei ng [ ..... ] 
82,4 [ <cat> ]tle, and pasture cattle, each man of them having 500 animals; goat-
herdsmen, being l 3 '080. E[ <ach man> ..... ] 
82,5 [<bird->] keepers, being 22 '530, each of them having 34'230 birds; fishermen [ .... . ] 
402 This word is q~ile difficult, cf. A. Nibbi, "Some Remorks on Ass and Horse in Ancienl Egypt and the Absence of 
the Mule, " ZAS 106 (1979):166-168; K. Kitchen, 'Prd > Ptr = 'Mule' in New Kingdom Egypt?, ' GM 13 
( 1974): 17-20; Helck, Beziehungen, p. 512, No. 83;. Lesko (Olfl: 186) provides only "(domesticated animöl)" 
which is probably the best provisional solution . Regordless of the philology, it seems rational to maintain herds of 
reproductive cattle, and to employ herdsman to watch after them, but mules would presumably be pul to work, 
and therefore need not appear in herds with herdsmen. 
403 Helck (Beziehungen, p. 513, No. 99) has related this apparent hapax (?) to the Semitic mlb, based on its 
appearance beside bsmnyw. So also Materialien, p. 467. 
404 Cf. Helck, Materialien, p. 467, where he has restored their wives as the logical complemenl to "their children" 
wh ich itself is however not certain, although the traces certainly speak in favour of pty.sn msw (sie!) . S. Allam 
("msw = Kinder/ Volksgruppe/ Produkte/ Abgaben, " SAK 19 [ 1992 ]: l-13) has suggested another alternative 
explanalion, which can be argued either way, should the traces actually be presenl. Either "products" or "children" 
can be argued . 
405 This passage has baffled J. Cerny, A. H. Gardiner, W. Helck, E. Wente and K. A. Kitchen as an intelligible 
version of the hieratic or a plausible lranslation has not been established. 
406 This is the crux of the matter, and - as usual - il is not clear. 
4o7 Cf. supra, p . 143 n. 401. 
408 This figure can be used to make comparisons on the level of the reliabil ity of the text and the meaning of this 
statement. E. Wente (Letters, p. l 19) lranslates that they produce 200 khar each, and this statement seemingly 
co~roborates the identical one in P. Bol. 1086, 21-26 (KR/ IV: 81, 2-5; W . Wolf, "Papyrus Bologna 1086," 
ZAS 65 [ 1930]: 95 -96), where each adult field worker is expected to account for 200 khar. In that reference, 
it is however a fsw-prt - which can be understood as "sowing order" - and it could be suggested that the sowing 
and not the harvesl is meanl. lf one extrapolates and concludes that sowing orders were issued in unils of 700 
khar (for which peculiar figure, cf. P. Berlin 3040a vso. 7; KR/ III : 160, l l) then this refers merely to sowing 
orders and not harvests. 
According to v. Beckerath's table (Chronologie, p. 122), Ramesses II 24 1 smw 21 would be near the end of 
March 1255 B.C. of the Julian calendar, and Krauss ("Detailfragen der altägyptischen Getreidewirtschaft," in 
144 
0. Gardiner 86 
82,6 them at three silver deben annually; the donkey grooms being 3'920 [ + ..... with] 
82,7 [ animals 20?']870; the pwtrw tenders, being 13 '227, each man having 551 ani-
mals; peo[ <ple>409 ..... ] 
82,8 plans which I made for them, to the effect that I re-assigned a number of their 
people, and let them build [ .. ... ] 
82,9 a great barn for the sn' of Memphis (Mn-nfr), ten arouras (of land) belonging to it 
[ ..... ] 
82, 10 [<the gr>]anary in it about its four sides: total 160 silos [there being 40 on each 
·d 410 ] SI e .... 
82, 11 many items of the treasury in silver and gold, bronze and clothing [ .... ] 
Fs Fecht, p. 267) maintains that the harvest should have been completed by the end of May, so that if the letter 
- and thus the date - is to be taken seriously, then this can refer only to the harvest preparations. 
W . Helck ( Wirtschaftsgeschichte, p. 246) and W . Schenkel ("Landwirtschaft," LÄ III: 93 2-93 3), have examined 
the estimates of the yields per surface area, seeming to imply that cultivators "employed" by temples each had to 
harvest twenty to forty arouras. The figures for Graeco-Roman Egypt confirm that 5 khar/ arouro (= 14 hectolitre/ 
hectare) is a reasonable rate, and thus 40 arouros are irnplied in an assessment of 200 khar. With a harvest 
seoson lasting several weeks, th is irnplies a total area of 2 arouras/ day, or slightly rnore than 5000 m2/daily, or 
sorne 800 litres/ day. 
Assuming that these cultivators are ernployed to do this work, and that the entire harvest was rendered to the 
temple, and then redistributed, this is a great deal of work. Assurning that the usual assessrnents were merely what 
had tobe delivered to the temples, and the incorne was what wen! beyond this, then the amount of work involved 
is alrnost inconceivable. lt is far rnore probable that these are merely the lower level administrators, who have 
field-workers in their ernploy. But, this would not explain the special case of the "stripling" with the l 00 khar 
respansibility in P. Bologna l 086. 
409 These figures are quite rernarkable, for the total rnust have exceeded the preserved one of 6 l '517 which amounts 
to sorne two-thirds of the total number rnentioned in P. Harris 1 11,4: 86'486 as the dependents of the Estate of 
Amun . lf this is a list of all the temple dependents in the Delta - as suggested in the tronslation here - it would 
support the contention that the majority of the dependents were in the Delta . The idea is appealing, but the • 
evidence slirn . 
410 1 am obliged to Prof.J J. Janssen who has provided the most logical and simples! solution to reading this passage. 
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Sir Alan Gardiner retrieved a number of administrative papyri from the material brought to 
light by Sir Flinders Petrie at Korn Medinet Ghurab, generally known as Gurob.411 Several 
potentially interrelated texts are drawn together here. P. Gurob, an account papyrus at-
tached to a letter, is one of the weil published fragmentary administrative papyri. Dating to 
Regnal Year 2 of Seti II, a btri of fish is associated with a Mayor (1. 2, 12). The letter of the first 
text is in the same handwriting and of approximately the same date as the following notes 
concerning servants and payments.412 The papyrus seems to have been written and stored 
in Gurob. 
P. GuROB413 
1.x+ 10[ ... <which>] 1 did 
2, 1 like that which was done for P~-R' , absolutely perfectly. 414 1 will cause myself 415 to 
be praised on account of this. 
2,2 1 will not allow fault tobe found for me.416 That which my Lord (L!P!H!) caused tobe 
done benefited me417, letting people be brought to me 
2,3 to instruct them (and) to educate them to accomplish this great task. Fortunate is the 
finding of my Lord 
411 For the identification of Mr-wr(t) as Korn Medinet Gharab ("Gurob"), cf. D. Arnold, LÄ II: 87-88; 922-923; AEO 
II: 115 * -116 *; A. H. Gardiner and H. 1. Bell, "The Name of Lake Moeris,"JEA 29 ( 1943): 37-50; A. H. Gardiner, 
Wilbour II: 29-30. 
412 Cf. Sir Alan Gardiner's remarks, RAD, p. ix. 
413 RAD, pp. 14-18; Griffith, Kahun Papyri, pp. 94-98; pls. 39-40; A. H. Gardiner, "The Harem at Miwer,,"JNES 
12 (1953): 145-149; W . Helck, Materialien, e.g., pp. 150,481,650,666,675,683; Wente, Letters, 
p. 36. The first poge is represented by the tail ends of the lines, the second is the conclusion of the !ext begun 
there. Although only a short note ot the end of this poge is directly concerned with "taxotion", the preceding text 
is presented as weil, as this is relevant to the interpretation of all the texts relating fo Mr-wr, which follow. As will 
be noted, the text is clearly tobe dated to the second year of the reign of Seti II. 
414 
'qty sp sn. Sir Alan (JNES 12: 146) translates as "they being exactly exactly alike" . 
41 5 With W. Spiegelberg (opud Griffith, Kahun Papyri, p. 106) and Sir Alan (JNES 12: 146-147), it is assumed 
that the scribe has placed a superfluous t here. The assumption is of course decisive, in determining that the letter 
was writfen by a lady to Seti II. 
41 6 As discovered by W. Spiegelberg , and confirmed by Sir Alan, this represents an idiomatic expression. 
41 7 W . Spiegelberg read F LI Griffith's ;b os an odjectivol noun ("a fine thing") modifying the following sentence 
(Kahun Papyri, p. 106; pi. 39/ hieratic, 2; pi. 39 hieroglyphic, 25), while F. LI. Griffith himself hod understood 
this as the object of the preceding sentence (Kahun Papyri, p. 95). Sir Alon corrected the reading of the hieroglyphs 
but generously atfributed the identification of the form as an "adjectivol predicate" to Spiegelberg (RAD, pp. 14; 
14a and JNES 12: 146 -148), while curiously adopting Spiegel~rg's translation, although obviously reading 
the seated figure as the l st. pers. sin~. dependent pronoun (cf. Cerny-Groll, p. 22) improves the sense. The 
following infinitive conslruction (p; rdit) would then be the subject of a preceding verb (tb), with the lst. pers. 
sing. fern . pronoun wi as an objecl. The dot of the seated female figure can be almest invisibly writfen when part 
of this pronoun (cf., e.g., Kahun Papyri, pi. 39/ hieratic, 3; or the hieratic text of Nwt-Nbti's testament-J. C:erny, 
"The Will of Naunakhte and the Related Documents,"JEA 31 [ 1945]: pi. 8, col. 3, line 3), but it con conceivably 
have been omitted . (Sir Alon assumed that precisely this error was made in 2 ,6 : cf. JNES 12: 146; 148 n. g) . 
Sir Alon (JNES 12: 146) notes that "we shall find that this short text contains at least two other miswritings", ond 
therefore the suggested readings are not that farfetched. lf a male scribe unaccustomed lo such activity was 
actually taking dictation from a lady, this would explain al least one of the Faults, where the seated female figure 
is inexplicably preceded by a t(JNES 12: 146). -
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2, 4 that they 4 18 should be made to perform that wh ich the I i ke thereof has not been done 
for P;-R' since those who are here are !arge children, 
2,5 people who are like those people whom my Lord (L!P!H!) sent. Those who 
2,6 are able to, perform, and those who understand take instruction. They are 
foreigners 419 like those brought 
2,7 to us in the days of Ramesses II (L!P!H!), the great god, your good father. They teil us, 
"We were as 'b'w 420 
2,8 in the houses of the officials." They take to learning and they are able to do all that 
has been explained to them. 
2,9 This is an information dispatch (for Pharaoh).42 1 Year 2 III tbt 20. 
2, l 0 ~ for every servant active in the house of pt-bntyof Mr-wrt since year 2 III ibt 14. 
[A deliberate space of two lines, followed by:] 
2, 11 Year 2 III tbt l <7> . (The Royal) One was in the temple of [ Seti 11] in Memphis. 
2, l 2 Received as btri of fish wh ich was on the Mayor [ .... ] of [ .. . <the>] Southern City. 
2, 13 "g-fish: gutted, 300; whole 700, Total 1000. 
vso. 
1,0 [< .... 1>]00 
l , l [ .... < The usual wo> ]ges422 making Moringa Oil 130 hin; sesame oil l 30 hin 
1,2 [ ... . <sesame oi> ]I 2155 hin. 
1,3 [ <moringa oil hin 130 sesame oil hin>] 2286: details of it 
418 Sir Alan (JNES 12: 146-147) translates st as "her" and 'one", while this could also represent the 3rd. pers. pi. 
pronoun, and thus logically could refer to the people who are sent. For the text correction, cf. RAD, pp. 14-140 
n. 80 andJNES 12: 147). The stot the end of the sentence underlines the thought. 
419 The reference to foreigners being residents -even traditional residents ("like those sent" a decade earlier; II. 2,5-2,7) 
is interesting as it can be confirmed by archaeological dato. Although there seems tobe a hiatus following the 
early Hyksos period followed by a moderaie settlement in early Dynasty XVIII, ihere was also sufficient irnitation 
Mycaenean pottery to support the assumption of the presence of foreigners in Mr-wrt/ Kom Medinet Ghurab at 
the period at the close of the New Kingdorn; cf. Kernp/i\Aerrillees, Minoan Pottery, p. 248 (and cf. index, 
p . 336, s.v. "Medinet el Ghurab'). 
420 As Sir Alan (JNES 12: 146) suggests: "rnere nurnbers" perhaps? 
421 Sir Alan (JNES 12: 147; 149 n. k.) suggests a restoration, which is however not essential, and thus translated 
neutrally. 
422 This follows Griffith's proposal to sorne extent. Sir Alan correctly noted (RAD, p. 15a, l Oa) however that Griffith's 
(Kahun Papyri, p . 96) suggested reading, "fJ.rt hrw (?)", "is quite impossible", but hirnself provides two equally 
unsuitable readings. The group given in facsimile (RAD, p. 15a, 1. 1 Oa .) and in Griffith's photograph (Kohun 
Papyri, pi. 40, 1. 1.) can be read as mn, perhaps with a solar disk as determinative. Thus, one could translate 
- with Griffith - "daily". D. Mueller ("Sorne Rernarks on Wage Rates in the Middle Kingdorn, '' JNES 34 [ 1975]: 
249-263) has however shown !hat there would appear to have been a terrn meaning "basic wage" written mn• 
in the Middle Kingdorn. This uni! rn ight be meant here, with an understandable confusion arising frorn the similarly 
writteri term for "daily". 
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[vso.] 
moringa 
oil 
hin 
makes Sesame makes employees each Sesame Total Sesame 
1,4 5 
1,5 5 
1,6 <5> 
1,7 
1,8 
1,9 
l, lO 
l,l l 
l, 12 
l, 13 
l,14 
l,15 
l,16 [<5>] 
l,17 
l, 18 
hin 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
oil 
hin 
2 
2 
<2> 
<2> 
<2> 
<2> 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
*[5] 
2 
l 
*[5] 
2 
10 89 
10 70 
lO 70 
10 69 
lO 78 
10 68 
10 <6>7 
10 <7>7 
10 <6>4 
lO 6<3> 
10 40.5 
10 34 
10 33 
10 38 
2 
oil oil 
hin hin hin 
2.5 222.5 232.5 
2.5 175 185 
2.5 175 185 
2.5 172.5 182.5 
2.5 195 205 
2.5 170 180 
2.5 167<.5> 177<.5> 
2.5 192.5 202<.5> 
2.5 160 <170> 
2.5 157.5 167<.5> 
2<.5> 101.25 106.25 
2.5 85 95 
2.5 82.5 87.5 
2.5 95 105 
2.5 5 5 
*[130] *[2'156.25] *[2'826.25] 
vso. a 
la, l [<Regnal Year 2 .... (The Royal)>] Onewas in the House of [Ramesses II], the great 
k; of P<ar>aharakhte. 
l a,2 [ < .... the Mayor P>]~-Sr of Mr-wrt [ <received>] instead of fish, alfalfa mats 50. 
la,3 [< .... o>]f the fisherman P~-brw, son of lmn-ms, tpywfish, [ .... ] mc bq;t 1520. Details 
of it: 
la,4 [ ..... ]3145445332222 
la,5 [ .... ] <21 100 100> 4 122 120 12<8> 132<+> 113 1115768 3 
l a,6 [ .... ] loaves isbt-6read: 20; .s'yt-cakes: oipe 8 
la,7 [ .... <1>]2 
vso. 6 
l 6, l Regnal Year <2>, 1 prt 10 (The Royal) One was in the temple of [Ramesses II], the 
great k; of Paraharakhte. 
l 6,2 Receiving the btri of fish which is upon the Mayor P~-sr of Mr-wrt: dried tpywfish, mc 
[ .... ] 
16,3 making fish 1600. Details of it: 159 127 127 125 141 123 12[<0+> .... ] 
l 6,4 116 114 73 65 60 70 2. 
l 6,5 inw of the royal superintendent of the Throne: given towards material support of this 
house, good 6read: large 'qw-loaves: 10; Syrian 6eer [ .... ] 
l 6,6 Regnal Year 21 prt 11 (The Royal) One was in the Temple of [Ramesses 11], the great 
k; of Paraharakhte. 
l 6,7 Withdrawn from the magazine of this House, given to the Porter Ss-s~w-nb-nbt for 
t[ <he> .... ] 
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P. GUROB FRAGMENT G 423 
1, l [ .. .. ] brr <5>, tunic 424 [ .. . . ] ( 1,2) [ ... . ] papyrus 39 [ .... ] ( 1,3) Withdrawn from the 
storeroom of th is house for ( 1,4) the tp-grt425 of the Opening of the Year Festival: 
l ,5 royal linen, as covering brr l 
l ,6 royal linen, tunic, l 
l ,7 mk-cloth, sJ-pJ, 5 
1,8 mk-linen, nf°, 10 
1, 9 double fine thin dress426, 6 
l , l O double fine thin tunics, 3 
1, 11 thin dress, 15 
1, 12 thin tunics, 15 
1, 13 thin loincloths ( ?) , 427 papyrus [ .. . . ] 
1, 14 given towards in[<W> ... ] 
l , 15 from the hands of the Scribe Se[ <ti of this House> ... ] 
l, 16 Thin dresses, [<9> .. . ] 
2,x+ l [ . ... ]making as cov[<ering> ... ] 
2,x+2 [ .... ] all <fay>ence (?) for coverings [(?) ... ] 
2,x+3 [ .... ] decorated with mrwof lapi[<s lazuli> ... ] 
vso. 
1,2 [<Regnal Year .... day 10 .... (The Royal) One was in>] the House of [Ramesses 111], 
the great k~ of Paraharakhte, 
1,3 [ .... ] clothing given towards the One who is there from the journey, from the hand 
1,4 [ .... ] the pt-bntywhich is in Mr-wrt. 
1,5 [ .... ] royal scribe of the Harim, Seti of this house. 
1,6 [ . ... <in the time of the (?) King>]ship (of) the King of Upper and Lower Egypt 
[ Ramesses II]. 
vso 
2, l [ .... ] dtiwcloth 24, making silver deben [ .. .. ] 
2,2 lapis lazuli, extra fine quality,428 deben 6, (making) silver deben [ .... ] 
423 RAD, pp. 20 -21; W. Helck, Materialien, pp. 932-933 . 
424 For brrcf. perhaps H.O. 65, 2 vs. 2. Thatthe ms is a tunic or galabia is supported byJanssen, Prices, pp. 259-264. 
425 Prof. J J Janssen was so kind as to confirm my suspicion that this was indeed tp -grt, as Sir Alan Gardiner 
(RAD, p. 20a, l. 7a) at least indicated was possible. Cf. J J Janssen, "Requisitions from Upper Egyptian temples 
(P. BM l0401), ··JEA77 (199l) 88 . 
426 Forthe idg, cf. Müller, Liebespoesie, p. 43; pi. 17, l5;JJ,Janssen, CommodityPrices, pp. 282 -284; J J Janssen, 
"A Twentieth-Dynasty Account Papyrus, "JEA 52 ( 1966): 85 n. j. Forthe idgas a mantle, cf. E. Edel (" GADTüGmak!alu 
gleich Hieroglyphenqj';']ff ;dg, etwa "Mantel, Umhang, " in Fs Alp, pp. 127-134). As Edel points out, the 
implications of dripping oil as suggested in Müller, Liebespoesie, pi 17, 15 do not support the reading as a 
kerchief, and the prices and quality are quite high , but it is clear that this must be one of those festive dresses worn 
at parties. 
427 Adding with W . Helck (Materialien, p. 932) - another variation to Janssen's (Prices, p. 272) list of possible 
writings of this word, for the meaning of which, s.v. pp. 272-277. 
428 nfr nfr. 
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2,3 lapis lazuli deben 40 (making) [<silver deben> .... ] 
2,4 green stones 429 deben 10 (making) [<silver deben> .... ] 
2,5 safflower430 blossoms mc. [ .... ] 
RE/v\ARKS 
As Sir Alan has arranged the material, there are several more pages with lists of various 
kinds of clothing,431 sand then indistinct remarks about comings and goings and some 
figures, 432 before some notes about deliveries of fish to the Harim at Mr-wrt.433 The letter 
seems to have been written by a lady to the reigning Pharaoh Seti II, and the other notes on 
the same papyrus were written in the same hand, so that the additional fragment translated 
here has been related to the first text due to the repetition of the phrase referring to the 
presence of the Pharaoh. Each statement referring to the receipt of btri fish from a given 
Mayor is preceded by a neutral statement to the effect that the King is in a particular temple. 
What seems to unite all of these documents is the Harim at Mr-wrt, and the fact that there is a 
strict accounting for fish where on the one hand Pharaoh seemingly receives them from P;-Sr, 
the Mayor of Mr-wrt as a htri payment434 but then ~ri, the Mayor of Mr-wrt gives fish - without 
any other identification - to the Harim.435 
The relationship of the text in the letter to the accounts may be clear in that both concern 
temple employees or dependents, but a careful examination of the letter did not allow any 
deductions concerning the significance of the transfers. lt is merely clear that (a) considerable 
quantities of sesame and moringa oil were expended for the employees of the establishment; 
(6) that the fish being collected from the Mayor of Mr-wrt were probably collected from 
people unrelated to those being "instructed" in the letter; and (c) that the people being given 
instruction were foreigners. lt is possible that these latter were the ultimate recipients of the 
fish, but it is not clear that the two delivery types of fish were identical. 
Associating the term htriwith the term mn, i.e. the assumption of a reciprocal obligation, the 
htri can be interpreted as the Mayor's obligation to the Pharaoh, and the mn os the obligatory 
wages to the employees and overseers. But, the htri is not the same as the mn, as the htri is 
fish (and a few loaves and mats) while the "wages" are moringa and sesame oil, so that the 
products are not the same. 
lt can merely be suggested that the Mayor's htri is for the pt-bntyof Mr-wrt, and the fact that 
a civilian was responsible for the deliveries to the pt-bnty. The pt-bnty was at least partly 
staffed by foreigners (clear from the references in the letter of the recto, pp. 146-147), and 
responsible in some way for some activity beneficial to the god Pi-W. The documents show 
that this institution received fish, sesame oil, and moringa oil (and probably also the loaves) 
429 Cf. Harris, Lexicographica!Studies, pp. 102-104. 
430 For kJas Carthamus tinctorius, "safflower", cf R. Germer, Flora, pp. 173-175. 
431 RAD, pp. 22 -23; 25 . 
432 RAD, pp. 24-26. 
433 RAD, pp. 26-28. These are followed by some badly preserved texts relating to the smw and inyt as grain 
deliveries. 
434 RAD,pp. 15,6-8; 17, 14-16. 
435 RAD, pp. 26, 18-27, l-2. Some additional fragments also related to fish, but in their present state do not specify 
whether they were collected from or delivered to the temples listed. 
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to be redistributed to the dependents, and that btri designated some of this. Additional 
references suggest that the manufacture of cloth or garments be associated with the pJ-bnty. 
The Royal Superintendent of the Throne's inw is for the temple. Whether it is justifiable to 
explain the use of the term inwby the foreign origin of the Syrian beer is extremely speculative. 
The first page of the verso of P. Gurob Fragment G appears tobe the same type of entry as 
found in P. Gurob, mentioning "(The Royal) One's" presence in the shrine of Ramesses II the 
great kt of Paraharakhte. The second poge mentions lapis lazuli, but the list is quite similar 
to that on the recto, where valuable clothing materials are listed under a heading which 
indicates that they are "withdrawn" from the temple. This text bears a very close resemblance 
to P. B.M. 10401,436 which is however from Thebes and not Gurob. 
Col. 1 of P. B.M. 10401 lists metals, garments, fruits, and animals, etc. as having been the 
inw of the "Chief Taxing Master" ( CJ-n-st), withdrawn from (sdi m) some shrines in Upper 
Egypt. 437 The Prophet of the temple of Khnum at Elephantine delivered gold, cloth, stones 
and fruit. 438 Cloth and fruit follow in another entry related to Khnum. 439 A Prophet at Korn 
Ombo delivered some fruit and mats.440 The temple of Horus Behdety provided cloth and an 
ox_44l 
Col. II appears to bear ariother heading, beginning with "(2, 1) tp-grtof the Prophet Nb-N!rw" 
as col. 1 began with "the inwof the Chief Master". Although there is no reason to believe that 
a new text began with the top of col. II, it is curious that only the affiliations of this Prophet 
and the chief Taxing master are missing, but this is doubtless a mere oversight, the Prophet 
being the same as that mentioned in connection with the Behdety, and the items being 
likewise assigned to the Chief Taxing Master, merely under a different heading. The chief 
problem being whether to interpret the tp-grt as an ex-officio obligation on the Prophet 
himself, or as a particular designation for a payment rendered up by the temple. The items 
listed in cols. II and III from the temples of Horus of Nekhen, the house of Nekhbet, and the 
Khnum temple at Esna repeat the same items: gold, cloth, animals and bread. 
436 J. J. Janssen, "Requisitions from Upper Egyptian Temples (P. BM 10401)," JEA 77 (1991): 79-94. My own 
approoch is a mere shadow of that produced by Janssen's masterly abilities, so that for the text and translation, 
one is referred to his article, and the treatment here is 1ntended to touch the salient points. 
437 J. J. Janssen (JEA 77: 84 n. (c)) rejects the possibility that this is the substantive, as the genitive n is absent. Were 
this a conventional verbal construction, then one would expect a multitude of objects tobe referred to as n; inw 
rather than p; inw. As he interprets the first phrase of the sentence as being formed with a direct genitive (snny n; 
ibt, translating " List of the objects," JEA 77: 81) this appears tobe a secondary issue. The use of the genitive n 
usually suggests that the previously designated inw came from that source (e.g., "the inw of every land", KR/ 1: 
197,8), while the dative n defines the ultimate recipient (eg., "for his father, " KR/ 1: 23, 3). An n could thus 
conceivably have been misconstrued by an Egyptian , who understood it as a dative, suggesting that it was "for" 
him "rather than "his" - whatever this may be interpreted as signifying. Taking the construction as a direct genitive 
also explains why the abstract determinative rather than that of a verb of motion is used, etc. 1 thus read: "( l, l) List 
of the items, the inwof the Chief Taxing Master ( 1,2) which were withdrawn from the shrines." This does not imply 
that I understand anything except a direct relationship between the "Chief Taxing Master" and the inw, and most 
certainly not the implication that the "Chief Taxing Master" was fulfilling his obligations by recourse to the temples 
to make up an unexpected deficit. lt should be noted that hitherto it has not been established that the official we 
call the "Chief-taxing Master" was port of the government rather than the temple bureaucracy, so that "requisitioning' 
is perhaps exaggerated, if the transfers are within the temple system . 
438 Janssen, JEA 77: 80, II . 1,3-12. 
439 Janssen, JEA 77: 80, 11. l, 13-16. 
440 Janssen, JEA 77: 80, II. l, 17-21. 
441 Janssen, JEA 77: 80, II. 1,22-25. 
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Al [ .... (wood ?) <750>] [Left Blank] plaster khar l l/4 [ .. .. (rest?) <khar>] 5/8 
A 2 [ ... . ] through 443 the scribe P!-sr: wood, 500, rest, 1000; plaster, khar l, rest, 
khar 7/ 8. 
A 3 [ .. .. <lQ ... <t>]he workmen worked at the site 444 [ . .. ] 2 5 
A 4 [ .... <gi>]ven to the site on this day 5<6,> 20, total 76 
A 5 [ .... ] day 11 for the left side, through the scribe P!-sr, the foreman, 1 1/ 4; khar 3. 
A 6 [ .... work]men, men, 14, each one, khar 1 2/ 4, making khar 21, men 9, each 
one, khar 2, making khar l <8>. 
A 7 [ .. .. <khar>] 1/ 2 brought later khar 3 3/ 4. Details of it: the foreman, khar 1 2/ 4 
A 8 [ ... . ] khar 1 <l / 4> surplus (from?) before of III Jbt khar 1/ 4 
A 9 [ ... . ] th is <day> khar47 3/ 4 
A l O [ .... <received as the inyt from the r-prw-chapels of the> We ]st of Thebes, beer, 
ds-jars 5 
A 11 [ ... . <potter>] Ptb-m-wi; of the right to the scribe P!-n-B-wrt, bJkw 2 
A l 2 [ .. .. ] of the right; workman tiwy, son of tiwy-nfr of the left 
A 13 [ .... ] [???] diwfor the right side, made from Regnal Year 5 1 Jbt l 
A 14 [ .... <khar>] 5 2/ 4, their five days, khar 2/ 4; 1 + l / 4 + l / 8 [ ... . ] 
A 15 [ ..... <kh>]ar l; 2 + 3/4 [Left Blank] 1/ 8 khar 1/ 4; 2/ 4 + 1/ 8 + 1/ 16 [???] 
A 16 [ .... ] each one khar 1 [<2/4> .... ] 88, each one for theirfive days, khar3/4 + 1/ 8 
+ 1/ 16 making khar 1 1/ 4 [ .. .. ] 
A 17 [ ... . ] 
A 18 [ .... ] khar 1 [<2/ 4>]; 4; their five days khar 1/ 4; 1/ 16 [+?] 1/ 8 
[Loss2 ] 
B 1 [ ... . (Received from the?) <Temples 445> of West Thebes ... ] 
442 KR/ V: 437-448 . This fragmentary fXlpyrus has unfortunately been lost (cf. JEA 65 [ 1979 ]: 3), and thus hazarding 
a translation based on an imperfect transcription is perhaps rash, but this is one of the most important papyri from 
Deir el-Medineh specifying institutionol relations. A similar one (0. Edgerton 13) is unfortunately not published 
either. J. J. Janssen (pers. comm.) suggests thot the !ext be dated to the reign of Siptah/ Tawasert, and not 
Ramesses III, as listed by K. Kitchen; Kitchen himself indicated his uncertainty in the matter of the date (KR/ V: 
437). Certoinly the workman nomed Ptb-m-wi t was not listed under Ramesses III in Valbelle, Ouvriers, Annex, IV, 
but is listed for Siptah , even thouQh D. Valbelle used P. Greg as o source for the composition of the Gang dated 
to Ramesses III (Ouvriers, p . 344). 
443 Prof J. J. Janssen (pers comm .) suggests the reading of ."through' rather than "from " for m-g_rt. Logically this is 
correct in this cose, as the scribe was not a wood-cutter, but it not invariably logically and thus semontically 
correct. 
444 J. Cerny ( Communily, pp. 81-84) proposed "work in progress" as a rendering for the place of work os related to 
the royal tomb, pt r-'-btkw. lt would seem thot the most appropriole rendering in this ond mony other coses would 
be 'site". 
445 r-prw. Spencer (Temple, pp. 37-42; 54-55) hos shown convincingly thot in the obsence of o context, this should 
not be understood narrowly, ond con refer to the temples, ond in this cose must refer to the mortuory temples. 
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B 2 [(By the workmen of the?)] right side of the Gang [(and the workmen of the left side 
of the Gang?) ] 
B 3 [(Regnal Year 5 1 tbt 16: the Gang was working on this day446 ... . ] 
B 4 [ .... (given to the site?) 447]<this day> [ .... ] 
B 5 [ .... (workmen of the Gang, men)] twtw-loaves 448 50, pct-loaves 150, stkt-breads 50 
B 6 [fu the workman] 'i-pbty of the right side, workman Hr-m-wii of the le[<ft>] 
B 7 [ <Regnal year 5 1 tht 17> ], the workman worked at the site. 
B 8 [<Lamps is>]sued to the site, on this day, 42, 16 tot[<al>.. .. ] 
B 9 [ <Received as inytfrom the chief oL] the royal provisions of Pharaoh (L!P!H!) in the 
city449 bit-cakes, 7 and p(r)s cakes [ ... . ] 
B 10 [ <Received as the iny> ]t from the temples of West Thebes, beer, ds-jars, [Left 
Blank] 5 
B 11 [ <fu the workman>] of the Gang Ki-si of the right side, and Si-W~gyt for the left 
[ .. .. ] 
B 12 Regnal year 5 1 tht 1 8. The workmen of the Gang were working at the site [ .. .. ] 
B 13 lamps issued to the site on this day, 42, total 5<2> 
B 14 Received through plaster-maker B~k-n-wrnr of left, plaster, sacks, 1 [ .... ] 
B 15 fu the workman Mry-R' of right and the workman Nbt-sw of lef[<t> .... ] 
B 16 Regnal year 5 1 tht 19, the workers of the Gang were not engaged 450 on this day. 
[ .... ] 
B 17 fu the workman of the Gang, P~-n-lmn, of right, and workman of the Gang, Hwy-
nfr of lef[ <b ... . ] 
B 18 Regnal year 5 1 tht 20, the workmen of the Gang were not engaged on this day. 
B 19 Received as the inytfrom the temples of West Thebes, beer ds-jars [Left Blank] 5 
B 20 Received 451 through the fisherman P~-tw~i~ of right, fish, deben [ .... ] 
B 21 Received through the wood cutter Nb-R' of right, wood, 500,452 b;kw[ .... ] 
B 22 fu the workman of the Gang Qn-br-bps.f on rig[<ht, the worb ]man of the Gang, 
Im[ <n-> .. .. ] 
B 23 Total from 1 ;bt 11 to 20 making 10 days [ .... ] 
B 24 Wood, 1,750; plaster khar l 1/ 4, b;kw 2 of the potter [ .... ] 
B 25 left, through the scribe P~-sr [Left Blank] wood [Left Blank]; plaster khar l 1/ 4 [ ... : ] 
B 26 Regnal year 5, 1 tht 21 , the workman of the Gang worked at the sit[ <8> .... ] 
446 This restoration is merely a deduction based on the comparable entries and the traces in the following lines. 
447 Prof. Janssen (pers. comm .) points out that the quote using "this day" never immediately precedes "receiving" so 
that the published version must be correspondingly emended, and this restoralion removed . Usually the Gang 
was working or absent ''on this day" , or it referred to the place where they were in the preceding word . The "man 
of action" determinative indicates that they were not at rest, or that it refers to ' the site" . The logic of the text 
indicates the order. Thus the restoration . 
448 This must be a loaf and not an r. 
449 Cf. Janssen, Commodit,1 Prices, p . 458 . 
450 This phrase seems to imply merely "d id not work (at the site of the royal tomb)". They could have been elsewhere, 
and they were not "absent from work'', but merely from the site . 
45 1 1 have no confirmation that this was written in red. 
452 The units of wood are never specified, so we cannot estimate the volume. 
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B 27 lamps issued to the site, this day, 56 [ Left Blank] 20 Total [ <7 6>] 
B 28 Received as the inytfrom the chief of the royal provisions of Pharaoh (L!P!H!) in the 
city, bit-breads 8 <p[(r)s-breads> .... ] 
B 29 d[ <at> ]es, mbt-vessels 4, brought to him (from the) West of Thebes for beer, 
dates, gty-vessels [ ... . ] 
B 30 Received through the wood cutter, B~k-n-Mwt of r[ <ight, wood, 2> ]50 
B 31 Received through the wood cutter ljc-m-tri [ <Of the ... . <wood> .... ] 
B 3 2 Received through the wood [ <Cut> ]ter P~-iwd ( of the left) 453 wo[ <Od> .... ] 
B 33 Received thro[<ugh the wood cu>]tter lmn-bcw (of the[ .... ]) wo[<od> .. .. ] 
B 34 ~ the workman P~-bbnw of the right, (and) the workman [ .... <of the> ... ] 
B 35 [ <Regnal Year 5 !>] iht 22, the workmen are work[ <ing at the site>] 
B 36 [<Lamps (?) is>]sued to the si [<te this day> ... . ] 
C l Received as inyt from the [ .... ] 
C 2 Regnal Year 5 1 t[<bt 27. The Gang was working at the site> .. . ] 
[xlineslost] 
C x+3 [ .... ] 
C x+4 [ Received throu> ]gh the fisherman B~k-[ <n-lmn of left> .... ] 
C x+5 [ <Regnab] year 5 [ <!>] iht 28 . Themen of the Gang we[ <re working at the site 
this day>] 
C x+6 lamps issued to the site [<on this day .... ] 
C x+7 Received as inyt from the temples of the West of [ < Thebes: beer ds-jars 5>] 
C x+B ~ the workman Rmc of the right, [ .... ] 
C x+9 Regnal year 5 1 iht 29. Themen were not engaged this day. 
C x+ 10 the remainder of the diw corn of II tbt for the right side [ .... ] 
C x+l 1 8 men, each one, khar4, making khar32 [ ... . ] 
C x+12 [<men 7>] each one khar2, making khar 14, porters[ .... ] 
C x+l 3 [ <8 men, each one, khar 4 , making khar >] 32 
C x+ 14 the issuing of the diw corn [ dl tbt to] the foreman, khar [ ... ] 
C x+ 15 men 22, each one, khar 1 making khar 22, porters, men, 2 [ .. . . ] 
C x+ 16 stripling Wnn-nfr khar 1, P~-ym khar 1 [ .... ] 
C x+ 17 [ .... ] each, totaling on this day, khar 80 [ .... ] 
[x lines and x columns lost] 
vso. A 
A 1 [ .... ] for le[<ft, wo>]od, 500, [ .... <total 1>]500 
A 2 [ <Received as the inytof the chief of the royal provisions of Pharaob] (L!PIH!) bit-
breads, p( r) s-breads, 8, dates, 1 , 1 0 
[x lines lost] 
453 Restored using (vso. B 9) . 
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vso. A X 
A x+3 [ damps issued to the site on this day>] 50 
A x+ 4 [ .... ] 
Ax+l5 [ ... . ] 
Ax+l6 [ ... Textual Loss ... <dates>] mbt2[ .... ] 
A x+ 17 [ <Regnal year 6 IV Jht 15, the>] men of the Gang were working [ <0t the site>] 
A x+ 18 [ damps issue> ]d to the site on this day 60 [ +? .... ] 
A x+ 19 [ <Received as the inytfrom th> ]e temples of the West of Thebes: beer ds-jars <5?> 
A x+20 [ <Regnal year 6 IV Jht 6>] the men of the Gang were working at the s<ite> 
A x+ 21 [ damps issue> ]d to the site on this day, 60 
A x+22 Received as inyt from the temples of the West of Thebes: beer, ds-jars 4 
A x+23 [ <Regnal year 6, IV Jht l > li, the men of the Gang were working at the site 
A x+ 24 [ damps iss> ]ued to the site on this day, 50 
A x+25 [<Received as iny>]tfrom the chief of the royal provisions of Pharaoh [<(L!P!>]H!) 
bi[ < J-breads, p(r)s-breads .. . . >] 
A x+ 26 [ <Regnal year 6 1Y>] Jht 1 8, the men of the [Gang .... ] 
A x+27 [ < The issuing of the diw cor> ]n of I prt to right, [ <the fore> ]man of the [<Gang>] 
khar 2, the scribe khar [ .... ] 
A x+28 [<men 9, each one>] khar 1 l/2, making khar 13 l/2, men 13, each one khar2, 
making kh[ <ar 26>] 
A x+29 [ d w-p> J~y, khar 1 of remainder, it is for IV Jbt, khar l/2, porters [ .. .. ] 
A x+30 [ .... ] of IV Jbt khar l/8 , total[ .... ] 
[ x lines lost] 
vso. B 
B O [ <Regnal year 6 IV Jht 19, the Gang worked at the site this day>] 
B 1 [ da> ]mps issu[ <ed to the site on this day ... >] 
B 2 [ <Re> ]ceived as inyt [drom the chief of the royal provisions of Pharaoh (L!P!H!) in 
the city>] 
B 3 [ .... ] da[ des .... >] 
B 4 [ <Received through> .... ] 
B 5 Received from the wood cutter P[<~-iwd of left> ... ] 
B 6 Received from the wood cutter lmn-b'w of [ ... . ] 
B 7 Received from the wood cutter B~k-n-[<Mwt of right>454 . .. • ] 
B 8 Received bJkw of potter Ptb-m-[ <Wi~>? .. . Textual Loss ... ] 
B 9 P!-iwd of left, wood, 500 ß;k-n-Mwt of the rig[ <ht, woocL .. .. ] 
454 KR/ V: 443, 12 suggesls than the remaining signs suggest another reading, but this is restored taking (vso. B 9) 
as a guide. 
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B 10 P~-n-Rnnt of right, wood, 500, in day 20 [ .... ] 
B l l total from IV tbt 11 until 20, maki ng days [ < 10> .... ] 
B l 2 btkw of the potter 
B 13 left, wood, 2000, btkwof the potter [ .... ] 
B 14 inyt from th[<e>] chief of royal provisions of Pharaoh (L!P!H!) [ <in the city biJ-
breads> .... ] 
B 15 p(r)s breads 23, remainder 17, dates 14, remainder 46, beer, [ .... ] 
B 16 Regnal year 6, IV tbt 21, the men of the Gang were working at the [ <Site>] 
B 17 lamps issued to the site on this day [ .... ] 
B 18 Received as inyt from the temples of the West of Thebes: beer, ds-jars [ .... ] 
B 19 Regnal year 6 IV tbt 22, the men of the gang were working at khe site> 
B 20 lamps, issued to the site on this day, 22 [ ... . ] 
B 21 received as inytfrom the temples of the West of Thebes, beer, ds-jars [ .. .. ] 
B 22 Regnal Year 6 IV tbt 23, the men of the Gang were working at the <site> 
B 23 lamps, issued to the site on this day [ .... ] 
B 24 Received as inyt from the temples of the West of Thebes, beer, ds-[ <jars> ... . ] 
B 25 Re[<ceived through>] fisherman, ljc-m-tri (and) Hwy by [ .... ] 
B 26 [ <Received>] through fisherman B~k-n-lmn of left, fish, deben 400 [ +? .. .. ] 
B 27 [ <Regnal>] year 6 IV tbt 24, the men of the Gang were working at the <Site> 
B 28 lamps, issued to the site on this day 10[ .... ] 
B 29 day of completing with the left awnings in cloth (?and?), lamps [ .... ] 
B 30 lw-p~y of right issued lamps on this day, 6, left[ .... ] 
B 31 Receiving through the fisherman Hry of the right, fish deben 500 [(?) ... . ] 
B 32 Regnal Year 6 IV tbt 25 Receiving as inyt from the temples of the West [ <of 
Thebes, beer, ds-jars> .... ] 
B 33 Regnal year 6 IV tbt [ <2> ]6, day of the festival of Sokar-Osiris [ .... ] 
B 34 [<Receiving>] as inyt from the [<chief of>] royal provisions of Pharaoh (L!P!H!) 
bi[<t-loaves> ... . ] 
B 35 p(r)s breads 4, dates m/:it 5, beer, ds-jars, 3 [ .. .. ] 
B 36 Regnal Year 6 IV tbt 27, the m[<en of the Gang>] were working at the si[ <te this 
day> .... ] 
B 37 lamps issued to the site this day, 1 [ <8> .... ] 
B 38 Received as inytfrom the temples of the West of Thebes, beer, ds-[<jars> .... ] 
B 39 [ <Received>] through the plaster maker H~d-nbt [ .... ] 
B 40 [ <Regnal Year 6 IV tbt 28>] The m[ <en of the Gang were working at the site this 
day> .... ] 
[ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
[ There is a column x which has some elements which may be interpreted, but this is omitted 
here] 
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vso. C 
C l [Regnal year 7 .... ] 
C 2 Regnal year 7 [ d prf>] 12 the men of the Gang worked at [<the site this day> ... ] 
C 3 lamps issued to the site this day [ .... ] 
C 4 Received as inyt from the chief of royal provisions of Pharaoh (L!P!H!) [<biJ-
breads> .... <and p(r)s-cakes> .. .. ] 
C 5 the remainder of the diw corn of II ;bt of right, men 22, each one, 3/ 4 [ <making 
khar 1 6 2/ 4> ] 
C 6 the hmwt-slaves khar 1 2/ 4, for IV ;bt khar 1 l / 4, total khar 20 1 / 4 [ +? .... ] 
C 7 the foreman of the Gang khar 2, the scribe khar 1, men, 22, each one [ <khar 3/4 
making khar 16 2/ 4>] 
C 8 the guardians, khar 1, the porter lt-(?), khar 1/ 2 1/ 8, stripling [ .. .. ] 
C 9 total 24. Time, all which was made from this day [ ... . ] 
C 10 Day of arrival made by workman of the Gang Qn-br-bps.f on the way [ .... ] 
C 11 Regnal year 7 1 prt 1 3 
C 12 Regnal year 7 1 prt 4, receiving as inyt from the ch[<ief of royal provisions of 
Pharaoh (L!P!H!)>] 
C 13 bi-breads 7, p(r)s-cakes 7, dates 2 
C 14 Regnal year 7, 1 prt 15, Regnal year 71 prt 16 [ ... . ] 
C 15 [ <Regnal year 71 prt 17>] the [ <Worb ]men of the Gang were working [ <at site this 
day> .... ] 
C 16 lamps issu[ <ed>] to the site on this da[ <Y> ... . ] 
C 17 [ <Received>] as inyt [ drom the>] temple[<s of the West of The> ]bes, beer 
[ ds-jars> .... ] 
C 1 8 Regnal year 7 1 prt l 8 [ < The workmen of the Gang were working at the site this 
day> .. .. ] 
C 19 lamps [ <issued to the site this day> ... . ] 
C 20 [ <Received as inyt from the temples of the West of Thebes, beer, ds-jars> .... ] 
[ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
[ There is a column x and some unplaced fragments which have some elements which could 
be interpreted but are omitted here]. 
REMARKS 
This text gives an impression of the financial entanglements of the administration at Deir el-
Medineh . The b;kw appears associated only with wood-cutters and potters. The source of 
the diwcorn is never indicated. Two categories of item are listed as inyt: the small quantities 
of breads and dates coming from the "Chief of the Royal Provisions of Pharaoh", and the 
quantities of beer and looves from the mortuary temples of the West Bank. 
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The Chief of the Royal Provisions of Pharaoh recalls the reference in the text of the High Priest 
of Amun lmn-btp,455 to the income destined for the "provisions" which ultimately went to 
Pharaoh, and therefore there seems to be circulation of goods between the crown and 
temple domains. 
Dates, beer and precisely the loaves mentioned appear in the lists of offering for the festivals 
in P. Harris 1 (e.g., 17a, 13; 176, 5; 6; 21 b, 2; 3), donated tot he temples by Ramesses III. 
While this obviously suggests that the supplies were of a specific kind (and not generic), the 
vast quantities offered to the temples (totaling almost 170'000 loaves for Thebes alone in 
31 years) reveal that the types might be special, but that they were not unusual. lt is not clear 
that the very same loaves are in fact meant. 
This text does not detail the btri income of the Gang, but other texts show that this includes 
many different kinds of supplies.456 
455 Cf. infra, pp. 186. 
456 Cf. infra, pp. 264. 
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l, l [ .... ] on their head 458 [ . .. . ] 
1,2 [ .... ] tp-sf.rt of the d[<eputy> .... ] 
1,3 [ .... ] 
1,4 [ .. .. ] 
1,5 [ .... ] 2 mnit (?), 5 [ .... ] 
1,7 [ .... ] making isw-reeds (?) [ .... ] 
1,8 [ .. .. ] (?) [ .. .. ] 
1,9 [ .. .. ] (?) [ .... ] 
l, 10 [ .... ] (?) [ .. .. ] 
l, 11 [ .... ] (full ?) [ .... ] 
l, 12 [ ... . ] (?) [ .. .. ] 
l , 13 [ .... ] (?) [ .... ] 
l, 14 [ .... ] 100 [ .... ] 
l, 15 [ .... ] 
1,16 [ .... ] 
1,11 [ .... ] bsf.m-if[ .... ](?) 2000[+ ... . ] 
l, 18 [ .... ] (?) 
1,19 [ .... ](?)his2[ .... ] 
1,20 [ .... ] (?) 
1,21 [ .... ]man(?)[ .... ] 
2, l [ .... ] charcoal (?) 10 resin [??? .. . ] 9 of his orders (?) 
2,2 [ .. ,.] l [ .. .. ] 20 bring(?) bwtmc[<100>+2? .... ] 
2,3 [ .... ] mc live goose 1. 
2,4 [ .... ] (???) 2 [ .... ] their annual [ .... ] Asiatic dtiw-cloth 459 12 
2,5 [ .... ]his tp-drt, silver kite 2 [ .... ] (?) annual of inw thrown to 3 [ .... ] his [ ... . ] 
457 On the recto of the Turin Canon (P. Turin 187 4; Gardiner Royal Canon) are some detailed notes which repeatedly 
use the words with which this study is concerned. Helck transloted them as weil (Materialien, pp. 468-472; 
W. Helck, "Anmerkungen zum Turiner Königspapyrus," SAK 19 [1992] : 151-216, esp. 194-205). The papyrus 
is very fragmentary, and thus a translation does not necessarily throw much light on the subject, but some parts are 
weil enough preserved to justify presentation here, and some of the references may be fragmentary ond of no 
value in the context of this papyrus, but can be used to elucidate other references. 
lt is of course amusing to try and fit some of the missing fragments into positions, but this has been tried many 
times, and does not necessarily demonstrate the hypothesis. As the interpretation of fragmentory texts is highly 
speculative in any case, the temptation to philological discussion has thus been suppressed. A serious ottempt at 
commentary of this particular text would unfortunately lead one immediately into the realm of insubstantiol fantasy. 
"
58 As this can mean anything from obligation to authority or 'on behalf of", etc. it would serve no purpose to suggest 
a translation. 
459 Notforeign or imported, butmerelya designation of type, cf.Janssen, Prices, p. 265 n. 70. W. Helck(Materialien, 
p . 930) suggests that they were foreign, but his alternative suggestion that they were manufactured in Egypt 
corresponds quite weil to the interpretation of P. Gurob, cf. supra pp. l 46ff. 
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2,6 [ .... ] l Asiatic d;iw-garments 6 [ .... ] thrown to them 4 years 460 as [ .... ] 
2,7 [ .... ] of [ .... ] to deben of silver [ .... ] 
2,8 [ .... ] stripling [ .... ] 
2,9 [ .... ] 
2, 10 [ .... <hun>]dred 
2, 15 [ .... <hun>]dred 
2, 12 [ .... <hun>]dred 30 
2, 13 [ .... ] 7[<00>] waterfowl. 400 
2, 14 [ .... ] 85 
2, 15 [ .... ] 400 mc 461 [ ...• ] 
2, 16 [ .... ] in fish (10,000?) [ .... ] mnt-jars, l 
2, 17 [ .... <go>]ld deben [ .... ] 
2, 18 [ .... <fi>]sh (20'000 [ .... ] 
2, 19 [ .... go>]ld? tp-g'rt[ .... ] 
3, l Guardian of the cbw which is in Mw-b!r-'3, men l, his annual bJkw: fish 5'000 
3,2 Guardian of natron who is in R~-m'-n~, (ditto) [ = l man] (ditto) [ = his bJkw] ditto 
[=annual] gold deben l [ .... ] 1000 462 
3,3 Mat weavers who are in Mr-wr (ditto) [ = l man] (ditto) [ = his bJkw] [ditto>] 
[ =annual] [<textiles (?)>] 6[ <0 (?)>] 
3 ,4 Proper ~<::ti> of the [ .... ] Guide of the T wo Lands silver l ( ditto) [ = his bJkw?] 463 
near (?) [ ... ] it [ ... ] town [ .... ] 
3,5 Proper sdy wh[<ich>] it [<i>]s exacted from the fishers, fish, (from the) lake of 
Sobek fish 200'000 remainder [ .... ] 
3 ,6 tp-drt .Qf the mayor of Lake of Sobek. [ .... ] gold [ .... ] 2. wngw464 bulls [ .... ] live 
3,7 tp-drt.Qf the deputy of [ .... ] l [ .... ] 
3,8 [ .... ] 465 the scribe of [ .... <hun>]dred 
3,8a [ .... <hun>]dred [ .... ] l [ .... ] 
3,86 466 [ •... ] (???) silver kite 40 on [ .... ] 
3,9 [ .... ] fish 201000<+?>, fowl 30 
3, 10 [ .... <pro>]per btri [ .... ] 
3, 11 [ .... <hun>]dred [ .... ] 
3, 12 [ .... ] (???) [ .... ] <hun>dred 
3, l 3 tp-g'rt [<ob] the ma [<vor> .... ] donkey l 
460 This expression (and the same in the preceding line) refers lo back obligations "thrown" together. 
461 This is almost assuredly tobe read differently, but cannol be resolved. 
462 W. Helck (Materialien, p. 958) understood this as meaning "Natronwächter in Ramun liefert l 000 dbn Gold 
ab." Considering the condition of the fXlpyrus this reading is certainly a bit courageous, but even COmfXlring il to 
other sources indicates that the lacuna here must cover something to the effect that so-and-so-much-of-something-
else equals the gold-obligation. 
463 Dot in block, not red. 
464 Sir Alan discards the possibility that this is tobe read, but proposes nothing eise. 
465 Sir Alan does not make any distinction indicating that there may have been a red "ditto" here, so that the line 
cannot be used to suggest that scribes poid tp-g_rt. 
466 Although Sir Alan has numbered this line as (3,8), the appearance of the fragments does not support this 
numbering, and thus the deviation. 
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3, 14 which is upon him for Pharaoh [ .... ] 1 Jbt l [ .... ] which is on [ .. .. ] l 0 donkey l 
oxl 
3, 15 gold (?) [ .... ] fish [ .... ] on tp-_grt[ .... ] 
3,16 [ .... ](???) 
3, 17 wrr [ .... ] bJ [ ... . ]qm;[ .... ] 
3, 18 [ .... ] y 10 [ .... ] 3 [ .... ] khar(?) 100 
3, 19 [ .... ] 1 prt l [ .... ] sJywof smdt[ ... . <deben>(?)] 6, l each, deben <6> 
3,20 [ .... <templ>]e Abydos [ .... ] (???) 
3,21 [ .... ] in villa[<ge> .... ] 
3,22 [ .... ] all, from southern district [ .... ] all smdtof the mni [ .... ] Memphis deben l 
[ .... ] 
3,23 [ .... ] nat[<ron> .... ] the s[<ilver> .. ,.] 
3,24 [ .... <deben>(?)] scribe, 50, making deben 
3,25 [ .... <smdh(?)] scribe, 10 making deben [ .... ] 
3, 26 [ .... ] 5 block leather sacks 5 
3,27 [ .... <5>?.. .. ] ore, handfuls (?), each one, 20, making 100. Wooden (?) whips 5 
4/5, x-1 467 [ .... ] 3000 
4/5, l inw(?) man l [ .... ] bank, all, of the Estate of Amun in the Southern district [ .... ] as 
ore, ore [ .... ] 
4,2 [ .... ] charcoal [ .... ] 
4,3/5,4 [ .... ] controllers of the (?) [ .... ] his [<tp>]_grt, silver deben 2 
4,4 [ .... ] gold (???)[blank](?)[ .. .. ] 
4,5 steward [ .... ](?) [ .... ] 
4,6 tp-drt of the overseer [ .... ] 
4,7 [ .... <gu>]m [ ... ] 
4,8 [ .... ] 
4,9 [ .... ] 
4, 10 [ .... ] 10 
4, 11 [ ... . ] fat. (?) [ .... ] 
4, 12 annual [ .... ] l of man l 
4, l 3 tp-_grt of each of them, they [ .... ] 
4, 14 hunters (?) man, l, half of stripling 
4/5, 15 hunters (?) of [ .... ] 2 making [ .... ] 
4/5, 16 (?) [ .... ] (?) [ ..... ] overseer of fortress of [<8 (?) .... ] 
4/ 5, 17 (?) [ .... ] tpyw-fish mc 2, [<his>] tp-drt(?) [ .... ] 
4, 18 [<Annual> ... ] fisherman, fish which are from the water of [ .... ] 
4, 19 [ .. .. ] (?) ps-loaves 10 [blank] made (?) [ .... ] 8 their annual .smwf[<ish ... . ] 
467 The scribe was forming columns for his own purposes, and these seem at times to have made one column of 
coherent dato in lines extending from column IV to column V. Although this was not done consistently, and 
therefore the interpretation is bound to be limited by speculation, the reading has been taken in that fashion. 
Cf. Sir Alan's note to the effect that the columns in the published text are only indicated ·as a reference (Royal 
Canon, p. 17.) 
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4,20 [ .... ] 550 total 400[+ .... blank] proper sJyw [ .... ] overseer of fortress of [ ... . ] 3 
making 3 in place [<ob ... . ] 
4, 21 tp-grt of each of t[ <hem> .... ] granary delivered silver kite [ <2> .... ] 
4,22 [ .. .. ] 
4/ 5,23 [ ... . ] ferry of the riverbank [ ... . Textual Loss .. .. <b>]tri which was on them 
4/ 5,24 [ .... ] making the list of the remainder from them [ .... ] total 3000 [ .... ] 
4/5,25 [ .... ] his [<s'Jyw>] of Regnal Year l bull/ox l 3 32 [ .... ] (?) 10'101 
4/ 5,26 [ .... <50> (.?)] Z [=bull/ox] 7 59 52 
4/ 5,27 [ .... ] l [=bull/ox] 3 30 27 5'[<2>]30 
4/5,28 [ .... ] l [=bull/ox] 4 36 3[<3>] 6 '400 
4/5,29 [ .... ] l [=bull/ ox] [<3>] 27 [ .... ] 4'800 
6,x+ l [ .. .. ] (?) [ .. .. ] 
6,x+2 [ .. .. ] (?) [ .. ,. ] 
6,x+3 [ .... ] (?) [ .... ] 
6,x+4 [ .... ] the sJy[ .. .. ] 
6,x+5 [ ... . ] Cush [ .... ] 
6,x+6 [ .... ] (?) [ .. .. ] 
6,x+7 [ .... ] (?) [ ... . ] 
6,x+B [ .... ] gold (?) [ .. .. ] 
6,x+9 [ ... . ] (?) [ ... . ] 
6,x+ 10 [ .... ] (?) [ .... ] 
6,x+ 11 [ .... <mQJ>]iw(?) [ .... ] 
6,x+ 12 [ .... ] Overseer, Mayor[(?) .. .. ] 
6,x+ 13 [ .... ] of each of the mayors of [ .. .. ] 
6,x+ 14 [ .... ] tp -grtof the deputy 
6,x+ 15 [ .... ] mg'Jiwfrom [ .. .. ] 
6,x+ 16 [ .... <mgii>]w f[<rom> .... ] 
6,x+ 17 [ ... . <mQ>]Jiw f[<rom> .... ] 
6,x+ 18 [ .... <m>]gJiw f[<rom> ... . ] 
6 ,x + 19 [ .... ] tp-drt [<ob] the controllers [ ... . ] 
6,x+20 [ .... ] of Wsr-M~'t-R' [ .... ] 
7, l [ ... . ] his sJyw of Regnal Year l , bull/ ox l [ ... . ] 
7,2 [ .... ] ditto[ .... ] 
7,3 [ .... ] ditto[ .... ] 
7,4 [ ... . ] ditto l 
7,5 [ .... ] ditto l 
7,6 [ .... ] ditto 14 
7,7 [ .. .. ] ditto 16 
7,8 [ .... ] ditto 12 
7,9 [ .... ] ditto l 6 
7, 10 [ .... ] ditto 15 
7,11 [ .... ]dittol3 
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7, 12 [ .... ] ditto l 2 
7, 13 [ .... ] ditto 110 
7,14 [ .... ]dittol[ .... ] 
7, 15 [ .... ]ditto [ .... ] 
7,16 [ .... ] 
7, 17 [ .... ] 3[<6> .... ] 
7, 18 [ .... ] 20 [ ..... ] lO [ .... ] 
7, 19 [ .... ] 67 [ ... . ] 
7,20 [ ... . ] 27 [ .... ] 
7,21 [ ... . ] (?) 7'300 [ ... . ] 
7,22 [ .... ] (?) [ .... ] 
7,23 [ ... . ] (?) [ ... . ] 
7,24 [ .... ] in[<w>(?) .... ] 
7,25 [ .... ] (?) [ .. .. ] 
7,26 [ ... . ] 2 (?) 36 (?)[ .... ] 
8,x+ l [ .... ] the controller of the w[<ell> ... ] 
8,x+2 [ .... ] the controller of the Mig[<dol>468 .. . . ] 
8,x+3 [ .... ] the controller of the weil [<Ramesses lb .... ] 
8,x+4 [ .... ] the controller of the well [<Ramesses lb .. .. ] 
8,x+5 [ .... ] the controller of the well [Ramesses 11] which is in the br[ ... ]469 
8,x+6 [ .... ] the controller of the well [<Ramesses lb .... ] 470 
8,x+7 summary of the htri of the southern and northern oases 
8,x+B oasis, southern 
8,x+9 [ .... ] man l, stripling l [ .... ] 
8,x+l0 [ .... ] man 1[ .... ] 
8,x+ 11 [ .... ] man l [ ... . ] 
8,x+12 [ .... ] man 1[ .... ] 
8,x+ 13 [ .... ] man l [ .... ] 
8,x+ 14 [ .... ] wine, mnt-vessels 12 
8,x+l5 [ .... ]mc22. 
RE/v\ARKS 
This execrably preserved papyrus once recorded a series of records concerning various 
fiscal activities, naming the term employed along with the person upon whom the obligation 
was put, and the precise objects which were turned over to the administration as a result of 
this . lt must be emphasized that it does not appear from the fragmentary remains visible 
today that the lists recorded to whom the payments were made (with the exception of "which 
is upon him for Pharaoh", 3, 14). Geographically, it certainly referred to oases and the 
468 Following Sir Alan (Royal Canon, p. 17). 
469 Th1s 1s probably related to the toponyrn, but alternatively, cf. infra, p. 192 n 584. 
470 W Helck (Materialien, p. 250) points out that these fortifications and wells were on the desert route between S1le 
and Raphia, but goes on to suggest that it is not preserved whether they delivered grain. This last note is rather 
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Fayum, administratively, it seems to have covered many different types of profession, and 
the diversity of the objects rendered up includes wine, charcoal, fish, cattle, gold, etc. The 
value of the papyrus being considerably impaired as a result of its fragmentary state, the 
following conclusions resemble the above "translation" in being restrained rather than 
exuberant, and attempt to summarize the conclusions which can be justifiably drawn from 
the text, without undue exaggeration. 
lt would seem that the words wrilten in red ink had some particular significance, and these 
include tp-g_rt, sJyw, btkw, but also sdyt. This necessarily implies that these terms were in 
some way significant, and it is evident that the term b;1kw and the term sJyt 
are employed in a very similar fashion, not only being wrilten in red, but serving as the 
basis for a series of assessments (b;1kw in fish and silver; sJyw in cattle), underlining that the 
scribe concerned here was using bJkw in a fiscal sense. 
Aside from the word for annual, certain of the rotes of assessment, and the word for summary, 
only one title is wrilten is red (if "hunter" is the correct rendering), and this only once (and it is 
assumed here that this is an oversight), so it is assumed that no particular importance was 
associated with the officials, but that these terms of reference (rotes of assessment, etc.) were 
significant. 
lt is pointless to altempt to use the text statistically, so that the categories alone are worthy of 
altention. Where preserved, b;1kw is never associated with officials, as opposed to workers, 
while the opposite is true of tp-g_rt. sJyw seems tobe employed with regard to both classes 
of people (cf. 3, 19) and institutions (cf. 3, 4), as well as officials and individuals (cf. 4/5, 
20ff.; col. 7). 
Conversely, professional administrators (mayors, overseers, deputies, scribes, controllers) 
outnumber workers (fishermen, fowlers, guardians, mat weavers), but they all figure alongside 
one another, but wherever possible, it would appear that the types of obligations that they 
owe are clearly distinguished, although the jottings physically mix the categories, they are 
clearly differentiated) . 
In the preserved text, fish and cattle are the most important items listed, but gold and silver 
figure to a striking extent. lt is striking that successive lines !ist alternatively mats, whips, fowl, 
fish and silver (or gold), and that - seemingly - only cattle were deliberately grouped 
together and kept apart. Although an entire deben of gold is explicitly collected from the 
natron guardian (3,2), 47 1 it would appeör that there is otherwise no evidence of the 
employment of financial substitutions or equivalencies for exactions intended tobe delivered 
in fish, mats, wine, reeds, gum, or geese, etc., and thus it seems fair to conclude that the 
actual articles listed were assessed; assembled, and acquired. 
curious, because there are very few-if any- references to grain in the entire recto of the Turin Canon. E.g. (4, 19) 
refers to smw, but_the final traces suggest that "fish '' may be read instead_of grain as the form of paym~nt. 
J. -M . Kruchten ("l'Evolution de la gestion dominiale sous le nouvel empire Egyptien ," in Lipinski, Stole and Temple, 
pp. 517-522) points out that there are lwo types of rwg'w-controllers, and that the ones responsible for grain 
need not be associated with "responsibility", so that the "controllers" in this text, should be understood as officials 
responsible, but not as "agents" of the domains. 
471 Not 1000 as in Helck, Materialien, 958. The "1000" must be associated with an item in the lacuna, but the 1 
does clearly refer to a deben of gold, no matter how improbable this may seem . -
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The administrative text par excellence for fiscal materials of the Ramesside Period is the 
Wilbour Papyrus. 472 The 10 metres of this enormous papyrus are covered with over 5200 
lines of inked entries in two texts (A and B) listing primarily temple holdings (Text A) and 
khato lands (Text B) in a small part of central Egypt. The larger of the two texts, the 4500 
lines of Text A, lists only 4 per cent. of the surface area of the cultivable land in its part of 
modern Egypt, but indicates that its authors were concerned primarily with temple land. lt 
was prepared for the office of the c J-n-st, a title which has been translated "Chief-Taxing-
Master". This title is not known with fiscal responsibilities outside the temple sector. The 
object and intended use of the text have however never been resolved . 
Text A 473 
The entries of Text A follow a pattern. Divided into four sections, the text of each section lists 
a series of holdings identified directly with ( 1) the Estate of Amun, followed by a series of 
entries related to (2) the funerary temples of the Pharaohs in the Estate of Amun, followed by 
the holdings related to (3) Heliopolis, and then by (4) Memphis, and then by (5) the smaller 
temples. Each section ends with (6) miscellaneous holdings related to "Landing Places of 
Pharaoh", "white goats", "the treasury of Pharaoh", Harems, so-called mint-land of Pharaoh, 
and khato-lands of Pharaoh. Each section was defined by the area surveyed in several 
days, the whole text being an office copy relating to a survey carried out in less than four 
weeks inJuly and August of perhaps 1140 B.C.474 
The main individual entries follow a similar pattern. A group of fields "under the authority" of 
a given figure are listed. Each individual plot is listed, followed by a figure giving its size in 
arouras (2735 m2), a rate of assessment of either 5, 7.5 or 10 - most probably in khar 
(c. 75 litres) 475 - and the total assessment. Occasionally such entries are followed by a note 
472 The complete text has been transloted in absolutely exemplary fashion by Sir Alan Gardiner (Wilbour 111) and 
provided with an incomparable Commentary ( Wilbour 11). An excellent summary of the salient points of the text 
will be found in the first poges of Katary, Land Tenure. A summary of the problems can be found in J. J. Janssen 
"Prolegomena to the Study of Egypt's Economic History During the New Kingdom," SAK 3 ( 1975): 139-147, 
and these are also briefly mentioned by Janssen in Lipinski, State and Temple, II : 505-515. Menu, Regime 
Juridique should also be consulted. 
473 Katary, land Tenure, pp. 1 ff. provides a very competent up-to-date summary of the text, and thus this summary 
strives for even more brevity. 
474 v. Beckerath ( Chronologie, p. 1 24) places the ascension of Ramesses V at the end of December 1145 B. C., and 
the text dates to his fifth year. The last day of the survey (III Jbt 1) would fall in the first days of August according 
to his correlation. 
475 The actual written form signifies that the units are to be read as oipe (or one-quarter of a khar, 20 litres), but to be 
understood as khor, and thus the widely used "mc' for "measure of corn", which relieves the editor of deciding 
how this semantic problem is to be solved . 
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that 7.5 per cent. of the total assessment is tobe turned over to another institution, the posh 
entries. 476 
Following the paragraphs dealing with these relatively large fields is another form of entry 
relating to smaller plots and parcels, termed "apportioning domains" in English, and these 
appear tobe individual land holdings, as the plots are associated with individuals (and not 
"under the authority" of officials as in the "non-apportioning" paragraphs), and are generally 
small, being normally of 3 to 5 arouras, and the assessments would appear tobe made at 
a much lower rate of assessment. Among these "apportioning paragraphs" the tenants or 
beneficiaries are private citizens (soldiers, priests, widows, citizenesses, etc.) who presum-
ably received the right to till the plot in exchange for services. lt would appear however that 
the right to the plot was not undisputed, as they were obliged to pay the assessments to the 
temples. Among the paragraphs dealing with these types of holdings are references to plots 
of land having changed hands, with the occasional note indicating that they were "bought" 
or "carried off" (inw) as it is put in Egyptian.477 The entries in the P. Wilbour indicate however 
that along with whatever rights of ownership were transferred, an obligation to render up a 
portion of the grain produced on the plot was also transferred to the new owner.478 
Certain of these paragraphs begin with an entry referring to the smw ps (translated as 
"apportioned harvest-taxes") rather than beginning with a designation of an institution, although 
the institution then follows. The entries under this heading are invariably small holdings 
identified with individuals, related to small temples. Sir Alan emphatically drew attention to 
an important element of this in his original commentary: 
One cannot we/1 escape the impression that the apportioning domain paragraphs 
perform for the /arger and more distant temples the same function that the harvest-tax 
paragraphs perform for the smaller temples, that in Fact the two kinds of paragraph 
are merely different forms of one and the same kind. 479 
In discussing P. Harris 1, we will encounter exactly the opposite phenomenon, that namely 
the equivalent paragraph dealing with the smaller temples omits the sentences using the 
usual fiscal terms, while those terms dominate the texts of the relevant portion of the para-
476 These transfers have been interpreted as referring to leases for land or personnel, by one institution to another. 
477 Since it is not usually possible to bear away a plot of land, it must be assumed that the colloquial expression 
literally meant that the porticiponts understood that the plots had been purchased in the same way as a donkey 
or bed, i.e., the litle to the land had been transferred, but the new "owner'' (or his employees) came lo the piece 
of land , rather than the piece of land coming to the owner as in the case of a donkey. 
478 A general note of caution should be adduced, as it has been suggested in the literalure dealing Graeco-roman 
economic history that the Ptolemaic and Roman administralion of Egypt followed ancienl Egyplian - rather than 
modern Macedonian - ownership and administrative polterns. In Graeco-Roman Egypt, similar pieces of land to 
those of the "apportioning paragraphs" of P. Wilbour are the klhroucikh gh , i.e., "allotted" or "apportioned" land . 
This was re-classified as private land under the Romans. On the assumption that the Ptolemies simply continued 
with exisling arrangements, and that the prevailing system of the New Kingdom conlinued until the middle of the 
first millennium, there is evidence that these Graeco-Roman terms refiect the New Kingdom terminology. Cf. Wallace, 
Taxation in Egypt, pp. 1-3 and Rathbone, Economic Rationalism. 
479 Gardiner, Wilbour II : 25 (italics in original). 
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graphs for the !arger temple complexes. This re-inforces the conviction that the Egyptian state 
had a very clear fiscal organization and that the significance of the terms used was taken 
seriously by the bureaucrats in the administration. This does not however mean that the terms 
were used in other contexts as precisely. 
The one point upon which all commentators agree is that the l 7'324 arouras (4730 ha) of 
surface area 480 surveyed is only a small part of the cultivable land in this part of Middle 
Egypt. By way of comparison it may be recalled that Ramesses III claimed to have given the 
temples some l '071 '780 arouras (292'595 ha) in all of Egypt during his reign,481 or that 
Fairman estimates that in the middle of the 19th century AD., cultivable land in the same 
area will have been the equivalent of some 590'000 arouras (or roughly 160'000 ha).482 lt 
has been suggested that this is due to the fact that the lists concern only summer cultivation, 
or that it is only a list of state lands, or only temple lands. Given the nature of the text, the 
suggestion that it be understood as a list of lands which the temples were managing for one 
reason or another is not particularly impossible. lt is extremely hypothetical, but the Nauri 
Decree has a reference to ipw of temple holdings, and it is possible that the Wilbour 
Papyrus itself is the ipw-cadaster of Amun. 483 
Regardless of the interpretation, this document is the most important source for information 
about land holdings. But the fiscal significance of the text is less clear. The most logical 
assumption is to conclude that the assessments refer to the income of the temples in question, 
but the matter is open to dispute. 
480 Estimate by A. Fairman, Review of the Wilbour Papyrus, JEA 39 ( 1953): 119. 
481 P. Harris 1 67,8. 
482 1 have taken the liberty of rounding these figures as the actual nurnbers are completely irrelevant. Fairrnan quotes 
Willcocks for 453,329 feddan, and I have based rny calculations on this. 
483 This docurnent or the people responsible for it are rnentioned in few texts. A sailor of the ipw of lmn is known from 
the Abbot (Abbot dockets, col. A.,7; Peet, Tomb-Robberies, 1: 132; 134, 11: pi. 23, A 7) . A foreigner or 
drogoman is in P Mayer A (P. Mayer A 9, 20; Peet, Mayer Papyri, p. 15, and pi. poge 9/ 20); (for lranslation 
of dragornan, cf. nole in Turin Taxation Papyrus, infra; p. 174 n. 508). A documenl of uncertain characler in 
P. Sallier II 8, 9 (Helck, Dw:-f:Jtii II : 117-120), but the irnplication of P. Sallier 1, 8 (LEM p. 87, 16; Caminos, 
LEM, pp. 326-328 and Gardiner, Wilbour II: 78, n. 5) is that an ipw musl be some form of document relating 
to a land survey. lt is explicitly stated that an ipw was a land cadaster in the lnscription dedicatoire at Abydos 
(KR/ 11: 333, 2), andin the Nauri decree (KR! 1: 50, 1 ). lt is specifically associated with temple b:kw in P. Munich 
809 (=P. Mook, f'llam, HOP Tafelteil, pi. 102: l, 5; W. Spiegelberg, "Ein Gerichtspre>tokoll aus der Zeit 
Thutmosis' IV. ", ZAS 63 [1928 ]: 106). J. Assrnann's translation of P. Leiden 1 350 3, 9 (AHG, p. 314, "ihm 
gehört jede Akte seines Katasters") merely reproduces Zandee's rendering (Oe Hymnen aan Amon van Papyrus 
Leiden I 350 = OMRO 28 [1947]: 46). While representing a stylistic improvernent on G. Fecht's attempt ("Die 
Form der altägyptischen Literatur: Metrische und stilistische Analyse", Z45 91 [ 1964 ]: 47, "sein-ist- jegliches-
Inventar seines-Katasters") this begs the question (cf. also A. Gardiner, "Hymns to Amon frorn a Leiden Papyrus", 
Z45 42 [ 1905 ]: 27) . lt is identified as both a file and a docurnent in P BM 10373, vso. 2 (cf. Janssen , LRLC 
pp. 42-47, esp. p . 45 n 13; pls . 27-30 
The only reference indicating that an ipw was not a mere file in a comprehensive document, but rather such a 
document itself is P. Sallier 1, where the use is rather ambiguous. But it is clear that the ipw of Amun was a text 
related to surveying (measuring cords are mentioned in P. Leiden 1 350) of agricultural land (P Leiden 1 350, as 
weil as Nauri and the lnscription Dedicatoire) for fiscal purposes (cf. P. Munich 809; P. BM l 0373), and that it 
had low level employees (P. Mayer A) as weil as scribes. lf one takes the renderings of Fecht, Assmann and 
Zandee literally, il could be contended that the ipw of Amun was responsible for all the cadasters - and the text 
certainly seems to indicate this . 
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B. Menu contends that the "apportioning domain" paragraphs refer to the holdings of the 
nmhw, assuming that the nmhware those without a role in the official state, while the holders 
of the parcels in the "apportioning domain" paragraphs are beneficiaries of the state appa-
ratus (cf. supra, p. 61 n. 118), as must be the conclusion drawn from their titles The assess-
ments are low. She also contends that the sums refer only to the revenues which are to be 
assessed, rather than the assessments.484 lt may be worth comparing the administrative 
figures in P. Wilbour with the actual quantities collected from people with similar titles in 
P. Amiens: 
Title P. WilBOUR line P. AMIENS line 
("normal domains") (recto) 
mc (=khar?) khar 
cultivator 200 17, 3 232 3, 1 
controller 260 3,5 
w 'b-priest 300 9, 20 228 1,11 
scribe 25 49, 20 10 2,7 
("apportioning') (verso) 
w'b-priest 1 2/ 4 54, 23 3/ 4 6, x+4 
scribe 1 2/4 54, 24 9 2/ 4 4, x+4 
controller 22 2/ 4 34, 20 / 26,5 6 5, x+4 
controller 82, 10 1 2/ 4 5,x+9 
sherden 3/ 4 54, 28 3 1/ 4 1/ 8 4,x+l 
These figures suggest that two different types of assessments are being made, and that the 
figures in Wilbour Aare - more or less - the intended revenue, with the "normal domains" 
being productive fields intended to provide the temples with their main income, and the 
"apportioning domains" basically the fields at the disposal of the seNants of the state with 
nominal assessments.485 
Text B 
While Text A has attracted a great deal of attention, Text B of the Wilbour papyrus is one of 
the most neglected texts in Egyptology. lt is a list of khato lands of Pharaoh only, merely 
grouping those under a single authority together. Fairman estimated that Text B covered 
perhaps 14'420 arouras.486 Sir Alan Gardiner concluded that the Egyptian designation 
referred to plots of 10 arouras, literally meaning "thousand (land cubit) of land of Pharaoh".487 
The term is sometimes used without "of pharaoh", and it is difficult to judge whether there 
were khato-lands which were not Pharaoh's, or whether, the specification was simply omitted 
(as happens frequently in titles where the organization to which the person is attached is 
omitted) . lt is known that khato-lands of pharaoh were managed by temple officials (as in 
484 Menu, Recherches, p. 11. 
485 The figures were drawn from Gardiner, Wilbour III ; and A. H. Gardiner, "Ramesside Texts Relating to the 
Taxation and Transport of Corn," JEA 27 (194 1 ): 37-56. 
486 Fairman, JEA 39: 120. 
487 Gardiner, Wilbourll: 161ff., esp. 165f 
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P. Wilbour Text B and the Turin Taxation Papyrus 488), and that unspecified khato-lands 
were managed by secular officials (as in P. Valenc;:ay 1). Regardless of the relevant authority, 
income was put at the disposal of temples, as in P. Valenc;:ay I a scribe of the Divine 
Adoratress of Amun expects to be able to collect the income from some khato-land managed 
by the Mayor of Elephantine.489 The only khato-lands of P. Harris 1 (27, 12) are not identified 
as associated with Pharaoh, having been "made" for Heliopolis. 490 The Turin Taxation Papyrus 
records corn being collected from khato-lands of Pharaoh.491 
lt does not throw more light on the situation to realise that Text B explicitly states that the 
khato-lands lay upon fields belonging to other institutions. Sir Alan pointed to the signifi-
cance of this: 
There can be no doubt that what follows 'on the fields' names the titular possessor of 
the fields upon which the khato-land of Pharaoh lay, and this unexpected revelation 
that Pharaoh was not unconditional lord of land to which his name was attached 
calls for explanations that are not obvious at the present juncture.492 
The institutions were mostly temples, but "in Text B we find 'on the fields of Pharaoh' well over 
50 times." 493 Sir Alan originally speculated that this might have referred to the mortuary 
temple of either Ramesses IV or Ramesses V, but pointed out that this expression "was found 
in Text A in certain paragraphs closely associated with the Landing-places of Pharaoh".494 lt 
could be concluded that they were lands which changed hands and were temporarily 
designated before assuming a new identity.495 
488 Gardiner, RAD, p. 36, 3. 
489 Gardiner, RAD, p. 72, l 0. Not khato-lond of Phoraoh however. 
490 Other temples are "given" fields (e.g. , 59, 6) or fields are "made" for them (e.g ., 9, 4-5), but only Heliopolis 
received khato-londs. 
491 Gardiner, RAD, p. 36, 3; 14. The following chapter of this work. 
492 Gardiner, Wilbour II: 167. 
493 Gardiner, Wilbour II: 168. 
494 Gardiner, Wilbour II: 169. 
495 For the fact thot the areas were constontly changing, cf. Gardiner, Wilbour II : 189-190. 
169 
T HE TURIN TAXATION PAPYRUS 
RE/v\ARKS 
One of the most familiar documents relating to taxation is P. Turin 1896+ 2006, generally 
known as the "Turin Taxation Papyrus". As Sir Alan Gardiner has edited and translated the 
document with his (un)usual ability, 496 a new translation is not offered here, but rather a 
commentary on the value of the text. Although only the word smw appears marginally, it 
cannot be disputed that the text is directly associated with fiscal activities of some genre. 
The first poge of the text as preserved has the appearance of a title page,497 explicitly stating 
that the Nubian War Lord P~-nbsy authorized the collection of grain from the khato-lands of 
Pharaoh, under the responsibility of P~-bni, Prophet of Sobek, by the Necropolis Scribe 
.Qbwty-ms and the two porters.498 Just why the honourable .Qbwty-ms, Scribe of the Great 
and Noble Necropolis of Millions of Years of Pharaoh (L!P!H!), was delegated to collect 
grain is not entirely clear, as it will be noted that the grain collected was not brought directly 
to the Gang at the Necropolis, as might be expected were the Gang suffering from their 
traditional lock of payment. Such a situation is mentioned in a letter of this period: 
Se[nd] Nsy-Sbk your scribe, let (9) the porter .Qbwty-ms and the scribe lw .f-n-lmn 
go together with him. Let them bring the grain. [ ... vs. 4 ... ] Send (vs. 5) your scribe 
together with the Necropolis scribe lw.f-n-[lmn] and the porter .Qbwty-ms (vs. 6) or 
the porter ljnsw-ms. L[et] them hurry to bring the grain (vs. 7) that the Gang not 
starve.499 
While the unknown correspondent can hardly have meant this literally, the Turin Strike 
Papyrus indicates what might occur if things got out of hand.500 lt is possible that the workers 
required payment. lt is however less clear why they would have expected tobe paid at all, 
496 RAD, pp. xiii-xiv; 35-44; Gardiner, "Ramesside Texts Relating to the Taxation and Transport of Corn," JEA 27 
(1941 ): 22-37. 
497 Gardiner, RAD, p. xiii. 
498 As Sir Alan pointed out, this fits peifectly with the vivid portrait from the miscellany where "the scribe moors at the 
river-bank and registers the smw, the porters behind him bearing clubs". Cf., e.g., P. Lansing (LEM, p. 105 and 
Caminos, LEM, p. 390) here, but also supra, pp. l 33f. 
The translation of iry- 'J os "porter" has certain odvontages over that of "janitor'' or "door-keeper", as the Norman 
English term con refer either to the guardian of a gote (porte) or to one who carries (porte~ things, ond it is 
apparent thot these burley fellows were employed for both these (and other) purposes. R. Cominos (LEM, p. 249) 
prefers "aparitor" based on the study by E. Jelinkova-Reymond ("Recherches sur le role des guardiens des portes 
(iry- ';,) dons l'odministration generole des temples egyptiens, '' CdE 28 [ 1953 ]: 39-59. lt is however not necessary 
that they peiformed the same functions in the Theben Necropolis of the Lote New Kingdom and in the temples of 
the Laie Period. 
499 LRL, pp. 69-70; Wente, LRL, pp. 81-82. 
500 RAD, pp. 45-58; W. F. Edgerton, "The Strikes in Ramesses lll's Twenty-ninth Year,"JNES 10 ( 1951 ): 137-145. 
J. J. Janssen's study of the grain deliveries at Deir el-Medineh (Prices, pp. 464-465) has shown that these were 
anything but regular onyway. The stotement that they lacked grain, fish and greens might carry conviction in the 
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for the tomb of Ramesses XI (KV 4) is in a lamentable state.501 They could not have been 
active in the Volley of the Kings, for the tomb is quite incomplete, despite a reign of 29 years. 
lt is therefore logical to assume that they were in fact working on the still tobe discovered 
tomb of Herihor. 502 Would the Gang then have been responsible to a different set 
of authorities, with Qbwty-ms responsible to the High Priest of Amun, and not acting in his 
capacity of Necropolis Scribe responsible to the Vizier. Or does Herihor obscure back-
ground make such distinctions impossible? 
Storting out at the town of lw-m-itrw, 503 they collect some grain from khato-lands of Pharaoh, 
and then deliver it to the Mayor of Western Thebes. For the first part of the papyrus we can 
follow the collection and delivery of the grain in detail, while the grain collected later is not 
accounted for: 
mouth of a striking workers, but the insistence on the delivery- in the same breath - of such essential commodities 
as clothing and ointment, does not assure us that their plight was as bad as all that. 
The statement that the Gang had "no clothes" (RAD, p. 53, 16) would be quite without interest were it not for the 
temptation to compare this with the equally bizarre statement in P. Berlin 9784, 4, where an individual who 
wishes tobe paid (and who is probably not in -~ire straightsl says, "I am naked, pay me[ ... ]" (A H. Gardiner, 
"Four Papyri of the 18th Dynasty from Kahun,'' ZAS 43 [1906: 27-47). ltwould not appear improbable thatthis 
represenls the lextual preservation of an idiomatic expression (the words diverging either because it was "an 
expression", or because of the way il was wrillen down) in support of a demand tobe paid. 
M. Gutgesell (Datierung, p. 554) has used this as evidence of the failure of the economy to fun<:(ion properly. This 
has been rebutted elsewhere by the presenl author (cf. D. A. Warburton, "Keynes'sche Uberlegungen zur 
altägyptischen Wirtschaft," ZÄS 118 (1991 ): 78, n. 12) and Gutgesell himself, who later transformed the Gang 
al Deir el-Medineh from being the exploited viclims of royal whims to revolutionary entrepreneurs ("Die Struktur der 
pharaonischen Wirtschaft- eine Erwiderung, " GM 56 [ 1982]: 104, an __ explanation which is closer lo the truth 
in praclice, but of minimal economic importance (but, cf. Warburton, ZAS 118: 78, n. 12). 
501 Thal the workers were not rewarded for the quality of their work is clear from the fact that they were (eventually) 
paid for decorating the fomb of Ramesses III, as the artwork there borders on the criminal. But the lomb of 
Rames~s XI suffers not merely from bad workmanship and negligence, but also from a virtual failure lo exisl. 
502 Cf.J. Cerny, "Egypt: From the Death of Ramesses III," CAH 3 ll/2:655-656; D. Valbelle, Ouvriers, pp. 225-226. 
503 At a small village some 4.5 km south of Armant today. Sir Alan retracted his earlier posilion that lw-m-ilrw lay al 
Jebelein (AEO II: 27 4 * contra JEA 27: 24), accepting the view that il was a frifle north of AI-Rizeikat, some 
10 km further north. P. Monlef ( Geographie II: 52) refained the traditional view, associaling it specifically with the 
large island lying below Jebelein today. M. Megally (Recherches, p. 88) does not regard the dislinction qs 
significant. The discovery of a sfatue of the Niayor My; referring to the excavated sanctuary of Sabek at lw-m-ilrw 
near the village of al-Mahmoud Oibly (4.5 km south of Armant) would appear to have resolved the identification 
in favour of this village. 
This would appear to eliminate the necessity of seeking the island, despite the name. Cf. H. S. K. Bakry, 'The 
discovery of a temple of Sabk in upper Egypt," MDAIK27 (1971 ): 131-146. The statue is in the Luxor Museum 
(cf. Bothmer, luxor Museum, p. 141 ). 
Sir Alan (JEA 27: 24) found it "strange that what is virtually the title-page to the entire document should have 
mentioned [P!-bni, the Prophet of Sobek] alone." This would have been justified if all (or most) of the payments 
were in some way connected with the obligations of lands belonging to - or in some way financially responsible 
to - this temple or the prophet himself 
This toponym appears in !wo separate chronologically and administratively unrelated documents recording grain 
income - in the Turin Taxation Papyrus of the Theban Necropolis dating to the end of Dynasty XX, and in P. Louvre 
E 3226 (cf. M. Megally, Recherches, pp. 87-88) of the Theban adminisfration, dating to mid Dynasty XVIII -
and although grain income does not figure in TT 100 (Rb -mi-R', Urk. IV: 1126) precious metals and cattle do. A 
Landsat photograph of the region clearly shows that the extent of the cultivable land visible on maps produced 
today is considerably exaggerated, making the area a particularly unexpected source of important supplies of 
locally cultivated grain. 
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lines grain collected date khar delivered to date khar 
from 
2, 1-2,7 lw-m-itrw III 1ht 16 134 2/4 [=] Mayor II Jht21 136 2/4? 
khato-londs 54 2/4 of West Thebes 
smw of mud flats + 80 
2,8-2, 11 gny III 1ht 19 33 2/4 Scribe III 1ht23 33 
3 2/ 4 and Chantress 3 1/ 4 1/ 8 1/ 32 
fisherman lßlL.lQWl 
2, 12-2,15 lw-m-itrw III 3ht 26 183 2/4 M.ayor III 1ht 29 J.Q 
Foreigner Cultivator 
3, l-3,3 Mont temple IV 3ht 12 .Q (Appear 
again in 3,8) 
3,4-3,7 Shrine IV 3ht 13 30 Scribe and IV 1ht 14 30 
of Ramesses III Chantress 
3,8 Mont Temple This day H[=l (?) 
8 
6 
3, 10-4,5 Esna IV 1ht20 402[~ 6 Khnum and Nebu 337 = Expenses 337 
Temple "for Pharaoh" IV 1ht24 
Deputy's smw +220 = M.ayor 
? +1231 / 4 
(Account of scribe @ 
4,6-4,8 sundry souls IV prt5 8 2/4 Chantress 10 3/4 
.L!.ß 
4,9-5,4 Ni-pr-imw & 6 2/ 4 Chantress 1 smw9 18 2/4 
lw-m-itrw lJ..2ß. ll 
sundry souls lJ..2ß. 6 2/ ~ 
5 
5,5-5,6 'b'w of Pharaoh fD2!LLl. 72 [~l 
.,?_[5 3/4 
+ 16 l 4 
deficit) 
5,7-5,9 Scribe of Sobek fD2!LLl. 20 
5,10-5,l l 'h 'w of Pharaoh J 
A~un Temple 
vso. 
2, 1-2, l l Prophet of Hathor Year 14 30 
sundry souls 1 1ht 10 
3, 1-3,6 Smnt 
sundry souls [uncertain] 
3,7-3,15 lw-m-itrw 2 
sundry souls 20? 
4, 1-4,4 Khnum and Nebu 1 1ht25 80 
Temple II 1h17 70 
11 1h1 2 10 
RAD44, 
14-16 sundry persons 4 
.l1L1 
lJ..2ß. 
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There are certain difficulties of detail in the text, foremost among which is that the dates 
given by Sir Alan and those recognizable in P/R are not compatible: those of the facsimile 
of the papyrus seem to differ by one month from those logically necessary for the compre-
hension of the document, as in the case of the first grain collected, delivered in Thebes on 
II Jht 21, a month before it was collected in lw-m-itrw on III Jht 16. Assuming that the P/R 
transcriptions are correct, the only admissible conclusion is that the papyrus was prepared at 
a later date in a hasty manner, as a result of which some dates were mistakenly transferred 
from the notes to the papyrus as preserved.504 lt is widely assumed that the Wilbour Papyrus 
was likewise compiled in an office from field notes. A record of such changes will be found 
in an older document: 
11 Regnal Year 2 II Jbt 15 
[ ... ] 
12 Spent (a number of) day(s) measuring with the scribes of fields in the southern district 
1 3 Regnal Y ear 2 II Jbt 20 
14 Spent the day writing for him the adjustment of the inw in the office of fields of the 
northern district. 505 
Of great apparent interest is the fact that payments "for Pharaoh" were taken from temple 
officials and delivered to the secular mayor, P~-wr-ci (3, 11; 3, 16; 4,2). As however Sir Alan 
rescued the enticing words from the midst of a lacuna, it is difficult to justify drawing any 
conclusions. 
In terms of content, the papyrus appears to be remarkably straight forward, detailing exactly 
who paid what, and where it went. This is virtually the only case where the entire process is 
recorded. 
1,7 Given to the Necropolis [from] the grain of the khato-lands of Pharaoh (UP!H!) from 
the hand of the Prophet of So[bek P~-bni] 
The grain from lw""m-itrw, from the khato-lands went to the Mayor's granary,506 along with 
some smw grain from the "northern mud-flats". 507 There can be no doubt that both were 
under responsibility of temple officials. 
504 This is bosed on the rather presumptuous assumption that Sir Alan noted the discrepancy during his stay in Turin, 
and lost the notes on the matter in the course of preparing the text of RAD, and thus fails to refer to the matter, as 
it must have attracted his attention . 
505 P. C. Smither, "A Tax-Assessor'sJournal of the Middle Kingdom, "JfA 27 (1941): 74-76. 
The text is abbreviated as it is chronologically outside the scope of the present study, and otherwise not very 
relevant. The revised rendering of bbi inw("reducing" or 'adjusting", in place of "assessing" the inw) is bosed on 
the contention that the scribe's activity in both the southern and northern districts was due to some bureaucratic 
mix-up, obliging him to "adjust'' the obligations of the parties involved . 
506 For the final sum in 1. 2,7, Sir Alan transcribed and translated .Ll.l.2L4 and 136 2/4, restoring 5 (RAD p. 
37, 5;JEA 27:24). while P/R(pl. C, 7) have clearly l 03 2/4 and 101 2/4. Sir Alan has taken the sum given 
in 1. 2,4. lt is not easy to solve this problem. 
507 
'm'ni.t-land. R. Caminos (Tale of Woe, p. 62) suspects that W. Helck's (Materialien, p. 292) ossumption thot 
this land was not of particularly notable quolity can be upheld, while failing to demonstrate why o particular type 
of groin would be named after such land. The sequence in the onomastica (AEO 1: l O * -l 3 *) indicates either ( as 
pointed out by Helck) very poor quolity agricultural land or the commencement of a new category, whereby 
"mud-Aats" is not the warst rendering until ils true meaning is identified . Personal experience at the temple of 
Armant in this century supports it. 
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The grain from the town of cgny was received by the Scribe and the Chantress of Amun, 
while the following entry refers to grain from lw-m-itrw again, and again it is received by 
the Mayor, although it is grain of a foreigner508 and not further identified. 
The 30 kharof grain of the Shrine of King Wsr-M!ct-Rc, stp-n-lmn (L!P!H!) collected by Qhwty-ms 
and duly turned over to the Chantress of Amun and the Scribe (11. 3,4-7) are preceded by 6 khar 
which are not accounted for (3, 1-3). They appear again in conjunction with a second collection 
from the temple of Mont, but again the destination of this grain is not listed, although a blank in the 
papyrus indicates that space was reseNed for the note. lt does not appear to have gone to the 
Chantress and the Scribe who received the grain immediately prior to it. As the Mayor is the only 
other official who definitely received grain from Qhwty-ms, it is perhaps warranted to suggest that 
he was in fad the recipient, but as it was not recorded it could have been someone entirely 
different. The only tenable and logical conclusion would be that this grain was deliberately distin-
guished from the grain given to the Scribe and Chantress, and that it was not delivered to them. Yet, 
the Mayor receives grain at the Granary, "The Granary Overflows" (II. 2, 6-7), which is the same 
first silo into which the grain accepted by the Chantress and Scribe is poured (II. 3,7; 5,4). Drawing 
any conclusions from the failure to note the receipt of the grain on the copy preseNed is thus devoid 
of purpose, unless we assume that very careful records were kept at the silo according to which 
certain grain would be credited to one party, and other grain to another. We are thus obliged to 
conclude that it is not necessarily unwarranted to suspect that the grain did in fad go to the 
Necropolis as stated in the text, and that the Mayor and the Chantress and the Scribe were all part 
of the same team. 
The source of the grain is less clear. The opening reference indicates that the papyrus should record 
grain from khato-lands under the responsibility of the Prophet of Sobek. References to grain of the 
temple of Sobek appear in the text (II. 1,7; 2,2; 5,9), but other temples figure: that of Khnum and 
Nebu at Esna (II. 3, 11 ;vs. 4, 1 ), Month-Lord-of-Thebes (1. 3, 1 ), and the Portable Shrine of Wsr-M!ct-
R° (1. 3,7). To assert that all of this was under the supeNision the Prophet of the Temple of Sobek-
Lord-of-lw-m-itrw would be over bold. Pharaoh's cf-holdings 500 appear (II. 5,5; 5,8), under the 
authority of the scribe of Reckoning of the temple of Amun, and were we to give the titte poge 
complete precedence, Pharaoh's 'b'-holdings would be a division of Pharaoh's khato-lands. 
When subjected to a detailed examination, we find that the apparent clarity is of limited value, and 
that grain from temple holdings (e.g., the Khnum temple at Esna) winds up in a granary which is 
operated by both the Ma-.;or of the West, and a Chantress of Amun,510 most probably with the 
object of arriving at the Necropolis, to pa-.; workers who were no longer working. 
508 ; ' ' is customarily translated as "foreigner", but Sir Alan remarked UEA 27: 25 n. 4), actually referred to someone 
speaking a foreign language. Neither E. Hornung (Amduatll: 75, 5) nor H. Goedicke ("The Title [imy-r'] in the 
Old Kingdom," JEA 46 [ 1960]: 60-64) have sought to dispute the identification of this word with the Greek 
ßcxpßapoc, but this is entirely indefensible. The lonian graffito at Abu Simbel refers to "those of foreign speech" in 
an analogous context- Greek mercenaries - using AAOrAOI:OI: (a.UoyÄ.c.oocroc), meaning quite simply "those 
speaking a different tongue". This is clearly the Greek word tobe used. Cf. T. F. R. G. Braun, "The Greeks in the 
Near East," CAH2111/3:50. 1 have not located the thesis of Prof. L. Bell who evidently drew similar conclusions. 
509 Gasse, Nouvelles Donnees, p. 37 n. (80) su~gests that this is a magazine. 
510 lt is logical to assume that the references to ( l) the Scribe Nsy-lmn-m-ipt (lines 2, l 0; 3,6); (2) the Scribe of 
Reckoning of the Temple of Amonrasonther Nsy-lmn (lines 3,2; 5,8); (3) the Scribe of Reckoning of the Temple of 
Amun Nsy-lmn (lines 4,6; 5,5); (4) the Scribe of Reckoning Nsy-lmn (line 4, 11 ); and (5) Nsy-lmn-m-ipt (line 4,4) 
occasionally refer to the same person, but is immaterial here. 
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l, l i,t-fish,512 small, 300: making silver kite l 
1,2 [ .... ] large, fish, 800, making silver kite l 
1,3 snc-fish,513 l 00, making silver kite l 
1,4 palm ropes,514 very great,515 M quality516 for the royal barques, of cubits 1,200 
[+ x], 517 making silver deben 14 
1,5 palm ropes, very great, M quality for the royal barques, of cubits 1,200 making 
silver deben 12 
1,6 palm ropes, very great, M quality for the royal barques [<of cubits>] 1,000 (+ x?),518 
making silver deben 10 
1 ,7 palm ropes, cubits, 500, making silver deben 5 
1,8 palm ropes of cubits (?) b;ry 1, making silver kite l 
1,9 palm rope, cubits 300, making silver kite 1 
1, 10 palm rope, cubits 200 (?), making silver kite 1 
1, 11 palm ropes, cubits 7, making silver kite 1. 
1, 12 cedar, trunk, 519 good, of cubits 50, 1, making silver deben 10[+ x <against si>]lver 
in objects 
1, 13 cedar trun[<k, good>], of cubits 50, 1, making silver deben [x <against si>]lver in 
silver 
1, 14 cedar, trunk, good, of cubits 45, l, making silver deben [x] against silver in objects 
1, 15 cedar, trunk, good, of cubits 45, l, making silver deben [x kite] 5 against silver in 
silver 
1, 16 cedar trunk, AA quality, of cubits 40, 1, making silver deben [x <against>] silver in 
objects 
1, 17 cedar, trunk [<(?) quality, of cubits>] 40, 1, making silver deben [x against] silver in 
silver 
1, 18 cedar, tr[unk, of cubits x], 1, making silver [ .... ]520 
511 KR/ VI: 560-566; Botti/Peet, Giomale, pp. 10-13/pls. 1-3; Helck, Materialien, 893-895. 
512 Unknown type, not mentioned in Gamer-Wallert, Fische. 
513 Unknown type, cf. Gamer-Wallert, Fische, p. 44. She remarks that the type must be unusually small, but the price 
mentioned here indicotes a higher quality - at least - than the preceding examples. The reading is Kitchen's, os 
Botti/ Peet were unoble to read it. 
514 Cf. Janssen, Prices, pp. 438-440. 
515 Whether this refers to strength or length is not clear, but the subsequent reference to the length might imply the 
former. 
516 nfr nfr. 
517 Janssen (Prices, p. 439 n. 22) suggests 1400, os is logical from the following price. 
518 Whether the line after the "thousond" refers to one - ond only one - thousand? 
519 Cf. Janssen, Prices, pp. 378-379. 
520 Botti/ Peet, Giornale, p. 11, probably correctly do not hesitate to restore deben, but kite remains a possibility. 
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1 , 19 cedar, tr[ unk, of cubits x], 1 , making silver deben [ .... ] 
1,21 [ .... ] making kite [ .... ] 
1,22 [ .... ] making kite [ .... ] 
1,23 [ .... ] mhf of cubits 2, 1, making silver 
1,24 [ .... ] making silver kite 
1,25 [ .. .. ] 20, making silver kite 1 
1 , 26 [ .... ] 1 , making silver kite 1 
1, 27 [ .. .. grain?], 1 , making silver kite 
1, 28 [ ... . grain? ], 1 , making silver kite 1 
1 , 29 [ ... . grain? ], 1 , making silver kite 2 
1,30 [ .. .. ] grain, 1, making silver kite 2 
2, 1 cedar, iJn-beam,521 1, making silver [* ki]te522 , 3 
2,2 cedar, dpb-piece, 1, making silver [* ki]te 523 , 1 
2,3 cedar, mast, [ .. . . <of cub]bits 30 (?), making sil[<ver>] deben 4 
2,4 cedar, mast, small 524 (?), of cubits 38, making silver deben 3, kite 8 
2,5 cedar, mast, of cubits 35, making deben 3, kite 8. 
2,6 cedar, mast, of cubits 30, making silver deben 3 [ + x?] 
2,7 cedar, tpt-piece, of cubits 40 30 [ ... . ] 30, 1, making silver kite 5. 
2,8 cedar, tpt-piece [ .... ] of cubits 28 [ .. .. ] 27, [<makin>]g [<silver>] kite [ .... ] 
2,9 cedar, tpt-piece [ .. .. <pre>]pared 525 of cubits 20, 1, making silver kite 1 l/2 
2, 10 cedar, ke[<e>]l,526 [A]A quality, of cubits 40, 1, making silver deben 8 
2, 11 cedar, ke[<e>]I, [A]A quality, of cubits 30, 1, making silver deben 6. 
2, 12 cedar, ke[<e>]I, second rate,527 of cubits 30, 1, making silver deben 4, kite [ ... ] 
2, 13 cedar, gJrf, good, of cubits 30, 1, making silver deben 6 
2, 14 cedar, gtrt, second rate, of cubits 35, 1, making silver deben [ .... ] kite 5. 
2, 15 cedar, ribbing, 528 good, of cubits [ .... ], 1, making silver [ .. . ] 
2, 16 [<cedar>], ribbing, second rate, ma[<king silver > ... . ] 
2, 17 [<cedar>] styw,529 good, making silver [ .. . ] 
2,18 [<cedar>], ribbing, [ ... ] 1, making sil[<ver> ... . ] 
2, 19 [<cedar>], st[<yw> .... ] 
3, 1 [ .... ] 
3,2 [ ... . ] 
3,3 [ .... ] 
52 1 Cf. Jonssen, Prices, pp. 374-375 . 
522 A scribol error, but the restorotion is hordly bold, cf. Botti/ Peet, Giornale, p. l l . 
523 Cf. previous nole. 
524 Or thin ?: the nexl one is shorter, but not dislinguished os being "smoll". lts price is however also inferior. 
525 grg, meoning uncleor, cf. Jonssen, Prices, pp. 376-377. 
526 p;ypt, cf. Jones, Glossary, p . 164. 
527 Or used? 
528 wg, cf. Jones, Glossary, p . 40. 
529 DLE, III: 12, 113. 
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3,4 cedar, sk[<ty-vessel> .... ] 
3,5 its t;[ .. . ] 
3, 6 cedar, skty-vessel [ ... . ] 
3,7 cedar, skty-[<vessel> ... ] 
3, 8 cedar, g'ty-[<barge> 530 . ... ] 
3,9 cedar, g'ty-[<barge> .... ] 
3, 10 cedar, qrr-[<boat> .... ] 
3, 11 cedar, mns-[<barge> .... ] 
3, 12 cedar, bt[<r-freighter> .... ] 
3, 13 cedar, bt[<r-freighter> .... ] 
3, 14 cedar, bt[<r-freighter> .... ] 
3, 15 acacia, [<cattle->]ferry [ ... . ] 
3, 16 acacia, [ ... . -]boat, of cubits [ . ... ] 
3,17 acacia, [<cattle->]ferry[ .... ] 
3, 18 acacia, [<cattle-> ]ferry [ .. .. ] 
3, 1 9 acacia, [ ... . ] 
[ .... Textual Omission .. . ]531 
RE!v\ARKS 
Remarks 
The purpose and nature of this papyrus are obscure, and it will be noted that there is not one 
single reference to taxation, but that a number of the items mentioned also figure in P. Harris 1 
(cf. infra pp. 194ff.; pp. 306ff.) which is intimately related to taxation. 
530 Jones, Glossary, p. 88 . lt is logical to assume that these were "barges" in light of their usual contexts . 
531 The versa deals with activities of the Gang at Deir el-Medineh . 
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE VlZIER 532 
T RANSlA TION OF EXCERPTS 
lnstructions for the term 533 of the Vizier and mayor of Thebes (nwt rsyt) and (the vizier) 
of the Residence in the office of the Vizier. Concerning every act of this official, the 
vizier, when deliberating (in the office of the vizier [ ... ] 
2 [ ... ] 
3 [ ... ] He should be promptly informed concerning the opening and closing of the 
secure rooms. The condition of the fortresses of southern and northern Egypt is to 
be reported to him. The exit of every expense (prrwt) of the royal household 534 is to 
be reported to him, as is the arrival of all income ('qwt) into the royal household. As 
for all income and expenditures for the land 535 of the residence: whether income or 
expenditure, it is his agents who are to permit delivery and enable expenditure. 
4-16 [ ... ] 
17 [ ... ] As for anyone who shall petition the vizier concerning land, he is ordered to 
him, the vizier, aside from listening to the 
532 Urk. IV: l l 03-1117; Davies, Rekh-mi-Re', pls. 26-28. Only excerpts from the text are presented here, as 
deemed relevant to the task. Cf. Boorn, Duties; Helck, Verwaltung, pp. 29-43; W. Helck, "Dienstanweisung für 
den Wesir," LÄ 1: l 084; James, Pharaoh's People, pp. 51-72; D. Lorton, "What was the pr-nsw and who 
managed it?," SAK18 (1991): 291-316. 
The !ext was dated lo Dynasty XIII, prior to van den Boorn's early Dynasty XVIII dating, in his commentary (Duties, 
pp. 333ff.) .J-M. Kruchten's doubts (Bi Or48 [1991]: 821-831) apparently threw the date backwards once 
again, but Kruchten's own comments on the word btr indicated that its fiscal significance was restricted to the 
New Kingdom ("Le verbe btr et ses derives jusqu'a la fin du nouvel empire," AIPHOS 24 [1980]: 39-52), so that 
he undermined his own argumenl before advancing it, as the word appears in this text. The index of Guirke, 
Administration, does not eile the word. lt is probably a mixture of various strains and the presenl !ext musl have 
been established at a very early date in the New Kingdom. . 
533 Van den Boorn lranslates bmstas "session" following Faulkner (CDME, p. 170), while Helck (Verwaltung, p. 29) 
does nol lranslate il. "Session" would suggesl that il should be followed by nbt("every", 'each", "any"), as so offen 
in the !ext, while the Singular is perhaps not appropriale, as "session" refers to a specific evenl, while "term" can 
be used with reference to an individual session, or to the entire period of the occupation of the office as such, and 
this is more suitable in this context. Cf. e.g., Urk. IV: 288, 13, which clearly refers lo the "reigning" king (i.e., the 
king in his "term" of office), while Urk. IV: 349, l O refers lo a specific "session". 
534 pr nsw is probably more than the "palace" here. Cf. J. J. Janssen's remark that pr- '; or nswtshould be occasionally 
understood as referring lo the "state", ''b;kw: From Work to Product," SAK20 (1993): 94 n. 78. Cf. D. Lorton, 
"What was the pr-nsw and who managed il?," SAK 1 8 [ 1 991 ]: 308-309. 
'qwtand prrwtcould conceivably refer to mere "comings and goings" in the palace. However, Urk. IV: 1106, 13-17 
prescribes that when the doors are opened at the proper time, the scribes should conlrol the "comings and goings" 
in wriling, and a protocol will probably have been kept of these inlerviews. The notebooks of P. Boulaq 18 
(A Scharff, "Ein Rechnungsbuch des königlichen Hofes aus der 13. Dynastie," ZÄS 57 [ 1922]: 51-68, pls. 
1 **-24**) use the word 'qw for income. The t may have originally been the bread sign. Cf. Guirke, 
Administration. 
535 r sifw. Lit., "for/to the ground/floor". James (Pharaoh 's People, p. 63) renders "from the floors"; Helck ( Ve,;,..,altung, 
p 31) "in das Gebiet". The !ext would appear to deal with the palace and the adjoining offices. Thal some land 
would be associated with this is not remarkable. This suspicion receives suppart from the careful dislinction 
between pr-nswand s;tw n bnw. Cf. W. Helck ( ''Eine Stele Sebekhoteps IV. aus Karnak," MDAIK 24 [ 1969]: 
196, h) This is better than the "area" used by van den Boorn (Duties, pp. 43; 50,8). lt could be either a matter of 
commercial activity or merely the sources of provisionment for the palace. ·· -
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18 overseers of land, together with the magistrates of the Cadaster Survey.536 He will 
act within two months for his fields in Upper and Lower Egypt. As for his fields which 
are in the vicinity of Thebes (nwt rsyt) or the Residence, he will act within three 
days,537 as 
19 corresponds to the law. He must listen to every petitioner according to this law which 
is at hand. He also must bring together the land-courts, and it is he who sends them 
out that they may report to him the state of their lands. Every imyt-pr testament538 is 
tobe brought to him, and it is he who seals them. 
20 lt is he who makes land-endowments with each sdw-plot. As for any petitioner who 
says, "our boundary line has been shifted." and it is demonstrated that this is the 
case, under the seal of the appropriate official, he will read the sdw-plots to the 
magistrates, who will cause that they be shifted (back).539 And as for any mine 
whose "owner" shall come to it, examining the things within it: a petition shall be 
made in writing. He will not be permitted to petition a judge, and the same applies 
to any of the lord's petitioners, after he has made it in writing. 540 [ ... ] 
24 [ ... ] lt is he who shall despatch the courts of the land to make weirs541 in the entire 
land. 
536 The virtually undocumented fmt, known from BM 828; Cairo 20056; Leiden V 3; Urk. IV: 11 l 0, 13; 1113, 14. 
The eorly New Kingdom terms may beor little relation to the later terms. An unknown verb (Faulkner, CTIII: 33 n. 
3) could be related. 
537 This reference to "his fields" (tbw.t.~ would be most interesting were it to imply either personal or ex officio 
ownership. This section seems to concern assorted immobile property under his authority, such as fields awarded 
to people, testamentary property arrangements and perhaps the quarries mentioned at the end. lnterpreting these 
as belonging to Pharaoh - but over which his subjects had considerable freedom to deol - is probable. 
538 At the risk of over-simplification, imyt-pr seems to refer specifically to the emoluments associated with an office 
turned overtoanother individual. For imyt-prin the New Kingdom, cf. K. B. Gödecken lÄ III: 141-145; VI: 6-8. 
For the controversy about the stele of Ahmes-Nefertari: B. Menu, "La 'Stele' d'Ahmes Nefertary dans son contexte 
historique et juridique," 8/FAO 77 (1977): 89-100; M. Gitton, "La Resiliation d'une fonction religieuse," 8/FAO 
76 (1976): 65-89; B. Menu, "Quelques_Remarques apropos de l'etude comparee de la stele juridique de 
Karnaket la 'stele' d'Ahmes-Nefertari," Rdf 23 (1971 ): 155-163; 1. Harari, "Nature de la Stele de donation de 
fonction du Roi Ahmösis a la reine Ahmes-Nefertari," ASAE 56 (1959): 139-201; 2 pls. The uninitiated are 
warned that a lacuna in II. 5-8 of this important text has deprived our science of some very important evidence, 
but given complete freedom to speculation. Cleor is that an imyt-pr was ( l) a testamentary arrangement 
(2) transferring certain rights to another person (3) affecting the heirs of both parties, (4) specifically associated 
with the performance of an office, (5) of which the Vizier was obliged to certify the validity with his seal. The 
offices could be either secular or sacerdotal. 
539 This rendering attempts to ovoid supplying missing words (as Helck, Verwaltung, p. 35 and James, Pharaoh 's 
People, p. 65), while providing an understandable !ext. The text has obviously suffered considerably in the course 
of the centuries, so that many readings are feasible, but the Egyptians withdrew (sdi) something from (m) someone 
and not to (n) him. 
540 
"These sentences are very obscure" Üames, Pharaoh's People, p. 72 n. 18). Thus the divergence of this translation 
from James'. Assuming that these instructions deol with the mundane and not the spectacular, miracles are not 
expected. Quarries will have differed from agricultural land in that difficulties at the former were not necessarily 
urgent, requiring a decision before the termination of the inundation, in contrast to the latter. Using nb ("owner", 
"lord") does not mean that it is not really the "boss" but the dato are totally insufficient for speculation. Van den 
Boom (Duties, pp. l 95ff.) excludes ms' here, but quarrying and mining may have been part of the private sector, 
as copper mining in the Sinai does not appeor to have been either a royal or even Egyptian preserve (cf. supra, 
pp. l05ff.) 
541 
'-mwdoes not invariably meon "dyke". In the Kahun Papyri (Griffith, Kahun Papyri, pi. 2, 12) it should, but in the 
Nauri Decree (KR/ I; 48,5), it is perhaps better translated "pool" or "channel", and the English word "weir" can 
signify either "dyke" or "pool", and may thus match the Egyptian term as used. 
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25 lt is he who despatches the mayors and district officials to plough in summer. [ ... ] 
26 [ ... ] lt is he who despatches the expeditions and scribes of the cadaster suNey542 in 
order to conduct the business of the lord. The nome 
27 records will be kept in his office, for hearings concerning any fields. lt is he who fixes 
the borders of the nomes, all fields (?) of divine offerings, and all changes of owner-
ship.543 lt is he who makes all proclamations (official ?). lt is he who judges conflicts, 
when a man speaks out against his fellow. lt is he who makes every appointment 
28 to the Hall.544 Every inquiry from the Palace (pr nsw) should come to him . lt is he who 
notes every decree. lt is he who notes all shortfall in the divine offerings. lt is he who 
btri every/all btri from the income of all to whom it is given. [ .... ] 545 lt is he who seals 
29 it with his seal. lt is he who listens to every conflict. lt is he who fixes the inw-duty of 
the administrative units.546 The Great Council will report to him their btri and income 
[ .... ] at its side. [ .... ] lt is he who supeNises everything brought to (?) 547 
30 the hall ('rryt) and every transfer to the hall. lt is he who notes this. lt is he who opens 
the House of Gold together with the treasurer (imy-r sgtwty).548 lt is he who super-
vises the inwof the l[<ands> .... ]549 
31 imy-r pr wr together with the Great Council. lt is he who makes the cattle commissions, 
making the commissions from them. 
[ ... textual omission .. 32] 
All the mayors, village headmen, [ ... ], report to him their inw. [ ... textual loss ... ] the 
monthly festival requirements to define the inw550 [ ... textual omission .. . ] 
542 Cf. supra, 176 n. 536. 
543 In principle, the translation and interpretation of these sentences would dictate their being excluded, but the 
matters of the divine offerings and "land-ownership" compel their inclusion. For btm, Urk. IV: 808,2 can be cited, 
meaning, "to hand over". 
544 
' rryt. The oriental concept of "speaking justice al the gate" may lie behind the use of 'rrytas "hall of jud~ment", but 
this is not apparent from the Egyptian sources. Faulkner (CDME, p. 45) cites (1) Peasant, B 1,35; (2) P. Kahun, 
pi. 15,34; (3) Urk. IV: 1073,3; and (4) Urk. IV: 1107,5 as references . With the exception of the last, and the 
one here, this rendering is not justified, and here il is not compelling. lt should be discarded in favour of the less 
satisfying but more accurate "administrative department" as Spencer ( Temple, pp. 151-152) has shown that it 
had a "rather less specific [ meaning] than has been previously recognised". 
545 Only a few signs are preserved in these lines. 
546 Does bbi-inw refer to the income (in laxes paid by others) of the gs-prw, or the levies on them, which would 
probably be expressed with m and not n? This is a special land lax recorded in the Middle Kingdom, cf. P. 
Harageh 3, 26 (P. Smither, "A Tax-Assessor'sJournal of the Middle Kingdom,"JfA 27 [ 1941 ]: 74-76, pi. IXA, 
25 [but also pi. IX!]). Cf. also, R. Krauss, "Detailfragen der altägyptischen Getreidewirtschatt," in Fs Fecht, 
pp. 268-269, for the dates of the field measurements. 
547 Sethe's reconstructed text (Urk. IV: 1115, 1) suggesls n rather than the expected r, but Davies, Rekh-mi-Re', II : 
pi. 28 has a fragmentarily preserved sign that can only with extreme imagination be construed as an r, but even 
more would be required to read n. 
548 Cf. Pi-~qi-mn, Guksch, Paheqomen, pi. 9; H. Guksch, "Das Grab des Benja, gen. Paheqamen: Theben Nr. 343," 
MDAIK38 (1982): 195-199. 
549 Reconslruction impossible. 
550 Virtually the same as Gordon, inw, pp. 174-175, where van den Boom is rightly caÜtious. 
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REMARKS 
This text poses many difficulties, and far more commentary would be required to deal with 
the text properly, but it is clear that this text clearly reveals that the Vizier is responsible for 
deciding the btri, and the inw, and recording the deliveries. He is also the last resort for land 
disputes and responsible for the divine offerings. As inw rather than btri is the word that 
appears in the actual products brought 551 the suggestion that a distinction between 
conceptual and concrete distinctions be potentially regarded as valid should be considered. 
The fact that several of the key words used for this study do not appear in this text is certainly 
cause for alarm signals to be emitted before the conclusions are given undue authority for 
providing the definitive interpretation of the Egyptian fiscal system. 
551 Cf.supra,pp. l4lf. 
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T HE BILGAI STELE 552 
T RANSlA TION 
a [ .. .. <I g ive>] thee [<countless>] jubilee festivals [ .. .. ] 
b [ .... ] gods 
1 Horus the Steer [ .... dheir>(?)] enemies 
2 [ .... <Seth>] Son of Nut[.] 
3 to the effect that (?) [ .... <Seth>] 
4 Son of Nut [ ... . ] principal [ <wife>?] of 
6 Amun of Wsr-[<M;'t>]-R', [<elect of Re> ... . ] then [ .... ] 
7 [ .... ] the divine offerings 
8 <On > their places of [ .. .. ] the town. They are as go[<ds>] 
9 great in hea[ <Yen > .... , <the temple of millions>] of years of the King of Upper and 
Lower Egypt [ .... ] <in the Estate of 
10 Ä>mun on the West of Thebes. The Stew[<ard> .... ] the obedient servant [<made> 
vso. 
(?) .... ] 
11 [ .... ] Wsr-M;'t-R' elect of Re [ .... <gi>]ven eternity on na[<me>(?) ... . 
12 [ .... ] of the whole land, they satisfying him [(?) .... ] (?) 
13 [ .... ] He made [ .... ] from his granary, he made [ .... ] 
14 [ ... . ] cubit [ ..... ] 
[ .... ] Heliopolis which is in the South, Heliopolis Proper 553 [ .... ] 
2 [ .... ] with the park 554 of Amun of Wsr-M;' t-R' , elect of Re for eternity [ ..... ] 
3 [ .. .. . <after the f]orm (?) of the House of Amun of Wsr-M;'t-R' elect of Re. No claim 
shall arise from any brother, sister or relative of mine. [ .... ] 
4 [ .... <As for any Coastal Defence Officer>] yet to come, who shall disregard this 
chapel made by [the] great [demale king >(?) .... ] for the Lo[<rd of all the Land>(?), 
5 [ ..... <h>]er Father, or who shall prevent Amun of Wsr-M;'t-R', elect of Re, from 
resting within it at his every appearance at each festival, or who shall 
6 [<remove peo> ]ple from it, employing them elsewhere, beyond the jurisdiction of this 
chapel, he shall be under the power of Amun of 
7 Wsr-M;'t-R ' elect of Re, he shall be despised by the gods of the heavens, and by 
the gods of the earth, as well as by the King 
552 KR! IV: 341-343; A. H . Gardiner, "The Stele of Bilgai, " ZÄS 50 (1912): 49-57; Helck, Materialien, III: 472. 
On the basis of internal criteria, Sir Alan dated the stele to the close of Dynasty XIX. 
553 At the time, Sir Alan (Z45 50 [ 1912 ]: 50, 54) made little sense of these lines. Here, it is assumed that lwnw rsy 
refers to Hermonthis while lwnw 'rqy is taken to refer to the real Heliopolis, in the North. 
554 Cf. AEO II: 216 *. The imoge created by the parallel in P. Horris 1 8,3 hos been used here. 
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8 of his own day. No one shall accept any of his oblations. He shall not stand upon 
the firm lips of his brothers. 555 Neither shall his son take up his position. Nil shall be 
all his deeds. 
9 He shall not master anything he undertakes. 
And as for any Coastal Defence Officer who shall bear responsibility for the House 
of Amun of Wsr-M;ct-Rc, elect of Re 
10 attending to this chapel made by the grea[<t female king>?] of all the land for her 
Father Amun of Wsr-M;ct-W elect of Re, letting Amun of Wsr-M;ct-Rc elect of Re rest 
within it 
11 at his every appearance at all his festivals, who shall not remove people from it, 
employing them elsewhere, beyond 
12 the jurisdiction of this my chapel, made for <the> grea[<t princess>] of all the land for 
Amun of Wsr-M;ct-Rc elect of Re, her good father, he shall be praised 
13 by Amun of Wsr-M;ct-R', elect of Re, and by the gods of the heavens, and by the 
gods of the earth, as well as by the King of his own day. He shall stand upon the firm 
lips 
14 of his brothers. He shall retain his office as Fort Commander (i.e., Coastal Defence 
officer), his son following him in his position. Sent on a mission, he shall relate his 
report. 
15 His children shall remain as he has educated them tobe. 
1 speak to the royal scribe and Steward of the Mansion of Millions of Years of King 
[Siptah] 
16 in the Estate of Amun on the West of Thebes and the Steward P;-6;-s; of the Temple 
of Stby mry-n-Ptb in the Estate of Amun: "I am an official beneficent to his lord, 
fulfilling the smw, fulfilling the sJyt. Extraordinary was my 
17 (delivered) excess smwand styt. ten-fold my btri of smwand sJyt. 4'632 mnt-jars of 
wine was 
18 <m>y bJkw-rml, but I let them bear away 30'000: a surplus of 25'368. Ngm the 
supervisor did not 
19 (come to aid ?) mein any (thing ?) which I did at all, ever. 70 mnt-jars of honey were 
my honey btri. 1 of my efforts brought 700 
20 [meaning a surplus o]f 630. 70'000 mc was my annual smw. 1 brought 140'000, a 
surplus of 70'000. [ ... . ] 
555 The meaning of this expression is not entirely clear. According to Wb. IV: l 0, 17, it refers to the retention of an 
official position , but this interpretation is clearly based on this text. lt would seem more likely that it signified either 
( l) that the person would be forgotten (as his brothers would not mention his name, and he would thus cease to 
exist), as the following line refers to the posilion, or (2) simply that the person would stand in good or bad repute . 
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REMARKS 
Sir Alan Gardiner suggested that the inland situation of Bilgai (and presumably the lock of 
other Pharaonic monuments there) implied that the stele came from somewhere eise, and 
thus the structures mentioned in the text must be sought elsewhere. Equally astutely, he dated 
the stele to the close of Dynasty XIX, and specifically to the reign of T awosret. Although the 
stele bears certain royal features, it appears tobe the work of a private person, a Coastal 
Defence Officer,556 who boasted about his economic accomplishments to the Steward of 
the Mortuary Temple (of Pharaoh Siptah?) in the Estate of Amun. There are references lo a 
temple (pr) and a (barque shrine) chapel (ipt) of Amun of Ramesses II, which the official 
made under the auspices of someone who would appear to have been Queen T awosret. 
The payments referred to will have gone to the mortuary temple of Siptah however, as it is to 
an official of this institution that the author of the stele addresses himself. lt would appear that 
they were the produce of temple dependents, dependents who were not to be removed 
from the temple. This means that the whole would appear to have concerned the temple 
economy, the involvement of the government being incidental, insofar as our unnamed 
official was a Coastal Defence Officer, and thus a government official. The repudiation of 
the right of his relatives to claim the land donated along with the barque shrine would tend 
lo indicate that the official in question took land from his own private resources to establish 
and endow the barque shrine. 
This barque shrine would appear to have been made at his own private initiative, as it is 
mentioned separately from the fulfillment of his obligations. lf this interpretation is correct, the 
obligations would have been his regular dues related to his regular duties. As he has no 
sacerdotal titles, it would seem that his obligation to provide the Estate of Amun was an ex-
officio responsibility (perhaps comparable to many officials in, e.g., P. Wilbour). 
The actual transfers mentioned are: the expected btkw-rml, 4'632 mnt-jars of wine, (deliv-
ered 30'000); the expected btri, 70 mnt-jars of honey (700 delivered); the expected smw, 
70'000 mc ( 140'000 mc delivered) . "Extraordinary was my (vs. 17) (delivered) excess smw 
and sJyt: ten-fold my btri of smwand s;yt". The non-corn deliveries were stytand the corn, 
smw, while both are btri. The btri is also mentioned as a specific item, namely a quantity of 
honey. The separate bJkw-rmJ is specified as being of wine. 
The unils of the smw are of interest, as W. Helck557 reads khar whereas the text can be 
understood as referring to oipe (thus "mc"; "measure of corn" in the text). According to the 
evidence of H.O. 81 / 82 and P. Bologna 1086 (cf. pp. 144 n. 408, supra), a field worker 
was expected to deliver 200 khor as his share. lf we assume that 140'000 khar were 
delivered annually, it would imply the employment of 700 workers, 558 on a surface of between 
7'000 and 14'000 arouros (using the assessments of the Wilbour Papyrus) which would be 
a large holding indeed, and even a quarter of this (reading oipe) would still be a large 
holding. lt is however im probable that a mere Coastal Defence Officer had 700 field 
556 imy-r btm n pJ ym. 
557 Materialien p. 472. 
558 P. Harris l lists the btkw-corn of the Estate of Amun at a modest 309'950 khar ( 126,3). 
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workers and 14'000 arouras at his disposal, so that we may assume initially that oipe are 
meant (still implying 175 field workers on an annual basis), and suspect that he may have 
totalled up his "annual smw" for several years, so that several years are subsumed together, 
potentially reducing the number of field labourers and the size of the holding by a factor of 
ten. 
This however does not reduce the validity of his statement that his efforts were "extraordinary" 
as the excess smw was still twice his obligatory quantity, and even reduced in the above 
fashion, it is remains significant. The 700 mnt-jars of honey-btri compare favourably with the 
1 '370 mnt-jars (P. Harris 1 15a,3; 186,7) which the Pharaoh himself, Ramesses III, awarded 
to the Estate of Amun in the 30 years of his reign. The 30'000 mnt-jars of wine-btkw-rmf 
likewise approach half of the 62'000 for which Ramesses III took credit for having delivered 
to the Estate of Amun during his entire reign (15a, 14; 18a, 11). 
We will return to this in the final chapter, infra, pp. 325f. 
185 
T HE REWARDS OF THE HIGH PRIEST OF ÄMUN, lmn-~tp559 . 
T RANSIA TION 
The King himself said to the officials and courtiers who were at his side: "Yield up 
much praise and numerous rewards in beautiful gold and silver 
2 and millions of every good thing to the High Priest of Amonrasonther, lmn-btp, 
deceased, on account of the many excellent monuments which he has made in the 
Estate of Amonrasonther, in the great name of the great god . 
3 The King of Upper and Lower Egypt, Nfr-k;-R', elect of Re 
4 The Son of Re, Ramesses (IX), beloved of Amun, lj'w-(m)-w;st 
5 Given Life and Power like Re, 
6 All Security, Life, Power and Health, and all above it, like Re, forever. 
Regnal Year 10, III Jbt 19, in the Temple of Amonrasonther: the High Priest of 
Amonrasonther lmn-btp, deceased, paraded at the Great Forecourt 560 of 
2 Amun. (The Royal) One spoke to him, uttering his praise, in order to commend him 
with fine chosen words of the officials who had come in order that he be praised: 
the Superintendent of the Treasury of Pharaoh 
3 and Royal Attendant, 561 lmn-btp, deceased; the Royal Attendant, Nsy-lmn; the Scribe 
of Pharaoh and Royal Attendant and Herold of Pharaoh, Nfr-k;-R'-m-pr-lmn. 
4 What was said to him consisted of the praise and vaunting on this day at the Great 
Forecourt of 
5 Amonrasonther: Monthu was praised, the k; of Amonrasonther was praised; 
Paraharakhte; 
6 Ptah the Great, South of his Wall, the Lord of Memphis ('nb-nwy); Thoth, the Lord of 
Divine Words; (and) the gods of the sky; (along with) the gods of the earth . 
7 The k; of Nfr-k;-R', elect of Re, the Son of Re, Ramesses (IX), beloved of Amun, 
lj'w-(m)-W;st, the Great Ruler of Egypt was praised, the scion 
8 whom all the gods love, on account of the performance which you have made of the 
smw, sJyt, bJkw-
559 KR/ VI: 455-458 ; W Helck, "Die lnschrifi über die Belohnung des Hohenpriesters 'lmn-htp," MIO 4 (1956) : 
163-178. 1 have taken Helck's numbering of the lines. 
560 For wbff, cf. infra, pp. 2 l 2f n. 683 . 
561 wbJ nsw, literally, "royal butler". Sir Alan Gardiner points out (AEO 1: 43*-44 *) that these officials actually did 
serve the King, but that this merely emphasized - rather than diminished - their importance. 
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9 -rmJ of the Estate of Amonrasonther under your authority. You have brought them, 
filling the magazines562 having caused 
l O [<the perform>]ance, having it done in the inner chamber(s) of the treasuries and 
storehouses and granaries of the Estate 
l l of Amonrasonther. And from you are the inwand tpw-grt: the material support563 of 
Amonrasonther. 
12 [<lt is>] your [<causing that one bring to>] Pharaoh, your lord what is done by a good 
and efficient servant 
13 [<of Phar>]aoh, his Lord. Being strong in order to act efficiently for Amonrasonther 
14 the Great God, (and) in order to act efficiently for Pharaoh, his Lord . [etc .... ]" 
A similar speech is less weil preserved (and W . Helck has restored it): 
14 [ .. . ] 
as servant 
15 of the Estate of Amun . And from you are the performance, making the smw, sJy of 
the Estate of Amun 
16 under your authority. You caused that the inner chamber(s) of his treasuries, store-
rooms, 
17 granaries 
20 [ ... ] the inw, tp-grt material support. lt is your causing that one bring to the royal 
warehouses [ ... ] 
REMARKS 
lnscribed on the exterior of the connecting wall between the VII and VIII pylons of the temple 
of Karnak is this text relating how the Pharaoh (Ramesses IX) commanded the royal court to 
pay homage to the High Priest of Amun, lmn-~tp lt is specifically stated that he arranged for 
the payment "of the smw, sJyt, bJkw-rmJ, of the Temple of Amonrasonther" (text II. II: 8-9), 
and that the inw and the tpw-grt likewise belonged to the temple (text II. 11: 11 ). This 
inscription details fiscal responsibilities using most of the words discussed in this study. 
lt would appear that each item is understood to be a specific term with a specific meaning 
(and it is interesting that the word btri is not used, as this term seems occasionally to subsume 
the others). The actual material is understood as being delivered directly to the temple, with 
the exception of the inwand tpw-grtwhich seem to have belonged to the temple, but may 
have been rendered to Pharaoh. 
lt is significant that the High Priest is credited by the Pharaoh with having built many great 
monuments for Amonrasonther . 
562 For 'b' as magazine, Gasse, Oonnees Nouvelles, p. 37. 
563 
"Provisioning' or "Victuals''? , cf. P. Greg, supra, pp. l 52 ff . and Janssen, Commodity Prices, p. 458. 
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TRANSIATION OF EXCERPTS 
[ ... ] 
11 [ ... ]Lo, His Majesty was attentive seeking tbt565 for Egypt, looking for 
12 [ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
13 [ ... ] lf a nmhy makes a boat for himself bearing his Jnfy [ .... ] 
14 htri and the nmhw's possessions are stolen [ ... ] 
15 [ ... ] which is htri 566 for the wcbwt of Pharaoh 567 
16 [ ... textual omission ... ] 
17 [ ... ] a nmhw without a boat, but gets for himself a boat for his btkw from someone 
eise who causes that he order that he bring wood to him and he is [dollowing 
Pharaoh > 568 .... ] 
18-20 [ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
21 And likewise, any sgm-official of a chamber (et) hnktof Pharaoh (L!P!H!) going into 
the villages for corvee labour (W) for taking safflower569 [ .... <taking the male or 
female slave of the nm> ]hw570 
22 [ ... ] 
23 [ ... ] <the btkw of these servants will be extracted from him> 
24-30 [ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
31 [ ... <And like>]wise, the for<agers> of the w<[<bwt of Pharaoh (L!P!H!) going from 
the> ... ] 
32 [ ... <and the gardens of the>] nmhwtaking their forage (smw) daily, saying, "it is for 
the btkw <of Pharaoh (L!P!H!)" (thus) giving themselves over to stealing (from) these 
nm>]hw for their pss-work. To the effect [<that this is wrong: Let the foragers of the 
wcbwt 
33 of Pharaoh (L!P!H!) go forage for the btkw of Pharaoh (L!P!H!) from the maga-
zines> .... 
34 ... daxing (m st) in the southern and northern districts extracting corn and flax and 
vegetables from the burghers [ ... ] 
564 Excerpts only are presented here, as the text has been admirably edited, cf. Kruchten, Horemheb. 
565 The word tbt appears where "beneficial things" are sought. Kruchten 's "action bienfaisante" for nf,w and "ce qui 
est utile" for tbt (Horemheb, pp. 20-2 l ), may overlook the fact that tbt may in fact be the very goods we are 
looking for. 
566 Kruchten, Horemheb, p. 30, "mettre au travail". 
567 Cf. Kruchten, Horemheb, pp. 42-44. 
568 Although the text is quite fragmentary, logic suggests that the victim has acquired the boat in order to carry out his 
btkw, but the owner is demanding rent before the btkw has been accomplished, and that this is what is to be 
prevented. 
569 Cf. Germer, Flora, p. 174: safflower, not safron, p. 199. 
57° Kruchten (Horemheb, p. 195) translates "qui du seNiteur, qui de la seNant", but the text can be read straight 
without restorations. 
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Right side 
5 [ .. . ] And as for the sJyt of silver and gold [ ... ] 
6 [<My majesty ordained>] one should cause tobe halted the permitting of exacting 
the s;yt of anything from the courts of Upper and Lower Egypt [ ... ] that extracting diw 
from a single double granary [ ... ] 
COtvVv\ENT 
The Decree is (very badly) preserved on a large stone stele at the southern side of Karnak, 
on the north side of the IX Pylon . From the lamentably mutilated text it can be concluded that 
the bJkw was a payment from the nmbw to Pharaoh unrelated to the obligations of his 
officials, which were also apparently termed b;kw. There are some tantalizing items in the 
final part of the text, but to include them would drive us into the realm of speculation . lt is 
however clear that Kruchten is correct in assuming that the question of the legal size of corn 
measures is touched upon in the text. The text attempts to re-establish order in a very detailed 
level, assuring both the king his righ~ul revenues, and the people their rights. 
This text is the only text to mention the bJkw-n-pr-<;, the b;kw of Pharaoh. The term is not 
preserved a single time, but Kruchten found the term in the copies of his predecessors and 
does not indicate that it is one of his (commendably conservative) proposed restorations. 
This text is the only royal text of its kind. 
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T RANSIATION OF EXCERPTS 
Regnal Year 4, 1 prt l. The beginning of eternity, the commencement of happiness, 
of eons of contentment, of millions of jubilee festivals on the throne of the horizons of 
eternity, in the reign of Atum, under the Majesty of [ ... ] 
2 [Seti 1] [ . . . ] Lo, his Majesty was in Memphis (dmi n bwt-k;-Ptb) earning the praise of 
[the major gods of Egypt] 
3-5 [ . . . Textual Omission ... ] 
6 [who are saying: " . .. ] The heart of the Lord of the Necropolis [Osiris] is joyous 
seeing thee upon the dais like Re, for thou art upon earth ordering the Two Lands, 
making festive the houses and cities, [ ... ] 
7 [ ... ] construct(ing) his [Osiris'] House [ ... ] 
8 [ .. . ] the palace within it richly adorned with new f.f<m-gold from the mountains [ ... ] 
9- 13 [ ... Textual Omission .. . ] 
14 [ ... ] [ <The treasuries>] are full, with [<ric>] hes, silver [<in>] heaps from the earth 
15 , royal linen and textiles in every (quality), millions of moringa oil, incense, wine, 
honey, beyond measure [ . .. There are fowl, cattle, slaves, poultry farms, etc ... . 
16-18 [ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
19 [ . .. . ] beyond means of counting 
20 their abundance. [<Their (?)>] btri [<re-(?)>]new(ed) for their days in the commands of 
divine possessions. [ . .. Cattle in herds: with herdsmen, with transport vessels, and 
good pasture land are provided ... ] 
21-23 [ .. . Textual Omission ... ] 
24 [ ... ] He [Seti 1] has made for him [Osiris] cadastre lists572 with hundreds of thousands 
of plough-lands, 573 
25 islands, high-lands: all cultivable fields ideal for harvest.574 He [Osiris] may count 
571 KR/ 1: 45 -58; KRIT 1: 38 -40; KRIN 1: 48-55; F. LI . Griffith, "The Abydos Decree of Seti I at Nauri ," JEA 13 
(1927): 193-208; W.F . Edgerton, "The Nauri Decree of Seti 1: A Translation and Analysis of the Legal Portion", 
JNES 6 (1947): 219-230; A. H. Gardiner, "Some Reflections on the Nauri Decree",JfA 38 (1952): 24-33 . 
572 Cf. supra p. 167 n. 483. 
573 For nbb cf. A. H. Gardiner, Wilbour II : 28 -29, n. l 0 and pp. 178-181 . The translation "fresh-land" is based on 
the contrast between fni- or "tired"-land, as weil as the verb, "to open" . One can however also "open'' land by 
ploughing it. This ambiguous interpretation has been selected in order to emphasize the distinction between nbb 
"plough"-land and mtwf "new"-land , while avoiding the misleading impression that the question has 
been satisfactorily resolved. But cf. supra p. 4 l n. 60, 
574 wJbyt cf. Caminos lEM, pp. 412-416. Translated "abundance" by A. H. Gardiner, R. Caminos correctly 
remarks that it also meant "yield", as pointed out in Wb. 1: 258, 8. R. Caminos (loc. cit.) also identified the 
connection with nfr, while avoiding the logical but perhaps incorrect distinction made in the Wb. (1 : 258, 8; 
II : 261, 4) between nfr=barley and wJbyt=wheat (Spelzen, whereby emmer would be meant, as Triticum spelta 
is not found in Egypt: cf. D. M. Dixon, "A note on cereals in ancient Egypt, " in Ucko/ Dimbleby, Domestication, 
p . 131 ). lnteresting is the use of the word in Urk. IV: 925,5 (TT 85; P-M 1: 170-175), where it is said of the 
Horvest goddess: 'Renenutet, she gives the wJhyt.'' Harvest is perhaps the most appropriate meaning here (cf 
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them, offered to his kJ. He [Seti 1] has made for him [Osiris] k;[<rJ>] rt-boats to 
transport [<the>]ir every harv[<est>] (wJhyt). The granaries are swollen with corn, the 
heaps of it reaching heaven. O[<ne>] [Pharaoh]575 has made a decree command-
26 -ing that its [the temple's] serfs throughout the Jsw576 of Upper and Lower Egypt, and 
all its [the temple's] people are exempted and protected like the geese on the (river) 
banks in all their desires and occupations dedicated [<to>] his kJ, in the great [<ter-
ritory>]577 that he loves. They shall not be taken away (?) by others, nor shall they be 
interfered with, 
27 [ <b]rom son [<to son, estab>]lished in their occupations to the ends of the limits of 
eternity. 1 [Seti 1] have purified Your 578 Mansion millions of times. 1 have exempted 
those within it repeatedly. 1 have placed the serfs who came into existence for me579 
into Your Mansion. You will not (be) pa~ed) from them. 1 began there. From Your 
childhood 
28 until the ruler (of?) Ptb 580 [ .... ] content (?) in performing m;°t, [<sweetening> their?] 
bringing to them the sJyt. 581 1 gave to Hirn the whole of Upper Egypt as well as 
Lower Egypt as the sustenance of His kJ' s. 
29-40 [ ... Legal Sanctions and Guarantees ... ] 
4 1 [ ... ] As for 582 any Viceroy of 
42 Cush, any military official,583 any Mayor, 
43 any Controller (rw.Q'w) or any person who removes any people from the Mansion of 
Mn-M(t-W, Heart's Ease in Abydos forcefully (m kf') from district to district, as 
also KR/ II: 326, 14). The Vizier (Urk. IV: 1390, 14; TT 93; P-M 1: 190-194) is called the Lord of the wJbyt' 
where "harvest" is_ perhaps superior to bounty or abundance as it refers to neither Pharaoh nor a god, but a mere 
human. CairoJdE 28569 (G. A. Gaballa, "Three Acephalous Stelae,'JfA 63 [1977]: pi. 22, x+2) refers to 
"increasing the wJbyt in this land" where harvest is again the most suitable translation. The text of the "Blessing of 
Ptah" (KR/ II: 267, 1; 3) refers to npri wtbyt, "the corn of the harvest", if the text is suitably emended. P. Lansing 
12,4 (LEM 111,2) can be translated with "harvest-corn' as harvest alone is not appropriate here, as far as this 
peculiar text can be understood. The principle may be that wtbyt was a general word for harvest, with .smw 
bearing a more specific meaning . 
575 ir. <f>w. In F. LI Griffith's facsimile (JEA 13: pi. 40, 1. 25) there appears tobe sufficient space for a t tobe 
restored. While K. A. Kitchen (KR/ 1: 50,4) resists temptation, it is not unreasonable to succumb. 
576 F. LI . Griffith renders "districts". 
577 Cf. KR/ 1: 50,6 with K. A. Kitchen's note (KR/ 1: 50, 16) against F. LI. Griffith's facsimile,JfA 13: pi. 40, 1. 26. 
578 There seems tobe a consislent effort to distinguish the seated man from the divine determinative, indicating that 
these are lobe translated differently. Thus the divergence from F. LI. Griffith's translation, where both are rendered 
with the first person singular. This and the following references of a similar nature should be understood as 
referring to Seti (first person singulor) and Osiris (second person singular), etc. 
579 Or: "which I have created" . Cf. K. A. kitchen 's note, KR/ 1: 50, 16. 
58° F. LI . Griffith's rendering does not take account of the difficulty posed by im, which is not followed by a suffix, but 
a preposition (according to the translation), aside from the clear presence of the divine determinative. Thus, nhn 
is rendered as a sgm.f form here, followed by a conventional use of nfryt r. The philosophical meaning is not 
however enhanced by a correct reading. 
581 As. K. A. Kitchen points out (KR/ 1: 50, 16), it is not at all certain that this mutilated possage uses s:yt, and not b:yt, 
although probable. 
582 F. LI. Griffith correctly emended the text here to ir. 
563 bry Pfit: Whether this refers to an officer, literally "Chief of Archers" or to an official responsible for foreigners is not 
clear. Helck, Militärführer, p. 73, translates "Oberst" (Colonel); Schulman, Rank, p. 4 and passim, translates 
"commander of a host". 
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pressed to corvee labour,584 to plough as 
44 corvee labour or to harvest; or who shall likewise remove any woman or any man of 
the Mansion of Mn-M;'t-R", Heart's Ease in Abydos; or likewise any of their slaves 
forcefully for any task 
45 which is anywhere in the entire land; or likewise any charioteer, any stable master or 
any other person belonging to the Crown Estate sent on any mission of Pharaoh 
(L!H!P!) who shall take any people of the Mansion of Mn-M;'t-R', Heart's Ease in 
Abydos 
46 from district to district as pressed or corvee labour to plough as corvee labour or to 
harvest, or likewise do any task: the Law shall be enforced against him, in that he 
shall be beaten585 with 200 blows and five deliberate wounds,586 
47 together with exacting from him the btkw of the Mansion of Mn-M; ' t-R' , Heart's 
ease in Abydos for every day he shall spend with him . And he (himself) shall be 
given over to the Mansion of Mn-M;'t-R', Heart's Ease in Abydos. And as for 
48 any Viceroy, any Military Official, any Mayor, and Controller, and any person sent 
on a mission to Cush who shall detain any vessel of the Mansion of Mn-M;'t-R', 
Heart's Ease in Abydos, and likewise the boat of any controller of the Estate 
49 mooring it for even a single day, saying, "I will seize it as the requis[<ition>] from 
him f[<or>] any [<mis>]sion of Pharaoh (L!H!P!)": The La[<w>] shall be enforced 
[<against>] him, [<in that he shall be beaten with>] 200 blows and five deliberate 
wounds. 
50 The btkw of the boat shall be exacted from him for every day that he shall have 
moored it. And he (himself) shall be given over to the Mansion of Mn-M;'t-R", 
Heart's Ease in Ab[<yd>]os. [<And>] as for any official, any Field Supervisor of this 
Estate, 
51 any plough herdsman 587 and any controller who shall violate the boundaries of the 
fields of the Mansion of Mn-M;'t-R', Heart's Ease in Abydos to shift the boundaries: 
the Law shall be enforced against him, cutting off his nose and his two ears, 
52 and he shall be given over tobe a cultivator in the Mansion of Mn-M;'t-R', Heart's 
Ease in Abydos [ .. ... .. ..... ]. 
584 For the expressions brtyand bbw, cf. A. H . Gardiner (JEA 38: 28-29) where he correctly points out that "brt in 
our decree cannot mean corvee, since that is the meaning of bbw which follows" . Thal it cannot refer to an 
ordinary type of 'contract" labour (his own rendering with "?") he himself made quite clear. lt can only refer to 
some kind of "assigned" or "enforced" labour. lt is usually associated with the Hebrew br't, "covenant", 'pact". 
Although the use of the normal r in place of the lion r would speak againsl the reading of an /, the Akkadian biltu 
and Aromoic blt suggest themselves. 
585 Sir Alon renders this quile correctly (JEA 38 : 30) . . 
586 F. LI. Griffith (JEA 13: 201, n. 15), W.F. Edgerton (JNf56: 223, n. 28) and K. A. Kitchen (KR! 1: 53 : 7; 17) 
concur in the exclusion of the single superfluous strake. The rendering of wbnw sd is o voriotion on thot ~rovided 
by F. LI . Griffith ond W.F. Edgerlon ("pierced wounds"), since wbnw themselves ore "open wounds" (Deines/ 
Westendorf, Wörterbuch 1: 178), while sg has the meaning "to inflict" (CDME, p. 257) . W ithoul any unduly 
sodistic thoughts one is obliged to ossume thot five intentional wounds are to be inflicted upon ony law-breaking 
official who hos the misfortune lo suffer several (unintenlional) open wounds in the course of the flogging . 
587 Cf. G . R. Hughes, SOLL, pp. 45 -47, for the Demotic references to ';m; Wb. V: 384, 14-385,9. 
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COMtv\ENT 
The Nauri Decree of Seti I is intended to protect the lands and servants, and therefore the 
income of the temple of Osiris at Abydos. Seti I awarded the temple massive donations of 
land and supplies and serfs, "htri anew",588 and, perhaps ''bringing the sJyt (?)". 589 In the 
legal sanctions he stipulates that "the bJkw of the boat will be exacted" from a miscreant 
official "for every day he shall have moored it". 590 lt seems to be clear that the bJkw referred 
to here are for the temple, in contrast to the bJkw of Pharaoh in the Horemhab decree. 
There is no evidence of any exemptions or special arrangements, as the evidence merely 
indicates that the temple personal are protected from interference, and threatened with 
grave sanctions should they violate the property rights of the temple. 
588 1. 20. 
589 1. 28. K. A. Kitchen (KR/ 1: 50, 16) points out that it is not even certain that this is sJyt, and not btyt, but the former 
is possible. 
590 1. 50. 
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Su/vVv\ARY oF THE CoMPLETE TEXT 
1 INTRODUCTION : 1 , 1 -1 , 8 
The Pharaoh Ramesses III announces that he intends to delineate all of the gifts 
which he has arranged that the gods receive during his prosperous reign 
II THEBES: 3, 1-23,6; . 
preceded by vignette 
a lntroduction: 3, 1-9,9 
The King 6egs the gods to take care of his soul and reminds them of all the 
wonderful things which he has done for them, including everything from massive 
construction projects to overflowing granaries and precious trinkets. Among these 
general statements are sentences including btri and btkw 
6 The List: 10, 1-11, 11 
of the of the temple dependents, cattle, gardens, forests, lands, 6oats, lumber and 
villages which the Pharaoh has presented to the temples 
c The List: 12a, 1-126, 13 
of the styt, btkw-rmf products from mining, agriculture, manufacturing, etc. char-
acterized as the "annual btri" of the dependents of the temples which the King 
gave the temples during his reign 
dThelist: 13a,1-166,12 
of precious metals, precious stones, linen, oils, wine, animals, etc., (referred to as 
inw) which the King himself presented during his entire reign 
e The Grain Offerings: 166, 13-166, 15 
of the entire reign (2,981,674 khar) 
fThelist: 17a,1-216,10 
of the Festival Offerings: cakes, loaves, dates, flowers, incense, etc., 6ut also 
cattle, fowl, fish, etc., provided 6y the King himself 
g The List: 21 6, 1 1 - 2 1 6, l 6 
of the divine images made of metal and wood 
h The final prayer: 22, 1-23,6 
591 Only excerpts are provided in the translation following the summary, with the poge, line (e.g. 486,7) numbers of 
those of the original !ext (Birch, Facsimile, used by Erichsen, Harris!. Roman numerals (e.g., IVa) refer to the 
sections of the text in the summary. Grandel ( Papyrus Harris, pp. 20-22 has produced a comparable orgdnization 
of the text, and cites those of his predecessors as weil. Those requiring the entire text are referred to Grandet, 
Papyrus Harris and BAR IV: 87-206. 
The purpose of the passages quoted here is to provide the reader with an image of what P. Harris I contains, not 
a comprehensive account. This tronslation was made prior to the publication of Grandel, Papyrus Harris, which 
is the authoritative translation. 
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III HELIOPOLIS: 25, l -4 l b,6 
preceded by vignette 
a lntroduction: 25, l-30,6 
as above for Thebes 
6 The List: 31, l -32a,6 
of temple dependents, cattle, gardens, forests, land, boats, lum6er, and villages 
which Pharaoh presented to the temples 
c The List: 32a,7-32b, 14 
of the s;yt b1kw-rmJ products from mining, agriculture, manufacturing, etc., 
characterized as the "annual htri" of the dependents of the temples 
d The List: 33a, l-346,5 
of precious metals, precious stones, linen, oils, wine, animals, etc. (characterized 
as inw), which the King himself presented during his entire reign 
e The Grain Offerings: 346,6-346,9 
of the entire reign ( l '097'624 khor) 
f The List: 346, l 0-370, 13 
of the Festival Offerings: cakes, loaves, dates, flowers, incense, etc., 6ut also 
cattle, fowl, fish, etc., provided by the King himself 
g The Nile Offerings: 376, l - 4 l 6,6 
of precious metals and precious stones, as well as loaves, 6eer, oils, incense, 
greens, honey, etc., which the King presented to the Nile at Heliopolis 
h The Final Prayer: 42, l-42, l o 
IV MEMPHIS: 44, l-566, lO 
a lntroduction: 44, l -50, l 
preceded 6y vignette as a6ove for The6es 
6 The List: 5la, l-516,2 
of temple dependents, cattle, gardens, forests , land, boats, and a village which 
the Pharaoh presented to the temples 
c The List: 5lb,3-52a,3 
of the s;yt b1kw-rmJ products of mining, agriculture, manufacturing, etc., charac-
terized as the "annual htri" of the dependents of the temples 
d The List: 52a,4-53 6, l l 
of precious metals, precious stones, linen, oils, wine, animals, etc., which the 
King himself presented during his entire reign 
e The Grain offerings: 536, l 2-54a, l 
of the entire reign (947'688 khor) 
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f The Nile Offerings: 54a,2-56a, 12 
of precious metals, and precious stones, as weil as looves, 6eer, oils, incense, 
vegeta6Ies, honey, etc. which the King presented to the Nile at Heliopolis 
g The Final Prayer: 566, 1-566, 10 
V THE Stv\ALLER TEMPLES: 57, 1-666, 10 
a lntroduction: 57, 1-60, 10 
The King descri6es the various services which he has caused to be rendered to the 
less significant sanctuaries of the land, in general terms, without once referring to 
btri, sJyt, b1kw, b1kw-rml, etc. with the specific meaning of "imposition", "levy" 
etc., in stark contrast to the regular use of these terms in the parallel paragraphs for 
the temples of The6es, Heliopolis and Memphis 
6 The List: 61 a, 1-62a, 10 
of temple dependents, cattle, land, gardens and shipyards, which the Pharaoh 
himself presented to the temples 
c The List: 62a, 11-62a, 13 
of grain, greens and flax, equivalent to, 6ut not explicitly stated to 6e the annual 
btri of the temple dependents 
d The List: 626, 1-65c, 16 
of royal gifts: precious metals and precious stones, linen, incense, honey, oils, 
fowl, cattle, lum6er, leather, gardens, land, etc., as inw as a6ove in parallel 
paragraphs 
e The List: 660, 1-66a,4 
of grain provided for the divine offerings 
f The Final Prayer: 666, 1-666, 10 
as a6ove, with a reference to the inw as part of an optative form 
VI THE ToTALS: 67, 1-74, 12 
a Summary: 67, 1-686,3 
of everything which the King has turned over to the various temples 
6 The List: 68b,4-70a,2 
of the sJyt b1kw-rmf "which the King gave to the various temples "as their annual 
btd' 
c The List: 70a,3-74, 10 
of the royal gifts 
d The List: 7 4, l 1 -7 4, l 2 
of the grain provided for the festival offerings (khar 5'279'552) 
VII The Historical summary: 75, 1-79, 12 
The King explains himself 
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The paragraphs must evidently be distinguished from one another, not only based on the 
items listed under each heading, but primarily according to the headings themselves. The 
same types of items appear under two different headings, with respect to one and the same 
temple. The King provided various temples and sanctuaries with dependents, as weil as 
large numbers of articles from his own reserves. He seems to have taken credit for the 
objects given by the dependents to the temples as "their annual htri". The smaller temples did 
not receive any deliveries from their dependents classified as b;kw-rml, s;yt, or htri. The 
King alone is responsible for the items termed inw being delivered to the temples, as they do 
not seem to have their own inw income. 
T RANSIATION OF EXCERPTS 
I INTRODUCTION 1, 1- 1,8 
1, 1 Regnal Year 32, III smw 6 under the Majesty of the King of Upper and 
Lower Egypt, Ramesses III [ ... ] beloved of all the gods and goddesses 
[ ... ] 
1,2 [ ... ] 
1,3 [ ... who] relates in praise, adoration and adulation the mighty and numerous 
presents which he has made as King and Ruler while still on Earth [for] the 
Estate592 of his august father, Amonrasonther 
1,4 and Mut and Khons and all the deities of Thebes and for the Temple of his 
august father Atum, the Lord d the Two Lands at Heliopolis and 
Ra-Harakhte, lw.s- 'is.t, Nb.t-btp and all the deities of Heliopolis, and 
for the Temple of his august father 
1,5 Ptah the Great, South of his Wall, the Lord of Memphis ('nb-g-wy), and 
great Sakhmet, consort of Ptah, and Nefertem, the Shelter of the Two 
Lands, and all the deities of Memphis (Hwt-k~-Ptb), and for his august 
fathers, all the gods and goddesses [sie!] of Upper 
1 ,6 and Lower Egypt, (and) namely the beautiful and [<numerous>] gifts [<made 
by the peo>]ple of the Land of Egypt, (and) every land, assembled in their 
entirety in a single account593 in order to inform 
592 The tronslotion of the word pr in such contexts hos alwoys been difficult. In the text of this book, it is frequently 
rendered os "Temple" or ''Estate" (in the cose of Amonrasonther) . Cf. P. Spencer, Temple, p . 20. 
593 This restorotion differs from that of Erichsen and Breasted; and Grandel (Papyrus Harris, p. 221) hos followed 
them, although he likewise tronslates the sentence os ending with a single complete lisl. The present writer hos 
some difficulty in thinking of presents mode to the people, os none such are listed, while it is frequently stoted that 
Egyptions ond foreigners were responsible for certain categories of gifts. The unonimous accloim is more logical 
if it is from the foreigners for the gods, rather thon if we assert that Ramesses III octuolly wanted to help the 
foreigners! lt is the duty of the people to moke gifts to the gods. The reading ''(ond) every land'' is not sotisfoctory, 
but this motches the text, olthough very probably something is missing here. 
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1,7 the fathers: all the gods and goddesses of Upper and Lower Egypt [sie!]; 
the people: nobles and commoners all; and the sunfolk, of the many 
numerous and mighty presents 
1,8 which he made while still on Earth, as great ruler of Egypt. 
II Thebes: 3, l-23,6 
lla 
3, l-4,2 [ ... ] 
4,3 [ ... ] 1 fill into its treasuries namely objects of the lands, and of Egypt: 
4,4 gold and precious stones, all 594 (abundant) by the hundred-thousand. 595 
lts granaries overflow with the good corn of successful harvests. [lts] 
cultivable land, its herds: their numbers like unto the sand grains of the 
river banks. 1 have btri for it 
4,5 Upper and Lower Egypt. Nubia and the Phoenician Coast are burdened 
with their b1kw for it. Filled with the plunder which thou hast given me 
from the foreign enemies [ ... ] 
4,6 [ ... ] 
7,4 [ ... ] 1 have endowed for thee festival offerings for the festivals of seasonal 
commencement, tobe presented 596 before thee at thy every appearance, 
provided with bread and beer, cattle and fowl, wine, incense varieties, 
(all) beyond count. They were btri anew 597 to the officials and control-
lers598 in excess of all the gifts which I have made for thy kI. [ ... ] 
7,5-9, l [ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
9,2 [ ... ] The foreigners of Syria (R!nw) came to it 
9,3 bearing their inw to it, as appropriate for its divinity. 1 have drawn the 
earth (?) as a whole to thee, burdened with their b1kw to offer it to Thebes, 
your distant 599 city. 
9,4-9,9 [ ... ] 
594 Since 'U is a feminine, such o scrupulous scribe would have written nb.t correspondingly, were we to follow 
ßreasted. 
595 One could be tempted to render this as 'like todpoles'' os suggested in the following sentence, using o simile with 
grains of sand, but the corresponding entry for Heliopolis (28, 1, infra) shows that o figure is tobe understood, 
ond not o simile. 
596 The text has r-mf, which could be interpreted 'renewed", but in onology to the similor possages, ans is missing, 
which hos been restored here, for the reading, "presented''. 
597 iw.sn htri m mMf ..... One would expect iw.sn br btri in o text of this quolity. lt is possible that this is o post 
passive porticiple, "they being htri onew to". As the goods ore not identified os btri, bJkw, etc., it is possible that 
this use ot htri actually meons "assigned to'' in a generol sense and not in o specificolly fiscal sense. 
598 Cf. J.-M. Kruchten, "L'evol~tion de lo gestion dominiole sous le nouvel empire egyptienne,' in: Lipinski Stole ond 
Temple, II: 517-525; J. Cerny, Community, pp. 255-259. 
599 Or "mysterious'. 
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l 0, l Summary of the possessions, herds, gardens, fields, mns barges, dock-
yards, villages, which Pharaoh (L!H!P!) gave to the Estate of his august 
father, 
l 0,2 Amonrasonther and Mut and Khons and all the gods of Thebes, imy-prwo 
eternally and forever. 
10,3-10, 16 [ ... ] 
l l, 1 Divine images, divine tabernacles, divine statues of favourites601 for which 
b1kw the officials and standard bearers, agents, and people of the land, 
11,2 which Pharaoh (L!H!P!) caused made as endowment (br sdf) of the Estate 
of Amonrasonther under the authority of those responsible for them, for 
eternity and forever. 
11,3 gods 
making individual pieces, total 
1 1 ,4 heads total 
11,5 cattle and sheep and goats 
1 1 , 6 gardens, etc 
11,7 fields arouras 
11,8 kJr- and mns-vessels 
1 1 , 9 carpenters' workshops 
11, 10 villages in Egypt 56 
11, 11 villages in Syria and Nubia 9, total 
2'756 
5'164 
86'486 
421 '362 
433 
864' 168 .25 
83 
46 
65 
12a, 1 ltems: the sJyt b1kw-rmJ of all the serfs of the Mansion 602 of the King 
Ramesses III [ ... ] in the Estate of Amun 
l 2a,2 in the Southern and Northern districts [of the Land of Egypt] under the 
authority of the officials of the House of Ramesses III [ ... ] in the Estate of 
Amun in the city; the House of Ramesses III [ . .. ] in the Estate of Amun; 
12a,3 the Mansion of Ramesses III[ ... ], united with joy603 ; in the House of lmn-
m-ipt; the House of Ramesses III[ ... ] in the House of Khons, the five herds 
l 2a,4 made for this House given by the King Wsr-M~'t-R', beloved of Amun 
(L!H!P!), the great god, to their treasuries, magazines, and granaries 
l 2a,5 as their annual btri. 
600 Cf. supra p . 179 n. 538. 
601 ib-ib, cf. Caminos, LEM 29. 
602 Cf. P. Spencer (Temple, pp. 21-27), where bwt ('Mansion") is shown tobe a specific term for the mortuory 
temples, although frequently used with other or broader meanings . The temples listed are the Medinet Habu 
Complex, the barque shrine at Karnak, the temple at Luxor, the temple of Khons and the southern Karnak temple. 
603 Cf. 1. 5,7, as indicated by W. Erichsen's ''sie". 
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604[ kg ] 
12a,6 fine gold 217.5 deben [ 19.79] 
l2a,7 gold of the mountain of Coptos 61.3 deben [ 5.58] 
12a,8 gold of Cush 290.8125 deben [ 26.46) 
12a,9 total: fine and desert gold 569.6125 deben [ 51.83] 
12a, lO silver 10'964.9 deben [ 997.8 l 
12a, 11 total: gold and silver l 1'546.8 deben [ l '050.76] 
*[ l l '534.55) deben * [ l '049.64] 
12a, 12 copper 26'320 deben 605 [ 2'395.12] 
12a, 13 royal linen, fine thin textiles: 
total: 3'722 fine thin garments 
12a, 14 linen 3'795 deben 
12a, 15 incense, honey, sesame oil 1'047 ; " vessels 606 
126, l sweet wine (?), wine 25'405 :" vessels 
126,2 silver, as o6jects: the btkw-rmt, consecrated for the 
divine offerings 3'606.l deben 328.2 l 
126,3 meosured corn: 607 the btkwof the cultivators 309'950 khar 
126,4 fresh greens 24'650 mrw-6undles608 
126,5 flax 64'000 n 'bw-6undles 
126,6 waterfowl: the btkwof the fowlers and fishers 609289'530 
126,7 oxen; ox calves; short-horned cows; registered cattle 
entered, of the herds of Egypt610 847 heod 
126,8 oxen, ox calves; short-horned cows; cattle : the btkw 
of the Land of Syria (n. w n btr) 
.12 heod 
total: 866 heod 
126,9 live geese as .styw 744 [pairs of wings) 
126, 10 cedar skty-ferries611 11 
604 The figures between square 6rackets are there to orient the modern reader in the relative value of the items. 
Figures in square 6rackets preceded 6y an asterisk are the figures produced by adding up the preceding figures, 
and are thus the totals corresponding to the text, 6ut need not necessarily be correct, as the mistake may lie in the 
scribe having written the inappropriate figures rather than having made a mathematical error. 
605 The proportions of gold and silver presented here are quite curious, when compared to the relative values of these 
metals. While ·the exchange value of gold:silver:copperwas l :2: 120 at the time (cf.J, J Janssen, "Prolegomena 
to the Study of Egypt's Economic History," SAK 3 [1975]: 155-156), the ratio of the objects presented is 
l : 20: 40. The actual quantity of gold reported does not compare favourably with the more than l 5'000 k.g (sie! 
cf. Janssen, SAK 3: 154) presented 6y Thutmosis III. 
606 lt is not entirely cleor what value these vessels signified, cf. Janssen, Prices, pp. 337-338. 
607 ssr bq;t: strictly "corn measure corn". The total would be the quantity expected of l 550 work.ers with an 
o6ligation of 200 khareach (cf. 0. Gardiner 86, vso. 3/H.0. 82,3; supra pp. 144-145 n. 408), which is not 
incompati6le with the extraordinary num6ers of temple dependents. 
608 The value of these 6undles is unknown, cf. Janssen, Prices, p. 360. 
lffl Although the quantities appear a bit fantastic, a comparison with the recto of the Turin Canon shows that 
extraordinary quantities of fish and birds were aclually collected . Cf. supra p. 160 and Gardiner, Royal Canon, 
f?I. 6: 3,5 with 200'000 fish in a single entry. 
610 
'[ ... ] ihw n qdwt n r; n mnmnwt kmt". The meaning of qdt in this context (Wb. V: 80,6) is as mysterious as that 
of n r; n mnmnwt(Wb. II: 392, 12). qdt(in this sense) might appear in Gurob Fragment F, 1,7 (RAD, p. 19,3), 
which is not particularly enlightening, while the second term is not present elsewhere. lt is possible that P. Turin 
1882, vs. 2,8 (LEM, p. 123, l; Caminos, LEM, pp. 453-454; A H. Gardiner, "Ramesside Texts Relating to the 
Taxation and Transport of Corn,"JEA 27 [1941]:21) provides a hint for the proper translation, and this opportu-
nity has 6een exploited herein the interest of reada6ility. 
611 S. Glanville ("Records of a ~oyal Dockyard of the Time of Thutmosis III : Papyrus British Museum l 0056,'' ZÄS 66 
[ 1931]: 105-121 and 24S 68 [ 1932]: 7-41; 68: 14-15, 31 n. 2) suggests that these vessels were either 
foreign boats themselves or Egyptian copies of such boats. Another novel suggestion is that the names denote the 
ports of call of these various ships. Jones, Glossary, pp. 145-146 is less committal. 
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126, l l acacia skly-boats; floating stalls; bw bnt-ib cattle 
transports; 612 J:rti-skiffs and ktrcorn tronsport vessels 71 
126, 12 total of cedar and acacia vessels 82 
126, 13 items: from the oasis/foreign wood in greol quantilies 
for the divine offerings 
lld 
13a, 1 Silver and gold, real lapis lazuli, real turquoise, all real precious stones, 
ore, garments of royal linen, extra613 linen, 
13a,2 thin linen, fine thin linen, decorated garments, jars, fowl, and all things 
which Wsr-Mn-Rc beloved of Amun (L!P!H!), the great god, 
13a,3 gave as inw of the Lord (L!P!H!) for the provisionment of the estate of his 
august fathers, Amonrasonther, Mut and Khons 
1 3a,4 from Regnal Year 1 to Regnal Year 31 , making thirty-one years. 
makes 
l3a,5 fine smithed gold totol 42 
l3a,6 fine gold, chosed,614 rings of Asia (?), 22 
13a,7 fine gold in inlay, rings of Asia (?), 9 
13a,8 fine gold in chased work, with inlay of precious 
stones, oll real, stqw of a column for Amun, 1 
l3a,9 fine gold incised (?) 615 to6Iet, l 
l3a,l0 total of fine gold in equipment 
13a, l l re-used gold,616 chosed work, inlay in rings of Asio (?), 42 
13a, 12 re-used gold, vases,617 2 
13a, 13 total of re-used gold 
13a, 14 shining 618 gold, rings of Asia (?), 310 
136, l shining gold beods, 264 
136,2 shining gold, beoten, rings of Asia (?), for the god, 108 
136,3 shining gold, omulet cords, 155 
136,4 total shining gold, 
136,5 total fine gold, re-used gold, shining gold 
136,6 silver vases, rim of gold in chased work, l 
136,7 silver lid (?) for vase, l 
136,8 silver, strainer, l 
136,9 silver, vase, 4 
136, 10 silver, large boxes with lids, 31 
136, l l silver, caskets with a lid, 31 
136, 12 silver, weapons cases, 6 
61 2 Cf. Naville, Tb. II : 89: Sp. 26, 4. 
6 13 Cf. Jonssen, Prices, pp. 489f. 
deben 
21 
3 
22 
9 
57 
*(57 
4 
30 
35 
16 
48 
19 
6 
90 
183 
112 
12 
27 
57 
105 
74 
30 
614 Cf. BAR IV: 129, ''raised work". The weight would confirm the suspicion. 
kite [ kg 
[ 1.91 l 
3 [ .3003 l 
3.5 [ .12285] 
5 [ 2.0475 l 
5.5 [ .86905] 
5 [ 5.2325 l 
7] * [ 5.2507 l 
5.5 [ .41405] 
5 [ 2.7755 l 
0 .5 [ 3.18955] 
3.5 [ 1.48785] 
4 [ 4.4044 l 
8 [ 1.8018 l 
2 [ .56 l 
7.5 [ 8.26 l 
5 [ 16.7 l 
5 [ 10.24 
'l 3 [ 1.12 
7 [ 2.52 l 
4.5 [ 5 .23 l 
4 [ 9 .59 l 
4 [ 6.77 ] 
3 [ 2.76 l 
615 m qbqb is used of metal and stone: cutting into metol - incision - would oppeor tobe the suita6Ie etymological 
guess here. (BAR IV: 130, "hammered' is etymologically less likely). 
6 16 nbw n sp sn. 
61 7 Cf. Janssen, Prices, p. 409. The weight seems far too great for simple cups. 
618 Taking occount of determinative ofter bsl 
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136, 13 silver incised (?), ta6Iet, l 19 3 .5 [ 1.76 
136, 14 silver incised (?), ta6Iet, 2 287 0.5 [ 26 . 12 
136, 15 silver, scrap 100 [ 9 . 1 
136, 16 total of silver in articles and scrap 827 1.25 [75 .27 
*[826 4.5] * [ 75 .21 
14a, 1 total of gold and silver in articles and scrap 1'010 6 .25 [91 .97 
*[1 '010 3]619 * [ 91.94 
14• ,2 lapis lazuli , real stones, 2 14 5 
14• ,3 copper, incised (2) ta6Iets, 822 
14a,4 rnyrrh, dried 5'120 
14a,5 rnyrrh, dried, bqu? 3 
14• ,6 rnyrrh, dried, hin 20 
14a,7 rnyrrh trees 15 
140,8 rnyrrh seed, in oipe 100 
14a,9 royal linen, dw-garrnents 37 
14a,l0 royal linen, dw-upper garrnents 94 
14a, 11 royal linen, hmn-garrnents 55 
14a, 12 royal linen , gtw-garrnents 11 
14a, 13 royal linen, Horus-wrappings (?) 2 
14a,14 royal linen, Q'w-garrnents l 
14a, 15 royal linen kerchiefs 690 
14a, 16 royal linen, mss-garrnents 489 
14a, 17 royal linen, garrnents of the august statue of Arnun 4 
146, l total of royal linen garrnents 1'383 
146,2 mk-shawl 620 
146,3 mk-cloak621 
146,4 mk-covering of cloth for the august irnage of Arnun l 
146,5 total of mk-clothing: 3 
146,6 fine thin dw-garrnents 2 
146,7 fine thin .Q'w-garrnents 4 
146,8 fine thin dw-upper/over garrnents 5 
146,9 fine thin scarves 31 
146,10 fine thin mss-garments 29 
146, 11 fine thin kilts (?) 4 
146, 12 total fine thin clothing 75 
146, 13 smooth g Jiw-garrnents 876 
146,14 smooth mss-garrnents 6'779 
146, 15 total smooth clothing 7'125 
* [7 '555] 
146,16 total royal, mkw, fine thin, thin srnooth articles of clothing 8 '586 
*[9'116] 
15a, l white incense, mnt-jars 622 2 ' 159 
619 The total here are particularly difficult : 1'010.625 - 827.125 = 183 .5, so that lines (14a, l ), (136, 16) and 
(136,5) are internally inconsistent. (136,5) is however erroneous, as Breasted pointed out, and should read 
57. 7 . This correct figure was used for the surn, so that the interim reckoning was not used, demonstrating that the 
whole document may have been copied line for line, and that search ing for errors is amusing 6ut futile, as it is 
rarely clear exactly which total is inaccurate . 
62° Cf. Janssen, Prices, p. 290. 
621 Cf. Janssen, Prices, p . 278 . 
622 Cf. W . Helck, "Maße und Gewichte, " LÄ III : 1203, who indicates that a mnw-vessel was an amphora of 
20 hin, while the preceding poge of the same article (LÄ III: 120 l ) says that the mnt-vessel was an indefinite 
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15a,2 
15a,3 
15a,4 
15a,5 
15a,6 
15a,7 
15a,8 
15a,9 
15a,10 
15a, 11 
15a, 12 
15a, 13 
15a, 14 
15a, 15 
white incense, mnt-jars (2) 
honey, mnt-jars 
Egyptian sesame oil, 623 mnw-jars 
Syrian sesame oil, msb-jars 624 
Syrian sesame oil, mnt-jars 
white animal fat, mnw-jars 
goose fat, mnw-jars 
curds, 625 mnw-jars 
total of J«t-jars,626 full 
sweet wine, mnw-jars 
sweet wine, kb-jars627 
wine, mnw- jars 
Translation of Excerpts 
total of sweet wine and wine mnw and kb 
carnelian 628 wgJf-eye amulets 
12 
1'065 
2'743 
53 
1'757 
911 
385 
20 
9'125 
*[9'105] 
1'377 
1'111 
20'078 
22'556 
*[22'566] 
185 
measure, of between 20 and 40 hin. The Wb. (II : 66, 4-10) does not dislinguish the fwo. Certainly the 
traditional identification of the vessels held by the kneeling king at offering scenes as mnw-vessels would speak 
against a volume of 20 hin ( l O litres). J. J. Janssen (Prices, R· 330) pc:>ints out however that P. Turin 1894, 4 
suggests that "5 mnt-jars are said together to contain 49 hin.[ ... ] mean[ing] that the capacity was c . l O hin for 
each". The jars thus probably contained an unspecified quantity of liquid. as the hin measure was occasionally a 
value measure and not a measure of fluid volume (cf. Janssen, Prices, pp. l 08- l 09) . 
As a measure of volume, the hin would be roughly half a litre (cf. Gardiner, Wilbour, II: 64) . J. J. Janssen (Prices, 
p. 108) suggests that when measuring sesame-oil, the uni! did seem to have been a value as such, with one hin 
equal to one deben . This raises the question of whether these quantities - in P. Harris 1 - are values and not 
quantities, but texts such as P. Turin 1894 suggest that it was the quantity and not the value that was measured, 
so that the quantities given in P. Harris I are probably volume, but the total quantity of sesame-oil in these lines 
would be dependent upon reading the msb value, and assuming that the mnt-jar had a specific volume value. 
The total volume of the Syrian and Egyptian sesame-oil in mnt-vessels is the curiously round 4500, which cannot 
be divided by 3 l (even if we add in the 5 3 msb vessels), but comes out to roughly 145 vessels a year. lf we 
follow Janssen (Prices, pp. 340-341) assuming that the mnt-jar of sesame-oil was l O hin, the figure would be 
roughly 22'500 litres. 
623 1 am sorely tempted to accept Grandet's logically sound suggestion that "sesame oil" should be changed to "olive 
oil" (pace Grandel, Papyrus Horris II : 47 n. 178), but the botanical evidence seems less persuasive (cf. R. Germer, 
"Olive," LÄ IV: 567). 
624 Through a lopsus colomi Erichsen has mnt; BAR correct. J. J. Janssen (Prices, p. 330 n. 7) suggests that __ the 
volume of the msb was indefinite; cf. Janssen, Ship 's Logs, pp. 71-72 . W. Helck ("Maße und Gewichte," LA III : 
l 203) suggests that P Turin 68, l O suggests that the msb-jar contained 46 hin, but this is precisely the reference 
used by Janssen (Prices, p. 330 n. 7 ; Ship 's Logs, pp. 71-72) which can only be used to suggest a capacily of 
c. 55 hin, but only if you disregard the order in which the jars are listed individually. W. Helck intended to eile 
P. Turin 1894 (P/R, pi. 34,3) where two msb jars contain 92 hin, which need by no means be inlerpreted as 
suggesting that each held 46 hin. 
W. Helck (lÄ III: 1203) points out that the msb corresponds to the mosabto, but the Akkadian mosbartu(m), 
mosbaru(m), or masbatu (v. Soden, AHW II : 618 ; CAD l 0 / 1: 323) refers to vessels containing oil, without a 
volume value (q. v . "Maße und Gewichte,·' RlA VII: 457-530 where it is not listed, even under informal Syrien 
measures). 
625 Cf. Janssen, Prices, pp. 352ft 
626 For the J"t-jar as a generic term uniting mnw and msb-vessels, cf. Janssen, Prices, p. 338 . 
627 Amphora? 
628 Harris (lexicographical Studies, p. 120) notes for hrst that "there cannot in Fact be any doubt that the WäRTERBUCH's 
translation 'carnelian' is correct", while C. Müller-Winkler (Obiekt-Amulette, p. 124) notes that carnelian wgJt-
eye pieces of Dynasty XVIII date are far more common than those preserved from the Ramesside period. ("Carneol 
bleibt jedoch die weitaus beliebteste Steinsorte' in Dynasty XVIII, Müller-Winkler, Obiekt-Amulette, p. 118). 
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15a,16 lapis lazuli 629 wgJt-eye amulets 217 
156, 1 red jasper630 scara6s 62 
156,2 turquoise scara6s 224 
156,3 scara6s of amethyst and quartz (?) 631 224 
156,4 lapis lazuli scara6s 62 
156,5 wgJt-eye amulets of precious materials 165 
156,6 seols and tyt-amulets of precious materials 62632 
156,7 faience seols 1'550 
156,8 faience beads 155'000 
156,9 faience hin-jars 155 
156, 10 wooden slucco cartouches 31 
156, 11 6lock633 of alabaster 
156, 12 cedar beams 6 
156, 13 cedar tp/634 1 
156, 14 nnyb-wood,635 3, making deben 610 
15a, 15 qdy-wood,636 l, making 800 
156,16 reed,637 6undles 17 
16a,1 ti.sps-plant, 638 msti-sacks, 639 246 
16a,2 fi.sps-plant, 6undles 82 
16a,3 grapes, msti-sacks 52 
16a,4 nkpti-plant,640 msti-sacks 125 
629 C. Müller-Winkler (Ob;ekt-Amulette, pp. 96; 173-177; 498) noles that wgJf-eye lapis lazuli amulets are rare 
at all periods. H. Harris (lexicographical Studies, p. 129) notes that bsbd also means faience imitations. The 
figure of 217 would thus initiallyappearto be surprisingly high (if lapis lazuli is meant) or low(if faience is meant) . 
lf however the figure in the preceding line of 185 refers to real carnelian pieces manufactured during Dynasty XX 
(and not Dynasty XVIII heirlooms), then the two figures are extravagant, 6ut credi6Ie . As the following entries 
indicate that they are in fact to be regarded as "real", it is interesting that these various malerials are not 
designated as "real", whi le the word is used in 1. l 4a,2. 
630 J. Harris ( lexicographical Studies, p. 124) indicates that bnmt means either red jasper or the glass imitalions. The 
figure indicates !hat it need not be understood as an imilation . B. Jaeger (Scarabees Menkheperre, p. 21) noles 
that pu6lished information about the materials of scara6s is unrelia6Ie, while E. Hornung and E. Staehelin 
(Hornung/Staehelin, Skarabäen, pp. 22-23) suggesl that red jasper was generally rare, 6ut particularly appre-
ciated in the Ramesside period . 
631 Hcirris, lexicographical Studies, p. 110. 
632 lt will be noted that the figures 62 and 224 appear repeatedly: 62 is two a year for 31 years , while 217 
(15a , 16) is seven a year, and 224 is seven a year, plus seven . ( 155 is thus likewise five a year) . 
633 Cf. Osing, Nominalbildung, 723 n. 850. This context indicates that ipip(t) is more proba6Iy the 6rick ilself than 
the material, i.e., not "material for 6ricks", 6ut "material os 6ricks". 
634 Jones ( Glossary, p. 192) is non-committol. 
635 R. Germer (Flora, p. 147) is cautious about the identificolion. 
636 R. Germer and L. Keimer (Gartenpflanzen II: 34) dou6tfully suggest a foreign conifer, which would sound oppro-
priote here, 6ut the price is extremely high, cf. supra pp. 175ff. 
637 Keimer, Gartenpflanzen, II : 74 . 
638 R. Germer (Flora, p. 14) comes out decisively ogoinsl the identificotion as cinnomon, on the assumption thot there 
was no Irade between Ceylon ond Nu6io or Egypt. She does not however propose an alternative interpretotion, 
6ut ossumes thot it comes from Nu6io . 
639 Cf. Janssen, Prices, pp. 403-406. Curious is the existence of a msti-boat, Jones, Glossary, p. 140. Does this 
suggest thot msfi designotes something thot ''corries' something , rother thon o specific item? Or is the ms/i-ship o 
container vessel? 
64° Keimer ( Gartenpflanzen, 1: 138-39; 186) hesitotingly suggests mini. lt is probo6ly related lo Akkadion nik/ 
qiptu(m), defined os "o plant" (CAD 11/2: 222) or equolly clearly as "ein Euphorie-Strauch?" (v. Soden, 
AHWII: 788). 
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l6o,5 
l6o,6 
l6o,7 
l6o,8 
l6o,9 
l6o,l0 
l6o,l l 
l6o,l2 
l6o,13 
l6o,14 
l6o,l5 
166,l 
166,2 
166,3 
166,4 
166,5 
166,6 
166,7 
166,8 
166,9 
166,10 
166,l l 
166,12 
lle 
T ronslotion of Excerpts 
iwfyt-plont,641 msti-socks 
bqq-plont, from Hiiw,642 , msti-socks 
cucumbers (?),643 bqt 
gropes, pdr-socks 
gropes, bunches 
pomegronotes, pdr-socks 
bki-plont,644 in oipe 
cattle, various 
geese, living 
trp-geese 645 
waler-fowl, living 
fat geese from the traps 646 
notron blocks 
solt blocks 
palm leoves,647 bound (2) 
palm leaves, loads 
palm leaves, shoots 
palm leaves, fibres 
mots 
split rnats (?) 648 
idniniw 
onions, msti-socks 
neat webbing 649 deben 
166, 13-166, 15 [ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
llf 
101 
26 
46 
1'809 
1'869 
375 
1'668 
297 
2'940 
5'200 
126'300 
20 
44'000 
44'000 
180 
50 
77 
2 
60 
1'150 
60 
50 
750 
17a, 1 061ations of the festivals, endowed 6y King Ramesses III[ ... ], the great 
god for his father, 
17a,2 Amonrasonther, and Mut and Khons and all the deities of Thebes in the 
twenty days of o61ation festivals of 
l7a,3 "Ramesses III[ ... ] Making Thebes festive for Amun" in I smw 26 until II 
smwl4, 
641 W . Helck ("Kyphi," LÄ III: 902-903) points out thot nkpti and iwfyt(= fd) appear together, and contributed to an 
ancient incense rnixture. 
642 Cf. Janssen, Prices, pp. 356-357, esp. p. 356 n. 80. W. Helck ('Ernährung," LA 1: 1268; 1270 n. 37) 
suggests bananas. 
643 Cf. Keirner, Gartenpflanzen, 1: 131-132. 
644 Cf. Keirner, Gartenpflanzen, II: 68. 
645 Cf. Helck, Materialien III: 504; Corninos, LEM, p. 130. 
646 Thal 'sft would rnean "trap" would seem ( frorn the context and suggested root) at least os probable as that it rneans 
flock seerns evident, but is not certoin . · 
647 Waller!, Palmen, p. 48. Just how the words following w!f are tobe understood, as products, rneasures, etc. is 
unclear; cf. W. Helck, 'Maße und Gewichte," LÄ III: 1208 n. 174. 
648 Wb. 1: 470, 14: "nähere Bezeichnung für eine Matte". 
649 Corninos, LEM, pp. 435f. 
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l 7a,4 making twenty days from Regnal Year 22 to Regnal Year 32, making 
eleven years together with the oblations of 
l 7a,5 the festival of Southern Opet in II Jot 19 until III Jot 23, making 29 days 
from 
170,6 Regnal Year 1 until Regnal Year 31, making thirty-one of years. 
l7a,7 fine oblation 6read, large sacks 1'057 
170,8 fine 6read, large heaps 1277 
l7a,9 fine 6read, large btb-measures 1277 
17a, 10 fine 6read, heaps on the earth 440 
l7a,l l o6Iation 6read, large sacks 43'620 
17a, 12 papyrus raw (grw ?) of the House of lncense 685 
17a, 13 beer from the beer stores, 4401, making [incomplete] 
l7a,l4 fine 6read, meat, s'y.t-cakes, rbs-cakes, btp-baskets 650 
for display651 165 
17a, 15 fine 6read, meat, s'y.t-cakes, rbs-cakes, gold trays 485 
176, l fine 6read, meat, s'y.t-cakes, rbs-cakes, trays 
for consumption l 1'120 
176,2 fine 6read, meat, s'y.t-cakes, rbs-cakes, trays, 
Fy-baskets 652 for consumption 9'845 
176,3 fine 6read, meat, s'y.t-cakes, rbs-cakes, trays, 
gty-vessels 653 for official 654 3'720 
176,4 fine 6read of the divine offerings, dnit-baskets 655 
of gold outfitted 375 
176,5 fine 6read of the divine offerings, biU-loaves 62'540 
176,6 fine 6read of the divine offerings, ps-bread 656 106'992 
176,7 fine 6read of the divine offerings, white loaves 13'020 
176,8 fine 6read, large 'qw-cakes for consumption 6'200 
176,9 fine 6read, s'b-cakes 657 [???]658 24'800 
176,10 fine bread, 'qw-cakes baked in the ashes (?) 659 16'665 
176,l l fine 6read, large 'qw-cakes 992'750 
176, 12 fine 6read, ps- and 'qw-cakes, h:t 17'340 
176, 13 fine bread, white oblation loaves 572'000 
176,14 fine bread, bnbn-loaves 46'500 
176,15 fine bread, kyllestis-6read 441'800 
650 Cf. Caminos, LEM, p. 205; Janssen, Prices, pp. 160-16 l. J. J. Janssen indicates that he reads btp as "tray" (pers. 
comm.) 
651 The significance of these phrases is o6scure, 6ut proba6Iy it is tobe distinguished from (176, l) 'for consumption". 
652 Janssen, Prices, pp. 204-205. 
653 Janssen, Prices, pp. 426-428 (bronze vessels). 
654 Peculiar, 6ut the form is more likely sr than wr (cf. Möller, Paläographie, II: nos. 11; 13; BAR IV: 135), which 
does not aid in elucidating the meaning, as no official is specified, and the expected plural slrokes were clearly 
not inlended, nor is there an article. 
655 Janssen, Prices, pp. 140-143. 
656 Janssen, Prices, pp. 344ff. 
657 Janssen, Prices, p. 346. 
658 Hieralic uncertain. 
659 Cf. Verhoeven, Grillen, pp. 170-171. 
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18a, 1 fine 6reod, of the o6lations 127'400 
l8a,2 flour (?) for white looves l 16'400 
l8o,3 fine p 't-looves 262'000 
l8o,4 Total fine 6reod, 'qw 2'844'357 
*[2'806'407] 660 
l8o,5 .s'y, rbs 6reod, JmJm-meosures 344 
180,6 s'y, oipe 48'420 
l8a,7 rbswoipe 28'200 
l8a,8 sk-flour '-jors 3'130 
18o,9 sweet wine (?) , mnw-jors 2'210 
18a, 10 sweel wine, jors 310 
18a, 11 wine, mnw- jors 39'510 
18a, 12 Total, sweet wine, mnw-jors ond jors 42'030 
18a, 13 beer, bnw-vessels 219'215 
18a, 14 sweet bq, mnw-jars 93 
18a, 15 sweet bq, hin-jors 1'100 
186, l white incense, mnw-jors 62 
186,2 incense, oipe 304'093 moking 
186,3 incense, sqw(for 6urning?), mnw-jors 778 
186,4 red bq, mnw-jors 31 
186,5 sesome oil, mnw-jars 93 
186,6 sesame oil, hin 110'000 
186,7 honey, mnw-jors 310 
186,8 white fat, mnw-jars 93 
186,9 olives, mnw-jars 62 
186, 10 thin diw 155 
186, l l thin rdiw 31 
186, 12 decorated sheets 31 
186, 13 decoroted ms-garments 44 
Total 261 
186, 14 wox, deben 3'100 
186, 15 all good fruits, kbs-baskets 620 
186, 16 all good fruits, py-baskets 620 
190, l fruils , troys 559'500 
l9o,2 fruits, dni-baskets 78'550 
l9o,3 figs, btkw, oipe 310 
19o,4 figs, btkw mbJ 1'410 
19o,5 figs, btkw661 msti-sacks 55 
l9a,6 figs in oipe 15'500 
l9a,7 figs, py-baskets 310 
19a,8 mhiwt 3'100 
l9o,9 tisps-plant, trays 220 
19a, 10 tisps-plont, msti-socks 155 
660 Cf. BAR IV: 135, n. f. . 
661 J. Breosted (BAR IV: 137) renders these three items as "of the impost", 6ut the usuol use of the fiscal term b:kw in 
P. Harris identifies it with a particular group, e.g., the cultivators ( 126,3) or the fowlers ( 126,6), and here only the 
meosures are listed. lt is also perhops significanl thot according to the interpretotion advanced here, none of the 
"fiscol terms" oppear in this section of the texl, 6ut btkw as "worked" does appear, e.g., 21 o,2, infra. This is the 
reoding advocated here. 
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19a, 11 s 'm 662 troys 
19o,12 co6boge (??) 663 bq:t 
19o,13 gorlic, 664 bqJt 
19a, 14 garlic, 665 'nbw-6undles 
19a,15 grapes, msti-sacks 
19a,16 grapes, py-sacks 
196,l seed corn, Upper Egyptian,666 bq:t 
196,2 alfalfa-grass mats 
196,3 papyrus sandals, pairs 
196,4 salt, khar 
196,5 salt, 6Iocks 
196,6 natron, 6Iocks 
196,7 thick (cloth), diw-gorments667 
196,8 flax mats (?) 
196,9 rushes, mrw-6undles 
196,10 reeds, mrw-6undles 
196, 11 leather sandals, pairs 
196,12 bqq-fruit in oipe 
196, 13 pomegranates in oipe 
196,14 pomegranates in pdr-sacks 
196,15 olives, g;y-vessels 
196,16 jars and pots of the mouth of the canol 
20a,l papyrus raw (?) in oipe 
20a,2 ndb-boskets oipe 
20a,3 iwt-cattle 
20a,4 young stock of iw; 
20a,5 ng;-cattle 
20a,6 heifers 
20a,7 6ullocks 
20a,8 wn,dw-cattle 
20a,9 tpyw(?) 
20a,10 cattle 
20a,1 l Total of 6ulls and heifers 
20a,12 male orynx 
20a, 13 orynx 
20a,14 ibex 
20a,15 gazelles 
20a,16 Total 
20a,17 Total of herds 
206,l live geese 
206,2 bt- '; 6irds, live 
206,3 lrp geese, live 
662 Germer, Flora, p. 182. 
663 Uncertain, cf. Germer, Flora, p. 51 . 
664 Far from certain, cf. Germer, Flora, p. 195. 
665 Uncertain, cf. Germer, Flora, p. 202. 
P. Horris 1 
1'550 
620 
310 
6'200 
117 
1'150 
8'985 
620 
15'110 
1'515 
69'200 
79'400 
150 
265 
3'270 
4'200 
3'720 
449'500 
15'500 
1'240 
310 
9'610 
3782 
930 
419 
290 
.lll 
2fil. 
1 
740 
.12 
1'122 
2'892 
54 
l 
81 
137 
3'029 
6'820 
1'410 
1'534 
666 Or is this a dictation error, with the almost homonymous "6lossom' (Wb. IV: 472, 1-3) intended? 
667 J. J. Jonssen (pers. comm.) suggests this rendering, but asks if this is out of place. But, if "thick cloth" is the meaning, 
then some of the preceding items may have been wrapped in this material? 
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206,4 
206,5 
206,6 
206,7 
206,8 
206,9 
206,10 
206,11 
206, 12 
206,13 
206,14 
206, 15 
21a, 1 
21a,2 
2la,3 
21a,4 
21a,5 
210,6 
21o,7 
210,8 
2lo,9 
(21o,10) 
(21a, 11) 
(21a, 12) 
(21a, 13) 
(21o,14) 
(21o,15) 
(216, 1) 
(216,2) 
(216,3) 
(216,4) 
(216,5) 
(216,6) 
(216,7) 
(216,8) 
(216,9) 
(216,10) 
crones, live 
live hotching fowl 
live woter fowl 
Translation of Excerpls 
150 
4'060 
25'020 
mnit-birds, live 57'810 
p 't-6irds, live 21700 
common fowl, live l '240 
birds of the sky 6'510 
Total of fowl 126'250 
qrb-vessels filled with fish, with non oirtight lids(?) 440 
white fish 2'200 
evisceroted sn '-fish l 5'500 
gutted fish l 5'500 
whole fish 44 l '000 
6lossoms worked (b;kw) os Aowers of fons 668 124 
flowers, toll bouquets 3' l 00 
6lossoms worked (btkw) os ffowers of perfume blossoms 669 l 5'500 
papyrus 6lossoms (?) 670, oipe 124'35 l 
flowers, wreothes 60'450 
flowers, krbt-bunches 671 620 
lopis coloured flowers, 672 tied 673 l 2'400 
flowers, hondfuls 46'500 
flowers, heops 110 
lotus blossoms, hondfuls 144 '720 
lotus 6lossom bouquels 3' 140 
lotus 6lossoms hondfuls 110'000 
papyrus bouquets 
papyrus, pieces 
lorge 'bw-flowers, worked (b;kw) os 61ossoms 
dotes mgt-meosures674 
dates, bnk-meosures 
greens,675 heops 
greens, brs-6undles 
flowers,676 handfulls 
eors of corn (? : it-m-it) os bouquels 
eors of corn, handfulls 
flowers, bouquels 
flowers, lrays 
68'200 
349'000 
19'150 
65'480 
3'100 
2'170 
77'200 
128'650 
l 1'000 
31 '000 
1'975'800 
1'975'800 
668 Cf. BAR IV: 139: 'Blossoms of the impost of flowers: sunshodes" . As noted above, btkw as the fiscol term here 
seems superfluous, but it might be the cose, if it does not refer to their having been "prepared" or "worked" in some 
woy, which is an interpretotion permitted 6y the !ext. Cf. also Dittmar, Blumen, pp. 58; 60. 
669 Cf. Dittmar, Blumen, p. 59. 
670 Cf. Dittmar, Blumen, pp. 54-55 . Whether the blossoms were reolly packed in oipe units would oppeor tobe 
doubtful on oesthetic grounds, but these can hordly hove been mere plonts os J. Dittmar cleorly demonslrales. 
671 Cf. Dittmar, Blumen, p. 44. 
672 J. Harris (Lexicographical Studies, pp. 148-149) makes it cleor thot the reference is purely to hue. 
673 Cf. Janssen, Prices, p. 186 n. 24. 
674 Cf. A. H. Gordiner, "The word m'gJ ond its vorious uses," JEA 26 (1940): 157-158; 0 DeM 106, vs. 5; 0. 
DeM 318, 9-10. (1 am inde6ted to J. J. Janssen for these references) . 
675 Cf. Dittmor, Blumen, p. 61: "Kraut". 
676 Cf. Diitmar, Blumen, pp. 54-55, for the logic. 
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llg 
llh 
[ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
[ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
P. Harris 1 
III Heliopolis 
llla 
1116 
25, l-27, l l [, .. Textual Omission ... ] 
27, 12 1 have made for thee khato-lands anew with pure barley. 1 increased 677 
for thee their cultivable fields, having been barren 678 in order to multiply 
divine offerings in great quantities for your august and beloved name. 
28, l I made for thee many fields (of arable land), on islands and new land in 
the southern and northern districts, like tens of thousands,679 attaching to 
them wooden (and stone?) boundary stelae in thy name established for 
thee by decree f orever. 
28,2 1 have made poultry houses for thee, filled with the denizens of the sky. 1 
caused water fowl to be conveyed to your city Heliopolis, to be 
presented to your ki, father Re', brought to thee, and to thy Ennead, 
which is your following. 
28,3 1 have made for thee troops of honey gatherers and incense porters who 
render up their annual bikw to thy august treasury. 
28,4 1 have made for thee troops of hunters to bring orynx that they may be 
presented to thy ki at thy every festival. 
28,5 1 have made for thee rowers and towers, 680 which I formed in order to 
exact the bJkw of the T wo lands, the htri, the siyt, to be transported to thy 
treasury in the House of Re', to increase thy divine offerings by millions. 
28,6-30,6 [ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
31, l-32a,6 [ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
677 Uterally "doubled". 
678 Or "fallow'? 
679 A curious expression, if correctly rendered, but cf. esp. 4,4, supra p. 198 n 595. 
680 The word mskb_wyw has a~racted a good deal of allention . A. Alt ("Eine syrische Bevölkerungsklasse im 
ramessidischen Agypten," Z4S 75 [ 1939]: 16-20) originally suggested the Semitic mskbm - an Old Aramaic 
word for a parlicular caste - as the origin of the word. While this has not met with general acceptance 
(J. J. Janssen, Ship 's Logs, pp. 34-3_:5; Schulman, Rank, p. 48; A. Schulman, "Mhr and Mskb, Two Egyptian 
Military Titles of Semilic Origin, " Z4S 93 [1966]: 123-132; Gardiner, AEO 1:92*; R. Faulkner, "Egyptian 
Military Organization," JEA 39 [1953]: 47; Jones, Glossary, p. 76), he was probably correcl in rejecting the 
idea the mskbw were directly responsible for tax-farming (conlra BAR IV: 266 and DLE 1: 247). The Egyptian 
meaning is unfortunately as undear as the identity of ils Semitic predecessor. While Schulman favours a military 
title, its appearance in non-military texts is sufficiently frequent (given the relative rarity of the word, this is perhaps 
misleading) to indicate that il refers to groups of men, employed by the Stole, and at least several times in 
connection with river-shipping. · ·· · 
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lllc 
32a,10 
326, 1 
326,2 
326,3 
326,4 
326,5 
326,6 
326,7 
326,8 
326,9 
326, 10 
326, 11 
326, 12 
326, 13 
326, 14 
llld 
llle 
lllf 
lllh 
Translation of Excerpts 
32a,7 ltems: sJyt btkw-rmJof the Mansion Ramesses III[ ... ] in the House of Re' 
32a,8 and of those of the Mansion Ramesses III[ ... ] in the House of Re' to the 
North of Heliopolis, the chapels, villages, and cattle herds of this House 
32a,9 under the authority of the officials, as their annual btri: 
silver 
copper 
royal linen, textiles, very fine thin, 
fine thin, fine smooth, total : 
incense, honey, sesame oil, total: 
sweet wine, wine, total: 
silver: o6jects of the btkw-rmJ for the divine offerings 
com: btkw of the cultivators 
fresh greens 
flax 
water fowl: btkwof the fowlers and fishers 
oxen; ox calves; short-horned cows; 
and registered cottle of the herds 
live geese, of styt 
a cedor ferry-boat 
ococio borges ond ktr-vessels 
586.37 deben 
1 '260 deben 
1 'O 19 garments 
482 t"-vessels 
2'385 t"-vessels 
456.35 deben 
17'100 khar 
4'800 mrw-6undles 
4'000 n'bw-6undles 
37'465 
98 head 
540.5 [sie!] 
7 
items: foreign/oasis in great quantities for the divine offerings 
[ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
[ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
[ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
[ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
[ kg 
[ 53.36 
[ 114.66 
[ 41.528 l 
IV Memphis 
IVa 
44, 1-48, l [ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
48,2 1 made for thee troops of honey gatherers and incense porters, founding 
for them companies to assemble them to exact their annual btkw for thy 
august treasury, to fill the magazines of thy House with great quantities, to 
multiply thy divine offerings to present them to thy kt. 
48,3 1 made for thee granaries filled with barley and emmer, great heaps 
reaching unto the very sky, the daily offerings of thy temple, for thy 
beloved face, the eye 681 of Heaven. 
68 1 Or "mciker" of Heaven . 
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48,4 1 made for thee royal statues (L!P!H!), with chased work in gold, others 
with chased work in pure silver, as well as covering the earth in thy 
presence with dnit-vessels,682 festival offerings, divine offerings, of bread 
and beer tobe presented in thy presence daily. 
48,5 For thy forecourt,683 1 made for you a great jar rack decorated with beautiful 
gold, its jars in gold and silver engraved with thy name and provided 
with divine offerings, all good, tobe presented in thy presence at down. 
48,6 1 made for thee b-vessels and mns-barges (traveling) in the midst of the 
Sea, manned mns-barges plied their trade in great numbers transferring 
the produce of the god's land, the bikw of the Land of Palestine, for thy 
great treasuries in thy walled city. 
48,7 1 made for thee great festival offerings, endowed anew to offer them to thy ki 
at thy every appearance. They included bread, beer, cattle, fowl, incense, 
fruits, greens, sweet wines and wine, royal linen, numerous gocx:l this textiles 
48,8 , sesame oil, incense, honey, dried myrrh, flowers, and everything good, 
sweet and fragrant, for thy beloved face, lord of the gods! 
48, 9 1 made for thee great festival offerings at the commencement of the Inun-
dation in thy august and beloved name Ptah-Nun Father of the Gods, 
being provided with bread and creations of the water 684 in thy great and 
682 Cf. J. J. Janssen, Prices, pp. 140-143, for dnit-vessels. 
683 P. Spencer ( Temple, pp. 4-13) has shown that the wb: was not necessarily a forecourt, tentatively concluding 
that wb: is a term describing no specific part of a temple, but rather the entire sacred precinct, the temenos. 
Combining textual and archaeological evidence is difficult, but R. Caminos (LEM, p. 28) renders cautiously "open 
court", and this is probably the most suitable. 
Spencer's evidence included the Lateran Obelisk (erected by Thutmosis IV where Thutmosis III had intended to 
erect it) with its inscription, identifying the wb: bry bwt nfr r hw ipt-swt(Urk. IV: 584, 10) as the sb: bry n ipt-swt 
bft br n W:s.t (Urk. IV: 1550, 18). Although this is plausible, she adds that, "lt is inconceivable that this area, at 
the back of the Amun temple, could have been regarded as a 'forecourt'" (p.8). While valid, it is indicated tobe 
an "upper wb:", to the east of the :b-mnw, near a gate, and a pair of obelisks. Obelisks not being rear wall 
ornamentati?n, the T uthmosides cannot have viewed this area as a neglected backyard . 
P. Cairo JdE 52002 (vso. 2) refers to men "demolishing in the forecourt", which would suggest socrilege if the 
whole temple was meont, but the author was probably referring to octivity in a specific ploce, which suggests thot 
the Egyptians regarded the wb: as a specific part of the temple, although they may have had a different woy of 
viewing space than we do. (Cf. P. Posener-Krieger, "Construire une tombe a l'ouest de mn-nfr (P. Caire 52002)," 
RdE 33 [1981] : 52; KR/VII: 265,9) . 
Spencer however concludes that since Ramesses III estoblished his bark station before the wb: of Amun (P. Harris, 
5,4), and thus in front of the contemporary frn;;ade, wb: can only be interpreted in the broadest passible sense. 
Seti I refers to his hypastyle hall as an wb: (KR/ 1: 201,5; L.-A. Christophe, "La foce sud des architraves surmontant 
les colonnes 74-80 de la wonde solle hypostyle de Karnak," BIFAO60 [1960] : 73-74), a structure which was 
behind Horemhab's Pylon (the contemporary temple front) and thus Ramesses' bark station just before thot wb: 
suggests that this source be eliminated. 
Spencer's recommended use of the Greek temenos is unfortunate as the etymology is from 'ttµvco, "to cut", "to 
sever" (in the sense of being cut off by walls), while wb: means 'to open up". Ramesses would however hordly 
hove erected a temple on land which was per definitionem profane, being "before the temenos", i.e., outside of 
it. The same is true of the "upper wb:" as "upper temenos", os there is no striking boundary with Tuthmoside Kornak 
which would enable the student to separate two different holy enclosures, and thus the term wb: must refer to an 
open court of some kind, usuolly between the pylon or a major wall and the brick enclosure walls, which 
generally meons "forecourt", but not invoriably. . 
684 qm: n mw. One parallel is 8D 125 (E. Naville, Tb. II: 325/ Spell l 25, 27-28) , usuolly translated (pace, e.g., 
Allen , Book of the Dead, p . l 00) "and threw (them) into the lake"; equally close is the "loyalist lnstruction, ' ön the 
212 
IVb 
IVc 
Translation of Excerpts 
august forecourt of the Crocodile Enclosure685 
48, l O for all thy statues, and the Ennead of the Eternal Water. Their entire btri is 
in thy treasuries, magazines, granaries, cattle stalls, bird pens, every year 
in order to satisfy the great collegium of Nun, the Eider, content and joyful 
at the festivals of the Views . 
48, 11 1 built thy august barque, Nb-nbb, [ ... ] 
48, 12-50,4 [ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
[ . .. Textual Omission .. . ] 
51 b, 3 ltems: the s Jyt b1kw-rmJ of the Mansion Ramesses III [ .. . ] in the House of 
Ptah 
516,4 , the herds Ramesses III [ ... ], the town 
516,5 on the western Canal, the House Ramesses III[ ... ] in the House of Ptah, 
the chapels and settlements of this House which tow to 
51 b,6 their treasuries as their annual btri: 
[ kg 
516,7 silver 98.391 deben [ 8 .95 
516,8 linen, fine, thin smooth 133.5 gorments 
516,9 wine 390 mnt-jors 
516, 10 silver as o6jects of the b;kw-rmf for the divine offerings: 144.31 deben [ 13.132 
516, 11 corn as the b;kw of the cultivators 37'400 khar 
516, 12 fresh greens 600 mrw-bundles 
516 130 oxen, calves of oxen, short-horned cattle, 
and registered cattle of the herds 15.5 
52a, l live geese of sJyt 13.5 
Sbtp-i6-R' stele (Seihe, Lesestücke, p . 69, l) translated again (pace W . K. Simpson in Simpson, Literature, 
p. 200), ''cast to the woters". In each case, the n is translated as if an rof motion (Gardiner, § 164, l : "whereas 
ris used of movement 'to' or 'towards' a thing'') . The phrase in the Loyalist lnstruction can be intelligi6lytranslated: 
"and his corpse will be as a reed of the swirling waters" . The meaning would in any case be diametrically 
opposed to that intended in P Harris, as the qm; n mwthere are directly associated with the life-giving waters of 
the gods. (The reference in the Book of the Dead is, as so often, somewhat o6scure) 
685 Cf. P. Harris 111. 47, l and 49,7 as weil. P Montet (Geographie 1: 33) prefers to translate "le Mur de Sobek", 
citing P. Sallier IV, vso. 1,9 (LEM p. 89, 11), 6ut R. Caminos (LEM, pp. 333; 340) prefers to read ''Mi-wr" (i.e, 
Mr-wrt, Guro6) in this case, removing Sobek from Memphis, where he is otherwise not recorded. When inb 
appears in the singular, it seems preferable to reod "enclosure" rother than "wall" in certain cases. 
wb; appears several times in the Memphite poragraphs of P Harris 1 (46,3; 48,5; 48,9; 49,7), hinting ot 
several distinct structures, unless this wbJ is the entrance hall to the Ptah Temple built by Ramesses II and embel-
lished by Merenptah and Ramesses III himself: the "west hall" excavated by W . M. F. Petrie (Memphis 1: pp. 5-6; 
pls. 1-2; 22-23). This might aid in clorifying the location of the jar rack (48,5). The role of the crocodile remains 
mysterious . 
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IVg 
P. Harris 1 
52a,2 items of Egypt and items of the god's double country,686 items of Syria, 
items of Cush, and the Oasis for the divine offerings in great quantities 
52a,3 and the Oasis for the divine offerings in great quantities. 
[ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
[ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
[ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
[ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
V T HE SMALL T EMPLES 687 
[ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
VI T HE TOTALS 
Via 
Vlb 
[ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
686,4 ltems sJyt b;kw-rmt of the serfs all 688 of the Mansion and 
686,5 chapels and settlements and Houses which he gave them as their annual 
btri: 689 
686 The immediate reaction is to regard this as a lapsus calami, 6ut this strange reference may be explained with the 
reference in the Deir-Bahri temple to Punt being br gs-wy wJQ-wr, "on both sides of the sea", Urk. IV: 325, 13. 
This would of course resolve the pro6Iem of whether Punt was in Africa or South Ara6ia, for the o6vious inference 
is that it was on both sides of the Red Sea, just as Egypt was on both sides of the Nile. 
687 At compara6Ie places in the texts relating to the small temples, all references to btri, s;ytand b;kware missing, not 
only in the introduction (57, 1-60, l 0), 6ut also at the appropriate paint in the lists (62a, 11 ), where products 
similar to those listed a6ove appear. There is no reason to believe that an oversight is respansi6le for this double 
omission. 
688 Or: "b;kw of the serfs and peaple all". 
689 The formulation of these introductory sentences (P. Harris, 12a, 1-5; 326,7-9; 526,3-5; 686,4-5) varies in 
each case. One aspect of this final version is the statement (656,5), "which he gave to them as/from (m) their 
annual btri". The translation of min the sense of the m of predication (as opposed to the prepasition, 'from") is 
based on the assumption that ''their annual b,ri" refers to the temples, not the dependents, and thus that the 
Pharaoh took credit for the delivery of an annual btri, which was in essence already the property of the temples, 
as the produce of the temple dependents. lt can also be plausi6ly argued that the Pharaoh sei aside apart of the 
dependents' annual btri that was due to him, and returned this to the temples. This is however not supparted 6y the 
version in the paragraph dealing with the The6an temples. There ( 12a, 1-5) it is clear that the dependents of the 
temples which Ramesses III created provide an 'annual btri' which must refer to the temples themselves. lt could 
nevertheless be asserted that the "annual btri' was due to the Pharaoh, and that he merely left the temples a 
portion of their dependents' produce, which rightfully belonged to him as their laxes. The structure of the sentences 
never gives a hint which would support this. 
214 
686,6 
686,7 
686,8 
686,9 
686, 10 
686, 11 
686, 12 
69,1 
69,2 
69,3 
69,4 
69,5 
69,6 
69,7 
69,8 
69,9 
69,10 
69,l l 
69,12 
69, 13 
70o,l 
70o,2 
Vlc 
Vld 
Translation of Excerpts 
beoutiful gold of the desert, used gold690 
os vessels, jewelry ond scrop 
silver vessels ond scrop 
Total: gold ond silver os vessels, 
jewelry ond scrop 
2'289.45 deben 
l 4'050. 12 deben 
16'339'65 deben 
l kg 
[ 208.299 l 
[ 1 ·218.561 l 
l l '486.908 l 
ossorted gold, precious stones, 
neckloces, jewelry ond wreothes 9 [ unit not specified] 
silver fittings from Thoth's remoinder (wgJt) 
copper 
royol linen, textiles, fine thin cloth 
linen 
incense, honey, sesome oil 
sweet wine, wine 
silver in o6jects of the bJkw-rmJ 
corn os the bJkw of the cultivotors 
fresh greens 
flox 
woter-fowl os the btkw of the fowlers ond fishers 
oxen, colves of oxen, short horned cows, 
registered cottle entered of the herds of Egypt 
oxen, colves of oxen, long horned cottle, 
short-horned cows os the bJkw of the 
Lands of Syrio l2 Total: 
live geese of styw 
cedor skty-ferries 
ococio skty-boots, flooting stolls, cattle 
borges, JJrti and ktr-vessels 
total: cedor ond acocia-boats 
l 
27'580 deben 
4'575 gorments 
3'795 deben 
1'259 full ;"-vessels 
28'080 ;"-vessels 
4'204.76 deben 
460'900 khar 
32'750 
71'000 
426'995 
1'920 
12 
78 
90 
mrw-6undles 
n 'bw-6undles 
items: of Egypt, items of the god's land, iterns of Syria, 
Cush, (the) Oosis, for the divine offerings in great quontities. 
[ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
[ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
[2·509.180 l 
l 382.633 l 
VII T HE H1sTORICAL Sui\Nv\ARY 
75, 1-76,7 [ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
76,8 [After defeating and slaughtering the Peoples of the Sea and the Libyans, 
the Pharaoh settled the suNivors in the Delta and exacted payments from 
them.] 
690 sp sn need not be interpreted os second dass gold, pace Wb. III: 436, 19. Cf. P Anost. 1, 10,6 (Gordiner, 
Hieratic Texts, pp. 19-20). Cf. supra, p. 201 n 616 for re-used. 
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76,9 [ ... ] 1 btri all of them: clothing and corn are paid into the treasuries and 
granaries annually. [ ... ] 
76, 10-77,7 [ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
77,8 [ ... ] 1 hewed great mns-barges and btr-vessels before them, equipped 
with numerous crews and lots of retainers. Their 
77, 9 Chiefs-of-Archers were for the mns-barges among them, under controllers 
and chiefs to command them, loaded with the things of Egypt without 
number [ ... ] 
77, 10 [ ... ] They arrived at the foreign land of Punt [ ... ] 
77, l l -77, l 3 [ ... ] 
78, l [ ... ] 1 sent out my messengers 
78,2 to the country of ':-ti-k~ 691 to the great copper mines which are there. 
Their mns-barges were filled, burdened beneath it [ ... ] 
78,3-78,5 [ ... Textual Omission ... ] 
78,6 1 sent forth attendants and officials to the turquoise mountain of my mother 
Hathor, Lady of Turquoise. Presented to her (was) silver, gold, royal linen, 
mk-linen, and many 
78,7 things in her presence like unto sand. Miracles of real turquoise were 
brought to me [ .... ] 
78,8-79, 12 [ ... Textual Omission .. . ] 
69 1 Gauthier, Dict., 1: 137. Apparently a hapax. This could however be the modern wadi Allaqi (on the assumption 
that the !i is a faulty copy of an original rl for D in Upper Nubia, which would explain the importance of the 
barges, which would not be as relevant for Sinai. The text certainly does not suggest an Egyptian mining mission . 
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THE WoRDS 

inyt 
T HE WORD inyt 
By definition, the word inyt signifies something "that is brought". T. E. Peet pointed out long 
ago that the verb ini also signified "to buy" .692 The noun inwhas been translated as "tribute" 
for even longer.693 In the administrative texts of the Ramesside Period, inyt appears very 
often in the sense of supplies being brought to the royal tomb, very frequently for items used 
in the work at the tomb itself, such as lamps.694 The fiscal use of the term is probably related 
to the administrative use of the term, if the Egyptians made any distinction. 
INTERNAL REVENUE 
Administrative texts 
P. Northumberland 11 695 uses inyt to describe flour being produced from grain. 
The term inyt is frequently used to describe certain ordinary deliveries to the Gang at Deir el-
Medineh during Dynasties XIX and XX (e.g ., Ramesses 11 696 P. Greg, infra, pp. 152ff).697 
These include fish .698 The latter is striking as plaster is classified as btkw in the text referring 
to fish as inyt. 699 
The extremely fragmentary P. Gurob M 700 mentions the usual smw, but also specifies twice 
(II. 9; 10) the" [toponym] arrears corn of inyt " of a citizeness and a cultivator, seemingly 
implying that this was smwcorn. Whether this impl ies that the inytwas smw is unclear; inyt 
was possibly used here merely meaning "brought", but the construction is unusual. 
P. Greg 701 is a rather weil preserved example of a list recording items brought to the Gang 
at Deir el-Medineh. A good part of the text has been lost, so that for certain entries we have 
only the items delivered but not the designation, while other lines have only the designation, 
the remainder being lost. The text quite clearly details a number of different types of itero_, 
which the scribe evidently feit were related . The first lines list deliveries of plaster, after which 
692 T. E. Peet, ''The Egyptian Words for 'money', 'buy', and 'seil' ," in Studies Griffith , pp. 122-127. This will be taken 
up again in the following chapter. 
693 Cf. Gordon, inw, passim. 
694 Cf. 0 . Cairo 25536, verso. 
695 KR/ 1: 24 1-242; J. Bornes, ''Three Hiera tic Papyri in the Duke of Northumberland's Collection, '' JEA 34 ( 1948): 
35-46. 
696 KR/ III: 509, l; 9. 
697 KR/ IV: 168, dated to Merneptah . (0 . Cairo. 25753) 
698 KR/ VI: 582, 1, 9 ; 583, 1. 
699 KR/ VI : 583, l l (Mw); KR/ VI: 582, l; 9; 583, l (inyt) . 
700 Gardiner, RAD, p. 33. 
701 KR/ V: 437-448; cf. supra, pp . l52ff. 
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the grain payments to the workers are recorded (as diw, II. A 13; C x+ 10),702 and lamps 
appear further down (1. B 8). Cakes, beer, plaster, lamps, fish, wood, grain and wicks 
appear in the lines that follow. 
Cakes or breads from the royal provisioning and beer from the temples (r-prw) 703 are 
clearly distinguished from one another and identified consistently as inyt. 704 As this particular 
text clearly uses words with specific meanings, this is significant. In both cases, deliveries -
in limited scope - are issued from higher authorities to the Gang under this title. 
The very badly preserved third page of the verso of P. Turin 2009 + 1999 705 uses inyt in the 
context of supplies for the Gang, potentially implying the responsibility of the vizier, and 
possibly indicating that the temple of Month was a source (II. vso. 3, 10-12). 
Exceptionally inyt appears in the same text mentioning the inw in P. Turin 1900.706 lt would 
appear that red jasper is associated with the inyt for a temple within the Estate of Amun 
(II. 3,3-3,4), delivered to the northern treasury of Amun-Re', from the Royal mortuary temple. 
CONCLUSIONS 
inyt refers to things brought to the tomb as provisions, but also materials necessary for the 
work of the Gang. inyt appears in administrative texts more frequently than inw, and inyt 
never appears in propaganda texts as a technical term, but it does not figure in the Tax Lists 
of the Turin Canon either. The chief difference between inwand inyt is not grammatical, but 
textual. inw is an ideological word, and a fiscal term. inyt is a simple delivery. The fact that 
it does not appear in propaganda texts probably indicates that it was not an official 
designation for a specific type of delivery, although local scribes will have probably understood 
it to have some particular significance.707 
One distinction that emerges from the texts is the contrast to btkw, and clearly where fish are 
delivered (inyt) and plaster is produced (btkw), the distinction does not require further 
elaboration, but what is one to make of the use of red jasper as inyt? Clearly, it was brought 
and worked, much as the grain in transformed into bread, and likewise labelled inyt, but the 
plaster underwent the same process, and yet was somehow identified as a product. Evidently 
an attempt to impose our categories on these concepts would be erroneous. 
702 Cf. supra, pp. 152ff 
703 Cf. supra, pp. 152ff., II. B 1 0; B 19; C x +7; vso A x+ 19; A x+22; vso B 18; B 21; B 24; B 32; B 38; vso 
C 17. 
704 The same ward inyt is used with regard to the same types of products from the same source in the ostraca, e.g ., 
0 . Cairo 25632, 25810 and 0 . DeM 249. 
7os KR! VI : 560-566; Botti / Peet, Giornale, pp. 10-13/ pls. 1-7. 
706 KR/ VI: 619-624. Dated to Ramesses IX, year 9 . 
707 lt is possible that the use of inyt implied a completed action. This calls to mind the very curious formulation of Turin 
Taxation Papyrus 5,6 (Gardiner, RAD, p. 42,4), where a quantity of grain is presumably turned over (iw, 
"arrived·'), with a note that there is a remainder, perhaps implying that the grain did not actually arrive2 
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THE WORD inw 
Like the preceding word, inw is related to the word, "to bring", but also "to buy".708 inw is 
assumed to mean literally "what is brought", or "what should be brought". From its frequent 
use in the annals and private inscriptions in Theban Tombs, the word inw has frequently 
been translated as "goods" or "tribute", and this has been equally often disputed.709 As the 
word has been studied at length and countless examples adduced, this chapter is merely 
intended to survey the situation. 
INTERNAL REVENUE 
Administrative texts 
inwappears in association with a type of land producing btri under the reign of Seti 1,710 but 
it is difficult to conclude anything from the context. 
P. Gurob 711 of Regnal Year 2 of Seti II states explicitly that (vso. l b,5) the "inwof the Royal 
Superintendent of the Throne, given towards the material support of this House", consisted of 
the cqw loaves and Syrian beer which precede the break in the text. P. Gurob Fragment U 712 
refers to the "house of the inw" (1. vso., x+5), which may or may not shed some light on the 
reference in P. Gurob. 
Several paragraphs of P. Mallet (dating to the reign of Ramesses IV) link a scribe of the 
House of inw713 with a cattle overseer obliged to a btri of wood,714 with references to 
corvee labour 715 and "the inw of (IV, l) Amonrasonther",716 but also an overseer of the 
708 T. E. Peet, "The Egyptian Words for 'money', 'buy', and 'seil'," in Studies Griffith, pp. 122-127. 
7w Cf. Gordon, inw, but also: M. Liverani, "Memorandum on the Approach to Historiographie Texts," Or. 42 
(1973), 191-193; E. L. Bleiberg, "Commodity Exchange in the Annals of Thutmose III," JSSEA l l/2 (1981): 
l 07-110; R. Müller-Wollermann, "Bemerkungen zu den sogenannten Tributen," GM 66 (1983): 81-93; W. 
Boochs, 'Weitere Bemerkungen zu den sogenannten Tributen,' GM7l (1984): 61-66; and R. Müller-Wollermann, 
"Ein Tribut an die Methode," GM 77 (1984): 51-55; E. Bleiberg, "The King's Privy Purse During the New 
Kingdom: An Examination of INW,"JARCE21 (1984): 155-167. Wollermann points out that "tribute" refers to 
payments made under duress, and regular payments of conquered peoples or a lax imposed on a subject 
population, and suggests that they might be gifts, but her evidence is slender and rests to some extent on her 
theoretical perspective. 
71° KR/ 1: 259-261, esp. 260,8; Spiegelberg, Rechnungen, pls. 4 etc.; Helck, Materialien, 638-639. 
711 Cf. supra, pp. l46ff.; Gardiner, RAD, pp. 14-18; Griffith, Kahun Papyri, pp 94-98; pls. 39-40; A. H. 
Gardiner, "The Harem at Miwer,"JNES 12 (1953): 145-149. 
712 Gar(ljner, RAD, pp. 22-24: Materialien, p. 933. The text could date to the reign of Ramesses II, as there is a 
reference to the Royal Wife Mii-f:fr-nfrw-R' (Fragment a, 1. 2). 
713 KR/ VI: 67,3-4; Bakir, Epistolography, pi. 22, 3. For this text, cf. Wente, Letters, pp. 127-128. 
714 KR/ VI: 67,2ff.; Bakir, Epistolography, pi. 22, l ff. 
715 KR! VI: 66,7; Bakir, Epistolography, pi. 21, 7. 
716 KR! VI: 66,9; Bakir, Epistolography, pi. 21, 9. 
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treasury of Pharaoh.717 The btri seems to have been destined for the magazine of inw of the 
temple of Amonrasonther (V,2; 9). 
P. Turin 1900+ 718 records the inn (sie) of the High Priest of Amun and the Divine Adoratress 
of Amun (II . 2,2-3) on lwo successive days where incense is specifically mentioned. The 
"inw of the Land of Cush" is associated with the "northern treasury of the Estate of Amun" 
{II. 3, 19; 3,21 ). In the same context, reference to the "inwof the house of Pharaoh" (1. 3,22) 
will be found. Although red jasper is associated with the inyt(II. 3,3-3,4), it is also mentioned 
as "the inn of the God's father of Amun" (1. 3,8). This paragraph potentially indicates that 
"true red jasper" was the inw of the Third Prophet of Amun, an Overseer of Cattle, and a 
herdsman as well as the God's Father.719 The crucial phrases of P. Turin 1900+ are however 
so seriously mutilated that any interpretation would ultimately depend upon guesswork. 
P. Turin 1903 720 specifically refers to transfers classified as btri (1. vso. 2, 1) from various 
sources to the Gang of the Tomb. Meta! ore from the Mortuary Temple of Ramesses III (1. vso. 
2, 13), another source (1. vso. 2, 14), and the vizier (1. vso. 2, 15) is termed inw. 
Both P. Leiden 1 350 verso and P. Turin 2008+ 2016 use inw in the context of items brought 
to ships. lt is difficult to judge whether the objects brought (inw) and issued (rdyt) are being 
exchanged, althoughjanssen doubts this, and suggests that these are official transactions of 
some kind. 721 In the event that the inw are to be understood as payments and not inter-
departmental transfers, the basic elements are extremely significant. The inware received on 
boats, and the ultimate beneficiaries unidentified, although P. Turin 2008+2016 links that 
vessel with the High Priest of Amun (vso. 1, 1 ), and P. Leiden 1 350 that vessel with the High 
Priest of Ptah at Memphis (e.g., 5,23). lt would appear that most of the materials received 
were re-issued during the voyage. 
A summary of the transactions in P. Leiden 1 350 vso.: 
717 KR/ VI : 67, 11; Bakir, Epistolography, pi. 22, 10. 
718 KR/ VI: 619-624; cf. Horris, lexicogrophical Studies, p. [266]. 
719 lt will be noted thot the text repeotedly uses inn or in rother thon inw, but inyt is cleorly written out (e.g., 
KR/ VI: 620,7), and the peculiar inn-form uses an indirect genitive, and in contexts excluding the possibility of 
reoding it os verbal torm. For this reoson, the reoding os inw has been proposed. 
72° KR! VII : 395 -397; Cerny, Notebook, 15, pp. 16-20. 
72 1 Janssen, Ship's Logs, pp. l 04 - l 05 
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inw rdyt preposition title line 
milk, woterfowl, colf-joint, 
wine, fire wood n Deputy of Choriotry 2,3-2,6 
looves, beer n Noble Lady 2,7-2,8 
looves, woterfowl, wine, groin, 
fire wood, chorcool, beer n Chorioteer 2,9-2, 13 
looves, meat, beer, wine, 
greens, fire wood n Scribe 2,14-2,17 
loof (Animo!) Teams 2, 18 
loof (Animo!) Teams 2,20 
n Physicion 2,21 
milk n man of Cush 2,22 
woterfowl, milk m smdt-serfs 2,23 
looves n Retoiners 2,24 
looves, meat, greens, beer n Chorioteer 2,25-2,28 
groin (Animo!) Teams 2,29 
greens n Charioteer 2,30 
( undefined) n Scribe 2,31 
loaves n Scribe (?) 3,2 
fish n (undefined) 3,3 
loaves n the people 3,5 
looves n Servont 3,7 
loaves n General 3,8 
looves n Scribe 3,10 
victuals n Scribe 3, 11-3, 12 
wine n mskbyw 3, 15 
loaves n the people 3, 16-3,21 
wine?, greens n Chorioteer 3,22 
loaves n PN 3,25 
looves n Crew 3,27 
loaves n Retoiners 3,28 
loaves n PN 3,29 
loaves n Retoiners 3,30 
looves n Crew 3,33 
looves n PN 4,3 
looves n the people 4,12-4, 16 
looves n htri 4,17 
cottle, milk, greens, poles m Princess 4,20-4,21 
looves n Retoiner 4,22 
looves n Crew 4,29 
223 
inw 
The text lists additional entries concerning expenses, before ending with a summary of the 
inw. Although the word rdyt is not used, the items "expended" are the same. As the first part 
of the text is missing, it is impossible to establish the veracity of the conclusion, but the 
tendency is to confirm that the voyage ended without a clear increase: 
Summary of the inw. 
inw 
Consumption loaves 55 
fine breod 80 
ibst-loaves 10 
milk 10 
wine 9 
waterfowl 40 
firewood 80 
charcoal 10 
used 
74 
200+ 
10 
10 
7 
[lost] 
10 
remaining line 
2 
70 
6,3 
6,4 
6,5 
6,6 
6,7 
6,8 
6,9 
6,10 
lt is curious that beer, greens, meat, cattle, calves, fish and grain do not figure in this list, 
although they are among the items that were collected and issued. The income seems to 
come generally from higher level individuals: a general, a noble lady, a deputy of Chariotry, 
but some private individuals, including a scribe, a charioteer and a seNant also appear as 
sources. In no case are these associated with any organization . The recipients are all clearly 
at the lower end of the social scale. In neither case is an indication made that an exchange 
was the reason for the transfer of ownership. In line 4, 17 it is not clear that the word is the 
term discussed infra (pp. 263ff.)or a personal name. 
Since the ownership of the vessel and the motivation of the transactions is unknown, this 
papyrus remains tantalizing, except as a basis for speculation. P. Turin 2008+ 2016 is quite 
similar in character, and line 2, 3 notes the receipt of inwat a boat which is unquestionably 
associated with the High Priest of Amonrasonther, and clearly states that the inw were 
traded (2, 14). Sesame oil delivered by a guard is specifically stated to have been 
exchanged for garments.722 
Janssen concluded after reviewing the texts: 
In studying these entries one might for a moment presume that ini and rdi are used 
here not with their general meaning of "to bring" and "to give", but in the idiomatic 
sense of "to buy" and "to seil" . This is not, however, correct since in that case the verb 
ini must be followed by the preposition m di and not by n, while there are no 
722 Janssen, Ship's logs, p. 71 . 
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examples known of rdi used absolutely for "to sell". We must therefore conclude that 
the food was really collected and distributed by the ships.723 
While the first part of Janssen's conclusion would appear tobe correct, it is not clear why the 
possibility that the items delivered as inw were not purchased (ini, meaning "to buy"), 
excludes the possibility of their having been sold (rdi n being the idiomatic sense of "to sell 
to someone"). Asjanssen's own translation of P. Turin 2008+ 2016 2, 14 reads: "Account of 
the trading of them ... " (p. 71), this would strengthen the argument that the items were 
collected - without necessarily having been purchased - but that they were in fact sold. 
Private Propaganda 
In the lnstructions of the Vizier,724 the inwof the lower level officials is reported to the Vizier, 
and one reference indicates that a specific inw was associated with festival offerings. 
In a potentially relevant scene, in TT 343, P;-bq;-mn "views" the inwof a prwy-hg_-treasury, 
but "receives" silver, gold, ivory and ebony from a pr-hg_-treasury.725 Although it is probable 
that the two treasuries are the same (and presumably royal, as he does not bear religious 
titles), the actual goods which he receives are named, but not categorized as inw. lt is 
possible that the receipt of the articles is actually related to their being issued to him by virtue 
of his position as Overseer of Works, and that he did not receive inw payments himself, but 
took the liberty of labeling them as such in a context where this was permissible, identifying 
their origin. 
In TT 125, DwH-nbb details a number of items as inw without specifying their origin (al-
though these appear tobe distinct from the foreign items, mentioned infra).726 As royal linen 
is mentioned, the cattle and other items in the same context should be attributed an Egyptian 
origin. lf the context can be properly understood, the tomb-owner distinguished not only the 
foreign revenue and products, but also the Egyptian products, referring to the "annual htri" 
separately from the inw. The titles indicate that he was responsible for a gs-prand a double 
granary, presumably, but not explicitly those of Amun. 
The inscription recording the rewards of the efficient High priest of Amun, lmn-btp,727 details 
fiscal responsibilities using most of the words discussed in this study, but links inwand tp-s:f.rt 
apparently as belonging to the temple and the king. As reconstructed his reference would 
seem to imply that the inwdelivered to the temple of Amun may have belonged to Pharaoh, 
723 Janssen, Ship's Logs, p. 104. 
724 Cf. supra, pp. 178ff. 
725 Urk. IV: 1468-1472; Guk.sch, Paheqamen, pi. 9; H. Guksch, "Das Grab des Benja, gen. Paheqamen: Theben 
Nr. 343," MDAIK 38 (1982): 195-199. H. Guksch dates the tomb to the final years of the sole reign of 
Thuthmosis III in the final article. 
726 Urk. IV: 1380, 1 ff.; Helck, Übersetzung, pp. 69-70. 
727 Cf. supra, pp. 186f. 
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and there is some indication in the text that it actually left the temple. As the inw is elsewhere 
what the Pharaoh del ivers to the gods, one could semantically argue that the Pharaoh is 
claiming it as his own by virtue of the servant who delivers it to Amun being his servant, but 
this logic seems torturous. 
Royal Propaganda 
P. Turin 1882 includes the passage: 
(1) fashioned thy portrait in the sacred shape to make festal thy chapels, which I have 
caused to come into existence, which I made previously, all the inw of my house 
(4,2) is loaded rapidly in their sacks, the rest in heaps, 1 present them immediately 
(to) thy halls, to propitiate thy names.728 
lt is a commonplace that Pharaohs delivered their inwto the gods, but in many cases it is not 
clear whether the inw referred to was domestic or foreign in origin .729 
FoREIGN REVENUE 
Administrative Texts 
In P. Turin 1903, the inw of Cush is termed the annual btri, and identified as being fruit and 
greens, turned over to the Gang by a Deputy of the Treasury (prvvy-bs;fJ. 730 
Private Propaganda 
In the time of Thutmosis I inw is used to refer to income from foreign countries, turned over to 
the Estate of Amun. lt would appear to represent - at least in part - an annual btri specifi-
cally designated from Syria.731 
Texts in Dynasty XVIII TT 125 detail that in a construction project directed by the tomb's 
owner, the "inw of the southern land" supplied the ivory, ebony and special wood which 
was used in the temple of Amun.732 The titles indicate that he was responsible for a gs-pr 
and a double granary, presumably but not explicitly those of Amun. 
728 KR/ VI : 70ff. , esp. 72,3; 74,4; A. H. Gardiner, "A Pharaonic Encomium," JEA 41 (1955): 30; pls. VII-XI; 
JEA 42 (1956): 8-20. 
729 Cf. e.g ., KR/ VI : 3-9 ; W . Helck, "Ramessidische Inschriften aus Karnak,' ZÄS 82 (1957) : 98-140, esp. pi. 5. 
Only in one instonce of the several references is it clear that it was foreign in origin (KR/ VI : 6,6) . 
730 C:erny, Notebook, 15, p. 20; rto . l , 1; KR/ VII : 396, 15-16. . 
731 Urk. IV: 70,4 -6 . Th is instonce certainly does not support Bleiberg 's (JSSEA l l / 2 : 107) ossumption that the inw 
was associated with individual princes, which indicates that using the material from a single reign moy be useful 
as a meons of establishing a unique sei, but it does not teil us what it meons. 
732 Urk. IV: 1379, l O; W . Helck, Übersetzung, pp. 69-70. This probably reflects the situation depicted in TT 343, 
supra, p. 225 n. 725. 
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In the dynasty XIX tomb of P;-sr (TT 106) he assigned together the inw from "foreign countries 
and Upper and Lower Egypt into the treasury of Pharaoh," distinguishing this from the "b1kw 
of the Two Lands",733 but he does not identify the destination of the latter. Another text 
records that the inw of the northern and southern foreign countries went to the royal treasury.734 
Royal Propaganda 
inw appears constantly in the annals of Thutmosis III, as being what is brought from foreign 
countries 735 
The Abydos temple received the inw of all the lands (gold, silver, and precious stones) under 
the reign of Seti 1. 736 
The Tyre Rhetorical Stele records the coastal people turning inw over to Pharaoh, the ultimate 
destination being unclear.737 
In the hypostyle hall at Karnak, Seti I received the "inw of all the lands," and "commanded 
the btkwof the entire land", presenting it to Amun .738 
In Seti l's Karnak War Scenes739 the inw of the foreign lands is presented to Amun. R!nw 
contributes silver, gold, lapis lazuli, turquoise and precious stones. The same items are also 
attributed to another region, and all of it is turned over to Amun-Re'. The actual articles are 
not necessarily products of the lands from which they are received. Slaves and prisoners are 
also in mentioned (the latter in one instance as plunder, btqt). After having benevolently 
been depicted as the ultimate recipient of the inw, Amun-Re' himself says to Pharaoh: 
1 cause (5) that the great ones of the southern foreign lands come to you, and that 
they let you receive inw consisting of [ .... ] 1 cause that ( 9) [ <foreign countries ignorant 
of Egypt>] come to you [<bearing>] their inw, loaded with silver, gold, lapis lazuli, 
and all noble precious stones of the god's land [ .... (11) .... [<the Land of Punt, their 
inw>] consisting of resin, noble myrrh [ ... }740 
lt is not probable that the Egyptians saw a contradiction in Amun-Re' receiving the inw, 
which he says belonged rightfully to Pharaoh, for the tenor of the speech is merely to 
emphasize that Amun-Re' has given Pharaoh domination over the lands in every direction 
(North, South, East and West), and created wonders in the Heavens and the very Earth itself 
for him. That Amun-Re' had a right to be rewarded with what he had made it possible 
for Pharaoh to receive was only normal. The victories are Pharaoh's, the proceeds are 
Amun-Re''s. 
733 KR/ 1: 299, 11-12. 
734 KR/ III: 9,7. 
735 Cf. e.g., Bleiberg,J55EA 11 / 2 : l07ff. In lightofthisarticleandofGordon, inw, thefollowing referenceslothe 
texts are merely representative, and have been restricted to KR/ references unavailable at the time. 
736 KR/ 1: 197,8. Curiously a similar phrase is not present in the Nauri inscription . 
737 KR/ 1: l 17, 10. 
738 KR/ 1: 201,5-6; 205,3. 
739 KR/ 1: 6-32, esp. l 0, l l -13; 15,8-9; 19,6-11; 23,3-6. Gold, silver, lapis lazuli, turquoise, precious stones. 
are the inw(b;qt) given to Amun. Most of it came from the Syrian coast. 
740 Speech of Amun-Re': KR/ 1: 26-27; 30-3 l. 
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In the inscriptions of Seti I at the temple at Kanais 741 Pharaoh records that he smites the 
foreign lands, his heart lusting after their inw of loads of electron (text B, 2). As Pharaoh went 
on to consider the plight of his expedition, bereft of water on the road, it is obvious that the 
inw here was not necessarily a tribute brought without infrastructural support. And the following 
text (C) records arrangements for water transport with q;r-vessels for his gold washers. 
Seti II received the inw of the foreigners bent beneath its weight.742 
The introduction of the Blessing of Ptb-g-tnn 743 states that the princes of foreign countries are 
there that they bemthe inw to Pharaoh (II. 4-5), while text emphasizes of Hatti alone that it 
renders inw, b;-kw, and h;qf (1. 25), applying the other terms in a different fashion . The 
inscription Seti I left at the Karnak Ptah temple, states the same concisely, but notes that the 
inw(which is hJqt) would be turned over to Amun-Re'.744 A reference to filling the granary 
might explain why gratefulness to Ptah would be expressed by rendering the goods to 
Amun, if the Estate of Amun basically dominated the granaries at Thebes. 
The Bentresh stele records that foreigners delivered the inw of gold, silver, lapis lazuli and 
turquoise to Pharaoh. 745 
The Hittite marriage texts record that "the great ones of every foreign country" were forced to 
bear their inw of gold, silver, amulets, herds of horses and livestock to Pharaoh.746 Part of 
this was designated for Ptah.747 Part of this inw may have been dowry, as is specified 
elsewhere of the inw with the daughter, gold, silver, slaves, and cattle uncountable.748 
Egypt itself is the designated destination of inw brought by foreigners in a text from 
Tanis.749 
In the inscriptions at the temple of Luxor, Ramesses II puts the inwand b;-kw of Asia together, 
and it would appear that both Pharaoh and temple were recipients.750 On the Luxor obelisk 
the inw is expressly given to Pharaoh. 751 Part of this inw may have been dowry. 
In the Memphis lists of Ramesses II, inw is designated of foreign origin and received · by 
Pharaoh, 752 and the same is stated in a text from T anis.753 
Ramesses 11's rhetorical stele at Abu Simbel records that defeated foreigners rendered the 
inw to the Palace.754 
741 KR/ 1: 65-66. 
742 KR/ IV: 259, 15. This text is from Karnak, and the recipient is the King himself. 
743 KR/ II : 258-281, esp. 260,4-8; BAR III : 175-182; Schlögl, Tatenen, pp. 64-66. The text dates back to 
Ramesses II, but numerous copies were made. 
744 KR/ 1: 41,3-4. 
745 KR/ II: 285,2-3; 6-7; 286, 16; 287, l. 
746 KR/ II : 283,2; 7-8 . 
747 KR/ II : 283, 13. 
748 KR! II : 247,4-6; 257, 11; 253, 10-11. This is an illustration that inwneed not represent reciprocity, asliverani 
(Or. 42: 192) suggests, but is simply used for those foreign goods arriving at the Egyptian court of foreign origin, 
if this is the dowry. 
749 KR/ II : 294, 11 . 
75° KR/ II: 608, 12. 
751 KR! II: 603,2; 10. 
752 KR! II : 490, 12. 
753 KR! II: 290,2. 
754 KR! 11 : 317,15-16; 318,7-8 . 
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In the texts at Abydos, Ramesses II implies that the inw is for the temple. 755 
In the war scenes, Ramesses II presents the inw received from the foreigners of silver, gold, 
lapis lazuli, turquoise and precious stones to Amun-Re' .756 The inwand the htqtare delivered 
to Amun after a successful campaign. 757 The Princes of R!nw likewise declared that they 
desired to present the inw to Amonrasonther himself.758 
The Kadesh texts explicitly relate that the inw of silver, gold, lapis lazuli, turquoise and 
precious stones rendered up by the rebellious foreigners was delivered to Re' 759 Deliveries 
of inwwere also designated for Amun. 760 
Ramesses III received the inw of foreign princes. 761 
Ramesses III records receiving inw from foreigners, which may have been passed on to the 
gods.762 Amun was definitely the recipient of the "inw of every land inundating" his treasury 
and compounding the holdings of his granary. 763 The entire world supplied inw for the 
gods, which was also htri and btkw, presumably collected after establishing fortresses (or 
provincial governors' palaces2, bbnwt) in Egypt, Nubia and Asia. 764 
Ramesses III presented a monument to Amonrasonther, providing the inw (perhaps of R!nw) 
as the endowment.765 
Ramesses III records taking natron and salt from the "magazines of inw' of Medinet Habu, 
presumably for use in divine services by the temple staff .766 
755 KR/11:514,14-16. 
756 KR/ II: 207, 13. 
757 KRIii: 171,6; similar in 156,8; 162, 12; 167,7. 
756 KR/ 11: 154, 10; 12-14. 
759 KR/ II: 147,9ff. lt was precisely the division of Re' that was eliminated in the battle of Kadesh, and thus this 
special tribute rendering to Re' will doubtless have been intended to get his support next time, or because he had 
a bad conscience in losing the division and wanted to propitiate the god. 
760 KR/ II: 143-146. 
761 KR/ V: 110,7. Amun received port of the tribute after the Nubian war (KR/ V: 9,3), but whether Pharaoh or Amun 
received the foreign inw in other instances (KR/ V: 27,6; 65, 14; 68, 10; 93,4; 97,9; 302, 14; 317,5) is 
uncleor. Whether Pharaoh or Amun-Re'-Harakhte received the (KR/ V: 97,3) foreign inw of gold silver, lapis 
lazuli and precious stones is likewise uncleor. In the case of Ramesses III, enough inscriptional material is avail-
able to attempt to distinguish between texts at Karnak and Medinet Habu, but there is no evidence of items 
specifically designated for Pharooh or god differing significantly between the two temples. In speeches of Amun 
preseNed at the temple of Karnak (KR/ V: 219, 16; 280,2) the foreign inw is specifically stated tobe delivered 
to the King. The same is clear from another text at Karnak (KR/ V: 225). Another text from Karnak (KR/ V: 240,7; 
242,2; W. Helck, "Ramessidische Inschriften II," ZÄS 83 [1958]: 32-33) records that the foreign inw is for 
Amun. 
762 KR/ V: 216, 12. 
763 KR/V:218,3. 
764 KR! V: 177, l 3f. 
765 KR/ V: 321,2. In this case precious metols are mentioned, and the inw is the result of compulsion, not a voluntary 
act, according to the text. 
766 KR/V: 144,1;4. 
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PREVIOUS ÜISCUSSIONS OF THE WORD inw 
Gordon basicallyconcluded that inwcould mean "tribute", "goods", "offerings" or "revenues". 
This may be perfectly true, but he also asserts: 
When used in the context of the king's relations to foreigners, with the Egyptians, or 
with the gods, inw almost always is tribute.767 
R. Müller-Wollermann approached the problem slightly differently, turning to anthropological 
sources to redirect the discussion, providing the criteria identifying tribute as colloquially 
understood, and then went on to state that political anthropology established that tributary 
relations do not have a specific mode of production, and that they can be assigned to any 
social system, but that those who pay and those who receive do not belang to the same 
ethnic and social group, and that those who pay have their own means of production, and 
are exploited by non economic coercion attached more to the collective group than to the 
individual. 768 
While this does match her source more or less, the source specifies that what she assigns 
colloquial meaning is that used by historians, who use tribute to refer to "requisitions from the 
conquered" and ethnographers who apply it for "occasional or regular requisitions from 
conquered tri bes." And "that tribute is a word with many meanings." 769 Since Egyptologists 
have a right to claim to be historians, it is only fair to point out that the way Egyptologists use 
the word is therefore correct, according to the context, and it need only be noted that if our 
method is less thorough than political anthropology, it is not necessarily Egyptology that errs. 
She concludes from the evidence of the New Kingdom that inwwas given by Egyptians and 
foreigners, from individuals and groups, but that it was never collected and that a reciprocal 
giving was not accomplished. She contends that it was not made regularly, and after 
examining the texts of the Old Kingdom and the Middle Kingdom believes herself justified in 
asserting that "gift" is the most suitable rendering for inw.770 
W. Boochs responded to this by citing the Wb. and reestablished the argument that inw 
could mean "tribute" by indicating that there was considerable evidence of the use of duress, 
and that voluntary submission of inw might represent a logical decision on the part of the 
giver, but that this did not compel the interpretation that it necessarily represented a gift. 771 
767 Gordon, inw, p. 389. 
768 R. Müller-Wollermann, GM 66: 81 . 
769 A. 1. Pershits, "Tribute Relations, " in Seaton/Claessen , Politicol Anthropology, p. 149. 
770 Müller-Wollermann, GM 66: 88-90. lt should be borne in mind that her conclusions are marred by her method 
of employing the dato. E.g ., she cites RAD 18, 2 (cf. supra, p 148) saying that the payment of the inw is made 
by a private person . The title of the unnamed person does not imply that the payment is made in a private 
capacity, and it is difficult to use "private person" for anything except nmhw and 'nb-n-nwt without facing 
insurmountable philological and semantic difficulties. This is an unusual error for one otherwise so inclined to 
specifications. 
77 1 W . Boochs, GM 71 : 61-66. R. Müller-Wollermann's response to this ( GM 77: 51-55) indicated that one had 
to examine the queslion in a different light. As Müller-Wollermann originally approached the problem with the 
conviction that by employing Polanyi's interpretotion of ''exchange" and "reciprocity'' while Boochs was using 
iconographic evidence, ond Müller-Wollermann 's response took refuge in Wortfeldtheorie, it became a 
dialogue des sourdes. 
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E. Bleiberg supported an interpretation which involved intricate distinctions between the 
King's Privy Purse and the rest of the administrative system. His evidence is that inw is always 
received by the king "or through a representative who has the authority to act on the king's 
behalf. "772 As the vizier is entrusted with duties on behalf of the king, it is clear that by this 
definition attention to the inw can also be so classified. Not only however do the references 
to inw in the "lnstructions for the Vizier" not figure in the sections of the text dealing with the 
palace or the king, but rather expressly in those paragraphs dealing with the management 
of the land as a whole 773 - and figures with btri - so that a compelling argument can be 
elaborated that the inw was one of the most significant official designations for government 
income during at least part of the New Kingdom .774 
He completely neglects P. Turin 1900+, P. Mallet and the Ship's Logs which record inw 
being quite distinct from the royal inw, and having no demonstrable relationship with the 
king at any level. Therefore the torturous logic which Bleiberg pursued was superfluous, as 
the vocabulary cannot be defined in the fashion advocated by his approach. A part of the 
inw may have been designated for the king's privy purse, but that is not the fundamental 
meaning of the term, and there is certainly no evidence. 
His evidence for the contention is selective. While contending that inw is an aspect of 
kingship, the evidence does not reveal that the inwwas turned over to the king as king. His 
own examples include a reference to the king receiving inw as "Lord of the T wo Lands", 
which is certainly an official designation.775 Accounting for the inwas intended for the privy 
purse is however not based on an objective view of the texts, but rather on the assumption 
that the inw was distinct from temple income, which was termed btkw.776 
The [ .. . ] examination of bJkw(t) will depend on the same theoretical considerations 
[ .. . ] The most fundamental of these ideas is that ancient Egyptian economic trans-
actions were named according to the ultimate destination of the products.777 
Not only is this distinction impermissible, as there are numerous texts uniting inw with btkw 
which show it heading in the same direction,778 but the b1kwof Pharaoh is a legal term, 779 
so that the logic is at fault. The distinction between the two terms is clearly the origin and 
designation, but not the destination. 
772 Bleiberg, JARCE 21 : 157. Since - through the length and breadth of Egyptian history- we have very few cases 
of people who acted independently of the king and lived to build a tomb in which they could commemorate this 
fact, this evidence amounts to a tautology. 
773 Cf. Urk. IV: 1114, 13; 1115,4; 12; 1116,2 
774 lt is of course possible that my selection of words was erroneous, and that other words with fiscal significance 
should be sought. The words I chose are those which are statistically significant in the literature as it is preserved 
(which means very little) , which other authorities have identified as having this meaning . 
775 Bleiberg, JARCE 21: 157-158. Or perhaps the relevant question is: how large was the royal privy purse ? 
TT 343 (cf. p . 225 n. 725 supra) shows clearly that the inw wandered through the admin istrative apparatus to 
someone who was Overseer of the Craftsmen of the Lord of the Two Lands. 
776 E. Bleiberg, "The Redistributive Economy in New Kingdom Egypt,"JARCE 25 (1988) : 157. 
777 Bleiberg, JARCE 25 : 157. 
778 KR/ 1: 201,5 -6 distinguishes inw as foreign, bJkw as Egyptian . KR/ II : 608, 12 puts the two in the same category 
as far as recipients are concerned, while d istinguishing their origin and nature. Similarly, KR/ II : 260,4-8 ; V: 
117, 14. 
779 Cf. "The Decree of Horemhab·', 1. 33 , supra , pp. l 88f. 
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His final conclusion is however, 
The institution of inw was neither trade nor tribute but rather represents a system of 
gift-giving to the king by a variety of people both Egyptian and foreign .780 
An examination of his conclusions reveals that his title and thesis is far narrower, for he fails 
to state clearly whether he regarded the inw as the main source of government income or 
not, merely indicating that it was officially separate from temple income. What he seemingly 
means is simply that subject peoples rendered up the inw - Egyptian or otherwise - to the 
king, but he does not distinguish in his detailed analysis just why he suggests that it be for the 
royal privy purse. 
His illustrations of the distribution of the inw fail to demonstrate that the inw was the exclusive 
personal property of the king, although there can be little doubt that the inwwas accounted 
for, and that it reached various parts of the administration, so that this is another weak link in 
his argument. lf one shifts the weight of his argument from the contention that it was the privy 
purse to the contention that it was royal, then his conclusions match h i s evidence (although 
failing to match t h e evidence) . An indication that this was in fact what he meant is to be 
found in a simple statement: 
The Egyptian system is based on what Polanyi would call a red istributive model. 
Goods were collected by the temple for eventual redistribution to the people. Rotions 
were distributed from the temple to people on the basis of rank rather than need or 
ability to buy goods.781 
We thus see that from an interpretation influenced by Polanyi, R. Müller-Wollermann comes 
to the conclusion that inw means "present" while Bleiberg concludes under the same influence 
that it is the income of the king 's privy purse. This despite the fact that both of them aver that 
one should not be influenced by modern categories.782 Neither has actually reviewed all the 
evidence before reaching their conclusions, and the conclusions of both fly in the face of the 
other evidence. 
Each has in fact been biased by an attempt to fit the concept of inw into modern categories. 
Modern categories are completely essential to gain understanding, but they certainly make 
the task difficult. Müller-Wollermann, e .g ., wanted to remove the modern category of "tribute", 
and yet found herself applying another modern category, that of "gift" . As both were equally 
inappropriate, the endeavour did not advance our science, as even Boochs' references to 
the Wb. were able to re-direct the argument. 
780 Bleiberg, JARCE 21: 167. 
781 Bleiberg, JARCE 21 : 156. 
782 Bleiberg, JARCE 21 : 155; Müller-Wollermann, GM 77: 51 . 
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CONCLUSIONS 
lt will be noted that previous discussions did not try to track all of the variables involved in the 
delicate task to which we have addressed ourselves in this work, to wit: 
Who paid what to whom and why? 
lt is true that from the Egyptian standpoint, inw could well imply tribute or presents, but the 
story of Wn-lmn contains an interesting detail concerning trade when discussing the pur-
chase of materials with the Prince of Byblos. 
He caused that the records of the days of his fathers be brought, and he had them 
read in my presence, and they found a thousand deben of silver, all of which was in 
the records. 783 
This text indicates that the Egyptians customarily paid for their acquisitions from Syria, and it 
is unlikely that the author would have invented the incident - which is not very flattering to 
him or his masters, let alone the earlier Pharaohs - unless there were at least a grain of truth 
in the matter. Liverani pointed out that inw could well be part of a reciprocal trade,784 and 
it is known that the word can be related to the word for "to buy", and therefore it could mean 
that inwwas what was "bought" or trade goods as has been frequently advocated. 
Egypt doubtless took tribute and plunder when their armies were marching through foreign 
countries, but the things that arrived in Egypt from outside are invariably termed either btqt, 
inw or b;kw, so that we cannot distinguish between trade goods and tribute, but must 
assume that trade goods and presents (offered in the spirit of reciprocity) were the rule rather 
than the exception. lt is possible that bJkw payments from Asia are more common than bJkw 
payments from Nubia, while inw from Asia and Nubia appear to be equally common. 
References to Punt delivering b;kw are far less common.785 The dowry offers a classic case 
in point, for dowry cannot be tribute, any more than plunder offered voluntarily is booty. inw 
would appear to figure not only in the same texts and contexts as b;kw, as has been 
frequently noted,786 but also more frequently in association with btri than sJyt. 
ldeologically there is evidence that the Pharaoh was awarded a conquest by virtue of th~ 
support of the gods -Amun-Re' in particular- and that the resulting income was turned over 
to the temples, where it was kept, but that Pharaoh had access to this. lt is also possible that 
some of the foreign inw went to the Pharaoh, but the extent to which the receipt of regular 
783 LES 68, 1-3 . 
784 liverani, Or. 42: 192-3. 
785 1 know of none. Th is might be evidence of inw meaning Irade goods, as Punt surely did not render tribute to 
Egypt, in the sense of obligatory payments impressed by the use of military force. Following the same logic, one 
would suspect that Egypt took items titled b;kw from countries where there was an administrative structure under 
Egyptian influence, while inw came from countries where such a presence did not exist (as a consequence of 
either Irade or military conquest). Given the evidence and the free use of btkw, this cannot be justified on 
philological grounds. 
786 Cf. e.g ., Bleiberg, }55fA 11 / 2: 107 ff. 
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payments went to either the Pharaoh or the temples on a regular basis cannot be elucidated 
from the texts. The inscription of the High Priest lmn-btp can be interpreted as implying that 
inwwent via the Estate of Amonrasonther to the Pharaoh (although this is not compelling).787 
TT 343 illustrates that the goods derived from the inw then became part of the properties of 
the treasury - and were used - as goods. Other texts indicate however that the inw as such 
- not merely the goods, but also the designation - was passed on to another authority (as 
e.g ., in the inscription of the High Priest of Amun, lmn-btp, pp. l 86f., supra), where it was 
transferred from the temple to Pharaoh . 
While a great deal of attention has been devoted to the foreign inw, the Egyptian evidence 
has been neglected. The inw of P. Gurob may have been termed such because it was of 
Syrian origin, and the same is could hold for the red jasper of P. Turin 1900+. The other 
references to internal inw are insufficiently precise to permit an identification, but certainly, 
the evidence of TT l 00 should support the contention that one form of obligatory payment in 
Egypt itself was termed inw. The details of the "lnstructions of the Vizier" tend to imply that 
during Dynasty XVIII, inwwas the single most important type of revenue for which the vizier 
was responsible, as btri is used in fewer contexts, while inw is applied for rural income, 
festival offerings, and for administrative units. 
P. Harris I definitely distinguishes between the inw, as this is the label applied to the royal 
gifts given to the temple of Amun, and the annual btri of the temple which is classified as sJyt 
and bJkw-rmJ. 788 Of the two lists, one striking difference is the detailed listing, lumping all of 
the categories together in the latter lists, while detailing the silver, textiles, incense, and 
wine, etc. as inwofferings to the temple. Perhaps significantly, precious stones figure only in 
the inw list, whereas otherwise, the same types of items are listed exhaustively in the inw list 
and briefly in the btri list. 
This suggests that the temple itself did not receive any inw income, apart from what the 
Pharaoh gave it.789 This would correspond to all of the other references to the foreign trade 
items as well, so that the inw income assessed in the lnstructions of the Vizier, and the inw 
income from the foreign countries belonged, at least initially and superficially to the King, 
and that he then turned over part of this to the temples. 
The fact that precious stones and faience were exclusively in the hands of Pharaoh and were 
not part of the normal temple income is striking, and suggests that the evidence from P. Turin 
1900+ need be recognized as indicating a royal monopoly on supply.790 Thus, the 
relevance of these texts for the understanding of the word inw may be misleading . 
lf inwwas the principal designation for the non-temple income of the state, then it is logical 
that Pharaoh and the Egyptians in general w ill have been more interested in representing the 
787 Cf. supra, pp. l 86f. 
788 The Bi lgai stele likewise does not employ inw, but does use smw, btri, sJ'lf, b;kw-rmJ. 
789 R. Müller-Wollermann (GM 66: 86) errs in translating that Rb -mi-R' counted the inw in a temple. Only gs-pr is 
written, without a further specification . 
790 Clearly, this involuntarily feeds speculation about royal monopolies on foreign Irade, but the evidence is slim . 
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foreign inw(i.e., whatever they received from foreign countries under any circumstances) as 
this indicated supremacy - the ability to oblige another to make a payment - and would 
explain why so few references to Egyptian inw are preserved, for it was not interesting in 
terms of their Weltanschauung. 
lt is extremely difficult to incorporate the evidence of the Ship's Logs into this argument, for 
the evidence tentatively indicates that the vessels were not royal. The transactions recorded 
in P. Turin 2008+2016 state that that vessel was associated with the High Priest of Amun 
(vso. 1, 1 ), and the suggestion that the inw were not purchased but simply received, and 
re-issued, would tentatively speak against a private trading venture by the High Priest. The 
transactions of P. Leiden 1 350 seem to be associated with the High Priest of Memphis. Both 
papyri record the receipt of inw, and the context would indicate that the acquisitions need 
not be understood as purchases, yet the recipients to whom they were subsequently "given" 
may been purchasing them. In general it can be stated that those delivering goods to the 
vessels are of a higher social standing than those receiving them. The articles are those 
characteristic of P. Harris: grain, garments, fish, papyrus, sesame-oil, etc. 
This evidence would indicate that inw-articles belonging to the temples are being collected 
by the ships. lt is however difficult to state whether those delivering the inwwere doing so ex 
officio, or meeting a personal obligation, or being compensated for their goods. lt is 
permissible to suggest that the goods were being sold, and that the profits of the transactions 
went to the owners of the vessels. lf the inw brought to the vessels was not purchased, it must 
be assumed that this was some kind of obligatory payment, i.e. a "tax" or "tribute". lt 
definitely cannot be documented that the Crown benefited from these transactions. 
As there is very little administrative evidence for inwfrom Egypt, aside from the Ship's Logs, 
it is legitimate to state that comparing the inscriptions with the records may be dangerous. lt 
is however interesting to note that Pharaoh takes credit for the delivery of the inw in the 
propaganda text P. Harris 1 (lld, llld), and that Pharaoh seems to make some claim to the inw 
in the propaganda inscription of lmn-btp. Since the administrative records do not demon-
strate this at all, indicating that the temples received the inwdirectly, there would appear to 
be a superficial contradiction. 
The regularity of the foreign payments is uncertain. Certainly those kings who were willing to 
collect inw personally on regular visits to Syria and Cush could assure that payment was 
regular, but in general the dato cannot guarantee that payments - even from areas under 
nominal Egyptian suzerainty - were made regularly. Deliberate maintenance of trade 
connections was probably logistically difficult in antiquity, so that foreign trade missions 
were probably not functioning on a basis which guaranteed delivery of products on a 
regular basis. lt will be recalled that the red jasper and turquoise scarabs were delivered to 
the temple at the rate of 2 a year under Ramesses 111. 791 
791 Cf. P. Harris, supra, pp. 203-204 n. 632. This is a very curious item: the higher number of carnelian items as 
opposed to lapis lazuli, and red jasper would suggest !arger supplies and thus easier access to carnelian, yet 
carnelian supposedly came from Indio, while lapis lazuli was from Afghanistan. Did the carnelian come in fact 
from Punt? 
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lf the lnstructions of the Vizier are correctly understood, the collection of inw within Egypt 
may have been standardized, possibly based on annual assessments.792 The local adminis-
trative officials will have been responsible to the next level up.793 
The evidence indicates however that there were several different types of payment desig-
nated as inw. Some inw was income destined for Pharaoh or the non-temple state adminis-
tration assessed in Egypt.794 The evidence from the Ship's Logs and the inscription of lmn-btp 
would indicate that the temples had their own inw-income. lt is difficult to judge the degree 
to which the evidence of the Ship 's Logs can be taxed . The income was apparently delivered 
directly to the temple vessels, and was apparently distributed or sold by those vessels, 
presumably for the benefit of the temples. There is however no evidence for the inw within 
Egypt which was ultimately del ivered to Pharaoh having been purchased or acquired by 
exchange. lt is however extremely probable that some of Pharaoh 's foreign inw-income was 
acquired through purchases. 
Sh. Allam did not elaborate on his interpretation, but it is possible that he is on the right track 
in indicating that the term does not have a precise meaning .795 This discussion has likewise 
accomplished little more than underline that Bleiberg and Müller-Wollermann were overly 
ambitious, and to confirm that Gordon's conclusion - that the word cannot be assigned a 
precise definition - is correct. lt must be noted however that the foreign inw included both 
payments made under duress 796 and trade goods, as weil as voluntary gifts. 
792 This is an assumption based on the contexts. As pointed out above, the inw is associated with the htri, in many 
contexts, and btri is frequently annual, so that it can be deduced that the inw is also annual. We will see below 
that the difficulty is that the btri seems to subsume the other categories, so that an annual btri con be understood 
as an abstract annual obligation to carry out a certain task which involves the delivery oF concrete goods. Those 
goods (inw, etc.) may be delivered annually, but the obligation to deliver them need not be expressed as an 
"annual inw" since the concrete goods are what is delivered in compliance of the "annual btri" obligation . 
The Tax Lists oF the Royal Canon, 2,4-5 (supra, p. 159) do however hin! that the inw moy have been annual. R. 
Müller-Wollermann (GM 66: 88) categorically rejecls regularity, but this is exaggerated . IF the annual btri 
assessments arrived as inwgoods, the Egyptians did not need to specify the regularity of the inw, because it was 
a different category from the assessment, which is correct. This does not alter the interpretation available to us: 
that inw-goods were seemingly rendered up on a regular, obligatory basis within Egypt, and on an irregular 
basis outside Egypt, dependent upon military campoigns and Irade missions, and diplomatic connections. 
793 R. Müller-Wollermann (GM 66: 88) states that "Von einer Eintreibung ist nie die Rede''. Urk. IV: 1115, 12 
certainly suggests that the Vizier had to keep very close track of the inw. 
794 Without implying that Bleiberg is necessarily correct in assuming a distinction between royal private and public 
income. 
795 Allam, S, "msw = Kinder/ Volksgruppe/ Produkte/ Abgaben," SAK 19 (1992) : 13. 
796 R. Müller-Wollermann (GM 66: 85) remarks that inw is never associated with force . While the inw was 
peacefully and voluntarily given to Amun in Karnak, the means oF acquisition Favored by Seti I would suggest that 
during the Ramesside period inw was acquired by Force (cf. e.g ., KR/ 1: 23, where Seti produces inw which he 
explicitly attributes to his might), and taken to Karnak, where it was freely given to Amun. (The implications oF a 
!ext like Urk. IV: 691, l 0-1 3 do not imply that the delivery was voluntary, and the same applies to Urk. IV: 
712,7). In general R. Müller-Wollermann's statement must be based on a different deFinition of Force than that 
usually understood by those Familiar with Clausewitz. 
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T HE WORD b;kw797 
In Dynasties XIX and XX, the word b;kw(t) appears to refer to work in the sense of the 
products of activity (working) or tasks,798 perhaps as distinct from the significance of k;wt, 
meaning "public works" or "projects", so frequent in titles of Dynasty XVIII. In the administrative 
texts from Deir el-Medineh of Dynasties XIX and XX, it is used to refer to the tomb of the 
reigning pharaoh in the expression, the "work in progress".799 In 0. Cairo 25536, b;kw is 
used several times in precisely this sense, referring to the commencement (line rto. 1) of the 
tomb of the Pharaoh Siptah, and to the further progress (line rto. 2), using both the idiomatic 
expression and the word alone. Etymologically and fiscally, it also refers to something that is 
"worked" or "produced" or a "product" that is traded, or rendered up to meet an obligation. 
INTERNAL REVENUE 
Administrative texts 
The miscellany text states concisely thatthe scribe's b;kw was in writing (P. Anast. V, 17,2).800 
What he did was write, and what he produced was writings, and this was not subject to 
htri. 
797 Cf.JJ.Janssen, "btkw: from Work to Product," SAK 20 (1993): 81-94; W. Boochs, "Zur Bedeutung der bikw(t) 
Leistungen," VA 3 (1987): 207-214; E. Bleiberg, "The Redistributive Economy in New Kingdom Egypt: An 
Examination of fükw(t),"JARCE 25 (1988): 157-168; Lorton, Terminology, pp. 90-105. 
798 E.g., KR/ III: 534, 12 (0. DeM 303); 542, 11 (0. Gard. 67; H.O. 47,2). KR/ IV: 359,3 (0. BMFA 11.1498 = 
J. Cerny, "An Hieroglyphic Ostracon in the Museum of Fine Arts at Boston,"JfA 44 [1958]: 23-25.) uses btkw 
in the sense of "performing a service for the lord of the gods"; which J. C:erny (JEA 44: 23) renders "to be a 
servant". Cf. also KR/ VII: 266,8 (P. CairoJdE 52 003) forworkcarried outon a temple in the Delta, which could 
be the mortuary temple of Ramesses III associated with his cenotaph there. An ostracon from Thebes (0. Cairo 
25241, erroneously atlributed to Abydos, KR/ VII: 7, 5) also refers to btkwas the work of stone masons and brick 
makers at a temple, but it is possible that theywere poid (forwhich no evidence eitherway!). Workers' pay btkw 
may be recorded in anothertext, relating to the tombof an officer(KR/ VII: 263-265; P. Cairo 52002). A jeweler 
is required "r btkw in the mansion of the enlightened soul of Ramesses, beloved of Amun (L!P!H!) in the temple of 
Ptah" (KR/ VII: l 02-103). Stones are given to him, and the work is potentially an obligation. Another obscure !ext 
uses btkw with large numbers of unclear significance (KR/ VII: 284-285; 0. Berlin P. 1268; S. Allam, "Einige 
Hieratische Ostraka der Papyrussammlung der staatlichen Museen zu Berlin," Fuß 22 [1982]: 52-53). 
Aside from these and texts which are cited below, and others which re-produce the same phraseology, there are 
dozens of examples where it is not entirely clear that a fiscal transaction could conceivably be involved, and 
these have been silently omitted on the assumption that being comprehensive does not necessarily require being 
exhaustive. 
799 Cf. J. C:erny, Community, pp. 81 ff. pt r- '-btkw is rendered elsewhere in this work as "site", as this is the 
meaning. 
800 Cf. supra, pp. 133-134. 
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P. Munich 809 (formerly P. Mook) 801 specifically refers to a b;kw payment traditionally due 
to the goddess Hathor ("since the days of Nb-pbty-R'" ), which was confirmed in the reign of 
Thutmosis IV. The fragmentary nature of the text makes interpretation difficult, but it would 
appear tobe certain that the obligation was that of a private individual, and that his obligation 
to pay was confirmed by a court composed of the highest civil officials (the two Viziers, 
deputies and fan-bearers) and not temple officials. 
The word appears repeatedly in connection with deficit obligations in P. Brooklyn 35.1453 
B. 802 The b;kw would appear to be measured in deben, although also counted in 
jars of honey. The purpose of the text is unclear but it clearly relates quotas with monetary 
values. 
The Tax Lists on the Turin Canon state that a specific fisherman 's personal b;kwwas collected 
in fish, while a guardian apparently paid a b;kw in gold, that of the mat weavers was in 
textiles, but the nature of another official b;kw defined as a regular sJyt is not preserved . 
Another delivery of fish is categorized as sdyt. The entries are phrased "his annual b;kw' 
(3, 1-3)_803 
The term b;kw is used in the texts of the Gang at Deir el-Medineh during Dynasties XIX 
and XX. 804 In concrete terms, plaster can be termed b;kw, but fish or firewood ore generally 
not in the texts where two of these appear. 805 In one transaction text, ore is referred to as 
b;kw, 806 while in a dispute, ore is referred to as inyt. 807 Piaster is classified as b;kw in a text 
referring to fish as inyt.808 Honey for the temple of Amun also appears on dockets, where 
the deliveries are termed b;kw, but are actually the sJyt of an official. 809 The honey is from 
the "bearers of honey" of the mortuary temple of Seti 1. 
b;kw is however the generic term for the obligatory quantities of fish tobe provided on a 
monthly basis by the fishermen supplying the Gang. 810 In year 25 of Ramesses III, Nfr-btp 
001 W. Spiegelberg, "Ein Gerichtsprotokoll aus der Zeit Thutmosis' IV.," ZÄS 63 (1927) : 105-115; Allam, HOP 
Tafelteil, pls. l 02-103. , 
802 Cf. V. Condon, "Two Account Papyri of the Lote Eighteenth Dynasty, " RdE 35 (1984) : 57-82, esp. p. 77. lt 
would appear that Condon's "wages'' reverses the situation, as it is the failure to deliver the bJkw that is meanl. lt 
should refer to honey. 
803 Cf. supra, p. 160. 
004 E.g., KR/ IV: l 64f. (P. Gard. 8/ Ashmolean 1960. 1283; C. J. Eyre, "An Account Papyrus from Thebes, ''JfA 66 
[1980]: 108-119); KR/ V: 536, 14 (0 . DeM 165); KR/ V: 527,6 (0 . Gard 150; H.O. 71,3); KR/ V: 460 (0 . 
DeM 92 - excavating the tomb); KR/ VI : 120,2 (0. DeM 45 - temporally specified obligation of potter) ; KR/ V: 
609, 12 (0. Cairo 25 591 -bJkwof potter; inytof Chiefof Provisionsof Pharaoh); KR/ V: 610, l (0. Cairo 25 
633 - Mwof potter; wood not specified); KR/ VI : 367,7; 368,2 -3 (P. Turin 1923); KR/ VI : 399,6 (P. IFAO 
sans; Y. Koenig, 'Livraisons d'or et de ~alene au tresor du temple d'Amon sous la XXe dynastie, " Hommages 
Sauneron 1: 185-220); KR/ VI: 409, 1 (P. Turin 1907 / 8; J. J. Janssen, "A Twentieth-Dynasty Account Papyrus," 
JEA 52 [1966]: 81-94); KR/ VI : 566,4 (Giornale). 
805 KR/ IV: 421, 12 (0. Cairo 25 593). 
806 0 . Cairo 25 722 . 
607 KR/ 111: 545 (P. Berlin 11239, 2.) 
808 KR/ VI : 583, 11 (b;kw); cf. KR! VI : 582, l ; 9; 583, l (inyt); KR! VI: 682, l, etc. 
809 KR/ VII : 84ff., esp. 84,8; 16. _ 
81° KR/ VI: 681 ff.; P. Turin 2075 (Cerny, Notebook, 15, pp. 23-30) , dating to Ramesses IX and Ramesses X. Cf. 
also KR/ VI: 653,4. N .B. these are texts where no contrast is made to wood, pots or plaster. lt is difficult to 
distinguish with certainty, but it would appear that the obligation is bJkw, while the actual delivery is unlabelled. 
(Prof. Janssen drew th is distinction to my attention in this text.) What is actually delivered is elsewhere inyt(cf. e.g., 
KR! VI : 582,9-10). 
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received lmn-bcw's btkw of fish, amounting to 380 deben. 811 In Year 19 Ramesses IX, three 
fishermen each provide 50 deben of fish daily each month, making a total of 4500 deben 
monthly. 812 The term used is sdi, "to exact". 813 In one cöse ljnsw-ms delivers eight kharof 
emmer which are reckoned into fish, but obviously regarded as the fulfillment of his fish 
btkw. 814 This use of a substitute btkwshould not be confused with the term used for deliveries 
of other goods to the tomb where the word fails to appear.815 Responsibilities appear 
confused when the water carrier ~ ' pi-'; delivers emmer, sheep and a bowl, all classified 
as his btkw.816 
In the particular context of Deir el-Medineh, it would seem that the word btkw is used (1) to 
identify specifically the obligatory del iveries of the servants of the tomb, but also (2) to 
identify other payments made, and specifically (3) the supplies issued to the Gang in order 
to carry out their work in the tomb. 
0. Cairo 25 536 uses btkw to refer to the work in the tomb. 
(1) Regnal Year 1, II tbt 12. Day of receiving the btkw by the mayor and Vizier ~ri. 
(2) The further progress: 13 cubits which were made from it. Progress (3) since after 
the receipt by the Vizier. The btkw cubits [ .. . ] 
This text clearly uses btkw referring to the "site" of the royal tomb or the "work in progress" as 
Cerny translates. 817 Technically it is here a measure of work, and the receipt of the b;kw 
must be understood as meaning that it was "recorded" or "observed" (unless ssp means 
"beginning" or "commencement" here, which would mean that the text refers to the start on 
work on the new royal tomb after the burial of the deceased). 
0 . Cairo 25 722 uses b;kw without the definite article in a context which appears tobe a 
private commercial transaction, a payment being made for the rearing of a bull, but the text 
is not completely preserved. 
P. Anast. Vlll 818 (1, 13) refers to the (?) "btkw of h<iS> fisherman". (3,3) and (3, 12) seem to 
refer to a papyrus btkw. The entire text is obviously related to the transport of commodities, 
but it is not clear under what title, for whom and from whom . 
P. Bib. Not. 199, 2819 seems to indicate that a piece of land was assigned by or to the 
Mayor of Thebes to a cultivator "in order to perform his b;kw". Specifically, the text indicates 
that a number of foreigners were assigned to work a piece of land, to provide the btkw. 
At the heart of the administrative letter P. Cairo 58056 the unidentified author 820 states to the 
Standard-bearer, 'b-pt: 
81 1 KR/ VII : 292-293; 0 . Campbell 2,3 . N\cDowell, Ostraca, pp. 4-5. 
812 KR/ VI : 653, 12-13; P. Turin 2075, 2,5; vs. l , l. 
81 3 KR/ VI : 682, 10; P. Turin 2075, 3,2. 
814 KR/ VI: 682, l l; P. Turin 2075, 3,3. 
8 15 E.g ., KR/ 1: 365ff. (fire wood); KR/ IV: 421 . KR/ VI : 603, 15 refers to "carrying btkwwhich is his obligation", but 
the text is fragmentary. KR/ VI: 639, 15 may refer to "carrying btkw[ ... . ] Pharaoh" . 
816 f5RI VI : 603-604, esp. 603, 15-604, l; P. Turin 2084 + 2091, 2, l-2,5. 
817 Cerny, Community, pp. 81 ff. 
8 18 KR/ III: 499-504; Bakir, Epistolography, pls. 28-32/ XXXVI-XXXVII; Wente, Letters, p. 120. 
81 9 LRL, p. 53; Wente, LRL, p. 69. 
820 The rank of the author will not have been notably below that of the recipient, as his name and title are lost at the 
beginning of the text, and these would have followed those of the recipient, were the latter significantly higher. 
239 
Look! Two kJr-vessels of yours (5) are herein Memphis (Mn-nfr) . And I have been 
told that you sent them when you came here (6) in the military manoeuvres (?) . You 
said to me, "Be still and make not conversation. 1 will cause the kJr-vessel to be 
brought to you." (7) At my arrival, please send to the soldier P~-s~-nsw that he give 
to me the b -vessel and I will give bJkw ( 8) the day of its bJkw. And may Ptah give 
you health, and that you not begrudge giving the b-vessel. [ ... ]82 1 
As the letter ends with what appears tobe a matter of private debts, it is possible that the 
b;kw here is a private matter as well, but not absolutely certain . The reference to the use of 
a boat to carry out bJkw is similar to the reference in the Horemhab decree, 822 possibly 
suggesting a public obligation carried out with private means, and that the lender is acting 
in a private capacity, while the borrower is doing so as private person with a public 
obligation. lf the donkey texts suggest that r b;kw.f means so much as "rent", the "the day of 
its bJkw" might correspondingly refer to the rate. But, "the day of its bJkw" may refer to the 
day when one comes to collect its bJkw, as in the following case, indicating that there is a 
bJkw which must be paid regardless of possession or use, which cannot be rent. 
The letter P. Cairo 58057 from the herdsman Qbwty-ms of the Mortuary Temple of Ramesses 1 
to P~ -iry, an Overseer of Cattle, records the former saying, 
[ .. . and to] say, please let the hoof-in-ore-donkey 823 be brought which is with you, 
through the servant Pi~y (3) since it was given to himfor its hoof-in-ore for the field of 
the Mortuary Temple of Ramesses I in the island of Pb~ under the authority of (4) the 
soldier Ms~ of the Mortuary Temple of Ramesses 1. That you may know it, there has 
been given to you a donkey by the soldier Tnn of the Phyle Dazzling (5) like Aten in 
Year l of the troop of Q~pr. He said to you, "Give it to Qbwty-ms." You did not give 
it. (6) 1 (filled you in?) here in Memphis together with the stable master lmn-ms, 
saying, "Give it!" And you said to me, "Do not take me (7) to court. Behold the 
donkey is with me. Had you sent someone to take it, would I not have given it?" So 
you said . (8) You made an oath of the Lord (L!P!H!) saying, "I will let it be brought," 
Look, you have not had it sent, and one comes (9) to exact the bJkw fromme year 
for year, and beast is with you . 824 
This rather obscure text hints that a bJkw was collected for donkeys, and that the administrative 
measures employed did not associate the presence of the donkey with the obligation, but 
821 KR/ III: 254-255; Bokir, Epistolography, pls. 4 -5 / VII. S. Allam ("Trois Lettres d 'Affaires," Melanges Mokhtar, 1: 
19-23) translates, "[ ... ] il me cede le bateau (de sorte que) je (puisse) donner (du) travail (a executer). (1. 8.) C'est 
(justement) le jourde son travail [ .. . ] ." One mightequolly read, ' [ .. . ] that I maycause tobe used(8) the day of its 
bJkw [ ... ]". The implication of a particular significance about the b1kw induces the translation presented above. 
822 
"[< As for>] (1. 17) any private person without a boat who gets for himself a boat for his bJkw from another and 
he causes that hebe ordered to get wood for him"; cf. supra, p. 188. 
823 
'gJwt.f m biJ. "Hired" or "borrowed' is the usual interpretation, but the context of the word generally falls into the 
field of the fiscal so that the expression is left. Cf. supra, p . 134-135. 
824 KR/ 1: 238; Möller, Lesestücke III : 8 ; Allam, HOP pp. 287-289; Tafelteil 86. 
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rather that the obligation existed independently of access to the donkey. 825 The reference to 
the "hoof-in-ore" is difficult, as the term seems to suggest to certain scholars that this is a 
reference to a rental agreement, and other texts relate it specifically to donkeys as weil, but 
the term never appears in Deir el-Medineh, where donkey rentals are common place.826 
The usual phrase in 27 texts from Deir el-Medineh is that so-and-so has taken a donkey "for 
its btkw". 827 Were it not for the present text (and a couple of unpublished references), 828 this 
would generally be assumed to mean that so-and-so was taking the donkey "for his work" . 
As however, the last line of this text states that a btkw is exacted for the donkey, whereas the 
first line dealing with the donkey refers to its "hoof-in-ore", it is not inconceivable that the two 
are related. The animal has been waylaid on its way to Qbwty-ms by the Overseer of 
Cattle, while it was ultimately supposed to have been with Pi;y. That P;-iry is somehow 
profiting from this "hoof in ore" seems to emerge from the first part of the text. The creature is 
apparently either the property of a major temple administrative complex or the Mortuary 
Temple of Ramesses 1 (less probably that of its servant, Qbwty-ms), so that the "hoof-in-ore" 
would appear to be the actual value of the work to the one using it, seemingly equivalent to 
the btkw. lf this torturous logic is correct, the "hoof-in-ore" which perished in the miscellany 
was the value of the work, while here the "hoof-in-ore" benefits the Overseer of Cattle, 
which was actually to benefit the temple ("for its hoof-in-ore for the field") for which the 
herdsman pays the btkw, and therefore it is an expression relating to fiscal transactions and 
not rental. 
Neither of these texts has however indicated to whom the btkw is paid, or rather who 
collects it. Apparently the obligation to account for the donkey owned by the Mortuary 
Temple of Ramesses I was not collected by that organization: the "hoof-in-ore" was intended 
for the benefit of that institution, but not the btkw. The b-vessel is the responsibility of the 
Standard Bearer, but the unknown author of the letter requires the boat, potentially for its 
btkw, but assuredly for a btkw that the author of the letter was obliged to provide. 
P. Turin 2084+2091 does not do more than throw some more dim light on the subject, but 
although the text is terribly mangled, it nevertheless emerges that a complaint is made (once 
again) concerning "five donkeys of the tomb" which had tobe accounted for "when they 
were not with Pharaoh (L!P!H!) their owner and not bearing [ ... ] ". 829 This could concern the 
donkeys used by the smdt, but regardless implies that the donkeys had tobe accounted for 
at all times. 
P. Cairo JdE 52002 830 appears to describe work on a royal cenotaph near Memphis, 
stating that there is a site (r-c-btkw) which a Chantress of Thoth was to visit. In this context, 
825 
"Hoof-in-ore'' cannot be o mere idiomotic expression for "borrowed" os the miscellony text - supra, pp. l 34- 135 
- emphasizes thot the "hoof-in-ore" hos perished, os weil os the team, so thot the term seems to refer to the volue 
there, while the text here emphosizes the choracter of the orrangement. 
826 Cf. supra, p 134 nn . 346-350. 
827 Janssen, SAK 20: 81-94. 
828 Janssen, SAK 20: 82 n. 9 . 
829 KR/ VI: 603-608; P. Turin 2084+209 l , 2,9. The divine determinative ofter nb indicotes thot the text should not 
be understood as "with Phoraoh (LIP!H!) or their owner", and that phoraoh was their owne,r. · 
83° KR/ VII: 263-265 ; cf P. Posener-Krieger "Construire une tombe a l'ouest de Mn-nfr, " RdE 33 (198 l ): 47-5 8, 
pls. 3 ~4 . 
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grain is collected for the diw of the workers (II. 9; 17), which is termed b;kw, when 
collected . 831 
P. Turin 2008+2016 uses bJkw in the context of items brought to a ship.832 The ownership 
of the boat is not clear, and thus the ultimate recipients unidentified. P. Turin 2008+2016 
vso. 2, 2 lists the btkw of papyrus possibly brought to the boat. 
The accounts papyrus P. Cairo 58096833 seems to relate to the distribution, handling and 
collection of items, detailed as bJkw: 
l, l [ .... ] (?)] 834 [ ... . ] 
1,2 [ .... ] together with the lapidary Nfr-br [ .... ] 
1,3 [ ..... ] to field [Left Blank] 
1,4 [ ... . <Total of(?) >] the deben of red jasper [ .... ] 
1,5 [<given for bJkw(?) >] at the gate of [ .... ] 
1,6 given for btkw together with lapidary [<PN> ... . ] 
1,7 Total day 1 D 17 [Left Blank] 
1,8 Again : given through lapidary Sw-n-r red jasper, fr-vessel 835 (items) 70 
1,9 red jasper, beads [Left Blank] 80 
1, 10 red jasper (?) [Left Blank <Withdrawn(?) from the Gold House>] 836 60 
1, 11 red jasper bs-block (?) 837 [Left Blank] in Regnal Year 43 II tbt 18 838 6 
1, 12 1 tbt 18. Day of commanding lapidary Nfr-' bt to btkw in the Mansion of the 
1, 13 enlightened soul of R'-mss-sw mry-lmn (L!P!H!) in the Estate of Ptah. 
1, 14 Given through scribe lyt red jasper beads, 839 20; pieces, 45 
l, 15 Given [<through the lapidary (2) >] Sm pieces 100. 
2, 1 Given through the lapidary S[<m>], pieces, 200(?). Again for silver plating(?), 
beads 12 
831 On the meaning of diw, cf. infra, pp. 264ff. 
832 Janssen, Ship's Logs, pp. 64 and 66. 
833 
~RI VII: 102-103; Cerny, Notebook, 145, p. 41 . 
834 Cerny may have read ss;fm here. 
835 J. J. Janssen (Prices, p . 338) refers to a Jr-vessel which is a rare word, for a conlainer of perhaps 11 .5 hin. (Cf. 
0. DeM 46, vso. 1 0; 0 . Cairo 25678,39). lf the word is the same, the lapidary has relurned a vessel filled with 
pieces, numbering 70 in this case. 
836 Partially represents restoration suspected by C:erny. 
837 J. J. Janssen (Prices, p. 206) has identified a bs-container, perhaps a pail. lt is tempting to have this filled with the 
stones, but the determinative does imply that these are the products rather than the container (and C:erny's 
franscription -which I have before me - does not indicate any doubt in his mind that this parl of th is line ended 
here), but the scribe did clearly make later additions, and therefore the determinative may have been meant to 
apply to what should have followed, rather than to the preceding word. 
The second determinative used indicates however that the scribe could not decide whether a bs was a "bead" or 
~ "block" (2,3), so that tending to the latter conclusion is more in keeping with the text. 
838 Cerny evidently had reason to suspect that the date was added later. 
839 inhm. The etymological origin of ''pomegranate", inhmn, being unknown (H. Brunner, 'Granatapfel," LÄ II: 891-
892), it is here assumed that inhm means "bead", and that this is the origin of the word for pomegranate, the 
Egyptians having conceived of the fruit as full of "beads". Drenkhahn, Handwerker, p . 49 categorizes the nsdyas 
a "bead maker'', but this is surely too narrow, although in this case, the lapidary was certainly making beads. 
242 
Interna! Revenue 
2,2 Given through lapidary Sw-n-r J'r-vessel (items) 70 840 
2,3 Given through lapidary Sw-n-r bs-blocks, 6 
2,4 Given through Scribe lyt red jasper beads 20 pieces 45 841 
2,5 Given through lapidary Sw-n-r red·jasper pieces, 60 
2,6 Given through lapidary Sw-n-r red jasper beads 80 
vso. 
l, l I spent 8 days in the Mansion of the Enlightened Soul Rc-ms-sw mry lmn, and I left, 
l , 2 and I was ordered to btkw II smw 16 in the lpet-Festival. 842 
The initial impression is that the most interesting element in this rather confusing text is a 
reference to what would have been the Mortuary Temple of the Cenotaph of Ramesses II in 
Memphis (1. 12). As it would appear that his successor Merneptah had a Cenotaph in 
Memphis, 843 this hint is of interest. The remainder of the text is so damaged that drawing 
any firm conclusions would appear to be ill-advised. 
The text demonstrates conclusively however that a lapidary who was definitely not on the 
staff of the Mortuary temple was commanded to perform a btkw for the temple. As usual, in 
contexts referring to the fiscal term, the P. Cairo 58096 does not use the article, or say 
"perform btkw" (irt bJkw), 844 but uses the simpler btkw familiar from other texts, as e.g., the 
donkey texts, "r btkw. -f". lt is not clear that the lapidary was obl iged to work stones provided 
by the temple or whether he and the others contributed stones as weil as work. 
The actual scribe of the papyrus concerning stones notes that he was ordered to btkw at the 
lpet-festival (vso. 1,2). One recalls the miscellany text, 
[Everyone is taxed] except for the scribe who controls everyone, and is not assessed 
(btri) (for) his btkw is in writing. 845 
In this case, however, while it is possible that this scribe was tobe recording other peoples' 
btkw's (his alleged btkw) the scribe lyt did turn over stones ( l, 14). lt could be suggested that 
he collected the stones from elsewhere, but this is not noted, as is usually done. The whole 
text should probably be interpreted as such a note. 
A wood btkw specifically associated with a door in Memphis is recorded, but the context 
does not allow interpretation. 846 
Another ostracon 847 records the btkw-work done at a gate, enumerating in each case the 
nature of the btkw in question. In this case, various parts of things are mentioned, but the 
840 The repetition of the figure indicates the size of the unit. These are clearly not beads - they are not identified as 
such - if 70 pieces fill obout 5.3 litres! But, if the some os the Jrb-vessel, it will be smoller, ond the pieces 
correspondingly smoller (cf. Jonssen, Prices, p. 435). 
841 Unless these are the some pieces os in ( l , 14) it is clear thot the quontities were carefully noted. 
842 Beginning in III smw, ond therefore os port of the preporotions. 
843 W. Helck, "Zum Kult an Königsstatuen,'' JNES 25 (1966): 32-33. 
844 The scribe was however notobly reticent in the use of orticles in the short hond of this text. 
845 P. Anost. V 17,2; LEM, p. 65; Cominos, LEM, pp. 247-250. 
846 KR/ 1: 263, 8; 266, 9; P. B.N. 209; Helck, Materialien, pp. 895; 897. 
847 KR/ 11: 071-672. 
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relationship between the objects is not clear. In each case, the dimensions or position of the 
item is listed, but not its value, so that probably only the activity and the parts are implied, 
but the use of the term "gate" raises the suspicion that b;kw here contains both meanings of 
the word. 
P. E[gyptian] P[apyrological] S[ociety] is a single roll with several documents glued 
together, according to the editor.848 Concerning primarily eye paint occasionally called 
b;kw and dating to the reign of Ramesses IX, the first document identified by W. Helck 
appears tobe a typical semi-official letter instructing the recipient to seek out and ship him 
eye-paint. The second takes up the matter with a more official tone, and can be rendered: 
22 The Royal Ordinance of the High Priest of Amonrasonther, R'-mssw-nbt 
23 to the effect that: this Royal Decree is brought to you to say, "I sent to you through the 
Steward of the Royal Treasury 849 (L!P!H!), 
24 the Royal Butler, lmn-btp, saying, "Let AA850 quality msdmt-eye paint be brought -
25 worthy of sgm-eye paint of Pharaoh (L!P!H!) - to the place where (The Royal) One 
is." And you let 
26 15 deben of msdm!-eye paint be brought through him. And after it was given to the 
physicians 
27 of Pharaoh's (L!P!H!) residence medical staff for his b;kw, 
28 it was found to be weak msdt-eye paint, not worth 
29 the sgm-eye paint of the b;kw of Pharaoh (L!P!H!), in it one deben only of msdt-eye 
paint was what was found. 851 Look, it will be brought (back) to you, and when this 
dispatch of Pharaoh (L!P!H!), your Lord, reaches you [ ... ] 
The dispatch goes on to detail instructions to dispatch higher quality paint. lf this understanding 
of the text is correct, it would refer to this b;kw as income of Pharaoh himself, collected - not 
inappropriately - by the Pharaoh's personal treasurer. 
Document C of the P EPS text refers to "b;kw-gold" (1. 60), but in a context so obscure that 
there is little point in using it as evidence, although it would appear that the text deals with 
workers employed by and supplying the Estate of Amonrasonther with gold directly. Probably 
not in exchange for this, but as a kind of rations, they are supplied with the goods listed in 
Document D, items of clothing, metal, bread, and even some service donkeys (II. 74-84). 
848 KR/ VI: 517-522; W. Helck, "Eine Briefsammlung aus der Verwaltung des Amuntempels," JARCE 6 (1967): 
135-151. 
849 imy-r pr-bd_-n-pr-'t, i.e., not the national treasury "of the Two Lands". Or is the office holder the same? 
850 nfr nfr. 
851 Helck translates the btkw understanding that it was "worked" in the first instance and uses Gebrauch in the second 
case, presumably from verarbeitet. lt must be noted however that in both instances the determinative is the scroll, 
and that the active man is not present in the second instance. r btkw.f is practically a terminus technicus, referring 
to some kind of obligation to pay. The New Kingdom genitives are usually expressed with the pronominal form, 
rather than the suffix, and verbal forms with the tw.f suffix, neither of which is in evidence here. lf we follow Helck 
there was likewise no reason to return the deficient material, and il would merely have sufficed to repeat the 
order. -
244 
Interna! Revenue 
P. Turin 2084+2091 from Deir el-Medineh 852 refers to an obligatory btkw with some items 
(grain, sheep and a bowl) associated with a water carrier (II. 2,2-2,5). As water-carriers 
presumably delivered water as their btkw, the items could represent a kind of remuneration. 853 
A cultivator is recorded as having delivered some grain (1. 2,7) . A note concerning the "five 
donkeys of the tomb" seems to indicate that a payment was exacted for time during which 
they were not serving Pharaoh (II. 2,8-2,9). lt seems that gold was received "which they 
consumed each" year (?). A reference to "exchange", perhaps in connection with a wood 
cutter, and the quantity of 90 deben, is enigmatic. diw is used but it is not clear for whom . 
The papyrus is badly preserved and thus difficult to interpret on its own. lt would appear that 
the text deals with income and expenditure, but whether btkw refers to both sides of the 
transactions is unclear. 
P. Greg 854 uses the term btkw with reference to potters and wood cutters. B 21 records a 
wood delivery of 500 unspecified units as btkw. B 24 has 2 unspecified units termed btkw 
of the potter. 855 Vso. B 12 is incomplete, but refers to the bJkw of the potter, while 8 13 
reads "left, wood, 2000; btkw of the potter [ .. .. ]" lt is possible to imagine that wood was 
delivered by the wood cutters to the potters for firing their kilns, but they were responsible for 
supplying the village directly, so that these must be two sets of deliveries to the village. 
The word btkw figures in P. Turin 1900856 in a text elsewhere mentioning htri and inw, but 
the actual context of b;kw forbids any deductions. 
P. Turin 2075 from Deir el-Medineh 857 identifies the btkw of three fishermen for the right 
side. In regnal Year 19, IV tbt 9, each is stated to be obliged to deliver 50 deben of fish 
daily for a month, making a total of 4'500 deben of fish. On IV tbt 24 and 27, the actual 
deliveries are enumerated in a list, the end of which is unfortunately missing, so that the 
numbers do not add up. In the following lines, the lists of actual exactions (sdi) continue, with 
the verso repeating the btkw-obligation to provide 4'500 deben of fish / month. 858 
The deliveries did not take place daily, but in quantities of several hundred at a time. 
The papyrus is badly damaged, but it is conceivable that the system of recording was similar 
to that of P. Louvre E 3226, with deliveries offset against one another. 859 Otherwise there 
would be no logical reason for listing the fish btkw of 4'500 deben for 19 IV tbt twice. In 
852 KR/ VI : 603-604. 
853 This is however not demonstrated, as water is specified but not designated. Cf. the references cited by S Eichler, 
"Untersuchungen zu den Wasserträgern von Deir-el-Medineh I," SAK 17 (1990): 144-145. Eichler assumes 
that water carriers are a professional group. Valbelle ( Ouvriers, pp. 103-105) demonstrates that the Gang 
consisted of some 40-80 workers as a rule, and that under Ramesses III , the figure was about 40, while for the 
same period Eichler (SAK 17: 141) identifies some 24 water-carriers . As it is impossible to establish the quan-
tities of water which they were expected to provide, the mere proportions should suggest that it was possible that 
the title was "awarded'' to some unlucky souls in the neighbourhood, and that they had to deliver water periodi-
cally on a regular basis, as priests had occasional employment in the temples, but that they were not a group of 
professionals . 
854 KR/ V: 437-448; supra, pp. 152ff. 
855 Or does this mean 2 potters2 
856 KR/ VI: 624,7 vso. 2,7 
857 KR/ VI: 653-655; 681-684; C:erny, Notebook, 15, pp. 23-30. 
858 Vso. 1, 1; KR/ VI: 654, 7-8. 
859 Cf. Megally, Recherches, passim. 
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this context the reference (1. 3,3) lo a delivery of "8 khar of emmer making 3'200 deben of 
fish" is potentially relevant. The reference indicates that the fisherman was permitted to 
substilute grain for fish, but the value to the workmen of such a delivery is unclear. 
P. Turin 2014/223 860 may have a reference to bJkw turned over to the Gang in the context 
of a smaller sum of 500 khardistinguished from the l 0'000 kharof grain otherwise discussed 
( l , 10; l , 14). lt is possible that th is was related to the Mansion at Medinet Habu, but the 
context is unclear. 
Private T ransactions 
The word bJkwserves many purposes, and Giornale Verso B 8-9 861 supplies an example of 
its use in a private transaction where the Chantress of Amonrasonther T5-ngmt contracts work 
for her tomb equipment out to the Gang. The objects (coffins) and the delicate craftsmanship 
are valued in deben, following which is the "total of money (bgj as b;kw of/for the artisans 
and draughtsmen" (1. B8, 12). As far as the damaged text permits one to conclude, the work 
itself is termed "tasks", while the total value is termed bJkw. Although abstractly it could be 
contended that the bJkw is T!-ngmt's obligation, it is far more probable that the formula 
simply expresses the monetary value of the work (bJkw). 
Private Propaganda 
b;kw is collected from the overseers, mayors and villages chiefs of Upper and Lower Egypt 
in an XVIII Dynasty text of the "clever scribe lntf". 862 
A Dynasty XVIII inscription records that Qbwty, an Overseer of the Treasury, received the 
b;kw of the mayors, and that he was praised by the king . 863 
Sn -nfr received bJkw associated with s;yt and btri, after having been appointed Overseer 
of the Double Granary. 864 
In TT 125, the owner recounts that he "counted as b;kw the reckoning in grain (barley) as the 
annual btri. "865 This was probably carried out at and for the temple of Amun. 
In the Dynasty XVIII tomb (EK 3) of P!-bry in EI Kab, a field worker states that "I am going to 
make an excess on the b;kw for the official. "866 
In TT 188, P;-rn-nfr records dogmalically that the bJkwof each god is measured, whi le that 
for Aten overflows. 867 W. Helck suspects that he did this by virtue of his position as Overseer 
of all the Prophets of Upper and Lower Egypt. 868 
860 C:erny, Notebook 23, pp. 20-23 . 
861 KR/ VI : 590-594; ßotti/Peet, Giomale, pi. 40; Allam, HOP, pp. 331-335. Cf. alsoJanssen, Prices, pp. 216ft. 
(no 26). 
862 Urk. IV: 973,3 -4. 
863 Urk. IV: 436, 13. 
864 Urk. IV: 530,l3 -16. TT99. 
865 Urk. IV: 1379 -1380; W . Helck, Übersetzung, pp. 69-70. 
866 In the scenes of daily life, pi. 3, middle register, in: Tylor Paheri. Cf. James, Phoraoh 's People, p. 109. 
867 Urk. IV 1996, 1 l; N. de G. Davies, 'Akhenaten at Thebes, 'JEA 9 (1923): 132-152. 
868 Helck, Verwaltung, p. 269 n 4. 
246 
lnternol Revenue 
The "receipt of the b;kw of the craftsman of the Temple of Amonrasonther" is recorded in a 
Dynasty XIX inscription. 869 
In the tomb of P~-sr (TT 106), 870 the text clearly distinguishes between the inw of foreign 
countries, and the b;kw of the two lands, both of which he was authorized to receive, in his 
role as Vizier. His role was mainly that of a government official. 
One dynasty XIX official claims to have been the "accountant of the b;kw of the lands and 
deserts". 871 His efforts went to the benefit of the Treasury of the Lord of the Two Lands, 
presumably. Another claims to have counted all the b;kw of the entire land, for the benefit of 
the state. 872 
ßJkw-rmJ is mentioned in the Bilgai stele and the lnscription of the High Priest of Amun lmn-
btp, but not bJkw. 
Royal propaganda 
In Dynasty XVIII Thutmosis III records that some defeated foreigners confirmed a b;kw destined 
for "your treasury" - meaning his majesty- but in a context at the temple of Karnak where it 
was ultimately destined for Amun. 873 While it could be debated to what extent Syrian 
princes were familiar with Egyptian fiscal terminology, it is probable that the scribes responsible 
for the inscription used the word correctly, and that the b;kw was that of the king voluntarily 
rendered by him to the temple. 
The Horemhab Decree 874 uses bJkw in a context (1. 17) indicating that a private person 
(nmbw) could be obliged to borrow a boot from another person in order to carry out an 
obligation which appears to have been to the Pharaoh. 875 Elsewhere (1. 23) a sgm-official 
will be held responsible if he takes a slave from a private person, so that the sgm-official will 
be obliged to render the slave's b;kw, due to Pharaoh. Forage-bJkw for the Pharaoh is 
clearly identified as being something that should be collected by the officials of the wcbwt 
from specially designated magazines, and is not tobe taken from private people (II. 31-33). 
In its present state, the text is quite mutilated, but it can be concluded that the bJkw was a 
payment from the nmbw to Pharaoh unrelated to the obligations of his officials, which were 
also apparently termed bJkw. 
869 KR! III: 330,2; TT 178. 
87° KR! 1: 299, l l -1 2. 
871 KR/ III: 136,7. 
872 KR/ III : 54, 15-55, l. The significonce of KR! III: 16,6; 21,9; 841 , 14 moy hove been similor. A Dynosty XIX 
inscription from the Deir el-Medineh Hothor temple uses b:kwos an obligotory poyment, which moy hove been 
rendered unto o god, but the !ext is very uncleor (KR/ II: 705, 14) 
873 Urk. IV: 759. 
874 Cf. supra pp. l88f.;J.-M. Kruchten, Horemheb, II. 17, 23, 32, 33. 
875 Phorooh's concern becomes opporent in 1. 33 where the 'bJkwof Phorooh is specified." The context is cleor, but 
Kruchten interprets the text os meoning thot the nmhw hos gotten wood for himself ("pour son compte personnel, 
du bois," Horemheb, p 194), whereos it con also be interpreted os meoning thot the second porty (the lender of 
the boot) is requesting thot wood be rendered up to him, before the completion of the bJkw. lt is obviously in the 
king's interest to prevent people from hindering the preporotion of poyments due to the stete (b:kw), ond thus o 
logicol oddition to the code. 
247 
Seti 1 "commanded the bJkw of the entire land, presenting" it to Amun-Re'. 876 His mortuary 
temple was the beneficiary of the bJkw of precious metals delivered by the rbyt. 877 
The Nauri Decree 878 specifically enunciates that any misappropriated bJkw will be punished, 
by the (equivalent of the) bJkw itself being turned over to the temple ("exacting the bJkw from 
[the miscreant official]") and the misbehaving official being obliged to work for the temple 
an equivalent period of time ("for every day he shall spend with him", 1. 47). lt is clear that in 
this case, the bJkw is at once the time spent, and the work done for the temple, and the 
objects produced, as the legal terminology stipulates that temple dependents are not tobe 
diverted to any other tasks, and that the bJkw will be collected. As in the Horemhab Decree, 
the bJkw is directly linked (II. 48-49) to a boat: 
[ virtually any official] who shall detain any boat of the [temple], and likewise the 
boat of any controller (rwgw) of this estate mooring it alone for a single day, saying, 
"I will seize it as the requis[< ition >] from him f[<or >] any [<mis>]sion of Pharaoh 
(L!P!H!)": The la[<w>] shall be executed [<against>] him, [<in that he shall be beaten 
with >] 200 blows and five deliberate wounds. The btkw of the boat will be exacted 
from him for every day he shall have moored it. And he (himself) shall be given over 
to the [temple]. 
W. F. Edgerton made a lengthy detailed analysis of the exact wording of the legal aspects 
of the decree, but Sir Alan quite correctly pointed out that this probably infers too much from 
the specific wording, and fails to take account ofthe general meaning of the text, Sir Alan 
pointing out that the purpose of the decree was quite simply to protect the income of the 
temple by assuring that its servants could operate unmolested. The bJkw of the boat is thus 
the value of the time, and here "fine" would be more appropriate than "rent" or "fee" but the 
word is the same. 
In the lnscription dedicatoire at Abydos Ramesses II indicates that the traders traded to 
produce a btkw of gold, silver and bronze. 879 This was a btri, and the context supports a 
meaning very similar to that which is delineated at length in P. Harris. There is no question 
that the King is taking responsibility for having given these resources to the temple, or made 
them available. The other items listed as btkw are less clear, but the quantities were such 
that transport vessels were required to move them. 
bJkw appears as the product of Egypt and foreign countries, destined for Amun in several 
texts by Ramesses III at Karnak. 880 This suggests that at least part of Pharaoh's bJkw were 
really intended tobe delivered to the god. 
876 KR/ 1 201,6; 205, 3. The text from the hypostyle hall uses the usual distinction between inw for foreign countries 
and b;kw for Egypt. 
877 KR! 1 79, 11-13 . lnscription at al-Dibabiyah , oppositeJebelein. 
878 Cf. supra , pp. l 90ff.; KR/ 1 45-58; F. LI. Griffith , 'The Abydos Decree of Seti I at Nauri,"JEA 13 (1927): 193-
208; W. F. Edgerton, "'The Nauri Decree of Seti : a Translation and Analysis of the Legal Portion ,' JNES 6 
(1947): 219-230; A. H. Gardiner, 'Some Reflections an the Nauri Decree," JEA 38 (1952) : 24-33 . 
879 KR! II: 333, 1-2. 
88° KR! V: 225, 1-3 . Specified are things, baoty and inw as btri (2), but also bikw, so that bfkw implies more than 
mere ibt (things) Cf also, KR! V: 239, 12; 241, 13; 244,9; 245, 11, etc. 
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P. Harris I uses btkw to specify particular entries under the heading of the "annual btri", 
which itself is defined as 6eing s;yt btkw for the major temples (Thebes, Heliopolis and 
Memphis). The corn delivered to the major temples is the "b;kw of the cultivators" ( 126,3; 
326,6; 516, 11 ), and the waterfowl of the fishers and fowlers delivered to the temples of 
The6es and Heliopolis 6ear a similar designation ( 126,6; 326,9). 
The bee-keepers and incense porters take "their annual btkw to your august treasury" in 
Heliopolis (P. Harris 1, 28,3), and to the treasury of Ptah at Memphis (48,2). 
The "btkw of the two lands" (along with the s;yt and btri) is likewise "to be transported to 
your treasury in the Temple of Rec {P. Harris 1, 28,5). 
The Karnak Festal Stele 881 uses b;kw twice with reference to the preparation of grain (as 
loaves and cakes) for Amonrasonther (II. col. ii: 39; 42), 6ut it would appear that although 
the offerings take place at Medinet Ha6u, it is the "pure granaries of the Estate of Amun" that 
will provide the grain. 
FoREIGN REVENUE 
Private Propaganda 
Sn-Mwt asserts responsi6ility for the b;kw of every land. 882 
Min-msw, a retainer of Thutmosis III, states that he "informed the princes of R!nw of their 
annual obligatory b;kw (b;kw.sn n b_rt rnpt)," 883 but does not specify any further. 
In EA 8, the Chamberlain Twtw states that King Akhenaten "commanded for him [Aten] b;kw 
of his Asiatics". 884 
These texts emphasize the royal command for the foreign b;kw. 
Royal Propaganda 
Thutmo.sis III donated villages in Upper R!nw to Amun, designating the btri as b;kw for the 
god as well. 885 The b;kw of W~w~t, 886 Cush887 and R~-mnn 888 was likewise assigned to 
Amun. 
In the dedicatory inscription at the Temple of Month at Karnak, Amenophis III states that the 
Asian and Nubian b;kw provided the adornment of gold, electron, precious stones and 
bronze for the temple. 889 
881 KR/ VI: 3-9, esp. 8,5. 
882 Urk. IV: 4 12,4 
883 Urk. IV: 1442,7. 
884 Urk. IV: 2013,9; Davies, Amoma VI: pp. 11-12; pls. XVIII-XX. 
885 Urk. IV: 7 44,7; Urk. IV: 185, 13; 186,2 specify that the king ordered b;kw(as annual btri) for Amun, at the end 
of the first Syrian campaign. 
886 Urk. IV: 734,2ff.; gold, slaves, cattle, ivory and .smware specified . 
687 Urk. IV: 708,9ff.; gold, slaves, princes, cattle and .smware mentioned. 
888 Urk. IV: 700,7. 
889 Urk. IV: 1668, 3; 5. The list as such includes electrum, gold, copper, lapis, turquoise and bronze. As some of the 
copper is specified tobe Egyptian, and the turquoise may have been mined by the Egyptians, this list combines 
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In the smaller Beth Shan Stele of Seti 1, 890 a hintat military force in Palestine encouraged the 
locals of Yarmouth to come bearing bikw (II. 16-18). lt is not stated whether the payment 
was intended for the estate of Amonrasonther, or indeed what it was. Seti l's Beth Shan stele 
can be interpreted as referring to obligatory btkw the delivery of which was interrupted 
during the rebellion, or to a new obligation . The people of Yarmouth delivered their bikw 
voluntarily, after the necessary encouragement. 891 
The bikw of the gold washers is the object of various projects mentioned in the inscriptions 
of Seti I at the temple at Kanais. 892 After initially establishing his interest in the gold, Pharaoh 
arranged for wells tobe sunk along the route, and subsequently had qtr-vessel crews take 
over the gold washing (Text C, 6-8). Drawing on the btkw of the temple of Mn-m;'t-R', 
divine figures were manufactured. In passages similar - but far briefer - than those of the 
Nauri decree, he guarantees the security of the gold-washers, forbidding anyone from 
diverting "their btkw in gold" from the temple. 893 
The Karnak War Scenes of Seti 1894 use btkw to define articles received which are to be 
turned over to Amun. inw is the term used in the longer texts. 
"Their inw consisting of btkw of Asia" is turned over to the Pharaoh or the temple in a text in 
the Luxor temple of Ramesses 11. 895 In inscriptions from Tanis, Ramesses II claims that the 
b1kw is borne to the palace. 896 
The Blessing of Ptb-t;-tnn 897 uses bikw several times with reference to income from foreign 
countries: 
(Speech 1) Recitation by Ptb-t;-tnn [ ... (4) ... ] 1 have decreed for thee [i.e., Pharaoh] 
lands, 1 have created their princes (5) bearing their b1kw to thee coming to thee 
burdened with (6) their great inw 898 [ ... (Main Text 14) .. . ] 1 have caused foreign 
mountains of all precious noble stones tobe created for thee [ ... ] 1 have put it into the 
heart of all the world to offer their b1kw to thee themselves, princes, courtiers, and 
local and foreign objecls, and only the general slalements in the !ext can be relied on. As it slands, the !ext may 
ind_icate that the cedar doors were btkw, but the btkw may refer in fact only lo the bronze adornment; but il is 
cerlain that this is the revenue btkw and not merely the ward for "worked". The texl also refers to foreign inw in the 
same general way. 
890 KR/ 1: 15-16; W . Helck, "Besan," LÄ 1: 727. 
89 1 KR/ 1: 16,14-15. 
892 KR/ 1: 65-70. 
893 KR! 1: 70,2; C, 16- 19. 
894 KR! 1: 6-32. 
895 KR! II : 608, 12. 
896 KR/ II: 416, 1. Foreigners are possibly meant. Foreigners are definitely mentioned, specifically defeated Asian 
princes who bare their btkwto Egypt (KR/ II: 289, 15). The .föwalso bring bJkwto Egypt(KR/ II : 294, 14). Cf. 
also KR/ II: 182, 11 ; 186, l O; 297, 16. Cf. at Abydos (lnscription dedicatoire, KR/ II : 333,2, 8 ; l 0) where b;kw 
also appears. btkw appears as work here as weil (KR/ II: 330,7; 327,6). 
897 KR/ II : 258-281; BAR III: 175-182; Schlögl, Tatenen, pp. 64-66. The lines cited are those of Abu Simbel Text 
(Kitchen ''1"), with free restorations from the porallels This texl plays on the words ktwt-works and btkw-works , 
making the distinction between them that of general public works (ktwt) and specific items (btkw) . In 1. 15 Ptah 
says lo the Pharaoh , "I have caused that all works (ktwt) are beneficial to you, and all btkw (are) for thee[ ... ]". In 
1. 32 Pharaoh replies to Ptah saying, ''I have enlarged thy mansion in fjwt-k;-Ptb , protected with eternal works 
(k ;wt) consisting of excellent workmanship (b;kw) . 
898 KR/ II : 260. 
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others, with (16) one desire of 6enefiting thy kJ, King of Upper and Lower Egypt, 
Ramesses [ .... ] 1 have made (25) for thee the land of Hatti [ ... ] serfs of thy palace, 1 
have put it into their heart to offer themselves [ ... ] to thy kJ, 6urdened with their bJkw, 
and the 6ooty (b;qt) of their chiefs, all their 6elongings as inw for (26) the power of 
thy majesty (L!P!H!) [ ... Ja99 
The 6asic purpose of the text is to assert Pharaoh's dominion over all the countries of the 
world, delivering their products (b;kw) voluntarily and with pleasure. The reference to 6ooty 
(b;qt) 6eing delivered quasi-voluntarily is somewhat original. 900 The goods are clearly 
awarded to Pharaoh. 
Merneptah received a yearly bJkw, from Cush or the Li6yans, 6ut it is not clear whether this 
went to the temple or Pharaoh.901 
The Medinet Ha6u inscriptions associate b;kw and btri destined for the god.902 Wretched 
Cush is specified as the source of bJkw for the T wo Ladies as weil. 903 The bJkw of R!nw was 
collected for the 6enefit of Amun-Re' .904 
P. Harris I rhetorically states that "Nu6ia and the Phoenician coast are 6urdened with their 
bJkw for" the Estate of Amonrasonther (4,5). The cattle delivered to the same temple are 
termed the "b;kw of the Land of Syria" (126,8). None of the other temples are specifically 
recorded as having received items as foreign revenues, 6ut the introductory paragraph for 
Memphis includes a reference to the "b1kw of the Land of Palestine, for your great treasuries 
of your walled city" (48,6), and the final line (52a,2) of the lists of the sJyt bJkw-rmJ mentions 
items from Syria and Cush, and the oases in a general fashion: "in great quantities". The 
corresponding line (326, 14) for Heliopolis merely indicates foreign sources in an even more 
general way. 
PREVIOUS D1scuss10Ns OF THE WORD bJkw 
D. Lorton concluded that the context indicates that bJkw "is clearly employed in Dyn. XVIII in 
reference to an exchange of goods, a meaning which is in accord with the use of the root 
in domestic Egyptian contexts." 905 He noted that in one context, "the fact that these goods 
are called bJkw implies that upon receiving them, Thutmosis compensated the native chiefs 
899 KRI II: 268-274 . 
900 Does this imply that by the time of Ramesses II, Egyptians no longer knew the meaning of h:qt as booty of war2 
More probably this is a failure to recognize the consequences of the battle of Kadesh. 
901 KR/ IV: 10,2. 
902 KR/ V: 50, 12; 117, l 3f. Cf., however KR/ V: 318,5 for gold and precious stones as b:kwfor the King, from 
foreigners. 
903 KR/ V: 9,8-9. An inscription of Siptah at Buhen seems to indicate that the btkw of Cush went to the Estate of 
Amun (KR/ IV: 368, 7) 
904 KR/ V: 321,2. Precious metal is implied here, but it may not be from R!nw, although this would appear tobe the 
cose. Cf. also KR/ V: 225,3; 239, 12; 241, 13; 244,9; 245, 11 for btkwfrom every land for Amun. 
905 Lorton, Terminology, p. l 03. 
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for their activities on his behalf." 906 This interpretation confuses several of the different 
meanings of bJkw, and therefore the conclusion is not necessarily inevitable, aside from 
confusing premises with proof. 
E. Bleiberg's discussion of btkw logically followed his treatment of inw. He defined inw as 
the king's income and bJkw as the temple income because of his interpretation that 
redistribution was accomplished exclusively through the temples. He distinguished according 
to presumed destination rather than designation or origin .907 Many of his examples indicate 
that, like the inw, the brkw was given by the king to the temples, so that he distorts the 
evidence for both categories equally.908 He concludes "fükw(t) is an economic transaction 
between foreign lands or groups of foreigners or Egyptians and the temple. "909 
W. Boochs commented that brkw appeared far more frequently in association with foreigners 
than with Egyptians, and associates this with tribute type payments, disputing the suggestion 
that they were mere trade arrangements. For the internal sources, he assumes that the King 
had the right to everything in the land and therefore the work of the people as well, and that 
this is the character of the btkw payments, which were regularly assessed. He concluded 
that some of the foreign brkw were the result of contractual purchasing done for the King, 
and that the internal btkw were obligatory payments made to the king.910 
Although this could be ascribed to the nature of the Egyptian attitude or to the accidental 
preservation of the texts, the term does not appear in the lnstructions of the Vizier, so that it 
was not a principal source of government revenue at the time that that text was established. 
The number of cases where temples receive the brkw does not support this interpretation, 
either. 
J. J. Janssen concluded that the word meant both work and product, and noted that 
we have not as yet discovered the leading principle according to which the Egyptians 
termed some deliveries to the state and the temples brkw, others inw. [ .. . ] Did inw 
mean no more than the goods which were actually 'brought', brkw that they were 
the 'products' of some work? 911 
906 Lorton, Terminology, p. 104. 
907 E.g., P. Greg (supra, pp. 152ff.) shows quite clearly that the Egyptians distinguished by type of object and 
origin, but not by destination . lt is particularly important here that in Deir el-Medineh fish and wood are not 
invariably b:kw, but plaster and pots are. 
908 Bleiberg, JARCE 25: 157-159. 
Q(), Bleiberg, JARCE 25: 168. 
910 W. Boochs, VA 3: 212-213 . 
911 Janssen, SAK 20: 94. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Virtually all of the commentators are agreed that the evidence suggests that bJkw implies 
some kind of obligatory payment or delivery, and it would appear that the administrative 
and monumental evidence from the Egyptian sources is more or less uniform in supporting 
this contention . One issue of dispute is the discussion of the basis on which the sovereign 
authorities of the land claimed a right to these payments. Before proceeding any further, it is 
therefore perhaps advisable to make an effort to define some implications of the hypothetical 
relations implied on any politically based contractual assumptions of reciprocity. lt is routine 
in agricultural societies for people to carry out obligations to the state through labour for 
which they receive no remuneration, as in feudal societies, where peasants simply owe an 
obligation to their lord, by virtue of their lord being a lord and the fact that they accept his 
right to rule (by not, e.g., becoming bandits), or an obligation is owed to the community, for 
which there is no remuneration. By accepting the right of the ruler, the peasant has accepted 
an obligation to pay. Theoretically the feudal lord or king or church may owe an obligation 
to the peasant to provide protection or to guarantee the application of the law, and this 
forms the bridge of the reciprocal contractual arrangement. In practice, the recognition of 
the title to limited amounts of private property, the possession and security of which are 
guaranteed by the sovereign authority probably lighten the load of the peasant, and the 
hope of an improvement makes his life bearable. The feudal lord may thus receive many 
types of object, and may be obliged to trade to acquire the mix he requires from the mix he 
has acquired. 
The peasant can renounce this relationship voluntarily or involuntarily by attempting to flee 
the jurisdiction of his lord, or by placing himself completely at the service of the sovereign 
(be it a lord or the church or some other authority), so that the relationship is no longer that 
of an independent being to another independent being, but that of master and slave or serf. 
The implications of slavery and serfdom are manifold, but the evidence from Egypt does not 
suggest that there is any reason to believe that the entire population or even a large part of 
it was the private property of Pharaoh, the temples or feudal landlords. Failing this interpre-
tation, the people will have enjoyed their limited freedom at the cost of some regular material 
transfers from themselves to Pharaoh or the temples or their lords. The following notes are 
made on the assumption that the implications of the Nauri decree are that violations of the 
principles of the obligatory payments could lead to a loss of freedom, and therefore that 
officials did enjoy a certain degree of freedom, while the Horemhab decree likewise 
assumes that at least that group termed nm/:,w likewise enjoyed some freedom, but that both 
decrees demonstrate that both nm/:,w and officials can be assumed to have been bound by 
oblig0tions. The fact that officials were threatened with a loss of freedom in the Nauri 
decree supports the contention that at least a proportion of the people of ancient Egypt did 
not enjoy even the relative freedom of the nm/:,w and the officials. The term bJkw seems to 
be connected with payments to the state by all of these respective groups, and therefore the 
term cannot be understood as meaning only one thing in our translations and interpretations, 
but this does not imply that the Egyptians did not understand the concept. 
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Therefore, once one has stepped beyond the basic facts, even with general agreement on 
the principles, the evidence can be interpreted in very different ways. The interpretations thus 
range widely, from a general concept of btkw meaning product to the specific provisioning of 
either the king (Boochs) or the temples (Bleiberg), and in character from tribute to trade. 
Certainly relevant here is the Fact that btkw is written in red ink in the Tax Lists of the Turin 
Canon (cf. supra, pp. 159ff.; Gardiner, Royal Canon, pi. 6: 3, 1) where other relevant 
indisputably fiscal terms, such as tp-grt and styt (e.g., Royal Canon, pi. 7: 4,6; 4,20; 6, 
x+ 19) are likewise entered in red, suggesting that it had a very specific meaning in Egyptian. 
One set of payments was of fish, in kind, and thus this clearly official btkw may be defined 
as the product of labour, even if it is not produced. Another payment recorded there was in 
gold, but this will have been improbably produced by the guardian of natron - in his official 
capacity- and therefore is more likely to signify either a substitute for in kind deliveries, or a 
"tax" on his turn-over. In either case, it is not the product of his work, and therefore it cannot 
be logically contended that even if the btkw was more than a product that it was merely a 
kind of corvee in kind, based on some abstract principles. 
That the term is used in particular contexts in P. Harris 1, where hundreds of "products" are 
lined up, but only a fraction of them labelled btkw, demonstrates that neither a vague 
"obligatory payment" nor a mere "product" is meant. Logically this raises the suspicion that 
expressions like "their annual btkw" (P. Harris 28,3; cf. Tax Lists) identify a specific payment. 
This however still does not demonstrate that this corresponded to the exaction of a "fraction" 
of production, and therefore a "tax" or "rent". lt does however confirm that it is something 
quite specific of a fiscal nature. In P. Harris the bikw of the temple is distinguished from the 
inw of the king, which the king awards the temple. More specifically, the cultivators and the 
fishers and fowlers are attributed a specific bikw, delivering grain and fish and fowl. Although 
the precious metals as such are not listed as btkw, the lnscription dedicatoire indicates that 
they were a btkw as weil: that of the traders. 
In P. Brooklyn 35.1453 B, btkw are measured in deben as well as hin of honey.912 In 
another context, slaves are also listed as btkw,913 and it is inconceivable that the basic 
meaning of the term as understood by the Egyptians can have been merely "product" - as 
opposed to an exacted payment of some kind - if they include what we would term human 
beings among the means by which the bikw obligation could be fulfilled. This demonstrates 
that btkw was a specified quantity which could be paid in kind and is therefore associated 
with part of the income of the state, but that the term was understood by the Egyptians as 
signifying primarily a payment, not a product. 
There are numerous propaganda texts recording the receipt of the bJkw by both the 
government and the temples, from government officials and from craftsmen, and foreign 
countries. In the administrative texts, concrete obligations termed bJkw were the responsibility 
of individuals in certain contexts, and could be paid to government 914 or temple authorities.915 
912 Condon, "Account Papyri," RdE 35: 77. 
913 Urk. IV: 708, l l; 734,4. 
914 This was very frequent at e.g., Deir el-Medineh. 
915 P. Munich 809, cf. supra, p. 238. 
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Deliveries of plaster or honey given by those engaged for the purpose (e.g., "bearers of 
honey") clearly represent the fulfillment of contractual relationships and perhaps a form of 
taxation or corvee labour delivered as products.916 
The workmen of Deir el-Medineh delivered a b;kw- the excavation of the royal tomb - for 
which they were remunerated with regular income, some of which was itself termed b;kw. 
While it is not clear that the smdt who served the tomb were paid for their efforts,917 the 
workmen were, and therefore the two types of bJkw are quite different. The scribe's b;kw of 
writing is a similar example, if less concrete. 918 b;kw could be used in private transactions 
to refer to the same type of contractual agreement, where the delivery of objects in return for 
services was reciprocal. The receipt by the temple of Amonrasonther of b;kw-gold from 
workers, in exchange for rations could potentially be the same type of contractual arrangement. 
At least one text indicates that a craftsman could work at a temple, carrying out a b;kw 
obligation,919 while others supplied items. In another case, a similar system applies to 
provisions for Pharaoh.920 The Deir el-Medineh texts use b;kw in contexts associated with 
donkeys relating that so-and-so took a donkey r-bJkw.f, which was previously understood 
to mean "for his work", but seems to imply "for the value of its work", and it is not clear to 
whom this work is valuable or just why it is recorded in this fashion - after all it is evident that 
one takes a donkey to use it.921 The meaning must be "rent", in which case, it is not "for its 
value", but "against its price", as Janssen has shown tobe the semantic significance. 
The other text relating to a missing donkey refers to its bJkw which is collected year for year, 
and here the payment should correspond to the value of the work of the donkey.922 This 
b;kw cannot however be construed as a type of corvee labour or tax, as the b;kw is 
undoubtedly that of the beast and not the borrower or the owner, and the beast owes no 
bJkw. This is even less true when applied to a boat (as in the Nauri decree, and substantiated 
in P. Cairo 58056) so that the b;kw was an obligatory payment representing a value, which 
could be met by producing equivalent products, and this value could be termed a "use tax", 
but the meaning is that the donkey or the boat are intended tobe used at the institution to 
which they are assigned, and that the b;kw is exacted from the responsible officials when it 
916 Contractual in this sense means merely "obligatory and specified". Whether the providers were remunerated for 
this work is very doubtful, but they were obliged to do so, and did not do so voluntarily. Whether mere threats 
sufficed to encourage them is unknown. The one hin! at preserved evidence of a reciprocal arrangement would 
appear tobe in the text P. Turin 2075 (Cerny, Notebook, 15, pp. 23-30) where deliveries may be offset one 
against the other, as in P. Louvre E 3226. 
917 My own interpretation is that advanced earlier, that some peasants were simply assigned to bear things up to the 
tomb, and that this was their obligation by virtue of existing within society. But there are a few references which 
support the assumption that the smdt were paid, and Eichler (SAK 17: 157) identified 0. Cairo 25 597 and 
0. DeM 149. While the former is doubtful, the latter is possible. Her use of P. Turin 2003 (SAK 17: l 58ff.) is 
interesting, as the text does not bear any resemblance to other texts which could be interpreted in this fashion. lt 
bears however an uncanny resemblance to, e.g., Giornale, Verso 8 (Botti/Peet, Giornale, pi. 40; KR/ VI: 
590ff.; Allam, HOP, pp. 331-335) which is quite a different kind of text altogether. 
918 P. Anast. V 17, 2; cf. supra, pp. 133-134. 
919 KR/ VII: 102-103; P. Cairo 58096. 
92° KR/Vl:517-522 
921 Cf. Janssen, SAK 20: 81-94. 
922 KR/ 1: 238. 
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is not used as intended, apparently whether deliberately or not. In a private context, this 
could be understood as "rent", while in a public context, this particular type of bikw could 
be rendered as "fee" or "fine".923 One paragraph of the Horemhab Decree (line 23) uses 
bJkw in both of the latter senses, while another paragraph (line 17) uses it in the former 
sense. One cannot ovoid the impression that b;kw was measured on a daily basis in many 
cases, but it is difficult to judge if the quantities delivered by the smdt at Deir el-Medineh 
were likewise measured this way. Thus some bJkw would be payments measured in time, 
and some in quantities. 
Officials of both temples and government were obliged to provide b;kw, but this will have 
been part of their duties as officials, and it is probable that the concrete goods received 
were the b;kw, and that these were then regarded as the s;yt or htri of the official, but in 
making quick notes, these subtle distinctions may have been lost. 
The word bJkw also seems to apply to activities which can not even remotely be construed 
as "taxes". bJkw would thus seem to be simply work carried out, for which remuneration 
would be provided. In the dogmatic propaganda texts, the exchange character of bJkw 
might be forgotten. The Gang at Deir el-Medineh was paid to carry out their b;kw, which 
was the excavation of the tomb. Scribes were paid to carry out their b;kw, which was 
writing, and counting. The b;kwwith which they were remunerated could also be the htri of 
another official. But the bJkw of the individual members of the Gang who worked for the 
wealthy officials of Thebes was their "wages", the money they received for working. 
"Rent", "fee", "corvee labour (in kind)", "fines", "contractual labour", or even "wages" are 
probably all equivalent to certain examples of b;kw. Obviously, the products delivered from 
foreign countries would occasionally be acquired under duress, and these products could 
also be classified as inw or hJqt. The primary significance of the technical term b;kw was 
however that of obligatory "payment" or "delivery", and secondarily the fact that it was 
produced or acquired by labour. 
The b;kw supplied by certain private people, groups of people, people using donkeys and 
boats, or craftsmen delivering objects may potentially be construed as a kind of obligatory 
exacted payment, a corvee in kind or a "tax" equivalent to the value work but not necessarily 
either a product of the work or the work itself, which is payable to either Pharaoh or a 
temple, depending up the type of arrangement. The documentation does not suffice to make 
any statement concerning the proportion of the population obliged to submit b1kw "taxes" to 
the temples or the government, nor can any specific proportion of income, wealth or time be 
923 Cf., e.g ., P. Coiro 52002, 9 (KR/ VII : 264,7). P. Posener-Krieger ('Construire une tombe o l'ouest de Mn-nfr, ' 
RdE 33 [1981 ]: 50) tronslotes, ' [ ... ] le scribe Bwkntwf portit ovec les gens qui etoitent sous son authorite avec 
un bateou destine a ses fournitures [r btkw.f] pour la ville [ .. . ]" . While cleorly a reference to this type of poyment, 
it is not certoin whether it was o boot rented from the outhorities or from o private person. lf the former, it is cleorly 
o "fee'' ond not o "fine" os he took it without violoting the ony principles. For the Egyptions o poyment made to the 
government would be o poyment, regardless of whether o "fine" or o "fee" for us. In the Horemhab Decree, some 
of the poragraphs were intended to protect a private btkw, if the boot was rented by o bootless person to carry 
out some task for Pharaoh, the king wanted to protect that person from abuse (cf. Horemhob, line 17, and supra, 
pp. l 88f.), and thus protected the "rent" agreement. 
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identified in these cases, but it would appear that virtually the entire population could 
conceivably have been rendering some kind of btkw to the state in one way or another, 
and that this was the most significant part of the "revenue" of the state. Whether the plaster-
makers delivered part of their production to the state and sold the rest on the private market, 
or whether the water-carriers were peasants detailed to corvee duty at the tomb, or whether 
the potters sold most of their production and turned over a mere fraction of it to the government 
- these are all questions which cannot really be answered, but evidently, the interpretation 
of btkw as a "tax" depends upon this knowledge. Therefore the use of "tax" for translating 
bikw is only justified in very specific contexts. In official texts it generally refers to an "obligation", 
but it is clear that as early as Dynasty XVIII btkw meant a payment which could be made in 
products, and not merely a "product". 
lt would appear that the official btkw was the most important element of Egyptian society -
as the scribe says, everyone had a btkw: scribes, the Gang, craftsmen, traders, smdt-serfs, 
etc. Some were rewarded with provisions or by bits of land, but for most it was an obligatory 
burden, a kind of corvee in kind which had tobe fulfilled by lapidaries going to temples or 
peasants seNing as wood cutters, fishermen, water-carriers, etc. lt is probable that most of 
the population pursued such activities in their free time, but others will have had other - more 
arduous and demanding - obligations to Pharaoh or the temples by virtue of their having 
been assigned to specific onerous duties, for reasons which remain unelucidated, and this 
was also termed btkw, but potentially the type of btkwdescribed in the next chapter. lt was 
the btkw that made Egypt go round. 
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THE TERM b1kw-rmJ 
b1kw-rmJ means literally the "work of a man (or men)", and is merely a variant writing of the 
b1kw type of obligation, appearing in a few cases as a specific item. The existence of the 
term has been widely overlooked, as it is not at once evident that the term is being used, but 
it does appear in several contexts. One example which could potentially illustrate the use of 
the term is an otherwise useless reference in Tax Lists of Turin Canon (3, 19) where the "s'Jyw 
of the smdt" (s1yw n smdt) is used analogous to the "s;yt b1kw-rmJ smdt" of P. Harris 1 
(e.g., 12a, l ), where the b1kw-rmJ is simply inserted in between, indicating that it is another 
type of obligation, of the same type, perhaps significantly applied to the smdt. 
INTERNAL REVENUE 
Administrative texts 
The term b1kw is used in administrative texts, but the term b1kw-rmJ appears primarily in 
propaganda texts. This corroborates the suspicion expressed in the last chapter that the 
various terms labeled b1kw are not all the same thing. 
Private Propaganda 
b Jkw-rmJ is used in conjunction w ith many of the other words appearing in this work in two 
private texts, the Bilgai lnscription (htri, smw, s 1yt) and the inscription of the High Priest of 
Amun, lmn-btp (smw, sJyt, tp-grt, inw). 
In its present condition, the Bilgai lnscription does not specifically state that temples received 
the goods, but it is certainly not rash to conclude that the deliveries arrived at chapels 
associated with the Estate of Amun and the Mortuary Temple of Siptah. lt does however 
state that the b1kw-rmJwas 4,632 mnt-jars of wine, and that our noble servant of the state 
delivered "30,000, a surplus of 25,368" (II. vs. 17-18).924 
The inscription recording the rewards of the efficient High Priest of Amun, lmn-btp, 925 details 
fiscal responsibilities using most of the words discussed in this study. 
[ ... (8) ... ] on account of the performance which you have made of the smw, sJyt, 
b;kw-(9)-rmJof the temple of Amonrasonther under your authority. You have brought 
924 KR/ IV: 341-343; A. H. Gardiner, "The Stele of Bilgai, " ZL\S 50 (l 912): 49-57; cf. supra, pp. l 82ff. 
925 KR/ VI: 455-458; W. Helck, ''Die Inschrift über die Belohnung des Hohenpriesters 'lmn-~tp," MIO 4 (1956): 
163-178; cf. supra, pp. l86f. 
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them, filling into the magazines. [ ... (11) ... ] And from (you) are the inwand tpw-grt: 
the material support (pJ cnbw) of Amonrasonther ( l 2) <which> you <have given to> 
Pharaoh, you r lord. [ ... ] 
lmn-btp's inscription does not detail what the payments were, but indicates that they were 
definitely intended for the temple of Amonrasonther, with the exception of the inw and the 
tp-grt. 
Royal Propaganda 
bJkw-rmJis clearly used as a technical term in P. Harris 1, consistently referring to the work of 
silver smiths in the temples (II. 126,2; 326,5; 51 b, l O; 69,4). lt would be tempting to refer to 
the work of the lapidary referred to as bJkw in P. Cairo 58096,926 and assume that this bJkw 
was actually a bJkw-rml, The headings of the totals for the whole text and the !arger 
temples include bJkw-rmJ (II. 12a,l; 32a,7; 516,3; 686,4), but not that for the smaller 
temples, where the entire heading is omitted. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Given the fact that the Bilgai Stele and the lnscription of lmn-btp are the two texts in which 
several of the terms concerning fiscal activities are scrupulously listed or delineated, it can be 
concluded that bJkw-rmJ was a fiscal term with a specific meaning. lt is thus very probable 
that what frequently appears as bJkw in the administrative and other texts, was occasionally 
officially designated as bJkw-rmJ, which simplifies part of the interpretation of the fiscal term 
bJkw, as the private bJkw will obviously be a separate category. 
The bJkw-rmJwill have been complimented as the bJkwof the cultivators (e.g., P. Harris 1 
126,3) and the bJkw of the fishers and fowlers (e.g., P. Harris 126,6), as these are items 
delineated under that title.927 lf we follow the logic of the preceding chapter, these could 
either have been the products of the serfs of the temples or free people delegated to provide 
these things. lf the text is to be taken at face value, the payments listed in this general 
category were all those of the smdtof the temples (e.g., P. Harris.I 12a, l ), but as we have 
no evidence that the smdtat Deir el-Medineh were paid for their efforts, rather that they may 
have been mere peasants delegated with the relevant duties, potentially as corvee labour, 
on a part time basis, we are unable to reconstruct whether this is a tax, or a kind of 
obligation, or the result of full time employment. 
Potentially relevant is that the bJkwof the cultivators was listed under the bJkw-rmJ in P. Harris 
(e.g., 12a, l; 126,3). The word bJkw does not figure in the two cases where the production 
926 Cf. supra, pp. 242f.; KR/ VII: 102-103; Cerny, Notebook, 145, p. 41. . 
927 The b;kwof Pharaoh from the Horemhab decree would then be the real exception following another rule, it must 
have been b;kw for Pharaoh, cf. Horemhab Decree, supra, pp. l 88f. 
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quota of 200 khar/ worker is stipulated.928 Regardless of how the figures are interpreted, 
they would seem to imply a large portion of responsibility and time, so that if this type of 
responsibility is the source of the btkw of the cultivators in P. Harris 1, that btkw implies a 
different scale of commitment from that of the smdtat Deir el-Medineh, but the proportions in 
P. Harris suggest that the btkw listed was not intended tobe heavy.929 
The incredible surplus produced by the author of the Bilgai Stele indicates that btkw-rmJ 
was, in principle, a proportion of the production that was turned over to the temples, i.e., a 
"tax", as otherwise it would not have been possible to produce such an extraordinary 
surplus. Like other btkw the btkw-rmL will have been assessed at a set rate, the btri. All the 
known examples of btkw-rmJ are related to temple income, which raises the question of 
what the btkw of Pharaoh was. 
928 Cf. supra, pp. 144-145 n. 408 . 
929 lt is however worth noting that the corn total of 309'950 khardivided by 20'000 (out of 85'486 dependents, P. 
Harris 1 11,4; 126,3) makes a mere 15.5 khar/ head, which is not onerous, being the recorded yield of merely 
3 arouras of ordinory land in P. Wilbour. Dividing the total surfoce area donated lo all of the temples by the 
number of khardelivered annually indicales an income of 2 khor/aroura. ff we assume !hat the number of khor 
delivered annuolly by the smdtwas correct, but that the temples "owned' five times as much land prior to the new 
gifts under Ramesses, 460'900 khordivided by 6 million arouras gives a yield of 3/ 4 khor/ orouro. All of which 
suggests that the revenue was only a small proportion of the yield, and that the smdt were not more than tenants 
obliged lo poy a proportion of their income lo the temples. 
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The term b1qt is not strictly fiscal in nature, as it literally means "booty" or "what was plundered". 
Presumably, the distribution of plunder was a royal prerogative lt was generally applied to 
foreign countries. The only reason for its inclusion here is the potential transformation of the 
meaning of the word by the end of the New Kingdom. The citations make no pretense of 
being complete, as the word is familiar. 
f OREIGN REVENUE 
Private Propaganda 
One of the earliest inscriptions of New Kingdom date records that leb-ms was awarded b1qt 
when his majesty plundered.930 
Royal Propaganda 
Ramesses II turned over b1qt to Amun after a successful campaign.931 An inscription at Abydos 
probably records that the King relinquished the b1qt of foreigners to the temple.932 
In the context of the Hittite marriage texts, Ramesses II records that the b1qt of Hatti, Ksks, lrty 
and Qdy were brought by the great prince of Hatti.933 He even ascribes piety towards Seth 
to the great prince of Hatti, and seems to imply that the great prince of Hatti gave b1qt to 
Seth directly. 934 
Ramesses lll's Karnak prayer relates that the Pharaoh plundered (b1q) Punt for Amun. 935 
The Blessing of Ptb-g-tnn936 records that "the booty (b;qw) of the great princes" is presented 
(1. 20), and particularly that chiefs of the land of Hatti delivered their b1qt(I. 25).937 
930 Cf. e.g., Urk. IV: 4, l6f.-5, lf., etc. 
931 KR/ II: 171,6. 
932 KR/11:514,14-16. 
933 KR/ II : 283,3-4. 
934 KR/ II : 246, 13-15. 
935 KR/ V: 221-225; 1. 19. 
936 KR/ II: 258-281; BAR III: 175-182; Schlögl, Totenen, pp. 64-66. 
937 KR/ II : 271, 9-1 l. 
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REtv\ARKS 
lt is conventionolly ossumed thot "plunder" is ocquired by conquest, ond thot "tribute" is either 
the result of militory conquest, or the threot thereof. Rendering b;qf os "plunder" is probably 
justified in mony coses, ond in the case of Punt, one con ossume thot Pharooh somehow 
thought thot he hod conquered o country which his army hod never visited, but such hyperbolic 
cloims cannot be used to justify the Prince of Hotti voluntarily turning plunder over to Pharooh 
and Seth. These two coses simply illustrote the point thot the Egyptions used the words 
loosely, and that btqt could os easily mean "tribute" or probobly "presents", although from 
the Egyption stondpoint the objects offered would have been "tribute". 
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THE WORD htri 
Meaning "doorpost", "team of horses", or "pair of pillars",938 as a noun, htri has an etymo-
logical connotation signifying both "symmetry" and "support " and "pair". The verb is less 
clear.939 
INTERNAL REVENUE 
Miscellanies 
P. Sallier 1940 is a letter purportedly from a chief archivist of the treasury of Pharaoh to a 
scribe relating that a stable master of the great stables of Pharaoh was given 30 arouras of 
land for "fodder for the htri of Pharaoh" (1. 9,3) . Even though the following relative phrase is 
in the singular, the reference is doubtless to the "teams of Pharaoh" and not to the fiscal term. 
The miscellany P. Bologna 1094 941 purports tobe a letter from a prophet of the Temple of 
Seth to a Steward, in which the latter is instructed: 
When my letter reaches thee, thou shalt go together with the Standard-bearer (6,4) 
Ptb-m-mnw and thou shalt report to the Vizier concerning the great sums of money 
concerning which the Retainer l~y has said, "give it." (6,5) This is surely not my btri! 
Thou shalt take document (?) of the money inwwith the documents to the south . And 
938 Cf. Wb. 111 : 199-203. 
939 Wb. III: 200, "zinspAichtig machen, ", but. cf. Wb. III: 202, "zusammenbinden". lf one wanted to find the 
Egyptian term for "redistribution", it would be this rother than "circulotion", wgb (cf. Morenz, Prestige-Wirtschaft, 
p. 36). 
940 LEM, pp. 87-88; Caminos, LEM, pp. 326-328 . 
941 LEM, pp. 5-6; Caminos, LEM, pp. 17-20; Gordiner, Wilbour II: 163 . This translation differs from thot of 
Carninos and Gordiner slightly. The divergence is greatest at the close of the cited possoge, where Corninos and 
Gordiner ossumed thot the prophet was comporing the comporotive plenty ovoiloble to the other temples with his 
own lock of means, while we suspect thot he is comporing the ossessments. This interpretation hinges on three 
uncleor words: 'b', Js ond sJw . 
1s appears occasionally in 1s-prt, tronsloted as "sowing order" but the ward is sufficiently rare as to moke an 
extended onolysis fruitless, although the usuol rendering may not be completely suitoble. In P. Bologna l 086, 21 
(cf. supra, pp. 144-145 n. 408; bJkw-rmJ, pp. 167-168; W. Wolf, "Papyrus Bologna 1086, '' ZÄS 65 
[ l 930]: 95-96) it is clear that the Js-prt is the assessment order - not the sowing or horvesting order. In P. Berlin 
30400, vso. 9, "the Jsw-prthe made for you" (KR/ III: 160, 15) is likewise clearly an ossessment in kharof groin. 
sJw is assumed tobe s:yt, and treoted there (cf. infra, pp. 278ff.) . 'h' can mean severol things, magozines 
omong them, ond it is very difficult to distinguish when the one ond when the other is meant. lt is possible thot 'b ' 
occosionolly refers to a kind of ossessrnent or perhops land or labourers ossocioted with a specific type of 
ossignment (cf., e.g., supra, pp. 172ff., where the 'h 'w of Phoraoh ore pul onto the account of the Scribe of 
reckoning of the temple of Amun (II. 5,5-5,6). The term does not appeor with sufficient regulority to justify any 
more precise statements. 
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thou shalt place them (6,6) in the presence of the Vizier. And thou will say to him that 
he should not htri (my?) people, for their are no people with me. But the mns-vessel 
(6,7) is in my charge. And the House of Nepthys is likewise in my charge. And look 
to the cf of the gs-pr which are in the district. (6,8) They are not like mine. 1 am 
exceedingly deficient. The deficiency limits that which can be done against me. And 
look (6,9) the people are the same today. And speak with others there about the 
great Js which has been set (6, 10) against me as the sJw of the House of Seth 
together with the b1-t1-land of Pharaoh (L!P!H!) under my authority. Look (how) small 
(they are) ! Likewise (7, 1) do not throw thy hand together with the standard bearer 
Ptb-m-mnw. Stay weil! 
Matters dealing the btri are dealt with by the Vizier, as in the case of the supplies for the 
Gang at Deir el-Medineh .942 A Retainer of Pharaoh has made financial demands of a 
Temple Prophet, who asserts that he does not have people. He does not say that he has 
people who are not obliged to submit to the btri. He merely pleads a lack of people and 
land, suggesting that he would be subject to pay the htri if he were better off. lt would 
appear that the assessments concerning the obscure ts and the khato-lands are not related 
to the htri, although it is highly probable that they are likewise fiscal in nature.943 
Excursus on htri and diw in the Deir el-Medineh texts 
The term htri is used to describe the ordinary deliveries to the Gang at Deir el-Medineh 
during Dynasties XIX and XX. These include almost all the products except grain.944 At least 
occasionally it is specified as having come from the treasury of Pharaoh,945 or the office of 
the Vizier,946 or the Mayor and Vizier.947 
A letter from the Vizier tfy to Nb-nfr asks whether he has "inquired about the htri of the 
Gang which is upon the house of the Treasury of Pharaoh" 948 and records that he had sent 
a controller "on account of our btri".949 A pseudo-missive concerning the office of the Vizier 
942 Sir Alan Gardiner ("A Later Allusion to Akhenaten,"JfA 24 [1938] : 124) noted that the author of P. Berlin 3040a 
"possessed authority to remit or alter the lax assessment of [ .. . ] Ra'mose, prince of the West of Thebes", while we 
note here that this must go to the Vizier. In the lnstructions for the Vizier, we note, "lt is he who btri every btri from 
the income of all which it has been given to him'' (Urk. IV: 1114,9 cf. supra, pp. 178ff.). The important element 
here is not that we have an administrative confirmation of the statement in the lnstructions, but that it is clear that 
not all of the btri of Egypt feil under his domain according to the lnstructions (Urk. IV: 1114, 14). The question is 
where to draw the line . 
943 Cf. supra, p . 21 O; II. 27, 12; 28,5. In P. Harris the khato-lands are associated with the btri, but it is d ifficult to 
establish the direct relation. 
944 E.g ., bread, beans, fruit and meat are mentioned in one case (KR/ III : 145-146; HPB III: pi. 31; 0 . Berlin 
P. 12337); greens, beer, milk, fish and firewood in another(KR/ III: 161, 11; HPB III: pi. 32; 0. Berlin P. 11238). 
Cf. D. A. Warburton, "Keynes'sche Überlegungen zur altägyptischen Wirtschaft, '' ZÄS 118 (1991) : 76, n. 1. 
945 E.g ., KR/ 111 : 45, 14; 0 . DeM 114. 
946 E.g., KR/ III: 29, l O and 12; H. 0. pi. 30; 0. Gard 13. This is a model letter but most probably uses the 
terminology properly. 
947 E.g ., KR/ VII : 455,5 (replacing KR/ VI : 151, 1-4). 
948 KR! III : 45, 13 -14; 0 . DeM 114. 
949 KR! 111 : 45, 14-46, 1; 0 . DeM 114. 
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orders that "the controllers from outside receive it that they may take it [i.e., btri] to the Royal 
Necropolis." 950 0. Cairo 25 832 mentions the Vizier and his concern that the Gang receive 
its btri. 
One text states that the btri of the Royal Necropolis consisted of "greens, fish, fire wood, 
beer, pots, livestock, and milk".951 A model letter952 refers to "their btri of annual requirements" 
listing bread, beans, fruits, fish, greens, and seemingly even various kinds of meat. The 
quantities suggest that an entire year's supplies may be listed, with such items as "fish 
various, 32'700".953 
In 0. Toronto A 11, the Police Chief Min-iniwy informs the Mayor and Vizier ljcy that 
"(l 5) The annual btri is borne, <i>t being in very good shape consisting of wood, greens, 
fish, b<eer>".954 He goes on to refer to "(19) .. .the annual btri of Pharaoh (L!P!H!)," which is 
associated with an Jbt field. There is a reference to a dispute about Jbt and sbt fields 
suggesting that they had some relationship to the btri of Pharaoh. lt is possible that the btri of 
Pharaoh referred to in 1. 19 is not the same as the btri of 1. 15, but a reference to "greens" 
(1. 27) supports the assumption that they are. 
0. DeM 306 records actual deliveries under the title btri: wood, vegetables and fish. P. Turin 
2007955 notes that the Gang actually received its btri, rather than the usual note that an 
official had ordered that it be attended to. 0. DeM l 00 records a delivery of the btri 
consisting of bread, vegetables and beer. P. Turin 2104/223956 appears to use btri as a 
generic term subsuming both deliveries of garments and the 8'000 kharof diwfor the Gang. 
Both the garments and the grain would appear tobe provided by the treasury of Pharaoh 
(1. 1,9). The diw would appear to have been partially the responsibility of the Mansion (i.e., 
Medinet Habu). The final lines of the first poge refer to sJyt of Cush and all btri given to the 
Temple ( i. e., the Estate of Amun?). 
P. Turin 1903 records "all btri given to the Great and Noble Tomb of Millions (vs. 2,2) 
of years of Pharaoh (L!P!H!) on the West of Thebes [ ... ] by the Overseer of the Treasury 
Wnn-nfr of the Treasury of Pharaoh (L!P!H!)."957 Specific references to the btri are: 
vso. (2,8) Received from the Deputy of the Treasury [ .... ] as their (vs. 2,9) annual btri 
of Year 4. 
(vso. 2,25) Delivered as the sgnn-oil of the srdn which is the btri of the vizier. 
(1, l) Delivered through the Deputy of the Treasury, ~ri, as the annual btri from the 
inw of Cush. 
95° KR/ III: 29, 13-14; 0. Gard 13. 
951 KR/ III: 16 l; 0. Berlin P. 11238; HPB III: 32; Wente, Letters, pp. 134-135. 0. Cairo 25 832 seems to 
indicate that plaster - presumably for work in the royal tomb -was included in the btri. Cf. Wente, Letters, p. 47. 
952 KR/ III: 145-146; 0. Berlin P. 12337; HPB III: 31 
953 1. 5. This is, of course, a model letter, but the actual deliveries recorded (e.g., 200'000 fish, supra, p. 160) eile 
figures which suggest that this is hardly unreasonable. 
954 KR/ III: 41-43. btri also appears in an unclear context of the same ostracon, KR/ III: 31, 12. 
955 P/R, pi. 83A. __ _ 
956 Cerny, Notebook, 23, pp. 20-23. LA IV: 735 reports that the recto contains unpublished accounts, but Cerny's 
note says that the recto is the Calendar of Lucky and Unlucky Days, while the versa is the accounts text, cited here. 
957 Cerny, Notebook, 15, pp. 16-20. 
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The items following this last entry would appear tobe fruits and greens. The final lines (rto. 
1,7 and 1,8) may refer to something that followed rather than what preceded. lt would 
appear that the various sources of the material came from various sources, some of which 
were classified as inw. 
An official letter states that "the btri of my Lord is in order, 1 am giving grain daily. Another 
matter:[ ... ] give the diwof the army men together with the cprw".958 From the plenitude of 
references to btri related to Deir el-Medineh, there are a number of texts which could throw 
more light on the subject.959 
These records make it clear that the btri n pi ist, the btri of the Gang at Deir el-Medineh 
(also termed the btri n pi br, the btri of the tomb) consisted of items consumed daily by the 
Gang at Deir el-Medineh. lt is however less clear that one can call such items "wages". 
J.J. Janssen notes that "from all this it is clear beyond a doubt that the workmen's wages were 
called btri," suggesting that the "original meaning of the word is probably 'what one is 
obliged to pay"'.960 0 . Berlin P. 12337 is probably a model letter,961 and therefore the use 
of btri is relevant, as the purpose of studying was doubtless to learn the proper use of terms 
(and forms of address, etc.) although the numbers might be absurd.962 
lt is however generally agreed that the real wage "income" of the Gang consisted of the 
grain, the emmer and barley,963 and the word used for issuing these was diw, 964 while btri 
was used as noted above for the assorted deliveries, which did not include the grain. They 
used the grain to some extent for exchange transactions, but the real significance of the 
grain was that it became a unit of account in the community, and therefore - of all the things 
that they received - is the only one that has been called "money" .965 The word diw would 
958 KR/ III: 250-251, l; P. Leiden 1 349, 1. 14; Bakir, Epistologrophy, pls. 17-18, XXIII-XXIV 
959 KR/ IV: 178 (0. Mich 66); KR/ IV: 164-165 (P. Gard 8/ Ashmolean 1960. 1283/C. J. Eyre, "An Accounts 
Papyrus from Thebes,"JfA 66 [1980]: 108-119); KR/ VI: 151,2 (0.Cairo 25 271); KR/ VI: 364,9 (H. 0. pi. 
68, 1/0. BM 50722 + 0 Cairo 25726); KR/ VI: 571,8 (Giornale); KR/ VI: 572, l 0(Giornale); KR/ VI: 580,7 
( Giornale). 
9w Jonssen, Prices, p. 457. 
961 Cf. A. H . Gardiner (HPB III : XXXla, identified as "Musterbrief") and J. J. Janssen (Prices, pp. 456 n. 3; 491 ), 
although W, Helck (Verwaltung, pp. 472-473 and Materialien, pp. 819-820) dates Seti, the Overseer of the 
Treasury, to the reign of Ramesses II. A. Fokhry ("Une statuette du nouvel empire, " ASAE 39 [1939] : 94) favours 
identifying this Seti as the one in question. 
962 Cf. J. J. Janssen, "Prolegomena to the Study of Egypt's Economic History during the New Kingdom", SAK 3 
(1975): 175-176. 
963 Cf. Janssen, Prices, 460; Valbelle, Ouvriers, pp. 148-152. 
964 For the sake of clarity, it must be mentioned thatthis word appears under spd in the Wb. IV: l l 2, 2-5, 'Proviant 
an Getreide der regelmässig verteilt wird". Urk. IV: 64, 1; P. Anast. VI, 42 (LEM, p. 75, 14; Caminos, LEM, p. 
292); and the Decree of Horemhab, r. side, 1. 9 (Urk. IV: 2158, 17; supra, p. 188) are examples showing that 
the rendering with rdi (Gardiner, Grammar, Sign-list X 8) is tobe preferred to spd(Gardiner, Grammar Sign-list 
[(M 44)] before Z 9), as Sir Alan remarks (Grammar, p. 533) For diw specifically associated with the delivery 
of grain, cf. 0. Cairo 25517, rto. col. l; 25592, l ; 25608,2; 25620, l; 25698, l; 25763, rto . l; 25765, 
rto . 1: l; 0. Turin 57072, l. lnteresting is the case of 0 Cairo 25588, rto. enumerating the grain given outside, 
avoiding the word diw, using merely bity('emmer') 0. Cairo 25620, 4 and 25698, 7 refer to diwgiven to the 
servants (bmwt). H.O. 58, 1,4 distinguishes, the deliveries (enumerated individually, as greens, wood, fish, 
beer, ~arments, oil) individually, without terming them htri, with the diw (which is not enumerated as barley and 
emmer). 
965 Janssen, Prices, pp. 109-1 l 1 . 
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thus at least conform to what are customarily termed "wages" and the word btri would 
correspond to what are generally termed "rations", "deliveries" "supplies" or "board". Both 
are of course in kind payments, as the ancient Egyptians did not have any other kind of 
payments except "in kind" ones, but the Egyptians obviously distinguished between the two, 
and modern scholars have also tended to separate the grain payments from the general 
commodities turned over to the Gang, although conventionally terming the grain payments 
as both wages and rations, they are here distinguished from one another on the basis of the 
divide that one served as "money" while the other did not, with btri as "rations" and diw as 
"wages". 
P. Turin 2009 + 1999966 records that there was "no diwfor III smw IV smw' (vso., 1,9; l, l 0), 
while the quantities of grain are added up in the preceding lines (vso. 1,5). The text is badly 
preserved, but the fact that the usual lists of names and numbers are missing, suggests that 
the 726 khar mentioned are a demand for 65 days of work, rather than an issue. The 
statement that there is "no grain for III smw IV smw' (vso. l, 17) seems to correspond com-
pletely, thus clenching the argument that the diw were the grain-wages, as vegetables were 
in fact brought (vso. l, l ). 
diw appears as "wages" for workers in a potentially private context.967 diw appears in a 
private context in Deir el-Medineh, where it would appear to refer to the grain payments as 
physical entities changing hands, but the damaged text does not permit further interpreta-
tion.968 
diw is used repeated to identify the grain wages of the Gang in P. Greg (C x+ l 0; C x + 14; 
vs. A x + 27; vs. C 5; and probably A 13). In this text, the deliveries are each identified, and 
btri is not used anywhere, and htri type deliveries are not listed. diw is used in the sense of 
"wages" for a fisherman in the Turin Taxation Papyrus.969 
J. C:erny termed diw "income in grain" in his commentary on the private papers from Deir el-
Medineh, 970 correcting 0. DeM 108, 7-8, referring to income arrange for by ;st, which 
cannot be subsumed under the heading "wages". "Ration" would be possible here, but 
"payment" fits as weil or better. The verb, rdi, "to give", in economic transactions means "to 
seil", as T. E. Peet pointed out. 971 In Egyptian one can either seil "goods" for "money" or 
"money" for "goods", as it was all the same, depending upon the understanding of those 
involved in the transaction. rdi could thus also mean "to pay", suggesting that the diwof the 
Gang will have been their "pay" or "wages", and not their rations. This semantic interpretation 
is economically supported by the substantial size of the grain payments, which exceeded 
that necessary for consumption, and with the "grain standard" economy of ancient Egypt 
provided the members of the Gang with liquid assets. That grain was as good as copper (if 
966 KR/ VI: 560-566, Botti/Peet, Giornale, pp l 0-13/pls. 1-7. 
967 KR/ VII: 263 -265, esp. 264, 11; 265,5 (P. CairoJdE 52002, II. 9; 17). P. Posener-Krieger, "Construire une 
tombe a l'ouest de Mn-nfr, " RdE 33 (1981 ): 49-58. 
968 Giornale vso B 9, l; KR/ VI: 590-594; Botti/ Peet, Giornale, pi. 40; Allam, HOP, pp. 331-335 . 
969 Gardiner, RAD, pp. 40,7, 1. 4,3. 
970 
"The Will of Naunakhte ond the Reloted Documents,' JEA 31 (1945): 41; 53 
97 1 
''The Egyptian Words for 'money', 'buy' and 'seil'," in Studies Griffith, pp. 123-124. 
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not gold) is clear from the use of the sack of grain, the kharas a monetary unit in transactions, 
along with the copper deben. 972 
lt would appear that the htri of the tomb was rendered up to the Gang, at least in part from 
the Royal Treasury, on the instructions from the office of the Vizier, and that it consisted of 
fish, beer, vegetables, milk and firewood, but excluded the diw grain wages for the most 
part.973 These grain wages were likewise the responsibility of the Vizier, but the grain could 
come from different offices.974 
(End of Excursus) 
Administrative Texts 
The "htri of the Nubians of the new lands of the inw under the authority of the (1,20) Royal 
Scribe Nb-nfr" is the designated origin of grain issued to the bakers for making <qw-loaves 
in a text dating to the reign of Seti 1.975 cqw-loaves appear as a form of income in the stele 
of Snw,976 where they seem tobe the bounty of Pharaoh, and it is likewise termed htri. In this 
case the recipients are "under authority of the Mayor of Memphis". 977 Nubians near Memphis 
being issued looves, were probably not working on the land, but employed on a project. 
P. Gurob978 of Regnal Year 2 of Seti II (II. 2, 12; vs. l b, 2) states explicitly that a htri of fish 
was a Mayor's obligatory payment collected by Pharaoh. The quantity involved (2'600 hqtt) 
is not given in a specific time frame. P. Gurob Fragment J explicitly states that the fish of 
another Mayor (tlri, of Mr-wrt) "are given to the people of the bnty in Mr-wrt."979 
In 0. Gardiner 86980 htri appears as a verb, following a list of professions, preceding a 
second listing of the same professions with their responsibilities or obligations. lt would be 
possible to interpret the term as meaning, "I have assigned", but this would not be strictly 
correct, as the 200 khar per field worker is assigned by definition ("each one of them under 
the obligation"). "I have assessed" would be equally inappropriate for the same reason, if 
applied to a single group of items. lf however, htri is an all-embracing term for "recording 
assessments", this would be possible.981 lt would not appear from the context that the actual 
collection is meant. 
972 Cf. J. J. Janssen, Prices, pp. l 09-11 l. 
973 lt is interesting to note that 0. Berlin P. 11238 (KR/ III : 16 l, 12; Wente, Letters, p. 134-135), 0. Berlin P. 
12337 (KR/ III: l 46,5f.) and 0. Toronto A 11 (KR/ III: 41, l 0; Wente, Letters, p. 46) include fish, wood and 
pots although these are the btkw of the smdt in principle. This confirms that the items are distinguished according 
to source more than character or destination. 
974 This may be related to the fact that at least towards the end of Dynasty XX, the granaries of Amun were the major 
public granaries in Thebes, and that they also held grain belonging to other authorities . The evidence in favour of 
this conclusion is slight, but cf. e.g., supra , pp. l 70ff. 
975 KR/ 1: 260,8 ; Spiegelberg, Rechnungen, pls. IV etc.; Helck, Materialien, 638-639. 
976 KR/ III : 92,9. 
977 KR/ III: 260, l 0. 
978 Cf. supra, pp. l46ff.; Gardiner, RAD, pp. 15,7; 17, 14. 
979 Gardiner, RAD, pp. 26, 18-27,2. 
980 H.O. 81, 14; cf. supra, pp. l43ff. 
981 Cf. P. Harris 1, 4,4; 7,4 indicates the same, with 'btri anew". 
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"My annual htri" is how an overseer of cattle defines his obligation to provide wood and 
charcoal to a scribe of the inw magazine in P. Mallet {II. V, 1- VI, 3).982 He goes on to insist 
that he paid an excess htri (Vl,4). As he refers to the overseer of the treasury of Pharaoh in this 
context, it is tempting to assume that the htri was somehow owed to Pharaoh. 
P. Leiden 1 350 verso 4, 17 may refer to the inw of the htri.983 The context is obscure. 
Private Propaganda 
The lnstructions to the Vizier 984 state that "(28) [ ... ] lt is he who notes all shortcomings in the 
divine offerings. lt is he who htri every/ all htrifrom the income of all to whom it is given." 
Following a reference to inw, is: "(29)[ ... ] The great council will report to him their htri and 
income < .. . >11 • The preceding reference to the divine offerings may be relevant or not, as this 
part of the text moves rapidly from one matter to another, e.g ., the inw being separated from 
the htri by some damaged text, following which is a reference to the use of seals, and 
conflict resolution . The dominant theme of these paragraphs is land management and the 
income generated by it, so that the htri and inw appear as technical terms referring to 
specific types of income. htri is used as a verb applied to the noun htri, with regard to 
income already delivered. From the context it cannot be exaction or collection, but can be 
"it is he who assesses every allocation from the income" . This would indicate that the htri is 
an assessment of the total income "given him", and that it could potentially refer to the "divine 
offerings" in the preceding sentence. This could simplify the interpretation of the following 
reference where htri and income of the great council are likewise distinguished. As the Vizier 
would be responsible for "assessing the htri-allocation of the total income (of his office)", the 
great council would be responsible for their btri-allocation, and thus two types of state 
income can be identified, each of which is sub-divided. The Vizier is responsible for both, 
but receives only the first kind. 
One Dynasty XVIII treasury official recorded measuring "the receipt of myrrh as the annual 
btri ". 985 Another Dynasty XVIII Overseer of the Double Granary reports having received millions 
of "their b;kw" as the "s;yt of their cities" classified as the "annual htri ". 986 Mn-bpr-Rc-snb, 
the High Priest of Amun under Thutmosis III recorded "receipt of the gold of the Land of 
Coptos and of wretched Cush as the annual btri ". 987 
Dw~-r-nbb records that he inspected and counted b;kw grain as the annual htri for the 
temple of <Ämun> at the behest of Hatshepsut.988 He details a number of items as inw of 
982 KR/ VI : 67, 10; Bakir Epistolography, pls. 21 -22; XXVII-XXX; Wente, Letters, p. 128. 
983 Janssen, Ship's Logs, pp. 43 . 
984 Cf. supra, pp. 178ff.; Urk. IV: 1114; van den Boom, Duties, p. 283; Helck, Verwaltung, pp. 38-39; W. Helck, 
"Dienstanweisung für den Wesir," LÄ 1: 1084; James, Pharaoh 's People, pp. 66-67. Boom (Duties, pp. 333-
376) has pushed the date of this valuable text from Dynasty XIII to XVIII , so that the use of the terms may 
correspond to those of the Ramesside period, an argument which would be less defensible if the text were dated 
to Dynasty XIII (but cf. supra p. 178 n. 532) . · 
985 Urk. IV: 503,8; TT 127. 
986 Urk. IV: 530, 11-16; TT 99. 
987 Urk. IV: 931,8-10; TT 86. 
988 Urk. IV: 1379, 18-21 ; TT 125. 
269 
btri 
foreign origin separately.989 Clearly distinct from the foreign items, and seemingly not the btri 
are Egyptian products labeled as inw.990 lf the context can be properly understood, he 
distinguished not only the foreign revenue and products, but also the Egyptian products, 
referring to the "annual btri" separately from the inw. The titles indicate that he was responsible 
for a gs-pr and a double granary, presumably those of Amun. 
btri is used in an unclear context where the Chamberlain Twtw speaks before the collected 
officials of the land. The context would indicate that btri could refer to his own income 
(text l, 1. 6). 991 
btri is mentioned in the Bilgai stele,992 where the unidentified author states to the Royal Scribe 
and Steward of the Mortuary Temple of Siptah in the Estate of Amun, P~-6~-s~, that he 
fulfilled the smw and the sJyt, identifying both as his own personal btri (II. vso. 15-17). 
Extraordinary was my (vso. 17) (delivered) excess smw and sJyt. ten-fold my btri of 
smw and styt. [ ... ] 70 mnt-jars of honey were my honey btri. 993 
His btri is also identified as 70 mnt-jars of honey, while he actually rendered up "700, a 
surplus of 630" (II. vs. 19-20). btri is thus here a term used to identify an obligation to pay a 
specifically quantified amount of something to a temple, possibly subsuming the smw, sJyt 
and bJkw-rml, i.e., a generic term for his assigned or allocated assessment. lf the manifold 
excess is to be taken at face value, it would mean that the assessment was meant to be only 
a fraction of the available production, and not even a significant portion of total possible 
production, for an assessment erring to the low side to this extent would be unexpected. 
The Sgw Stele994 uses btri in three different senses, the first being his own income (1. 4) as a 
scribe of festival offerings, the second to the fiscal term when he was chief scribe of the 
vizier, and the third with reference to income from Cush when viceroy of Cush. In the Vizier's 
office, he "btri the entire land with a mighty pen" (1. 5). Although he states that what he does 
is beneficial to his Lord (i.e. Pharaoh), and confirms that offerings are consecrated to the 
gods, and even in excess (1. 8), he does not tell us what it was. 
A Dynasty XIX tomb inscription records that the owner was a prophet of M~'t and that he 
filled both treasury and granary, receiving payments collected for the offering table. He uses 
the word btri in a difficult metaphor in this context, but clearly referring to things collected 
from the temple dependents for the benefit of the temple of Onuris.995 
989 Urk. IV: 1379, 10. 
990 Urk. IV: 1380, 1-4; cf. supra, pp. 221 ff. 
991 Urk. IV 2011 ; EA 8; Davies, Amoma VI : 11-12. 
992 Cf. supra, pp. l 82ff.; KR/ IV: 341-343; A. H. Gardiner, "The Stele of ßilgai," ZÄS 50 (1912): 49-57. 
993 KR/ IV: 343,7-12. 
994 KR/ III: 91-94; esp. 92,9; 11; W. Helck, "Die große Stele des Vizekönigs StMaus Wadi es-Sabua," SAK 3 
(1975): 85-112.; K. A. Kitchen, "The Great Biographical Stela of Setau, Viceroy of Nubia," OlP6/ 7 (1975/ 
1976): 295-302. 
995 KR/ VII : 226ff. (esp. 231, 12), replacing KR/ IV: 143-144. Dated to Merneptah. 
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Royal Propaganda 
In contrast to the usual "annual btri", Thutmosis III promises an "solid eternal btri" of live geese 
offerings for Amun.996 Among the objects listed as having been given by Thutmosis III to the 
temple of Amun, some vessels are listed as being "numerous large [vessels] as the annual 
btri", where a number is otherwise specified.997 Elsewhere the unidentified "annual btri" is 
assigned to Amun (which is the inw). 998 Divine offerings and grain are specifically stated to 
be the excess (bJw) of the btri awarded to Amun. 999 More detail is provided in one instance: 
My Majesty founded for [ Amun ... ] fields from the choicest of Upper and Lower 
Egypt, in order to cultivate. T o command the grain thereof for the divine offering of 
each day, My Majesty founded anew in excess of that which was before. 
My Majesty founded anew divine offering for him in order to make their praise in his 
mansion at Karnak. The annual obl igations of bread, cattle, fowl, incense, wine, 
and every good thing as the annual btri. 1000 
The annual btri was commanded by Thutmosis III for the benefit of both Khnum and 
Sesostris 111. 1001 Grain and trees are enumerated, and it is said that at least part of this was 
provided by the mayors of the southern district (tp) of Abydos. 
In the Horemhab Decree 1002 btri appears as a noun, referring to "btri for the wcbtof Pharaoh" 
(1. l 5) . In the previous line (14), btri is associated with a nmbw in an unclear passage. While 
the context does not encourage over-interpretation, one can associate private people with 
an obligation to provide goods to the wcbtof Pharaoh (and note that officials are supposed 
to extract bJkw from the webt of Pharaoh, and not directly from the private people, II. 31-33; 
q. v. bJkw, supra). 
At Gebel Silsile East, Seti I recorded 1003 the provisionment of the expedition which was 
bringing a major monument north. Among the various items listed is "the daily btri of corn 
6 khar" from the granary. 
In Seti l's West Silsile Nile lnvocations 1004 Pharaoh emphasizes the significance of the Nile's 
role in the life of Egypt, mentioning "the things of the offering table from (11) 1 Jbt 15 to II smw 
15 from the annual btri." The list of divine offerings from the granary of divine offerings of 
Amonrasonther includes: calves, goots, geese, bread, lizards, hippopotami, wine, curds, 
honey, milk, silver, gold, bronze, etc. Pharaöh evidently did not mind plundering one temple's 
treasury · in order to provide offerings for another, and it must be assumed that the gods 
likewise acquiesced to the practice. 
996 Urk. IV: 745,5. In P. Harris, the live geese are specifically termed s~yt( 126,9), es port of the annual btri. 
997 Urk. IV: 641, l l. 
998 Urk. IV: 70, l ff. Another (Urk. IV: 753,9) text alleges that the King himself "btrithe start of the season", but the text 
is unclear. lt is tempting to speculate that the annual btri was assessed at a particular moment, and that this text 
refers to the season of the htri, but it is unjustified . He may have "fixed" the season . 
999 Urk. lV: 163, 13-14. 
1000 Urk. IV: 7 46. 
1001 Urk. IV: 195-196. 
1002 Urk. IV: 2144, 10; 19. Cf. supra, pp. l88f. 
1003 KR! 1: 60-61, esp. 61,4. 
1004 KR/ 1: 81-96, esp. 90, 14. 
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In the Nauri Decree1005 Seti I affirms that fowl, cattle, slaves, poultry farms, honey, moringa 
oil, incense, wine, textiles, etc., are guaranteed to the temple of Osiris at Abydos. 1006 btri 
appears in the midst of these offerings (1. 20), without being associated with specific objects. 
Ramesses II referred to the btri in the context of the lnscription dedicatoire at Abydos. 1007 
"Thy treasury is filled with the desired things which I have given thee together with the 
btri". 1008 The King himself has btrifor Osiris. 1009 The officials around Ramesses II assured him 
that he, Pharaoh, "btri in order to strengthen Egypt". 1010 The btri seems tobe bikw, and it is 
specified that the bikw of the traders was in metals, while other btri and bikw require 
transport vessels to move them. To a considerable extent, the items and responsibilities 
correspond to those of the relevant paragraphs of P. Harris 1. 
Ramesses III associated construction in Egypt, Nubia and Asia with btri, bikw, and inw. 1011 
He also associated btri and bikw, of foreign origin, destined for Amun. 1012 In another context 
Ramesses states bluntly that on orders from Amun, he received the btri of the mrw-serfs for his 
own treasury. 1013 
In P. Harris 11°14 Ramesses III says that he "btri Upper and Lower Egypt" providing gold, 
precious stones, cattle and corn for the Estate of Amun (II. 4,4-4,5). Although in this general 
context, he distinguishes this local Egyptian income from the bikw of Nubia and Phoenicia, 
it is stated that "their annual btri" (i.e., what was awarded to the temple) was the .siy.tand 
bikw (Section llc of the text, supra). One specific paragraph definitely distinguishes the 
Pharaoh's gifts from those which rightfully belonged to the temples, using the verb btri: 
(7,4) 1 have endowed for thee festival offerings [ ... ]tobe presented before thee at 
thy every appearance, provided with bread and beer, cattle and fowl, wine, incense 
varieties, (all) beyond count. They were btri anew of the officials and agents in 
excess of all of the gifts which I have made for thy kt. 
The statement precedes the lists, which included, gold, silver, copper, linen, incense, etc. 
With the exception of the 309'950 khar of corn and the 82 vessels for transporting these and 
other things, the objects are precisely what would be required for the execution of temple 
tasks. That Pharaoh emphasizes renewing the btri can be interpreted as rhetoric, or placed 
in an historical perspective, as it may have been that as late as Dynasty XX the possessions 
of the Estate of Amun - expropriated under Amenophis IV - were still being returned to it. 
1005 Cf. supra, pp. 190ff.; KR/ 1: 45-58, esp. 49,5. 
1006 Although there ore some difficulties with the name and the allributes, the !ext is evidently inlended to guoranlee 
income for Seti's magnificenl temple al Abydos. 
1007 KR/ II: 333,6. 
1008 KR/ II: 332, 15. 
1009 KR/ II: 332,8. 
101° KR/ II: 197, l 0. 
1011 KR/ V: 117, l 3f. 
1012 KR/ V: 50, 13. 
1013 KR/ V: 284,3. 
1014 Cf. supra, p. 198. 
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Thutmosis III claims to have turned some l 5'000 kg of gold over to Amun, 1015 while P. Harris 
records less than 60 kg! 1016 
Not included under these headings are the temple dependents, cattle, corn, dockyards, 
gardens, divine images, etc., which Pharaoh gave of his own volition (Sections 116, lld - inw-, 
lle, llf), thus distinguishing these items from those that the temples produced for themselves, 
presumably thanks to the labour of the dependents which Pharaoh awarded them. 
The lists of Pharaoh's own offerings are far more detailed, e.g., the htri offerings have 4 lines 
of text for 51 kg of gold (12a,6-12a,9), while the king's offerings use 6 lines of text for about 
5 kg (13a,5-13a, 10). The same detail appears when comparing the htri-lists (llc) with those 
of the royal lists (lld) for incense, clothing, honey, wine, precious stones, etc., etc. This might 
suggest that the king actually authorized the distribution of his own resources on a detailed 
basis, but that he was merely kept informed about deliveries going directly to the temple. 
Despite the detail, the total transfer of wealth from Pharaoh to temple remains modest in 
comparison with the htri. 
For Heliopolis, Ramesses likewise asserts that the htriwas "transported to your treasury in the 
Temple of Re"' (P. Harris 28,5), and the total supplies are again counted as "their annual 
htri" (32a,9). The list is an abbreviated version of that for Amonrasonther, and the list for the 
Memphite temples follows the same pattern, where "their entire htri is in thy treasuries, 
magazines, granaries, cattle stalls, bird pens" (P. Harris 48, 10). 
The paragraphs preceding the lists for the smaller temples deliberately exclude the use of the 
terms btkw, sJyt and htri. 
Ramesses lll's Karnak prayer1017 uses the "annual htri" in a fashion indicating that the Pharaoh 
commanded it for the benefit of Amun (1. 22), suggesting that it may be specifically grain, but 
other items are mentioned. htri appears in a damaged context (1. 20) perhaps with reference 
to btkw which was transported to the granaries. 
fOREIGN REVENUE 
Private Propaganda 
Qbwty, an Overseer of the Treasury in the middle of Dynasty XVIII, recorded that he received 
ivory and ebony of "this foreign country as the annual htri" .1018 As the last line of the relevant 
passage states that His Majesty praised him, the text should doubtless be understood as 
fiscal in nature. 1019 
101 5 Urk. IV: 629-634 . Cf. J. J. Janssen, "Prolegomena to the Study of Egypt's Economic History during the New 
Kingdom, " SAK 3 (1975): 154. 
1016 To the temple of Amun . Altogether he donated more than ten times that much to all the temples: (P . Harris 1 
680,4), some 650 kg. 
1017 KR/ V: 221-225; esp. 225,2; 8. 
1018 Urk IV- 436 6· TT 11 
1019 And n~t a m~r~ interd~partmental transfer (cf. TT 343, supra, p. 225) . Whether the ivory and ebony were 
products of Egypt is less clear, and whether they w ere destined for the royal treasury is another matter. 
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According to his autobiographical stele, Min-msw was a retainer of Thutmosis III who 
followed his ruler to Nubia and to Syria. 1020 He details fiscal activities in Nubia and Syria, 
stating, "(8) [ ... ] 1 btri Upper R!nw namely silver, gold, lapis, all precious stones, chariots, 
steeds, un-(9)-countable; cattle and sheep like unto millions (mi Jsc_sn). [Reference to bikw ... ]. 
(1 o) 1 btri the princes of n-nbsy in electron (slm br g_(w.~, in gold, in ivory, African 
blackwood, 1021 ( 11) numerous boats, palms, as the annual btri like serfs (mrt) ( 12) of his 
palace. 
The objects which are the object of the verb btri do not include corn, but precious materials 
and animals. The following paragraph indicates that it was deposited in a treasury after 
being "counted" (although uncountable), but does not specify which treasury, although the 
simile refers to the "serfs of his palace". 1022 As the paragraphs following the foreign activities 
of the hero refer to temple activity, it can be suggested that he was acting as an agent of 
Pharaoh as king, and not (yet) in the name of the temples. Assessment and collection seem 
to fall together here as btri. 
When Viceroy of Cush, Sgw 1023 asserts that "I brought all btri of this land of Cush two-fold" 
(1. 12). 
Royal Propaganda 
Under Thutmosis III, an annual obligatory btri as bikw is assured Amun, in the form of divine 
offerings from various villages in Upper R!nw. 1024 Various seasonal offerings are also called 
an annual btri for Amun. 1025 The harbors of coostal Syria "make ready all things as their btri, 
as their annual custom (n(), probably for Amun. 1026 Both wretched Cush and various Syrian 
villages are obliged to deliver btri as bikwto Amun. 1027 
Seti I instituted btri associated with a festival for the chapel of his father Ramesses I in 
Abydos. 1028 He also provided the annual btri for ~'py and the gods in the Nile invocations 
at West Silsile. 1029 
In the context of the Hittite marriage, Ramesses II has the Hittites praise him for being the son 
of Seth, born of M;'t, 1030 who caused the land of Hatti to prosper for the Pharaoh: "We btri 
in love of thee, we bear it to thy noble palace". 1031 Ramesses III recorded that every land bore 
its inw, btri and bikw to Pharaoh, most probably tobe delivered to Amun at Karnak. 1032 
1020 Urk. IV: 1441-1445; esp. 1442,8; 11. 
1021 Lucas's suggestion (Lucas-Harris, Materials, p. 435), supported byGermer(F/ora, pp. 97-98), has been reputedly 
confirmed from material salvaged from the wreck off the Turkish coast at Ulu Burun. 
1022 lt is possible that this could signify that the serfs paid a btri to Pharaoh, but the evidence is slim. 
1023 KR/ III: 91-94; W. Helck, "Die große Stele des Vizekönigs Snw aus Wadi es-Sabua," SAK 3 (1975): 85-112.; 
K. A. Kitchen, "The Great Biographical Stela of Setau, Viceroy of Nubia," OLP6/7 (1975/1976): 295-302. 
1024 Urk. IV: 7 44,7. 
1025 Urk. IV: 750-751, esp. 751,4. 
1026 Urk. IV: 700,6. 
1021 Urk. IV: 185-186, esp 186,3. 
1028 KR/ 1: 114,4. 
1029 KR/ 1: 90, 14-16. 
1030 Probably the King, rather than Seth, who was usually the Son of Nwt. 
1031 KR/ II: 245,7-9. 
1032 KR/ V: 221-225, esp. 225, 1-2. 
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Previous Discussions of the word btri 
P. Harris I ends with a statement to the effect that after defeating the Peoples of the Sea, they 
were settled in the Delta, and that they were btri as well, "clothing and corn are paid into the 
treasuries and granaries annually" (76,9). This is a rare reference to a btri of corn, and not 
necessarily a reference to foreign revenue, as the "foreigners" were settled in Egypt. 
PREVIOUS D1scuss10NS OF THE WORD btri 
W. Helck termed the btri an "obligation" or "quota". 1033 J. J. Janssen suggested that the btri 
deliveries in Deir el-Medineh were termed such since they were the "deliveries" from else-
where being re-circulated through the system, rather than interpreting the abstract obligation 
from Pharaoh to his workmen. 1034 
In his discussion of the word and its contexts, J.-M. Kruchten defined the fiscal significance 
of the verb btri as "putting to work" and the substantive as indicating "what is produced by 
putting to work". 1035 More specifically, while concurring with the dictionary definitions, 
suggesting that it meant "to subject someone to tax or tribute," he distinctly emphasized that 
what it really meant was more "to put someone to work" than "to subject them to a 
contribution". 1036 
Given the discrepancy between the prescribed btri and the produced btri in the Bilgai stele, 
we cannot however escape the conclusion that the prescribed btri represented a mere 
proportion of the produce, and therefore it cannot mean "to put someone to work", but must 
mean to "assign" or "impose an obligation" to pay a portion of the produce, i.e., to make a 
contribution. As the prescribed btri must be our point of departure (for those issuing the 
instructions will have understood the word correctly), the conclusion is seif-evident. 
Kruchten's assessment likewise ignores the fact that none of the determinitives signifying 
action is associated with the word during the New Kingdom. While those used vary, the 
papyrus roll determinative suggesting an abstract meaning is common, particularly so in the 
carefully written script of P. Harris 1. This alone would suggest that it is not a verb of action, 
and that the substantive cannot be a "product of labor". 
In his study of P. Harris 1, Grandet indicated that Kruchten's philological reasoning was 
methodologically flawed, but himself confused philology and economics: 
T aking account of the semantic virtualities of the root btr, "to join" , and the theoretical 
administrative virtualities of economic systems based on redistribution, as discussed 
above, and avoiding a discussion in terms of "fiscality", a notion with modern 
economic connotations, which cannot be anything except a source of anachronisms, 
1033 lÄ 1: 7. 
1034 Janssen, SAK 3: 176. 
1035 J.-M. Kruchten, "Le verbe btr et ses derives jusqu'o la fin du nouvel empire. Sens et Traduction," AIPHOS 24 
(1980): 39-52, esp. p. 52. 
1036 Kruchten, AIPHOS 24: 40-41. 
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as stated at the start, we believe that it is possible to establish the economic and 
administrative meanings of the verb and the noun htr in the following fashion. 1037 
He thus establishes that his objectivity consists of rejecting fiscal thinking and assuming 
redistribution. His definition of the verb htr consists of "linking" two groups, avoiding the 
necessity of delivering things to the central administration whence it must have been redis-
tributed. His definition of the noun "conforms to the definition" of the verb, and thus ties the 
concepts of "wages" and "tax", as an obligatory payment which is "allocated" in terms of 
administrative measures, and economically corresponds to a fraction of production. 1038 As 
we will see below, this philological interpretation is marred only by the economic interpreta-
tion, and had the two been separated, his interpretation of the word would have been 
philologically impeccable. 
CONCLUSIONS 
htri definitely expresses an abstract obligation to render certain concrete articles to a higher 
authority, be it the government or the temples, but clearly only a portion of what is produced, 
for both the Bilgai stele and the inscription of Snw emphasize that they produced considerably 
more than the btri, and delivered it. While b;kwcan also be used in private contexts to refer 
to work carried out for another person on a private basis, htri is apparently never used in this 
sense. lt thus had a specifically fiscal significance, which was not equivalent to s;yt -
although many of the texts give the impression of a complimentary character - but more 
probably it defined the Myt, or rather htri seems to subsume s;yt, 1039 while being used 
abstractly, but the htri can also be more specific. Given the number of complaints concerning 
htri, it must have been the most demanding of the official obligations. 1040 The text referring to 
the b;kwof a fisherman which is classified as the htri of the Mayor and Vizier 1041 is probably 
the most useful reference for a comparison of these two terms. The Mayor and Vizier is 
responsible for the income, it is imposed upon him, and those who actually carry it out 
deliver it as their work. From the official standpoint, htri applied to people1042 would thus 
imply a b1kw type obligation on the people, which was the htri of the official. 
htri thus appears to have had several fiscal meanings. The nouns and the verbs were closely 
related, but the verb seems tobe exclusively fiscal, in the sense that the provision of supplies 
1037 Grandel, Papyrus Harris II: 63. [My translation]. 
1038 Grandel, Papyrus Harris II: 63-66. 
1039 In P. Harris 1 (pp. l 94ff., supra), lhe b;kw s;yt of the dependents are termed the annual htri(sections llc, IUc, IVc). 
The s;yt of live geese is specified, under the htri. In the Bilgai Stele (pp. l 82ff. supra), the sJyt is not identified, 
while the htri is specifically identified as the honey deliveries, but both the s;yt and the smw are lermed htri. 
1040 P. Cairo 58057 (KR/ 1: 238; cf. "b;kw", supra, p. 240) illustrales lhis, in that the author of the letter merely teils 
the recipienl, lhat lhe b;kw is being exacted from the aulhor while the creature is wilh the recipient. Complaints 
concerning the htri are more emphatic. 
1041 KR/ VI: 650-652, esp. 650, 14; 651,6. 
1042 As, e.g., P. Bol. 1094, II. 6,5-6,6 (LEM, pp. 5-6; Caminos, LEM, pp. 17-20). 
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Conclusions 
for the Gang at Deir el-Medineh was never referred to using the verb btri, while both 
Pharaoh and the vizier btri the btri, with an apparently direct relationship to income. The 
verb thus refers exclusively to activities relating to arranging income on a fiscal (as opposed 
to administrative) basis. 
The noun seems to refer to (a) "supplies in kind" at Deir el-Medineh, and (b) "their annual btri" 
appears to be the "assessment" or "levy", rather than the "dues" themselves, as implied in 
statements like "I have btri anew", which could mean "assessed again" or "levied again", or 
"lt is he who assesses every assessment", 1043 in the sense of "fixes" rather than examines. 
The fact that btri does not appear in the inscription of lmn-btp would imply that he is listing 
what has been delivered, and not the assessments, and this explains its absence. 
The English word "levy" means both "to impose" or "collect" and "assessment", "duty", "impost", 
"tax" 1044 and thus matches the difference in meaning between the verb btri, "to assess" and 
"to collect" while the noun could signify "dues", which could be interpreted as the obligation 
(1) imposed by Pharaoh in terms of deliveries to Pharaoh or the temples, and (2) of Pharaoh 
to provide for his dependents. From the ßilgai stele, where the author produced a ten fold 
btri, it may be deduced that the "levy" was only intended tobe a portion of the produce (and 
thus the equivalent of a "tax"), and that in this case, an exacting official became over 
ambitious. lt is also clear that "assessing anew" would not be necessary if all of the produce 
was taken from the producers in similar contexts. htri thus signifies "tax-assessment" in many 
cases, and occasionally a type of "income tax-assessment", payable to the temples or the 
government. lt was however an assessment for which officials were expected to take the 
final responsibility, like the btkwexacted from the mayors. From P. Harris I there is however 
considerable evidence that the htri of the temples was actually produced by temple labour. 
In either case, however, it was a specific obligation to supply goods to the temples and the 
government. 
The verb btri meaning "assess" would appear tobe the fiscal term par excellence for assessing 
what is due, whether sJyt, inw, smw, btri, or btkw. Understanding btri as meaning "assess", 
"assessment", "levy" is probably the best consistent rendering, and since it signifies "assessing" 
only a proportion of the production, the implications are that of necessity the other words 
modified by btri cannot be other than the equivalent of "taxes" imposed on a total production, 
of which only an "assessed" fraction was tobe paid to the authorities. 
1043 Cf. supra, p. 180; Urk. IV: 1114,9. 
1044 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 1: 1204. 
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T HE WORD sJy(t) 
s;y(t) normally means "destiny", related to the god of destiny, siy. 1045 The fiscal term is also 
written s;yw. 1046 In an economic context, it might etymologically mean "what is destined", 
"what has been decided". 
INTERNAL REVENUE 
Administrative texts 
The miscellany text states concisely that the scribe does not pay the sJyt (P. Anast., V, 
17,2-3) 1047. Another miscellany, P. Bologna 1094, records the request of a temple prophet 
that a Steward intercede for him in the Vizier's office, "And speak with others there about the 
great fs which has been set (6, 10) against me as the s;w of the Temple of Seth together with 
the khato-land of Pharaoh (L!P!H!) under my authority." 1048 In P. Harris 1, s;yt is written s;yw 
(69, 11) possibly corresponding to the contemporary pronunciation . The khato-lands and the 
sJytare mentioned in the same general context in P. Harris (27, 12; 28,5), where the income 
of the temples of Heliopolis are described. In the case of P. Harris 1, the payments are clearly 
to the benefit of temples, whereas in P. Bologna 1094, the Vizier is tobe consulted about a 
matter of temple income managed by a prophet. P. Berlin 3040a likewise indicates that 
obligations were in fact one of the major concerns of the top officials, 1049 as would be 
expected from the text of the lnstructions of the Vizier (cf. supra, pp. l 78ff.). 
Honey dockets seem to imply that honey could be the bJkwof the honey bearers (cf. P. Harris 1: 
28,3), but that at the same time it is the s;yt of an official, 1050 the one being concrete, the 
other potentially abstract. (Only a ~tri of honey is recorded in the Bilgai Stele). 
In a semi-official letter, 1051 the Scribe Twr greets "his mother, the Chantress of Amun", and a 
fragmentary passage indicates that in some way a Vizier associated with the author of the 
letter has sent or instructed someone "to exact sJyt of his controllers (rwg'w) who are in the 
fields" dealing in some way with a deficit from the preceding year (11. 6-7). The fragmentary 
text refers to registering this backlog in the "granary of Pharaoh" (1. 8). 
1045 Cf. Quaegebeur, Shai: 
1046 Ouaegebeur (Sha;; p. 58) points out that the written form does not signify the existence of a masculine, and that 
there is thus one single feminine term for this meaning of the word. Cf., e.g., P. Harris 1, II. 126,9; 326, 11; 
52a , 1; 69, 11 . Half of the examples are without the t, although all are the some word . For this reason, it is 
difficult to imagine that a difference between the forms with and without the t indicates a difference between 
prospective and accomplished . 
1047 LEM 65,6. 
1048 LEM, pp. 5-6; Caminos, LEM, pp. 17-20. 
1049 KR/ III: 160, 11 ff. ; A. H. Gardiner, "A Later Allusion to Akhenaten," JEA 24 (1938): 124. 
105° KR/ VII : 84, 8 - 16. Another !ext of the same type suggests a similar interpretation for the use of the word st}'f 
(KR/ VII: 85, 12) 
1051 KR/ VII : 190-191: The recto of O C:erny 3 + 0 Fitzwilliam l; Wente, Letters, pp. 146-147. 
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The Tax Lists of the Turin Canon 1052 refer to a regular_lb( (written in red) associated with an 
institution (3,4). Whether this might modify the following lines, or itself be modified by the 
lines relating to b;kw above is speculative, but improbable, for the relationship between s;yt 
and b;kw and tp-grt seems tobe parallel rather than complementary, so that it would be 
more likely- in comparison with P. Harris 1- for s;ytto be the same type of obligation as the 
b;kw, or to subsume the btkw, rather than to be subsumed by it. The s;yt of the smdt 
mentioned in a very fragmentary context (3, 19). We cannot therefore draw any conclusions 
which are not wholly speculative from col. 3. Col. 4 likewise associates an institution w ith 
the sJyw, but in a fragmentary context. 
Col . 7 of the Tax Lists specifies the obligatory annual payment of head of cattle, with totals 
that lead to large figures . The arrangement suggests that similar records of cattle in col. 4 be 
reconstructed and likewise assigned to the sJyw. lf this line of speculation is correct, the styw 
will have been a obligation held by an individual (the suffix .f being attached to it) 
Private Transactions 
The oracle text, P. B.M. 10335 1053 relates that a sgm-cs appealed to the god, saying, that 
when he was in pJ-bnty, those guarding the granary were exacting its sJyt, and that some of 
his garments were stolen, and it not clear that any logical or persuasive conclusions can be 
drawn from this text, aside from the association of the sJyt and the granary. The use of the 
term sgm-cs, rather than rmt-ist, indicates a deviation from the standard terminology of daily 
life, but would not appear to be important, and it can probably be accepted that the use of 
the term sJyt does not diverge from normal use. 
Private Propaganda 
A Dynasty XVIII inscription records the collection of the "sJyt of their cities". 1054 bJkw and btri 
appear in the same context, suggesting the tentative conclusion that their bJkw-payments 
corresponded to the sJyt which was the btri assessment. 
styt is mentioned in the Bilgai stele, 1055 where the unidentified author states to the Royal 
Scribe and Steward of the Mortuary Temple of Siptah in the Estate of Amun, P;-b;-s;, that he 
fulfilled the smw and the s;yt, identifying both as his own personal btri (II. vs. 15-17). He 
does not associate the s;yt with any specific items, as he does in the case of the other terms, 
but it is possible that a direct liaison with grain is possible. 1056 
1052 Cf. supra, pp. l 59ff. 
105 3 W. R. Dawson, "'An Oracle Papyrus. B.M. 10335,"JEA 11 (1925) : 247-248, pls. XXXV-XXXVIII. AM. Blackman, 
"Oracles in Ancient Egypt," JEA 11 (1925) : 249-255. 
1o54 Urk. IV: 530, 13-16; TT 99. 
1055 Cf. supra, pp. l 82ff.; KR/ IV: 341-343, esp. 343 ,7ff.; A. H. Gardiner, 'The Stele of ßilgai," ZÄS 50 (1912): 
49-57. 
1056 Another - administrative - text of unclear content dating to Ramesses II, refers to the sJytfrom the fortress of the sea 
(KR/ VII: 93,9) 
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The inscription recording the rewards of the efficient High priest of Amun, lmn-btp, 1057 
details fiscal responsibilities using most of the words discussed in this study, but does not 
identify the styt further than to confirm that it was allotted to the temple directly, and this 
along with the other products filled the magazines. The word htri does not appear in this 
text. 
Royal Propaganda 
In the Nauri Decree, Seti I states that "they bring the styt which I have given to him [i.e. 
Osiris]". 1058 
In P. Harris 11059 a number of categories termed the "annual htri" (12a,5) are specified tobe 
the "s;yt btkw-rmJof the smdt of the Mansion" (12a, l; cf. wording from Tax Lists, supra), his 
funerary temple in the Estate of Amun: gold, silver, copper, linen, wine, corn. Although btkw 
appears repeatedly, styt is not the subject of a specific entry, except for the "live geese as 
sJyt(l 26,9). 1060 
The same formulae are used for the temples of Heliopolis (32a, 7-32a,9), but in the preceding 
rhetorical paragraphs (28,3-28,5) styt appears as being equal in importance to (rather than 
a part of) the btkw and htri. The "live geese as styt" form a specific item (326, 11 ). The 
comparable paragraphs concerning Memphis repeat the pattern for Thebes, with the "live 
geese as sJyt" (52a, l ). 
The final summary of the lists (686,4-686,5) defines the sJyt bJkw-rmJ smdt as being the 
annual htri. The total of the silver and gold (of all kinds, 686,8) seem to exclude both the 
(non-s;yt btkw) objects given the small temples and the Pharaoh's own gifts to the Estate of 
Amonrasonther. 1061 Despite some mathematical discrepancies, the same seems to have 
been intended tobe true of the totals for the "garments" 1062 and "incense, honey and sesame 
oil".1063 
1057 Cf. supra, pp. l 86f.; KR/ VI: 455-458; W . Helck, "Die Inschrift über die Belohnung des Hohenpriesters '/mn-
btp," MIO 4 (1956): 162-178. 
1058 KR/ 1: 50, l 0. In the Herrnopolis Decree (KR/ 1: 125-126) Seti I also arranges for the protection of temple income, 
6ut does not use any of the usual voca6ulary (except sJw, KR/ 1: 126,5). ls this another case of the major temples 
having a different voca6ulary to the smaller temples? 
1059 Cf. supra, pp. 194ft. 
1060 The final t-suffix is in fact missing here. Entries (326, l l) and (52a, l) have n rather than m, so that "live geese as 
sJyt" is probably correct. 
1061 When added together, the equivalent lines from Memphis, Heliopolis and Thebes total less than the final total 
given, l 6'339.65 deben (686,8), but if the 4'204.76 deben of the silver btkw(69,4) are added, the balance 
indicates a difference of sorne 80 deben, or an error of less than 0.5 per cent. of the total. Thal the btkw-rmf 
silver rnay have been included lwice can be either an oversight or an error, or may be su6stanlially rnore 
significant. A simple error of sorne 25 per cent. need not however be excluded a priori (cf. note on incense, infra 
p. 280 n. l 063) . lt could be suggested that the scribes were far rnore careful in accounting for the silver than for 
garrnents and incense, but this is pure speculation. 
1062 The error is that the final total is 30 l iterns short of the rnathematical total of the totals of the individual entries (an 
error of ca. 7 per cent.). As Pharaoh clairns to have given twice as rnuch clothing to the Estate of Amun frorn his 
private sources (8'586 iterns, 146, 16; as against 4'575 iterns, 686, 12), neither this nor the gifts to the srnall 
temples - which would have inAated the figure even more - can have been included here. 
1063 The error is again that the final total is 270 iterns short of the corresponding entries in the lists (the error being 
nearly 25 per cenl. here). Again, frorn Pharaoh's personal reserves, far more than this has been turned over to the 
ternples. 
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f OREIGN REVENUE 
Administrative texts 
The first poge of P. Turin 2104/223 1064 uses the terms b:kw, btri, diwand styt, primarilywith 
reference to garments and grain for the Gang at Deir el-Medineh. lt would appear that the 
stytof Cush (and) all the htriwere turned over to a temple, probably the Estate of Amun, from 
the treasury of Pharaoh. The goods are not defined. 
Private Propaganda 
A Dynasty XVIII inscription records "receiving the styt of silver, gold, precious stones" by an 
overseer of the gold of foreign lands (or deserts) . 1065 
CONCLUSIONS 
lt is clear that the term had a specific meaning for the Egyptian administration, and the 
evidence from the Tax Lists of the Turin Canon and Harris would initially seem to suggest a 
payment in livestock, as it is associated with cattle, geese and honey, as opposed to 
products, as if to distinguish the two, yet, the Syrian livestock in P. Harris are termed b:kw, 
so that this line of logic cannot lead anywhere. 
While it is striking that the sJyt is associated with geese on two occasions, in another case, 
is that of "their cities". In the Decree of Horemhab, it would certainly seem to imply a direct 
legal term associated with the courts. That it is not purely abstract comes close to being 
proven in the Rewards of the High Priest lmn-btp, because there the abstract htri, assessment, 
fails to appear, yet the sJyt does. 1066 
Therefore, although sJyt would generally appear to imply an abstract obligation from an 
official to the administrative apparatus, of the temple or government, and does not seem to 
represent a specific dass of goods (since cattle, geese, precious metals and stones, garments, 
and other items are included), nor to be associated either exclusively with either individuals 
or administrative centres, it is difficult to isolate. The sJyt can be awarded to the temples by 
Pharaoh, but temple income can also be termed sJyt. lt seems tobe employed with regard to 
both domestic and foreign articles. The s;ytobligations are determined by the htri assessment. 
1064 Cerny, Notebook, 23, pp. 20-23. 
1065 Urk. IV: 536; TT 99. 
1066 Cf. supra, pp. l 86f. 
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THE WORD smw 
The term smw is frequently encountered in administrative texts dealing with the collection of 
grain. The word itself means either "summer" or "harvest", and thus the traditional rendering 
"harvest-tax" may appear to be suitable, as "harvest" does have a specific meaning, and 
this payment represents something collected by the authorities after the harvest. "Tax" has 
however likewise a specific meaning, usually that it is a fraction of something (wealth or 
income) paid by members of a community (individuals, corporations, etc.) to the government 
of the community. The word appears very frequently in certain texts, and its meaning is more 
or less clear. 
INTERNAL REVENUE 
Administrative texts 
The miscellany text 1067 indicates that the smw was a grain impost, paid by the cultivators 
and collected by scribes. The text emphasizes that there is "no grain", and it might be 
thought that the smwconsisted of all of the grain harvested, as one might speculate that the 
cultivator would be even more put aback, if whatever was left by the animals were tobe 
taken by the predatory tax collectors. This surmise is not however matched with those 
documents where specific proportions can be guessed at. 
P. Northumberland 11 1068 states that the daily rations (mnt) of the army (i.e., expedition, or 
squadron) were taken from "the smwof Year 2 of" Seti 1 (1. 3). They are defined as having 
been inyt (II. 5-7, 9; 11 ), which could mean "brought", or the fiscal term. 
In a letter dating to the reign of Ramesses 11 1069 the Overseer of Cattle Swnr reports to the 
High Priest of Ptah ljc-m-w;st that he has attended to the "smwof my Lord which is under my 
authority" (1. 4), with a reference to the temple of Ptah in the same partially preserved 
sentence. This seems to imply that the smw could belong to the temple of Ptah, it being less 
probable that it is the personal or hereditary obligation of the Prince. lt could also conceivably 
be an obligation that the temple owes to a third party. 
1061 Cf. supra, pp. 133-134; LEM 64-65; Caminos, lEM pp. 247-250. 
1068 KR/ 1: 241-242; J. Borns, "Three Hieratic Papyri in the Duke of Northumberland's Collection," JEA 34 ( 1948): 
35-46. 
1069 KR/ II: 894-895, esp. 895, 1; P. Leiden 1 368;J J Janssen, 'Nine Letters from the Time of Ramses II,' OMR04 l 
(1960): 45-46; Bakir, Epistolography, pls. 16-17, XXII. 
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A text from Deir el-Medineh dating to Ramesses II likewise records the receipt of the smwas 
emmer, delivering several thousand kharof grain to a granary, perhaps that of Pharaoh. 1070 
P. Gurob Fragment L is clearly dated to the very close of the reign of Ramesses II and the first 
year of that of Merneptah 1071 and consists of lists of quantities of grain delivered. Most of the 
quantities in Fragment Q are multiples of 1 2/ 4 khar, those of Fragment Q also include figures 
of l 00 and l 14. lt is stated in both texts that the corn is smw, in several cases referred to as 
"interest corn" (Fragment a, 1,7; 2,3; Fragment b, 3,6; 3,9). 1072 The assessments will have 
been annual, as it is stated that the grain of Year 67 was reported and delivered in Year 1. 
Some of the grain seems to be derived from small holders (as in P. Gurob M and the Papyrus 
Wilbour apportioning paragraphs), the corn would appear to have been recorded as having 
been turned over to the "granary of the Mayor of the Southern Lake, lmn-m-ipt" (1. 2,2). lt 
was unsurprisingly loaded onto cargo vessels for transport. The text is quite fragmentary, but 
it would appear that annual assessments were carried out in Y ear 67, and that the assessment 
corn plus a penalty was collected in Year l (which was the same year). Either this corn or 
other corn was delivered to the granary of the Mayor. This was then transported else-
where, 1073 the Mayor's granary having merely served as a an intermediary point. 
0. Petrie 47 1074 appears to mention the "smw of Pharaoh". lt would be rash to speculate on 
the purpose of the text. 
The undated and extremely fragmentary P. Gurob M 1075 mentions the usual titles associated 
with the smw("agents", "cultivators", "citizenesses"), 1076 but also specifies twice (II. 9; l 0) the 
"corn of inyt of arrears (~r-s;)" of a citizeness and a cultivator, seemingly implying that this 
was smw corn. Whether this implies that the inyt was smw is probably doubtful; inyt was 
probably used here merely meaning "brought", but the construction is unusual. 
smw does not appear in 0. Gardiner 86 (H.O. 82,3) 1077 where the obligations of 8760 
men are specified as being 200 khar each. lt may however be specifically mentioned in 
P. Bologna 10861078 where the same obligation per man is stated and the missing man's 
1o7o KR/ VII· 175-176· 0 Gord 227 
1071 Gordi~er, RAD, p~. 30-32; Gardiner, Wilbour II : 206-207. lf (2,5) should be reod 1 :bt 19, 1 :bt 18 (2, l) is 
the lost officiol doy of the reign of Romesses II (cf. Hornung, Untersuchungen, p. 95 n. 3) . 
1072 There is little evidence of "interest" from ancient Egypl, and Sir Alan (Gardiner, Wilbour II : 206 n. l 0) summarizes 
the situotion well in confirming thal the Coptic indicotes ms as the etymological source, but that the Graeco-
Romon sources do not support the intermediale slep wilh solid evidence. lf "interest" is interpreted, this merely 
gives the "rate" at which the "penolty" would be given, but the word - for the Egyptians - would be the same. 
S. Allom ("msw = Kinder/Volksgruppe/Produkte/ Abgaben," SAK 19 [ 1992]: 1-1 3) suggests that interest is not 
demonstrated for the Phoraonic period, while Ouack (Ani, p. l 00-10 l) understands thot the ward was used with 
this meaning in the Pharaonic period. The context certainly indicates thot property in general - ond not grain -
should increase in quantity and value. 
1073 As the Papyrus reportedly comes from Gurob (Kom Medinel Ghurab), it may be assumed that the scribe in Gurob 
was responsible for noling its origin and deporture, and that the scribe aboard the vessel will have recorded ils 
destinotion, meoning that the latter informalion is on onolher popyrus which we do not have (or al least lo my 
knowledge) 
1074 KR/ 111: 261-262; H.O. pls. 17, 3; 114,4. 
1075 Gordiner, RAD, p. 33. 
1076 Cf. J.-M. Kruchten, "l'evolution de la gestion dominiole sous le nouvel empire egyptien,' in lipinski, State and 
Temple, pp. 517-525. 
1077 KR/ III: 138-140; H.O. 81-82; cf. supra, pp. 143ff. n. 408 . 
1078 KR/ IV: 78-81. 
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"smwwill be counted as a loss againstyou, if he is alive." 1079 This quote must however be 
qualified by the preceding sentence, where it is stated that a Syrian cultivator has been 
given to the letter's recipient for "the months of smw." Thus, the potential loss of this man's 
smw could either be his "summer" or his "harvest". 1080 
The expression smw ps gave its name to the paragraphs rendered as "Apportioned harvest-
taxes" in the translation and commentaries to P. Wilbour. 1081 They are almost exclusively the 
fields of smaller temples, and characterized by being mainly lands tenanted by less exalted 
members of the bureaucracy, stable-masters, charioteers, priests, the occasional scribe, and 
quite a few women (who may be widows having inherited the land from their husbands, 
fathers, brothers, etc.). Under these paragraphs are also khato-lands which appear to take 
the form of normal domains, but it would appear that there is a high (but not complete) 
degree of correlation between the presence of fields with the usual type of domain assessments 
which are frequently khato-lands, associated with posh-entries in these paragraphs. As the 
Turin Taxation Papyrus 1082 indicates a correlation between smw and khato-land, and 
P. Valenc;:ay 11083 supports the contention that the income from khato-land could be assigned 
to the temples, the general tendency is to identify the smwof P. Wilbour with temple income, 
potentially as a kind of Pharaonic support, or by means of Pharaoh's resources. 
smw appears twice in the "Turin Taxation Papyrus". 1084 80 khar of emmer are collected in 
association with grain from khato-lands of Pharaoh (1 ,7 & 2,4). Direct responsibility for the 
grain is borne by the policeman who turns it over, but it would appear that overall responsibility 
for the delivery belonged to various officials of the temple of Sobek. The grain was turned 
over to the Mayor of West Thebes, perhaps for the use of the necropolis Gang (1 ,7; 2,5). 
Grain turned over to the Necropolis Scribe by the Cultivator S~b-g-nfr is classified as "his 
smw" (1. 3, 12), and is specified as being a "detail" of the grain collected from the temple of 
Khnum and Nebu at Esna (1. 3, 11 ). lt is likewise turned over to the mayor of West Thebes. 
P. Turin 2106 [Frag. 387]1085 records that 10 kharof emmer were received from a web-priest 
"in the temple of Amun" as smw(I. 4). This is added to some other grain, some from khato-
lands of Pharaoh managed by a Ramesside mortuary temple. 
1079 Gardiner, Wilbour II: 115. 
1080 lt is suggested elsewhere here that this is the btkw obligation, cf. "b:kw" and ''b;kw-rm[, supra, pp. 237ff.; 
258f. 
1081 Gardiner, Wilbourll: 24-25. 
1082 Cf. supra, pp. l 70ff. 
1083 Cf. supra, pp. l 36f. 
1084 Gardiner, RAD, pp. 35-44; Sir Alan Gardiner 'Ramesside texts Relating to the Taxation and Transport of Corn," 
JfA27(1941): 22-37; supra, p. 172. 
1085 Cerny, Notebook, 16, p. 81 . 
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Private Propaganda 
In the Dynasty XVIII tomb of P~-bry, the religious text at the back of the tomb assures the 
deceased that "smwshall be delivered to you from the harvest."1086 Another pious Dynasty XVIII 
inscription records that the "smwwill be brought from the harvest (wh;yt)". 1087 
lj'-m-b~t reported the smwof Upper and Lower Egypt in the presence of Pharaoh, "namely 
the smw of the Great Nile of the first Jubilee festival" of Amenophis III. He records a total of 
3'333'300 mc. of corn, for year 30 (which would explain the numerous "3"s), which he 
asserts is a surplus. lf the text is given credence, this includes the payments from the entire 
empire from Cush to Nahrain. 1088 
smw is mentioned in the Bilgai stele, 1089 where the unidentified author states to the Royal 
Scribe and Steward of the Mortuary Temple of Siptah in the Estate of Amun, P~-b~-s~, that he 
fulfilled the smwand the s;yt identifying both as his own personal htri(II. vs. 15-17). His smw 
is also identified as 70'000 units1090 of grain, while he actually rendered up "140'000, a 
surplus of 70'000" (1. vs. 20). lt would appear logical to assume that the payments were all 
turned over to the Estate of Amun, perhaps more specifically, the Mortuary Temple of Siptah. 
The inscription recording the rewards of the efficient High Priest of Amun, lmn-btp, dating to 
the reign of Ramesses IX, 1091 details fiscal responsibilities using most of the words discussed 
in this study. lt would appear that each item is understood to be a specific term with a 
specific meaning (and it is interesting that the word htri is not used, as this term seems 
occasionally to subsume the others), The actual material is understood as being delivered 
directly to the temple (with the exception of the inwand tpw-sf.rtwhich seem to have been 
delivered to Pharaoh). The presence of smw here merely underlines that it was paid directly 
to the temples. lt is not further defined. That he could double it implies that it is only a 
proportion of the yield. That he could only double it implies that it was a high proportion. 
FoREIGN REVENUE 
Administrative texts 
The Lachish bowl with two hieratic inscriptions (one inside, one outside) deals with smw 
from a regnal year 4. 1092 The object has been dated to the reign of Merneptah, and it has 
been asserted that the name Lachish was written on the bowl. 1093 The toponym is definitely 
1086 Tylor, Paheri, pi. 9; pp. 29-30; Urk. IV: 115, 11 - 116, 15. 
1087 Urk. IV: 499,4; TT 127. 
1088 Urk. IV: 1841, 16; TT 57; Helck, Verwaltung, pp. 389-390. 
1089 CL supra, pp. l 82ff.; KR! IV: 343,7-13; A. H. Gardiner, "The Stele of Bilgai," Z45 50 (1912): 49-57. 
1090 Whether oipe or khar is not clear. 
1091 Cf. supra, pp. l 86f.; KR/ VI: 455-458; W. Helck, "Die Inschrift über die Belohnung des Hohenpriesters 'lmn-
btp," M/04 (1956) : 162-178. 
1092 KR/ IV: 39, l 0-12.; J. Cerny, "Report on lnscriptions," in: T ufnell, lachish IV: 133; pls. 44, 47. Cf. 0 . Goldwasser, 
"The Lachish Hieratic Bowl Once Again, " TelAviv9 (1982): 137-138; 0. Goldwasser, "Hieratic lnscriptions 
from Tel Sera' in Southern Cancan," Tel Aviv 11 (l 984): 77-93. 
1093 Ahituv, Toponyms, p. 130: 'a reading of the name as Lachish is not improbable". Cf. M. Weippert, "Lachis," 
RlA VI: 4 1 2 for doubt. 
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not Lachish (r-ty-s;, not r-ky-s;), while the reign is probably correct. The payment was 
definitely expected in wheat, but the units and quantities and the time frame are not specified. 
This is the only administrative record recording the collection of the smwfrom outside Egypt. 
Royal Propaganda 
Thutmosis III claims to have collected smw from wretched Cush 1094 and W~w~t. 1095 
The Syrian smw collected after the siege of Megiddo amounted to 207'300 khar. 1096 As 
Syria was not at this time under the rule of Egypt, this could be interpreted as referring merely 
to the captured harvest. The preceding sentence states however that the Jht- and ihwt-fields 
were assigned to the controllers of the palace to harvest. This implies that specific types of 
fields were responsible for supplying the smw in this case, and that the fiscal term is meant. 
CoNcLus10N 
The smwwas a specific term for the harvest. In certain cases, it obviously meant a proportion 
of the harvest, as in the paragraphs of the Wilbour Papyrus. lt does not seem to have meant 
the produce of the domains, where workers may have been expected to produce 200 khar/ 
head. Virtually all of the sources concur in suggesting that it was destined for the temples, 
and that it may have been submitted to them from secular authorities working temple fields, 
sacerdotal or secular officials managing khato-lands, and from tenants, who are specifically 
identified as beneficiaries of the system, i.e. low level employees of the state. 
1094 Urk. IV: 709,3. 
1095 Urk. IV: 709, 12; 734, 10. 
1096 Urk. IV: 667, 13-14. 
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THE WORD tp-grt 
The term tp -sf.rt is one of the most obscure terms, meaning literally "head and hand"? 
INTERNAL REVENUE 
Administrative texts 
P. Berlin 3040a 1097 is a badly preserved letter, where the word tp-grtappears in an obscure 
context. 
(vs. 4) to [ ... textual loss ... ] he is [ ... textual loss .. . ] (vs. 5) scribe l cb-ms commanded 
[ ... textual loss ... ] Twi ~, the Mayor of the Western City, Re-ms. 1 d ismissed his tp-sf.rt 
because of the record (vs. 6) of account [ ... textual loss ... ] And I sent to let her know 
likewise. Do not let it be done for him [<another time> ? .... ] (vs. 7) [( ?)] to the effect 
that I have caused 700 khar of grain from your Jsw-prt be remitted for [ ... textual 
loss ... ] 
Sir Alan Gardiner drew attention to the quintessence of this text half a century ago, saying 
that "a miserably broken passage makes it obvious that [ one of the parties to the letter] 
possessed authority to remit or alter the tax assessment of [ ... ] Racmose, prince of the West 
of Thebes". 1098 Sir Alan indicated that he thought that the letter was written to P~-sr, but 
failed to identify the precise P!-sr, suggesting a contemporary of the more exalted P!-sr, and 
the published text now assigns this letter to an otherwise virtually unknown P~-sr, Mayor of 
East Thebes. 1099 lt was obviously the author of the letter - and not its recipient - who 
remitted the tp-grt, and the Jsw-prt obligation of 700 khar. 1100 There is no reason to relate 
the tp -sf.rt and the Jsw-prt obligation as signifying the same item. There is however equally 
no reason to believe that the tp-sf.rt was annulled, as the reason for remission was a check 
with the records, and therefore, it may be assumed that Re-ms, Mayor of West Thebes did 
in fact actually pay a tp grt. 
1091 KR/ III : 158-16 l ; A. H. Gardiner, "A Later Allusion lo Akhenalen," JEA 24 (1938) : 124. 
1098 JEA 24: 124. 
1099 KR/ III : 157. 
1100 lt is rather peculiar that the other reference to a Jsw-prtobligation is likewise for exactly 700 khar(KRI IV: 81,2) . 
Although il is generally ossumed here (cf. supra, pp. l 44f. n. 408) that we understond this correctly as signifying 
an obligotion of 200 khar per man and 100 for the stripling (as cf. H.O. 82, 3). the coincidence is worth 
bearing in mind . 
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P. Gurob Fragment G lists a number of different types of cloth as having made up the tp-grt 
of the Opening of the Year Festival. 1101 Sir Alan Gardiner assumed that these were withdrawn 
from the storeroom of the Harim at Mr-wr, 1102 but the reference to "this house" suggests that 
a temple be considered as equally probably having been the possible source. 1103 Sir Alan 
also assumed that the clothing was produced at the Harim, but there is no evidence to 
substantiate this. lt is clear only that the amounts of clothing are quite insignificant in terms of 
mere numbers, but the presence of 15 items of mk-quality clothing should be noted, as the 
list of royal gifts in P. Harris 1 (146, 2-5) a total of 3 items for Thebes. 1104 In some unclear 
fashion, the tp-grt is associated with an inw-obligation. 
P. BM 1040' states that a tp-grt obligation was rendered by the Prophet Nb-n!rw of the 
Temple of Horus Behdety to the "Chief Taxing Master", and that it consisted of a festival 
cow, 4 kite of gold, 1 smooth cloth g';y-garment, a cloth, and an ox. 1105 This tp-grt seems 
to be subordinate to the heading at the beginning of the text, which characterizes the 
objects assembled as having been p; inw. 1106 Above all, this text confirms that the various 
types of payments were distinguished according to origin and not destination or type, for the 
same items recur in the text without this (or - admittedly - any other precise designation). 
P. IFAO sans numero A. 1, 11 records 15 deben of msdt-eye-paint as the "tp-grt of the 
Mountain Chief Knr". 1107 The text makes it clear that Knr was responsible for deliveries of 
gold and msdt eye-paint, and that large quantities of the former were turned over to the 
treasury of the Estate of Amun (e.g., A rto. II, 11) and the High Priest of Amun (e.g., A rto. II, 
15), but it hardly explains why the term tp-grt appears here. 1108 As noted infra, the tp-grt 
was given by the High Priest of Amun, lmn-btp, to the Pharaoh. 
In the fragmentary Tax-Lists of the Royal Canon of Turin, 1109 tp-grt is the most commonly 
written fiscal term employed, being written out thrice as frequently as the other most common 
fiscal term ( 15 instances to 5 for My(t)). They list a tp-drtof 2 silver kite (2,5), as weil as the 
1101 RAD, p. 20, 6ff. Cf. supra, p. 149. lt is impossible to estimate the amountof mk-qualityclothing delivered bythe 
temple dependents, as it is not itemized (cf. e.g., 12a, 13). 
1102 RAD, p. X. 
1103 The Scribe Seti is somehow related to the collection of these objects (RAD, p. 20, 9), and he is further specified 
on the verso as having been the 'Royal Harim Scribe of this House', which means that he could have been 
primarily assigned to the Harim, but it would be more logical to suggest that his association with the "house" was 
more important. In either case, we cannot judge the exact nature of his role: only that the institution in question 
was rendering up a tp-Qrt. 
1104 Fora note that mk-cloth was appreciated across the Near East, cf. E. Edel, "Zwei Originalbriefe der Königsmutter 
Tüja in Keilschrift," SAK 1 (1974): 122. 
1105 J. J. Janssen, "Requisitions from Upper Egyptian Temples (P. BM 10401)," JEA 77 (1991 ): 79-94, esp. pp. 80; 
82. 
1106 lt is worth recalling that the scene involving the counting of livestock in the tornb of P:-bry (cf. Tylor, Paheri, pi. 3, 
and supra, pp. l 37f.) was the only temple activity in which P:-bry was involved. 
_
1107 Y. Koenig, "Livraisons d'or et de galene au tresor du temple d'Arnon sous 1a XXe Dynastie," in Hommages 
Sauneron, pp. 194; 216, pi. 34. Koenig attributes the tp-s;frtas a payrnent to the treasury of Amun, as he cites 
lrnn-btp (cf., supra, pp. 186f.) who was praised for having delivered it to Pharaoh. 
1108 1 believe that Koenig is correct to translate inw (e.g., Hommages Sauneron, p. 193) as "brought" rather than 
"tribute" or "gift", as the word always seerns tobe rnerely the verband not to be the terrn discussed supra, pp. 
21 l ff. This means that tp-s;frt is the only fiscal term used in the text, and that it is applied to msdmt-eye-paint, 
which has been identified with btkw-payrnents, elsewhere, cf supra, p. 244. 
1109 Cf. supra, pp. 159ff. 
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tp-grt of a deputy (1,2), some undetermined tp-grt's (2, 19; 3, 15), the tp-grt of a mayor 
(seemingly connected with money and cattle, 3,6), more deputies (3,7; 6,x+ 14), another 
mayor (3, 13), an overseer (4,6), and a controller (6,x+ 19). There are two references to the 
"tp-grt of each of them" ( 4, 1 3; 21 ) , and another unrelated mention of a tp-grt of 2 kite of 
silver (5,4). 
Roughly half of the instances are written in red ink (7 preserved) and half in block ink 
(8 preserved). In every case preserved in the Turin Canon texts, the term is associated with 
a secular official where any reference is preserved . In no case is the term preserved in a 
context suggesting a quantity of grain, although animals are mentioned. lnsofar as one can 
refer to statistics in a text as fragmentary as the Turin Canon, it is significant that the term is 
thrice associated with quantities of precious metals, 2 kite of silver appearing twice. 
tp-grt is never written as a systematic entry fol lowed by ditto marks (as, e.g ., bJkw and 
s;yw) . The term appears spread all over the page: at the beginning of lines, and in the 
middle of lines, and at the (seeming) end of lines, yet it never appears as a heading: it 
appears to be strictly a line entry type category, rather than an overarching one. tp-grt is 
invariably written with an indirect genitive, never a d irect genitive, and never with a suffix. 
Where other words are niodified with mtr, tp-grt is never modified. 
tp-grt is written in a context (3, 13-3, 14) where it is warranted to conclude that the reference 
to an obligation to Pharaoh may be associated with it. (This naturally fits weil with the other 
uses of tp-grt which indicate that it was a payment to Pharaoh, which went through the 
temples). 
All this can be used to suggest that in the context of the Turin Canon, the tp-grt was (1) a 
payment exacted from officials, (2) which was not a significant fiscal instrument, but rather 
(3) a designation for a specific type of payment, and (4) that it could be made in the form of 
metal, which is otherwise rare both in the Turin Canon and elsewhere. 
Private Propaganda 
The High Priest of Amun, lmn-htp under Ramesses IX, separately from the other fiscal terms 
( text II : 10-11), tpw-grt and inw are mentioned together ( text II : 1 3-14), as "the material 
support (p; cnbw) of Amonrasonther which you cause tobe brought to Pharaoh, thy Lord" . 
The inscription recording the rewards of the efficient High priest of Amun, lmn-htp, 1110 
details fiscal responsibilities using most of the words discussed in this study. 
And from you are the inw and tpw-grt. the material support1111 of Amonrasonther. 
(12) [<lt is>] your [<causing that one bring to>] Pharaoh, your lord what is done by a 
good and efficient servant (13) [<of Phar >]aoh, his Lord . Being strong in order to act 
efficiently for Amonrasonther (14) the Great God, (and) in order to act efficiently for 
Pharaoh, his Lord. [etc .... ]" 111 2 
111 0 Cf. supra, pp. l 86f. ; KR/ VI : 455-458; W . Helck, "Die Inschrift über die Belohnung des Hohenpriesters '/mn-
btp,'' MIO 4 (1956) : 162-178. 
1111 
"Provisioning'' or 'Victuals"?, cf. P. Greg, supra, pp. 152ft. and Janssen, Commodit,, Prices, p. 458 . 
1112 KR/ VI: 456,7-8. 
289 
tp-9.rt 
A similar speech is less weil preserved: 
(20) ... ] the inw, tp-grtmaterial support. lt is your causing that one bring to the royal 
warehouses [ ... ] 1 1 13 
In each case, the recipient is clearly either the Palace or the Pharaoh, and the origin is 
clearly the material wealth of the temple. 
PREVIOUS ÜISCUSSIONS OF THE WORD 
W. Helck noted that cattle1114 and geese1115 were favourite tp-grtdeliveries, and associated 
it with an office tax, referring to the illustrations in the tomb of Rb-mi-R' (TT 100). 1116 These 
suggestions cannot however aid us in understanding the term. 
J. J. Janssen has rendered the expression as "Head-tax (?)," suggesting that the assumption 
that it represented some kind of office-related exaction was not contradicted by the greater 
part of the evidence.1117 
CONCLUSIONS 
The lmn-btp text associates inw and tp-grt, without specifying their significance while the 
Gurob text identifies the actual items. As these items in P. Gurob G, appear to be the 
counterparts of the unusual use of inw in P. Gurob (vs. 1 b,5; supra, pp. l 46ff.), where inw 
1113 KR/ VI· 458 9-10 
1114 W. H~lck, "Abgaben und Steuern," LÄ 1: 9. His references are to the Turin Canon (where there is only one, and 
the fragmentary line [4,25] cannot be restored to read tp-9.rtas the item is modified by a suffix, which is never 
used for tp-9.rt in the Turin Canon, so that s;yt is the most probable restoration, with col. 7 continuing this); 
"RAD 65, l. 3" (regardless of how this is interpreted there is no way to find a tp-g_rt from this source); and "Hayes 
in: JEA 46, 1960, Tf. l 0 Nr.8" where there is no tp-Qt1 either (cf. W. C. Hayes, "A Selection of Tuthmoside 
Ostraca from D<;Jr el-Babri, "JfA 46 [1960]: 29-52). References to cattle however are confirmed from both the 
Turin Tax Lists and P BM l 040 l , but it was certainly not the main item. 
1115 Citing the Royal Canon 2,3 and Urk. IV: 1554, 11, where the tp-g_t1is not mentioned. 
1116 LÄ 1: 5. He dates TT l 00 to Dynasty XIII, probably on the basis that the lnstructions for the Vizier date to that 
period, and that the representations must likewise be assigned this origin. lconographically the argument is 
unusual (given the dearth of iconographic material from private tombs at that date) and Boom (Duties, pp. 375-
376) dates the lnstructions to the New Kingdom (cf. supra, p. 178 n. 532), so that this argument may ultimately 
be circular. 
To my knowledge the fiscal term tp-g_rtdoes not appear before the Ramesside Period. In TT l 00, the tomb of Rb-
mi-R' (Davies, Rekh-mi-Re ', pi. 60) the word is used twice in connection with work on statues, and the first time 
potentially in conneclion with divine offerings, but the second instance dispels this illusion, as it is the caption to 
a reference in the middle scene. 1 would go further than Janssen (JEA 77: 87 n. y) and contend that Sethe's 
restoration cannot be maintained without additional evidence, and that the term is not relevant to the fiscal system. 
lf tp-g_t1 had a fiscal meaning in the tomb of Rb-mi-R', then it would doubtless be employed in the captions to the 
scenes of deliveries. This does not negate the relevance of the possibility that cattle tp-g_rt's could have been 
paid, but it certainly demonstrates that this was not the term in Dynasty XVIII. 
1117 J.J.Janssen, "Requisitions from Upper Egyptian Temples (P. BM 10401 ),"JEA 77 (1991 ): 82; 87-88. There is no 
reason to associate the ''Chief-Taxing-Master" (';-n-st) with the secular administration, and thus the assumption of 
"government" involvement is unnecessary. -
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appear as items of daily use (as opposed to the type encountered in the usual "tribute" texts), 
the two texts may refer to the same type of ordinary del iveries, and by no means to an 
assessment related to an office holder. P. Gurob G specifically associates them with the 
"Opening of the Year Festival", while lmn-btp is specifically stated to turn over the material 
support of Amonrasonther to Pharaoh. 
P. B.M. 10401 suggests likewise the acquisition of things for a specific purpose, and not a 
type of regular income, but this is speculative. One should not exaggerate the significance 
of a "festival" cow, but Janssen quite correctly withdraws support from the concept that these 
were necessarily "taxes" for which there is no evidence.1118 There does not seem tobe any 
reason to believe that this is anything except part of an interdepartmental transfer where 
some articles are collected, most probably for transport to Thebes, and most probably for a 
festival. The failure of the scribe to note a date suggests that these payments were not being 
recorded in a serious fashion. P. Berlin 3040a indicates that careful records were kept of the 
tp-grt, and that it could be adjusted accordingly. Obviously, were the burden onerous 
and annual (for which there is, e.g, no evidence) the dates would have been recorded as 
well. 
Thus, the key elements, for the texts where tp-grt is in any way identifiable are the confirmation 
that (1) the tp-grtwas withdrawn from a temple, or the employees thereof; (2) that it consisted 
of valuable cloth items, but also metals and minerals (but not grain); (3) that there is no 
evidence of it prior to the Ramesside period; and (4) that it is not mentioned as being 
assessed on a regular basis. On the other hand, we find it associated with both temple 
officials and secular officers, and find that precise records are kept, but without regard to the 
calendar, but that it can be remitted on the basis of these records., all of which indicates that 
the tp-grt was a veritable kind of tax, applied to specific officials, payable with valuable 
materials and deliverable to Pharaoh, and that Helck's association with the term as a kind of 
"office tax" may be as close as any is possible until additional materials come to light. 
1118 Jansseri , JEA 77: 94 . 
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PART IV 
CONCLUSIONS 

PHILOLOGICAL SUMMARY 
A fiscal system is an administrative system which represents the practical expression of the 
ideological conception of a state. Therefore the notes jotted down on pieces of papyrus in 
offices do not necessarily reflect the concepts as well as the propaganda inscriptions, which 
may conceivably have been carefully drafted for public consumption, and thus the use of the 
various terms in the publicly accessible inscriptions are the best point of departure for a 
philological summary of the results of this work. The office notes are incomplete in that they 
leave out many of the details that would aid us, and the monumental inscriptions are not 
intended to be used as administrative documents, so that a balance is impossible. Each 
category must be used for its own sake, but the dilemma of interpretation remains. 
The principal elements of the fiscal vocabulary as preserved are inw, bikw, htri and siyt. 1119 
lt is however relatively clear that the source material indicates a preponderance of temple 
activity, while one tends to suppose that the King must have had still !arger resources as he 
supplied not only the temples, but the rest of the system. 
The official inscriptions of the New Kingdom convey the image of the inw as the voluntary 
tribute paid by foreign countries as an expression of respect for Pharaoh as the head of 
State, whose victories over foreign countries were guaranteed by the gods. 1120 inw probably 
meant "trade goods", "presents" and "tribute" in international relations. 
inw also appears as a specific kind of domestic income which the lower level officials 
reported to the Vizier as the representative of Pharaoh, but in the same context it is also 
associated with the divine offerings. 1121 inw also cippears as a specific labe! for materials 
transferred from Pharaoh personally to the temples. inw also appears in administrative texts 
as routine income delivered directly to institutions acting for temples or in the name of temple 
officials. 
Those delivering the inw appear to include the elite and low level officials. 
The inw would appear to have been the concrete expression (i.e., goods) which were 
rendered up in fulfillment of the htri-levy obligations, whether to the temple or Pharaoh. 
All of this confirms the historical interpretation of the development of the Egyptian state, if we 
assume that the earliest Kings basically ruled Egypt as their own family property, collecting 
"tribute" from their dependents, and expressing their appreciation to the gods as during the 
New Kingdom the Pharaohs tended to turn over the spoils of war to the gods. 
Thus, the original fiscal system of Egypt will have been one in which the people delivered 
their goods in exchange for the security guaranteed by the protection of the king and the 
1119 For inyt, tp-grt, smwand bqN, the reader is referred to the relevant chapters, as the present chapter could do no 
more than briefly summarize the brief summaries there. 
1120 Tribute and plunder are difficult matters for those not directly involved. lt is conventionally assumed that "plunder' 
is acquired by conquest, and that "tribute" is either the result of military conquest, or the threat thereof. Rendering 
btqtas ''plunder" is probably justified, but, like inw, btqtcould as easily mean 'tribute" or probably 'presents". Cf. 
inw, supra, pp. 121-236. 
112 1 Supra, pp 178ff. 
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gods, which also enabled the king to enforce payment. 1122 This ideological attitude 
apparently remained long after the development of a sophisticated economy. Use of the 
word inw may have declined in the domestic economy, as the fiscal terminology became 
more sophisticated. Due to its ideological content, inwcontinued tobe used prominently in 
contexts including foreigners, even if the Egyptians customarily paid for their acquisitions 
from Syria and Punt. Probably for historical reasons, some of the income which was eventually 
turned over to the temples, or transferred from the temples to the government, was also 
termed inw. 
lnternally, it probably denoted the oldest and most important types of income received by 
the King. lt appears superficially tobe relatively insignificant, but it is not well documented in 
the material preserved. lt is quite evident, that if inw in Egyptian meant something like "tax" 
or "tribute", the Egyptians will have awarded a considerably higher propaganda role to inw 
coming from foreign sources than local ones, as it signified sovereignty. The rarity of the 
word in the administrative documents may be related to the fact that a great proportion of 
our documentation seems to reflect the temples more than any other part of the administration. 
lt is also possible that this merely reflects the increased use of other words, such as b;kw. 
The official inscriptions of the New Kingdom record that b;kw payments from Asia and 
Nubia supplemented the inwfrom abroad. In concrete terms, b;kwmeans "products" in the 
same fashion that inw means "goods", and the term is derived from the official domestic 
fiscal vocabulary, the official term probably properly being one of the family related to 
b;kw-rml, meaning "production of a man (or men)" . The domestic terminology was once 
again applied to the foreign countries, and its use as "tax" is just as much a misnomer as 
terming inw "tribute". In contemporary international relations, the dowry of Ramesses ll's 
Hittite wife is called b1kw, which was merely the modern word for inw in this context, and 
fiscally meaningless, as it was part of a reciprocal arrangement. 
Therefore, both from abroad and within Egypt, bJkw specified concrete obligations which 
were payments. These were the responsibility of individuals in certain contexts, and could 
be paid to government1123 or temple authorities .1124 Craftsmen could carry out tasks or 
provide objects to temples or Pharaoh 1125 under the title of bJkw. The donkey b1kw could be 
construed as a type of "fine", "fee", or "tax" if official, "rental" if private commercial. The boat 
bJkwmentioned in the royal propaganda inscriptions seems tobe similar. The documentation 
does not suffice to make any statement concerning the proportion of the population obliged 
to submit bJkw-"taxes" to the temples or the government, nor can any specific proportion of 
income, wealth or time be identified in these cases . Only the statement of the miscellany that 
1122 These wild generalizations can be confirmed to some extent by the references to income of the first Kings of Egypt 
cited by Helck, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, pp 24-25 . After Scorpion and Narmer the lax vocabulary of the First 
Dynasty was unified, so that Aha, Djer, Wadj and Dewen of the First Dynasty received inw. 
11 23 This was very frequent at e.g ., Deir el-Medineh. 
1124 Cf. supra, p . 238; P Munich 809 (Allam, HOP Tafelteil, pls. 102-103); W. Spiegelberg, 'Ein Gerichtsprotokoll 
aus der Zeit Thutmosis' IV.," ZÄS 63 (1928): 105-115. 
1125 Cf supra , pp. 242f.; KR/ IV 517-522. 
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the scribe's "b;kw was in writings" suggests that bJkw was a nearly universal type of 
payment. 1126 
bJkw would seem to be simply work carried out as part of a reciprocal arrangement with 
remuneration provided. The Gang at Deir el-Medineh was paid to carry out their b;kw, 
which was the excavation and decoration of the tomb. But they were employees with an 
unusual status. 
The smdtof the tomb delivered their b;kw, but there is no evidence of their being paid, even 
though the "slaves" were occasionally paid. lf this was merely apart time obligation set on 
some peasants in the neighbourhood, it would correspond to another part of the social and 
economic system, for they would be neither employees nor temple dependents. Whether 
they also had to pay some kind of "taxes" on their lands - if they had any - or the lands 
where they worked is unknown. These b;kw-payments could also be the htri of another 
official altogether. The use of "tax" for translating bJkw is only justified in very specific 
contexts. In official texts it generally refers to an "obligatory payment", in kind - the products 
of labour - but not necessarily the kind of things that this particular peasant did. 
The term bJkw appears in administrative and public inscriptions, but there was a fiscal term 
btkw-rmJ with a specific meaning and thus what frequently appears as btkw was most 
probably officially designated the bJkw-rmf. The bJkw-rmJ of the cultivators may have been 
the 200 khar/worker assignments for grain production on temple lands, but the proportions 
do not actually support this contention. 1127 The incredible surplus produced by the author of 
the Bilgai Stele indicates that another kind of bJkw-rmJwas, in principle, a proportion of the 
production that was turned over to the temples, i.e., a "tax". Such a payment may have been 
required of craftsmen - lapidaries and silver smiths, and this rnight be termed a tax, although 
it went to the temples. 
Officials of both temples and government were obliged to provide bJkw, but this will have 
been part of their duties as officials, and it is probable that the concrete goods received 
were the bJkw, and that these were then regarded as the sJytor htri of an official, which will 
have consisted of products (b;kw) which were assessed at a set rate, the htri. 
Used as a verb, htri can mean "levy" in the sense of "to assign" or "assess". As a noun, it can 
mean "levy", in the sense of "assignment" or "assessment", and definitely expresses an abstract 
obligation to render certain concrete articles to a higher authority, i.e., a specifically fiscal 
significance, which was occasionally equivalent to sJyt. In general htri seems to subsume 
1126 P. Anast. V, 17,2; LEM 65,5-6; cf. supra, pp. 133-134. 
1127 Cf. W. Helck, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, p. 246. There will have been several rotes at which fields were assessed, 
and unfortunately we cannot be sure about the process. But it could probably be postulated - but can hardly be 
demonstrated - that the workers and officials divided the remainder of the production among themselves. The 
officials for certain types of fields may hove been responsible for production of 200 khor/worker, and the 
workers on such fields were presumably responsible for the delivery of 5 or 7 1 /2 or l 0 khor/ orouro (cf. 
Gardiner, Wilbour, II: 28-29) The surplus was thus probably at their disposal, and thus their benefits from the 
reciprocal or contractuol arrangement. There must however have been a great deal of land which was covered 
by another type of administration. Aside from the small tenants listed in the Wilbour papyrus, we have the nmbw, 
but we do not know anything about their arrangements, except that they apporently paid to Pharaoh rather than 
to the temples (cf. Decree of Horemhab and P. Valern;:ay, supra, pp. 137; l 88f). 
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sJyt, 1128 while being used abstractly, but the htri can also be more specific. From the official 
standpoint htri applied to people1129 would thus imply a bJkwtype obligation on the people, 
which was the htri of the official. 
htri appears to have had several fiscal meanings, with the verb exclusively fiscal, referring 
exclusively to activities relating to arranging income on a fiscal (as opposed to administrative) 
basis. The noun seems to refer to (a) "supplies in kind", (b) "dues" and (c) "assessment" or 
"levy". 
The English word "levy" means "to impose or collect" and thus matches the difference in 
meaning between the verb htri, "to assess" and "to collect" while the noun could signify 
"dues", which could be interpreted as the obligation (1) imposed by Pharaoh in terms of 
deliveries to Pharaoh or the temples, and (2) of Pharaoh to provide for his dependents. htri 
was probably intended to delimit (assess) a portion of the produce (and thus the equivalent 
of a "tax"). htri thus signifies "tax" in many cases, and apparently a type of "income tax", 
payable to the temples or the government. The htri of the temples was however actually 
produced by contracted labour. The verb htri meaning "assess" would appear to be the 
fiscal term por excellence for assessing what is due, whether sJyt, htri, or bJkw. sJyt identifies 
an abstract obligation from an official to the administrative apparatus, of the temple or 
government. The sJyt can be awarded to the temples by Pharaoh, but temple income can 
also be termed sJyt. lt does not seem to represent a specific dass of goods, as precious 
metals and stones, cattle, garments, and other items are included. lt seems tobe employed 
with regard to both domestic and foreign articles. The sJytobligations are determined by the 
htri assessment. 
The htri assessment was also applied to the smw which was a specific term for the harvest-
tax. In certain cases, it obviously meant a proportion of the harvest, as in the apportioned 
harvest taxes of the Wilbour Papyrus. 1130 lt could be collected from small holders and from 
the khoto-lands of Pharaoh. 
One difficulty with the administrative system is that the terms inyt, inw, and bJkw were used 
loosely. inyt simply refers to things brought as provisions or materials necessary. inw can 
refer to income which is generally the equivalent of "taxes", but when writing the Egyptians 
did not perceive it in that fashion. That inyt does not appear in propaganda texts probably 
indicates that it was not an official designation for a specific type of delivery, although local 
scribes will have probably understood it to have some particular significance. 1131 The inw 
1128 Cf. supra, pp. l 94ff. In P. Harris 1, the btkw styt of the dependents are termed the annual htri (sections llc, lllc, 
!Vc). The styt of live geese is specified, under the htri. In the Bilgai Stele (supra, pp. l 82ff.), the styt is not 
identified, while the htri is specifically identified as the honey deliveries, but both the stytand the smware termed 
htri. 
1129 As, e .g ., P. Bol. 1094, II. 6 ,5-6,6 (LEM, pp. 5-6; Caminos, LEM, pp. 17-20) 
1130 We assume that domain production was btkw-rml, where the cultivators were expected to produce 200 khor/ 
head, and that this was and not a lax in the same way that the other kinds of btkwwere. lt is not clear who was 
responsible for the payments, but the domain lands were specifically intended to provide income for the temples, 
and not to skim off or create a surplus. Cf. supra, pp. 144-145 n. 408. 
1131 lt is possible that the use of inyt implied a completed action. This calls to mind the very curious formulation of Turin 
Taxation Papyrus 5,6 (Gardiner, RAD, 42,4), where a quantity of grain is presumably turned over (iw, ''arrived'), 
with a note that there is a remainder, perhaps implying that the grain did not actually arrive 2 
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probably had a mean ing in earlier times, which changed as obligations became 
responsibilities, etc. The bJkwwas a means of fulfilling an obligation. Sometimes bJkwmay 
have been written where bJkw-rmJwas meant, and sometimes the bJkw may have been an 
official payment which was not a tax. 
The real fiscal system associated with the inw and the bJkw was based on the assessments, 
the sJyt and the htri, which determined which official had to produce how much. Since 
certa in things did not require emphasis this is insufficiently clear in the documentation as 
preserved . 
Pharaoh and the Vizier thus assessed (htri) all of Egypt, determining the obligations due (htri 
and sJyt, in some cases inw) to the government and the temples. The officials responsible 
thus assigned the quotas of products or activity (b;kw-rml, bJkw) which they would exact 
from the population in order to carry out their missions. Both the harvest taxes and the grain 
production quotas (smw, bJkw-rm[j were the core of the system, as these were 
then redistributed to the workers providing the bJkw, where they were not able to retain 
some grain income. 
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SutvV-MRY 
Given its nature, the documentation preserved from ancient Egypt necessarily reflects both 
(1) Pharaoh's concerns with legitimacy and (2) administrative measures concerned with fiscal 
policy. All discussion must be based on the evidence, which indicates that the resources of 
Pharaoh and the temples were substantial, and that Pharaoh was primarily responsible for 
assuring growth through construction projects, while the temples were responsible for the 
maintenance of their domains. Distinctions between the government, the larger temples, and 
the smaller temples can also be established using the fiscal dato. Distinctions between rent 
and taxes also suggest themselves, along with evidence for some marginal market 
activity. 
While reflecting a certain reality, this superficial reading need not mean that it be taken at 
face value, as reflecting the overall character of economic activity in ancient Egypt. Such 
reflections have led to the conclusion that ancient Egypt was a Redistributive Economy or a 
Revenue Economy. lnferences made in light of the philological and theoretical discussion 
suggest that ancient Egypt can be understood as a pre-capitalist market economy. 
LEGITIMACY: STATE AND TEMPLE IN THE NEW K1NGDOM 
In theory, a fiscal system is a practical expression of an ideological conception of the nature 
and role of the state. In practice, a fiscal system is basically a reflection of state involvement 
in the economy. lf the fiscal system of any country is tobe understood, a sound understanding 
of the state is thus essential. lt should be evident to every student of ancient Egypt that the 
dichotomy of State and Temple must be banished from one's mind . Just as it was once said 
that "the Church of England is the Tory party at prayer", the temples of ancient Egypt were 
served by state officials, who frequently bore several titles. Some of these officials were 
primarily religious administrators, others primarily government functionaries. 1132 The evidence 
for the close relationship between the government and the temples has been manifest on 
virtually every poge of the preceding text, and thus it is necessary to consider why. 
Legitimacy is a sine qua non of government, as a government without recognized authority 
cannot assert itself in the face of opposition. The issue of succession is not resolved without 
legitimacy. Power may be acquired by sheer brute force, and the use of force obliges 
recognition, but it does not necessarily guarantee legitimacy, in that there is no regulated 
1132 The reverse relations were also equally valid : the Vizier was evidently responsible for the Tomb, but his duty 
consisted in assuring that the temples actually delivered the necessary goods to the Gang, which was employed 
for the sacerdotal purpose of attending to the King for the Beyond, and thus only the tomb itself, but none of the 
practical aspects of it interested the Vizier: the King wanted it completed, and as the highest official he had to 
make sure that it was. Responsibility was delivered to the temples, but authority to the Vizier. 
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system of changing government if the possession of force is the only source of power. 
Government authority may however be acquired by force, but justified post facto in divine 
terms, and if the governed accept the legitimacy of a government more by virtue of its divine 
right than by simply submitting to brute force, the divine support provides legitimacy, which 
provides for a system of succession. 
The ruler himself may be divine, 1133 but the entire legal state organization is not divine, 
despite the employment of divine right as a source of legitimacy. The ruler himself may 
purport to rule, but it is the administrative and judicial apparatus which actually govern the 
country. Pharaoh's responsibility in Egypt was to implement m;'t, "justice", and he was also 
beloved of M~'t, the goddess of justice. Pharaoh ruled through the bureaucracy of scribes. 
The scribes may have worked in the temples of the gods, but it was the government which 
ruled, and the gods which sanctified the rule of the government. Assuming that, on the 
simple theoretical plane outlined here, the government acquired its legitimacy through the 
approval of the gods, then the gods could not be counted part of the government any more 
than the population of the country could be regarded as part of the government, even 
though their recognition of Pharaoh's legitimacy was the very pillar upon which his rule was 
based_ 1134 
The monopoly on the use of the means of force is the means by which a government is able 
to extend its sway throughout its realm, and those means of force must be at the disposal of 
the government, and while they assure the capacity to threaten repression, in themselves 
they do not provide legitimacy. Legitimacy and the exercise of force are two separate 
aspects of government. The consent of the governed guaranteed by some form of 
philosophical or ideological justification, supported by force, suggest that three different 
variables are being discussed. 
Divine services and temple construction projects in Egypt were carried out using public 
means, sanctified and enforced by Pharaoh. This was done as part of the effort to maintain 
legitimacy. lt is thus clear that neither the gods nor the temples could be regarded as part of 
the government, for they were the very source of legitimacy of the government. These logical 
conclusions may not seem to apply directly in the case of ancient Egypt, where the people 
and bureaucracy may not have been conscious of such theoretical distinctions, but following 
the argument based on this interpretation, we find that Pharaoh was generally proud of his 
contributions to the temples, and emphasized that he was expressing his thanks to the gods 
by rendering them concrete homage in the form of temples, obelisks and incense, etc. for 
divine services. 
On the other hand, there are very few inscriptions extolling Pharaoh's virtue for having, e.g., 
increased the annual budget of the chariot corps of the army. 1135 This may result from the 
fact that there are very few barrack buildings preserved, while temples are plentiful, but it is 
1133 l.e., he may actually be a god, or regarded as such, or regarded as the member of the state with the closest lies 
to the gods. 
1134 Distinguishing between the right lo rule, which was divine right, and the rule itself, which was exercised by virtue 
of the fact that the people accepted his rule, based upon his own cla ims to legitimacy, and their own comfort. 
1135 1 have not seen any. 
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also possible that this is the result of a distinction between ordinary transfers within the 
government organs (e.g., from the treasury to the military), and extraordinary expenditures 
from the government to the temples. lf this distinction existed, even if it was not consciously 
clear to the Egyptians, it does correspond to the theoretical model proposed here, implying 
that the temples were part of the state, but not the government, and that in return for providing 
legitimacy, Pharaoh provided the temples with their essentials. The temple economy itself 
was maintained at a low level and particularly concerned with day to day maintenance, 
while completely dependent on the Pharaoh for significant growth. 
Ancient Egypt had several enormous bureaucracies with interlocking directorships, one of 
which was the government and the others were the major temples. The temples had land 
holdings and large numbers of dependents, and thus their own agricultural and industrial 
production remained within their control and was not distributed back to Pharaoh, while 
Pharaoh and his government likewise controlled large holdings and large numbers of 
dependents, the proceeds of which provided for the maintenance of the government, but 
part of which was voluntarily relinquished to the temples. 
These parallel bureaucracies employed many of the same people, and thus it is not surprising 
that the same terminology is used with reference to temple income and government revenue. 
These !wo bureaucracies also dominated the economy of the country to a considerable 
extent, in that they were the main source of demand, for construction projects and statuary, 
etc. 
The situation in the New Kingdom seems to have been dominated by the growth of the 
temples as economic entities, completely dependent upon Pharaoh for provision of land, 
construction and particular products, but themselves major economic actors. lt would seem 
that part of the population was attached to these temples, by virtue of obligatory deliveries 
of products assigned to the temples, and exacted from the subjects of Pharaoh. Pharaoh's 
subjects were likewise obliged to render up payments to his treasury and his granary, and 
the slim corroboratory evidence from the inscriptions of Mes and P. Valern;:ay I indicates that 
this was centrally organized. lt would seem that both the decrees of Horemhab and Seti at 
Nauri were anxious to establish the freedom of their subjects to fulfill their obligations 
unhindered by illegitimate bureaucratic interventions. They thus defined the rights of temples 
and individuals and officials. 
The propaganda texts seem to imply that Pharaoh claimed responsibility for the inw income 
which ultimately came to the temples, especially that which was acquired through military or 
political victories won with the help of the gods. The administrative texts do not seem to 
mirror this image, indicating that the temples received inwdirectly. The distinction may well 
lie in the fact that ultimately Pharaoh may have perceived himself as voluntarily permitting the 
temples to benefit from income which was lJltimately collected by virtue of the state's 
monopoly of force. At the same time, the gods will have feit that it was their own right, since 
they provided legitimacy and victory. Administratively, this may have been a tacitly 
accepted reality. Politically it will have been unacceptable during the New Kingdom, as 
recognition of this would ultimately result in the temples assuming responsibility for the state, 
as happened at the end of the New Kingdom ... . 
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REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 
As it provides excellent comparative material, P. Harris I is the most useful document for 
commencing an analysis of the institutional relations. 1136 There are several different categories 
presented to the temples: 
the outright gifts of significant quantities of land, dependents, etc . (116, 1116, IV6, V6, Via); 
the produce of the temple dependents (llc, lllc, IVc, Vc, Vlb); 
- the lists of precious metals, stones, etc. which the King gave the temples during his reign 
(lld, llld, IVd, Vd, Vlc); 
- and the following lists of grain offerings, festival offerings and divine images, which the 
King made to the temples. 
Taking the statements in P. Harris at face value, it may 6e concluded that the three major 
temple complexes, of Thebes, Memphis and Heliopolis each had their own income from 
their own dependents. lt is specifically stated in sections llc, lllc and IVc that these products 
are those of the temple dependents. The only 6asis for which Ramesses III could justifia61y 
assert - according to the text as preserved - that he was responsible for awarding these to 
the temples would 6e the claim in the preceding sections (116, 1116, IV6) that he had given the 
dependents, land, gardens, etc. to the temples, and that it was these dependents who 
provided the material listed in llc, lllc and IVc. P. Harris thus allows the conclusion that the 
King had enormous reserves at his disposal (grain, incense, cattle, land, villages), and that 
Ramesses III voluntarily parted with a large amount of his own personal, family or ex officio 
holdings, in favour of the temples. The other sections of each chapter concerning the !arger 
temples confirm that the King retained control of certain categories of his possessions, and 
that he voluntarily relinquished the produce of these holdings, 6ut not the title to them. 
Schaedel interpreted the deliveries of the temple dependents as a special tax levied on the 
temple dependents, turned over to the temples during the reign of Ramesses III, after which 
Ramesses IV did not intend to pursue a similar course. 1137 This would necessarily mean that 
either the temples themselves or their dependents (which is not the same thing) were regularly 
taxed, and that these taxes were exceptionally returned to the temples, either wholly or in 
part (i.e., a tax 6reak, if it was a tax on the temples) . Should this logic 6e followed, it would 
be necessary to conclude that the temples provided an economically significant part of 
government income. This would not correspond to the frequent claims that Pharaohs were 
constantly turning their wealth over to the gods, but does not render it invalid for that reason 
alone. 
The lnstructions for the Vizier state that this official was responsible for lands, 6eing o6liged 
to möke decisions concerning land disputes, and assigning plots, as weil as arranging the 
fields for the divine offerings. 1138 He was also responsible for assuring that the responsible 
1136 References to the !ext will be made to the sections identified in the summary supra, pp. 194 ff. 
1137 Schaedel, listen, pp. 59-60. 
11 38 Cf. supra, pp. l 78ff. 
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officials had the fields ploughed. P. Harris itself records the produce of the Crown lands 
(e.g., lllf), which is itself evidence of the existence of such holdings. In P. Valenc;:ay I reference 
is made to nmbw who paid up gold to the treasury, and it is specified that this was separate 
from the khato-lands, which are otherwise known tobe some kind of Crown property. 1139 
The Crown thus had various kinds of property and income from it. This will have been the 
source of the Crown lands which Ramesses III turned over to the temples.1140 
In P. Harris, the produce of the dependents is listed at length and the nature of the objects is 
decisive. lt is conceivable that gold, garments, and grain were produced by the temple 
dependents, and that they were obliged to relinquish a portion of their produce to Pharaoh, 
and apart of their produce to the temples. lt would then be necessary to conclude that they 
either received some form of income to guarantee their continued existence or that they were 
permitted to retain a portion of their production. lf the portion retained was the greater part, 
and that delivered the lesser, then the deliveries might be termed a "tax" or "rent". lf however, 
the proportions were the reverse, then this was their way of making a living, and the temples 
were their employers. 
Although it has been widely assumed that Pharaoh dominated the mining industry both 
inside and outside Egypt, the gold of Coptos and Cush could conceivably have been 
acquired by the temples or Pharaoh imposing a tax on production. There is evidence that the 
temple of Amonrasonther at Thebes had access to direct gold production, and little reason 
to believe that those at Heliopolis or Memphis did, and thus it is not surprising that only the 
temple of Amonrasonther received gold from its dependents. 1141 lf the gold was thus 
acquired under this title, as btri, bJkwor sJyt, this would imply that these are not fiscal terms, 
but actually pertain to basic production, of what was delivered to Pharaoh or the temples, 
and not that the dependents turned over a mere portion of their income to Pharaoh. 
Not only do we know that these were derived from trade as weil, but these are the very 
terms which the Bilgai stele indicates must have defined a mere fraction of production, for 
the extraordinary surplus delivered would otherwise have been impossible. Therefore, one 
possibility is to postulate that the gold came originally from elsewhere and was then re-
worked, i.e., that Pharaoh gave the gold to the temples whose dependents then smithed it. 
A certain number of silver objects are however designated bJkw-rm[, which would imply the 
work involved, and this conclusion is thus excluded. lt would seem compelling to suggest 
that this gold flowed to the temples from their employees panning gold, 1142 and from the 
1139 Cf. supra, pp. 137, l 68ff. Römer (Priesterherrschaft, p. 42 l) is more cautious. 
1140 lt is extremely speculative, but worth noting that it was entirely possible that Akhenaten actually expropriated the 
lands of the Temple of Amun and possibly other gods, and that these were not all given to Aten, but maintained 
as Crown Property, until Ramesses III tried to return (some of?) them. 
1141 Cf. supra, P. Harris 1; pp. l 94ff. 
1142 Cf. e.~., KR/ VI: 517-522; W. Helck, "Eine Briefsammlung aus der Verwaltung des Amuntempels,'' JARCE 6 
(1967): 140; Y. Koenig, "Livraisans d'or et de galene au tresor du temple d'Amon," in Hommages Sauneron, p. 
191 ff. B. Kemp ("Temple and town in ancient Egypt," in Ucko, Urbanism, pp. 658-656) fails to rigorously 
distinguish the gifts from their possessions, lumping them together, but the temple gold washing activities were 
probably insignificant in comparison to the resources available to the king, so that it could be contended that 
these actual sources were nearly insignificant, although it cannot be proven. 
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merchants in their employ. 1143 However, the far greater quantity of silver cannot be 
explained as coming from mines, for this would demand that the temples have access to 
silver mines, for which there is utterly no evidence, as silver was imported . The lnscription 
dedicatoire indicates that the bJkw of the traders was silver, gold and bronze,1144 which 
reveals the origins of the metals not derived from mining, but it does not elucidate the 
economic implications of the mode and motive of acquisition, which must account for (1) the 
implications of the meaning of these various terms as being a fraction of output and 
(2) identify the purpose for which it was acquired, if it was not intended to be used for 
statuary and other ornamentation (which would presumably have been the btkw-rmJ of the 
silversmiths, and some of the King's own donations). 
Following metals in P. Harris llc are a couple of lines concerning garments. Another set of 
items suggests that the King likewise donated large quantities (though not comparable) of 
garments to the temples. Other documents record garments and honey being sold by boots 
moving from riverbank market to market. 1145 P. Turin 2008+2016, 2, 9ff. as weil as 
P. Brooklyn 35. 1453 B list exchanges involving articles appearing in P. Harris. 1. 1146 There is 
thus both direct and inferential evidence supporting the contentions that the temples were 
recycling their income by exchange. P. Leiden 1 350 verso may represent a similar trading 
mission organized with a boat belonging to a temple. 1147 
With the exception of limited quantities, the P. Harris llc and lllc sections treating the produce 
of the dependents do not list incense,1148 precious stones, or import products, such as Syrian 
oil, 1149 which would be of immediate value to the temples for their religious services. 
These objects were acquired by the king, and delivered by him to the temples, identified as 
inw. 
This fact has a multi-fold significance: for (1) the temples were evidently dependent upon the 
King for certain essential aspects of the cult; (2) just as they were dependent upon the king 
for the initiation of large scale construction projects and (3) this underlines that the basic 
features of the temple revenue indicate that the economic activity of the temples reflected in 
P. Harris I was not primarily designed to guarantee supplies of certain essential cult items, 
such as incense or to provide funding for major construction work, but for the mere maintenance 
1143 KR/ II: 333, l-2. 
1144 KR/ II: 333, 1-2. 
1145 Janssen, Marktop de Oever. The ~pyri referred to were partially published by V. Condon, 'Two Account Papyri 
of the Lote Eighteenth Dynasty," RdE 35 ( 1984): 57-82. The nature of the transactions must remain speculative, 
but it does seem logical to assume that this was a trading mission . _ 
1146 Cf.Janssen, Ship's Logs, p. 71; V Condon, "Two Account Papyri of the Lote Eighteenth dynasty, ' Rdf 35 (1984): 
57-82; supra, pp 238 n. 802 . 
1147 Cf. supra, inw, pp. 222ff.; Janssen, Ship's Logs. 
1148 An exception are lines 12a, 15, and 326, 3 listing l 047 and 482 ; " vessels respectively of incense, honey 
and sesame oil. The figures are only faintly comparable to the long lists of the king 's own donations. 
1149 These items are listed as the inw of the king (Section lld), and these are the items which we encounter in the so-
called tribute, so that the inw is evidently what was received from foreign countries, and turned over to the temples · 
by the king. This corresponds to the use of inw in the texts : the god awards the conquest of a foreign country to 
the King, who dutifully passes on the proceeds to the god, while claiming credit for the gift. 
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of temple operations on the economic level. lt is also clear that the temples engaged in trade 
to acquire other items, but that, peculiarly, the essential items necessary for temples to 
function as religious institutions remained in the hands of the King. The perfectly rational 
conclusion following from this line of reasoning is that the temples were involved in wide-
scale redistribution, for the sheer volume of material listed in P. Harris I makes this appear 
probable. 
lt has been emphasized that the most important single element of state income will have 
been the grain which played a key role in the economy in several respects. The grain in 
P. Harris is termed bJkw of the cultivators. The tomb of P~-bry uses bJkw in the sense of work 
carried out in the fields, as the expected grain obligation of the official, rather than the field 
labourers.1150 There is evidently a specific type of grain levy which is the produce of the 
labourers working for temple lands, separate from the smw. 
lt is possible that this is the production mentioned in 0 . Gard. 86 and P. Bol. 1086,1151 
where the word smw is not used, but the raw figures of 200 khar/ man are given.1152 The 
total quantity is however quite restricted, as P. Harris llc (1. 126, 3) lists only 309'950 khar, 
while the figure from 0 . Gard . 86 would suggest that th is one official was responsible for 
the annual production of l '752'000 khar, or the produce of roughly 100'000 arouras. This 
might indicate that 0 Gard. 86 is a school text, but confirms that the figures in the relevant 
sections of P. Harris I are the annual htri as stated in the text, and not the accumulated 
donations of the reign, as these are generally specifically indicated as such. 1153 Were one 
to assume that the literal meaning of annual htri was that the lists in P. Harris llc were annual 
levies, and not the cumulative collections for the entire reign - and as these are specified for 
the royal donations this is logical - this would still indicate a mere skimming off of excess 
production, and thus that the primary activity of the temple dependents was not the very 
essence of the production for the temples. 
Waterfowl deliveries are also termed bJkw, and these can be assumed tobe the catch of 
fowlers and fishermen, as stated in the text. The live geese are termed sJyt. 
lt is difficult to interpret the meaning of the cattle provided from the herds of Egypt, but the 
cattle bJkw of Syria must have come from the Syrian villages donated to the temple ( 19 head 
from Syria for the Estate of Amun, which does not testify to the significance of this source) . 
The final lines (of llc and lllc) concern entire boats and it must be assumed that the materials 
were placed at the disposal of the boat builders, and that they were remunerated for the 
work, as they could not retain part of the boat. This particular case emphasizes that this 
cannot be a simple tax. Either they were dependent on the temples for their income, in which 
case they were either slaves or employees, or they were entrepreneurs rewarded on an ad 
hoc basis for their work. In neither case can boats be regarded as anormal item that would 
be paid as tax, if that word has any specific meaning . 
1150 Cf. supra, pp. 138; 246. 
115 1 Cf. supra, pp. 144 -145 n. 408 . 
1152 In 0. Gord. 86, this is cleorly htri, the term used in P. Horris llc , etc. 
11 53 This would be the logical way of negating Schaedel's assertion (Listen, pp. 59-60) that these were laxes made 
during the reign which were revoked by Ramesses IV, if the logic were compelling, which would superficially 
appeor tobe the cose. · 
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In this context, it is useful to refer to a passage in the Giornale text P. Turin 2009 + 19991154 
which contains a list of items, with a single line devoted to each entry in which each item is 
given a value in terms of silver deben or kite. In several cases, a note is added to the effect 
that (a) r hs;f_ m hs;f__ or (b) r hs;f_ m (i)bt. 1155 Rendering the phrase, (a) "against silver in real 
silver" (i.e., "purchased with money") and (b) "against silver in objects" (i.e., "purchased by 
barter") does not appear risky on the philological level, but this interpretation of the text 
would appear to have striking consequences for the understanding of the Egyptian economy 
in light of the specific objects in question, and the general interpretation of the text. 
The first three lines concern fish, of which the names irJ and sn' have been preserved. The 
sn'-fish is weil known from the Deir el-Medineh documentation, 1156 but the fish delivered to 
the Gang were usually recorded in terms of deben rather than kite.1157 
"Palm ropes for the royal barques", cedar trunks, beams, masts, keels, ribbing are listed in 
the lines that follow, and usually enough of the text is preserved to substantiate the assumption 
that each was valued in a manner implying that some kind of exchange was involved. 
The final lines of the third column list types of wood, followed by types of vessels. The text is 
however so severely damaged that the significance of the entries cannot be analyzed. Five 
of the actual boats mentioned are also listed in P. Harris 1: g';y-boats, 1158 and skty-vessels,1159 
qrr-boats,1160 mns-barges, 1161 and b;r-freighters. 1162 Accacia barges1163 also appear, and 
the form of the entry is identical, with the wood type preceding the name of the vessel. In 
P. Harris they are not given values, but merely enumerated. The items in the shipyard texts1164 
are not given values, and it is not clear that the Giornole entries actually gave a value, but 
the context suggests that this could have been the case. Whether the boats themselves were 
purchased, or parts of the boats, or whether they were listed for other reasons is however 
1154 KR/ VI: 560-566; Botti/Peet, Giornale, pp. 10-13/pls. l-3;. cf. supra, pp. l75ff. 
1155 (a):11. l,13; 1,15; 1,17;(6): l,12, l,14, 1,16.Theeditorsjustifia6Iytranslated(a)"conlroargento(pagato)in 
argento" or (6) "ogetti diversi", 6ut noted that "Non siamo riusciti a compredere il senso preciso delle r bd in questa 
frase." Botti/Peet, Giornale, p. 10, n. 4. 
1156 Cf. Gamer-Wallert, Fische, p. 44; Helck, Materialien, pp. 8 l 7f. 
1157 lt should be noted that deben are generally assumed to be copper unless otherwise indicated, and fish were 
generallyweighed in deben (e.g., KR/ VI: 581-590; 0. DeM 139,4; 140, versa; 142, passim; 143, passim), 
whereas this account refers to silver kite, implying that they were purchased in exchange for silver (involving the 
question of calculating x deben [weight] = y silver kite [value]. lt is entirely possi6le that the same political or 
economic situation that led the Necropolis Scribe .Qbwty-ms to take up tax collecting (cf. supra, pp. 170ff.) may 
have o6Iiged the state to purchase provisions for the Necropolis towards the end of Dynasty XX. lt is however 
slriking that the a6sence of references to kite in Deir el-Medineh is counterbalariced 6y their presence in the "tax 
lists" of the recto of the Turin Canon (Col. 3,86, p. 160 supra). 
P. Turin 2075 (C:erny, Notebook 15:23-30), states concisely that 3'200 deben of fish equal 8 kharof emmer 
(1. 3,3), meaning 1 khar400 deben fish, or 1 copper deben 200 deben offish, indicating that the deben offish 
are generally references to weight, not value. These values indicate that the number of fish mentioned in P. Turin 
2009 + 1999 might actually be in deben, rather than individual fish, in which case the quantities are again 
compara6Ie to those known from other texts. 
1158 P Harris 126, 1 0; 326, 12; 69, 12. 
1159 P. Harris 126, 1 0; 59,2; 69, 12. 
1160 P. Harris 11,8; 32a,5; 5 la, 13. None of these entries is under the title of a term dealt with in this work. 
1161 P. Harris 11,8; 32a,5; 51 a, 13. None of these entries is under the title of a term dealt with in this work. 
1162 P. Harris 8, 1; 77, 10 (Jones, Glossary, has reversed the poge; line numbers in first reference, p. 137). 
1163 P. Harris 126, 11 ( 11,9, etc.) 
1164 S. Glanville, "Records of a Royal Dockyard of the Time of Thutmosis III: Papyrus British Museum 10056,'' ZÄS 66 
(1930): 105-121; ZÄS 68 (1932): 7-4 l. 
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immaterial, as the parts listed in the previous lines provide prima facieevidence for purchasing, 
andin association with types of vessels known to have been given by the King to the temples 
(in that he provided the dependents, who provided the objects, following the internal logic 
of P. Harris 1). These are the same vessels known to have been employed for 
administrative transport of goods. 
Among the significant points about the logical role of the temples defined above, it was 
pointed out that there is no evidence concerning the extent to which the temples had direct 
access to silver, as.opposed to acquiring silver through trade. The fact that Pharaoh built 
their temples likewise suggests that they did not have access either to the quarries or to the 
manpower to arrange the transport of stones. lt was likewise pointed out that Pharaoh alone 
provided them with incense, which he acquired from foreign sources. In the case of Punt and 
Sinai (?) Ramesses III takes responsibility for the acquisition, but not the production of the 
products. lt would thus appear possible that not only incense, but certain common metals 
were acquired through trade, and it could be postulated that trade was a royal monopoly, 
although this overtaxes the evidence. 
Among the sources listing rations or pay are those related to expeditions, primarily with the 
object of mining and trade. The temples were guaranteed income, and plentiful supplies of 
perishables, and their own fields for agricultural products, but the possession of exhaustible 
resources seems to have been a prerogative of the King. In P. Harris 1, Ramesses III delineates 
his gifts to the temples exhaustively, but fails to mention a single mine, although he does 
provide gold, silver and copper. He likewise lists temples, and temple furnishings, and 
gates, etc., but he does not mention having given one single quarry anywhere to any 
divinity, although there are repeated references to granite shrines, turquoise, lapis lazuli, 
jasper, etc. and other monuments.1165 Nor does he give any forests to anyone, although he 
does detail wood and wood products. 
lt was noted above that the temples could not have had direct access to silver mines. The 
copper resources available in Sinai may have been exploited, but the evidence is unclear. 
lt was argued before that the archaeological evidence for the "Egyptian Mining Temple at 
Timna" was not compelling. This led to the interpretation that the "Theory of Comparative 
Advantage" would have suggested that copper mining would not have been economically 
interesting for the Egyptian state. The question which remained was whether Pharaoh was 
the sole purchaser of the copper smelted in Sinai. According to P. Harris, the dependents of 
the temples delivered altogether some two and a half tonnes of copper to the temples 
(annually), the lion's share going to Thebes, which indicates that the temples at Memphis 
1165 Thal temple officials became prominent in quarrying missions after the reign of Ramesses III may be significant, but 
the actual meaning is not clear. Cf. C. Eyre's remarks ("Work and the Organization of Work in the New 
Kingdom, in Powell, Labor, pp. 180-183) about the makeup of the evidence from quarrying expeditions. Reviv-
ing the discussion about the relationship between the lemples and the king al the end of Dynasty XX would far 
exceed the scope of this work which is devoted to the longue duree of the New Kingdom, rather than the political 
struggle, but the impression of increasing royal incapacity and the inability of the temples to assume the royal role 
cannol be denied, especially as temple participation takes the form of encroaching into royal or government 
responsibility, but the logic involved cannot be elucidated: was it a deliberate inleNention or did the king actually 
seek this solution? · -
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and Heliopolis were not able to take advantage of their geographical proximity to Sinai to 
acquire copper directly from there. 
Pharaoh likewise provided the temples with incense, potentially indicating either a royal 
responsibility or a royal monopoly on foreign trade. The latter has been widely postulated, 
but it is difficult to grasp. That temple dependents delivered both silver and copper to the 
temples suggests that if Pharaoh had a monopoly on foreign trade, Pharaoh re-circulated 
these metals through the private sector economy. This alone would suggest that claims in 
favour of a royal monopoly on foreign trade are bold, for in a royal command economy it 
would superficially appear to be far more logical for the king to direct supplies exclusively 
from his mines or resources to the temples, rather than the round-about fashion of passing 
them into circulation, obliging the temples to recover the metals on their own. 
lt is therefore entirely reasonable to suggest that the Pharaohs did not deliberately engage in 
copper mining in Sinai on a large scale - if at all - and that they did not endeavour to 
establish a monopoly on copper imports, and therefore, that Egyptian copper was acquired 
from entrepreneurs operating in Sinai. At what stage Egyptians were involved in this trade is 
probably impossible to establish, but temple dependents may have been purchasing directly 
from the producers, using e.g ., the textiles at their disposal. 
CONSTRUCTION, ADMINISTRATION AND PROSPERllY 
One of the major features of the New Kingdom seems to have been that although the 
temples owned a great deal of land, and had transport vessels, etc. they do not seem to 
have carried out their own construction projects, as these were done exclusively by the king. 
This would imply that the portion of Egypt that was potentially under the control of the 
temples sufficed to guarantee the income and regular services of the temples at a high level, 
but did not allow for investment in new constructions. This investment for construction would 
come from additional lands and resources assigned to the temples by the kings, which 
would correspondingly increase their holdings, but only guaranteed that a particular project 
would be executed, and that at the end of construction, the land would be lost. For their own 
funerary temples, the kings adopted the expedient of transferring lands from the funerary 
temple of their predecessor to their own, which merely involved a transfer within the estate of 
Amun, but did not remove it from the hands of the gods entirely. This measure permitted them 
certainty in being able to construct larger funerary temples, but it did not free the lands from 
the temples.1166 
1166 Cf. Gardiner, Wilbour II: 11-1 2 for the dearth of holdings of earlier temples. The usurpation of fields was an old 
habil, cf. P. Posener-Krieger ("Les papyrus d 'Abousir et l'economie des anciens temples funeraires de l'ancien 
empire,' in lipinski, Stole and Temple 1: 139) who was surprised to find that the supplies for the mortuary temple 
of Neferirkare came from the king's solar temple, and not from the temple's domains, which purportedly existed 
when the records were compiled, os much os 200 years loter. She assumes thot becouse the domoins of the 
temple figure in the tombs of officials conlemporary with the records, that these domains were actually providing 
suslenance to the kJ's of the deceased. lt is far more logical that the king assumed that his domains would become 
a dead letter ofter his death, and was able to assure his eternal salisfaction by routing the supplies through the 
temple of a deity. Cf. supra, p . 33 n 30. 
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lt would seem that the temple dependents did not provide the temples with the absolutely 
essential articles necessary for religious services: the buildings themselves and the incense 
were provided by Pharaoh, at his discretion: ritual in exchange for legitimacy. Virtually until 
the end of the New Kingdom, it was still an exclusively royal privilege to construct temples 
and contribute to their growth.1167 On the one hand, Pharaoh could maintain good relations 
with the gods and the priesthoods, and indicate his preferences, but on the other, the 
temples could virtually oblige weaker Pharaohs to construct temples for them. lf the land 
transfers continued at a high level, and the temples failed to invest in construction on their 
own, it is obvious that the Pharaohs would ultimately become prisoners of the temples. With 
their own administration faltering, the temples were unable to assume their newly acquired 
responsibility. This meant that the economic growth and activity that had resulted from two 
millennia of expansion was brought to a halt: what had been a positive feature became a 
millstone for the economy. Productive resources flowed into temples which were not 
administratively prepared for the responsibility. The resources available to the King were 
diminished yet failed to add to those of the realm. 1168 
Many different explanations have been sought to account for the seeming discrepancy 
between the strikes in Regnal Year 29 of Ramesses III and the seemingly substantial income 
documented in P. Wilbour, and the temple donations recorded in P. Harris 1. 1169 The preceding 
conclusions suggest that the workers at Deir el-Medineh were responsible for construction 
and that they were supposed to be paid from Pharaoh's resources. 1170 lt is thus logical to 
suggest that the gifts Ramesses III presented to the gods (as recorded in P. Harris 1) had a 
direct negative impact on the degree to which Pharaoh was able to meet his own commitments, 
which led to irregular payments in the Necropolis. This would confirm that the problem was 
not the donations in themselves, but the administrative responsibilities, which implied that the 
transfers led to royal depletion. This royal depletion necessarily led to a halt in construction. 
This suggests that the Royal Domains were of limited extent, and this conclusion necessarily 
lends weight to the suspicion that the greater part of the land in ancient Egypt was in private 
hands, and that the ultimate result of Ramesses' generosity was to eliminate the wealth of the 
royal household. 
1167 Cf., e. g., the subheading "ßuilding ond the Stole Monopoly of Stone," in W. C. Hayes, "Chopter IX" of CAH 2 
II: 391. 
1168 The acute observer will note an opporent controdiction in my assertion (supra, p. 124) thot Wolf erred in 
interpreting the demise of the economy to these transfers, but in that context the desire was to emphasize the 
irrelevance of the possibility of bankrupting the economy through the lock of o credit system (o macro-economic 
detail) ond the foct thot the buildings were a positive feoture, mocro-economicolly, and tronsfers to the temples 
would hove been economicolly vioble, if the temples had had their own authority to construct, which they 
apporently did not. lf the temples were simply economic entities engaged in Irade ond acquisition, delivering 
resources to them was necessarily erroneous. 
1169 Cf. e. g., J. J. Janssen, ''The Year of the Strikes,' BSEG 16 (1992): 41-49; W. F. Edgerton, "The Strikes in 
Ramesses 111's Twenty-ninth Year, 'JNES 10 ( 1951 ): 137-145; C. Eyre, "Work ond the Organization of Work in 
the New Kingdom, '' in Powell, Labor, pp. 179-180. 
1170 Janssen ( Commodity Prices, pp. 455-459) indicates several sources, but the evidence implies that ultimately the 
Treasury of Pharaoh and the Granary of Pharaoh will have been among the authorities responsible. 
310 
Construction Administration ond Prosperity 
One piece of evidence which could serve to negate this logic is the suggestion that the Turin 
Taxation Papyrus seemingly implies that the Necropolis was able to acquire provisions 
directly from temple lands without having to consult temple authorities. The papyrus is however 
dated to the reign of Ramesses XI, when the Necropolis workmen were no longer building 
tombs, but probably emptying them, and probably doing so at the behest of the High Priest 
of Amun. 1171 Under the circumstances, it is very probable that the descendent of those kings 
whose tombs were being plundered would hardly have feit compelled to arrange for the 
payment of those engaged in such activities, even if he could conceivably have been held 
administratively responsible for them. 
This evidence clinches the argument that both P. Wilbour and P. Reinhardt probably record 
temple income and not taxation or royal income, for the wealth of the temples would then be 
comprehensible vis-a-vis the contemporary relative poverty of the Pharaohs. 1172 At the same 
time, the relative growth of the market would be easily grasped, as Pharaoh's capabilities 
diminished. This argument likewise strengthens the case for suggesting that the Crown lands 
did not cover a large part of the country either before or after the gifts recorded in P. Harris, 
for neither Crown nor temple possessions could possibly have been extensive if the gifts 
recorded in P. Harris actually infringed on the ability of the King to pay his employees, while 
P. Wilbour does not suggest that temple holdings were significant. 
The interpretation of the redistribution economy and the assumption that all the land in the 
entire country belonged theoretically to the King will have clouded the understanding of 
these matters which can be clearly grasped in terms of legitimacy. The failure to distinguish 
the various aspects of legitimacy, administration, power, etc. has led some commentators to 
conclude that the temples were merely another department of the state and that their specific 
role was not decisive: 
Everything leads us to believe that the Temple of Amun represented the state in the 
exercise of that specific branch of the administration concerned with the organization 
of the land of the country. Thus, the grandiose donations of Ramesses III to the temple 
were not so much a way of impoverishing the state - it was rather merely a kind of 
transfer from one part of the administration to another - as the establishment of a 
more solid basis supporting the growth of the power of the High Priests of Amun. 1173 
The temples were ideal recipients of income. They were however administratively unable to 
expend it in an economically significantfashion, given their responsibilities in ancient Egypt.1174 
1171 Cf. K. Jansen-Winkeln, "Die Plünderung der Königsgräber des Neuen Reiches," 245 122 (1995) 62-78. 
1172 Cf. Gasse, Donnees Nouvel!es, pp. 223-236. 
1173 Gasse, Donnees Nouvelles, p. 233. [My tronslationj 
1174 lt is interesting that the lmn-btp (os one of the lost High Priests of Amun during the New Kingdom) credits Pharooh 
with hoving proised him for the constructions which he - the High Priest of Amun - supposedly mode for 
Amonrosonther (cf. supra, pp. l 86f.), olthough architecturolly it is difficult to understand whot is meant. The 
significonce is thot he probobly did not build onything, but thot such construction projecls os followed later moy 
hove been adumbroted by the odditions to the small temple of Khonsu ot Kornak, olthough it is not possible to 
prove. 
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Thus, when the gifts actually diminished the capabilities of the state, by transferring wealth 
from that part capable of investing it with profit to another part unable to expend it, the 
donations were financially serious. According to Ricardo, when government expenses 
exceed revenue, taxation reduces capital, and that if not increased, the economy would 
face ruin. 1175 On the Keynesian principle of demand stimulus, the economy would begin to 
decline when government expansion stopped. Thus, on a theoretical level, the economy 
was condemned to ruin twice over (once by Ricardo, once by Keynes) when Pharaoh turned 
over productive resources to the temples which failed to exploit them. 
T EMPLES AND GOVERNMENT 
Evidently there is a clear cut relationship between the temples and the government 
bureaucracy, with each having clearly defined areas of responsibility. The relationship 
between these two parts of the state bureaucracy was extremely complicated, and it will 
probably be impossible for the modern student ever to establish the exact significance of 
certain transfers. Certain goods were received in the treasury because they were material 
collected to be placed there, others were being exchanged and/or redistributed, but both 
were "received" or "delivered" there according to the tale told by the principal actor in each 
case. Furthermore, that these events took place in a treasury, and that a "scribe of the 
treasury" recorded them can usually be established, but was this the "scribe of the treasury of 
the Lord of the Two Lands" or the "scribe of the treasury of Pakhet, Lady of the Desert"? Even 
where the whole formulae can be established questions remain unanswered. 
The Turin Taxation Papyrus 1176 indicates that grain collected from various sources was turned 
over to the Mayor of Thebes and a Chantress of Amun and a Scribe of Reckoning of 
Amonrasonther. The sources were khato-lands, foreigners, temple lands, the cbcwof Pharaoh, 
etc. One part, termed the .smw of the mud flats, was received by the Mayor. lt is possible 
that the goods turned over were specifically attributed to specific authorities, even though the 
grain was physically held in the same granary as can be detected in the note to the effect 
that a specific item is "on the account of the Scribe of Reckoning of the temple of Amun", 1177 
even though the grain came from the cbcw of Pharaoh. All of the collecting was done by the 
Scribe of the Theban Necropolis. Several bureaucracies were thus involved in the measures: 
the secular mayor, the temple of Amun, and the Necropolis. 
The distribution of responsibilities within the bureaucracy is equally evident from P. Greg, 1178 
which is apparently a journal of events, recorded day by day, concerning the Gang of 
workman at Deir el-Medineh. Certain lines relate that the Gang worked in the royal tomb, 
that they were absent, and that the scribe acknowledged receipt of lamps, plaster, wood, 
1175 Ricardo, Principles, pp. 186-188 (cf. quote at beginning of this book, supra p. 7) 
1176 Cf. supra, pp l 70ff. 
1177 Gardiner, RAD p. 42, 2-3. 
1178 Cf. supra, pp. l 52ff. 
312 
T emples and Government 
fish, grain, beer and dates. The diw-grain wages are their usual monthly remuneration for 
their work, and their source is not indicated, but other texts confirm that the Vizier was 
responsible for the grain issued to them. The grain came from royal and temple reserves, 
such as those collected by Qbwty-ms and turned over to the Mayor. In this text they regularly 
receive inytdeliveries, of various cakes "from the King", and beer from the temples of West 
Thebes. The cakes and beer are likewise grain products from royal and temple reserves. The 
deliveries of fish and firewood are elsewhere termed btkwor btri, depending upon the text, 
and it is significant that the terms were used in a precise sense, but not consistently. While 
the other items supposedly arrive at the Necropolis as part of the redistribution system, the 
smdtwho deliver the fish and firewood provide it directly to the end-users at the Necropolis. 
They are not recorded as having been paid for this work, but there are references to paying 
the bm,-slaves who worked for the Gang, frequently following their btri. 
The Turin Taxation Papyrus and P. Greg show the cycle of the collection and expenditure in 
ancient Egypt, with the grain being collected from the fields, turned over to temple granaries, 
and paid out to the workman who work on the royal tombs, who used the grain that they did 
not consume to purchase articles in the barter economy of the village. They were supported 
by a team of smdtworkers who provided essential commodities such as pottery and firewood, 
who were likewise state employees, but employed on a piece-work basis rather than given 
a monthly wage. Both the Temples and Pharaoh also chose to supply them with certain other 
articles, so that they were completely enmeshed in the bureaucracy between the temples 
and the government, even though they were effectively government employees, with the 
vizier responsible for their income. This is clearly a market economy with state employees 
receiving and spending their salary, and need not be characterized as a "redistribution" 
economy. 
That the Gang and the community of the tomb assumed a relationship to Pharaoh and that 
the Vizier was responsible for their being paid does not establish a clear division of 
responsibility between the responsible authorities about who actually distributed the goods. 
"They were paid and administered as a department of state," in C. Eyre's words.1179 The 
"Crown lands" were the royal domains which were the possession of the secular government. 
The temple lands were the possessions of the temples, and state servants received small 
parcels apparently on these plots as rewards, while others enjoyed larger parcels which 
owed dues to the King . ldentifying each of these with modern terms is difficult. Assuming that 
the major temples were part of the state apparatus does not however guarantee that all the 
temples of the land were part of the state apparatus, and in fact there are private establishments 
which were not part of. the state apparatus, which were treated differently. 1180 
1179 C. Eyre, "Work and the Organization of Work in the New Kingdom,'' in Powell , Labor, p . 171 . 
1180 lt is curious that - in analogy to the specific lock of terms in the P. Harris relating to the smaller temples, etc. - the 
Hermopolis Decree of Seti l likewise does not employ the conventional terminology (KR/ 1: 125-126). Seemingly 
only the temple at Abydos benefited from being raised to a higher level by virtue of Seti's bad conscience 
because of his name. 
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T HE EGYPTIAN STATE 
When Sir Alan Gardiner finished his lengthy Commentary to the Wilbour Papyrus, he 
concluded that the revenues being assessed must have been government income that was 
somehow diverted to the Estate of Amonrasonther. Religious institutions and government 
bodies converged at the pinnacle where the highest officials served both, and both together 
formed the State. This does not necessarily imply that income was diverted from the one at 
the expense of the other, but that the two formed a unity, and so Sir Alan's interpretation may 
not have been completely accurate. At the present juncture one can do no more than 
speculate, but it is certainly plausible to suggest that the domain paragraphs of P. Wilbour 
are not taxation, but the production for the temples by the temples on their own land, and 
that the apportioning paragraphs represent a kind of taxation with the individual holders of 
small plots assessed at a low rate: the difference between production and taxation being 
that in the former case, the greater part of the yield is tobe assigned the temple, and in the 
latter cases, the lesser part. 
Grandet assumes that the temples and the king were different organs of the state, and 
suggests that transfers between the two could make no serious difference, but we have seen 
that this may have been far from the case. O'Connor divides the Egyptian Government into 
four parts, the crown possessions, the military, and the religious and civil governments.1181 
We have argued above that organs of the state and government should be separated on 
the basis of legitimacy. Although it is difficult to make firm and lasting divisions in a land of 
interlocking directorships such as ancient Egypt; O'Connor's system thus appears too glo-
bal, and the flexible approach for identifying political relations adopted by E. Cruz-Uribe 
would appear tobe the key. 1182 
lf we endeavour to fit Cruz-Uribe's model to cover the role assigned the government in the 
model of the state as defined by the General Theory of Custom, War and Technology, 
identifying the state as a political and cultural organism, the legal state represents the sover-
eign powers of a political entity, while the government is the agency or apparatus through 
which authority is exercised. While it can be argued that the temples were part of the 
sovereign powers of ancient Egypt, they were necessarily not an agency of government. 
Analyzing the entity of the state, rather than the process by which states emerged, conventional 
understanding suggests that the right to collect taxes and conscript people for military (or 
other) service are the usual prerogatives of the administration of the legal state. The government 
treasuries (both central and provincial) collect taxes, turning the funds over to the various 
spending authorities. These authorities either have their own employees, or contract the 
work out to private enterprise, or employ conscript labour. The fashion in which they acquire 
things depends upon the technology and economic structures available, as well as their 
desires. lt is generally assumed that these works are undertaken for the public good, supplying 
needs which the private sector may not meet, as e.g ., infrastructure and security. 
1181 D. O'Connor, "New Kingdom and Third lntermediate Period, " in Trigger,Socio/ History, pp. 204-218. 
1182 E. Cruz-Uribe, "A Model for the Political Structure of Ancient Egypt, ' in Silverman, For His Ka, p . 48. 
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Modem western states emerged at a period when the palace and the military were the most 
important divisions of the government. Most commercial activities were in the hands of the 
trade guilds and agricultural activities were dominated by a landed aristocracy. 1183 Virtually 
all religious activity had developed independently of the state, so that some of the Protestant 
states inherited the wealth of the Church which had its own separate history. After the 
Reformation, the conflict between the landed aristocracy, the guilds and the church was 
transformed with the church generally regarded as being a part of the state, but not the 
government. 1184 As individuals, members of the aristocracy played a role in both church and 
government, and, as a collective, they acted as a kind of local government. This means that 
it is extremely difficult to compare the role of institutions within the states of the ancient Near 
East. 
The government acquires its role by virtue of the state. 1185 The state basically consists of an 
independent social organization within a territorial entity, with a population, 1186 and a 
legitimate government which administers, and makes laws. Laws need not be written down, 
but the administration must be assumed to be run using certain guidelines, either traditional 
or ad hoc. The legal system of a country can be independent of the government structure, or 
it can be part of the government, but the government itself must regulate its own behavior by 
some system of laws or rules recognized and accepted by the governed. The government 
may establish its legitimacy through the consent of the governed, and reinforce this by 
asserting that it enjoys the support of the gods. 
The image which emerges from this is that of Pharaoh dominating the means of growth and 
possibly access to the exhaustible resources of the land, and of asserting his legitimate 
authority for controlling certain aspects of trade, but the extent of this is not clear. Our 
documentation suffers from being primarily influenced by information from the temples, and 
fails to reflect either government or private activity to an extensive degree. Viewed at a 
1183 We are woefully under informed concerning the aristocracy and craftsmen of ancient Egypt. lt would appear that 
a bureaucratic meritocracy (potentially based on birth) replaced the aristocracy during the New Kingdom, at the 
lotest. lt is far more difficult to state with certainty that all the craftsmen were primarily state employed. There must 
have been private craftsmen preparing e.g., siele, tomb equipment, and other daily items, aside from house 
builders, etc. We know that the craftsmen who made the shabtis for Nsy-Khonsu claimed to have been associ-
ated with the temple of Amun, but we do not know if the feeling was mutual. 
Cf. D. Warburton, "Some Remarks on the Manufacture and Sole of Shabtis," BSEG9- l0 (1984-85): 345-355, 
for notes on payments to craftsmen for the manufacture of amulets. There can be no doubt that the craftsmen were 
likewise poid in other cases, cf. J. C:erny, "Le Caractere des oushebtis d'apres les idees du nouvel empire," 8/FAO 
41 (1942): 105-133. 
1184 There were naturally difficulties when the Catholic Church was governed from Rome, and thus in competition with 
the local governments of the Christian world before the reformation. Separation of Church and Stole was likewise 
a problem where secular rule was in the hands of episcopol officers (Bischof-fürsten, Princes-eveques), but it was 
not the Church that was ruling, but an officer of the Church, which was part of an organization beyond the state. 
After incorporating the Church into the state (as in England under Henry VIII), it was still not regarded as a branch 
of the government. Even if the head of state - in the sense of government here - was also the head of the church, 
the head of state merely incorporated the summit of two organizations within the state. 
1185 lt is easy enough to define the government as a rule, but there is not ·•any definition of the state that is accepted 
by the entire community of scholars", according to H. Claessen and P. Skalnik, 'The Early Stole: Theories and 
Hypotheses," in Claessen/Skalnik, Early State, p 3. The following generalizations are drawn from this baok. 
1186 The population of a state can be homogeneous, but it usually suffices if the ruling dass is homogeneous, with a 
common sense of identity. 
315 
Economic and lnslilulionol Relotionships 
slightly greater distance, the state still dominates our attention: the tombs of the officials are 
full of inscriptions worshipping the national gods, and giving lengthy lists of titles which bond 
them to the bureaucracy. The temples are likewise covered with scenes and inscriptions 
paying homage to the gods and providing historical accounts of events. 
Liverani has suggested that these scenes in the temples were intended for consumption by 
"Egyptian public opinion" .1187 This observation is particularly interesting, for one conventional 
view contends that the entire population of Egypt was registered for corvee labour and that 
they were exploited viciously - that there was no attempt to reason with them.1188 Only a 
small proportion of the population could read, but it is not clear that these texts were directed 
at the bureaucrats and craftsmen. Presumably the texts were intended for the gods, to whom 
the spoils of victory were rendered, but a nagging doubt remains that these texts may weil 
have been intended for public consumption, that the people of the land of Egypt were also 
included in the system, and not merely as the ever subservient labour force, but as 
participants. 
Soldiers, scribes, stable-masters, retainers, priests and other state employees were awarded 
small plots from which they were obliged to pay a portion to the temples or the government, 
which could be termed either "taxes" or "rent" depending upon the definition of ownership, 
and depending upon the precise role assigned to the temples - as a parallel government, a 
division of the government, or an independent branch of the state superstructure with an as 
yet undefined role, but the symbiotic nature of the relationship is just as clear as that emphasized 
in the Horemhab Decree, that people should be left alone to fulfill their obligations to Pharaoh. 
The Nauri decree emphasizes the opposite, that people should be left alone to fulfill their 
obligations to the temple. The scribe laughs at the others because his btkw is in writing, but 
the field workers carried out their obligations, and the state grew wealthy. 
As far as the documentation permits clear statements, the only group who can be clearly 
documented as economically significant beneficiaries of the alleged "redistribution" system 
was the Gang at Deir el-Medineh, and yet neither did they produce anything collectively, 
nor did they receive their pay on a regular basis, so that the evidence indicates that although 
income was accruing, it was not being redistributed, if that term has any specific meaning. 
Even so, the Gang did not revolt, they went on strike: they expected Pharaoh to deliver the 
mft. 1189 The necropolis was plundered, but the legitimacy of Pharaoh and the temples was 
never in doubt. 
1187 M. Liveroni, "Memorandum on theApprooch to Historiographie Texts," Or. 42 (1973): 193. R. Müller-Wollermonn, 
'Ein Tribut an die Methode, '' GM 77 (1984): 52-53 ottempts to distinguish the character of the sources, identi-
lying the cotegories of religion, politics and ort. Given the general ogreement thot mJ'twos o stote ideology, ond 
thot construction of monuments was to o lorge extent dictoted by politicol considerotions, ond thot ort was o 
politicol tool in oncient Egypt (os elsewhere), it is cleor thot - with the exception of administrative texts (which she 
foils to identify)- all of her categories fall ultimotely under the rubric of politics. As however, we cannol grasp the 
true nature of oncienl Egyptian politics, the process must be resumed onew, with the desire to understond the 
specific message, meoning thot the source is not os importonl os the inlention, ond discerning the intenlion must 
be guesswork, intelligent or otherwise, but her cotegories do not aid the effort. 
1188 E. Eichler, "Polonyi-Keynes-Warburton,' GM 131 (1992): 26-27. 
1189 Cf. J. J. Janssen, "The Year of the Strikes," BSEG 16 (l 992): 41-49. 
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The temples and their dependents owned land and collected income, and made exchanges 
with parts of the bureaucracy which are properly assigned to the government, namely 
departments for which Pharaoh or the Vizier were responsible. The Egyptian state was at 
least 1500 years old when the New Kingdom began, and was the product of an evolution 
from a period when there were no gigantic temples independent of the kings, and craftsmen 
were mainly associated with either the royal or private sectors, but not with temples. By 
virtue of its dominance, the Egyptian state was able to direct employment and to transfer the 
title of land ownership to the temples, and the Pharaohs of the New Kingdöm increasingly 
sought their legitimacy through the gods, which increased the power of the temples. 
This meant that the state necessarily failed to evolve a self-generating system of temple 
support, so that the temples continued to remain dependent upon Pharaoh for the enlargement 
of their physical plant, which guaranteed a continuous reciprocal relationship: Pharaoh 
would build, and the temples would guarantee legitimacy. The repressive fiscal measures 
necessary to assure the continued legitimacy benefited both Pharaoh and the temples, and 
the ideology of the state assured general stability, as each new King endeavoured to re-
establish mict on her throne. The technological level of society meant that manpower and 
agricultural products were the main items of input, but the cultural level of society used these 
primitive products to create splendours. 
The Egyptian state was ultimately responsible for justice and security. Pharaoh may have 
been responsible for the army, temple construction, some aspects of trade, and possibly 
education, training and various industries. The legal system need not however have been 
Pharaoh's responsibility, and private construction (of houses and tombs) was probably not 
his concern. Specific responsibility was therefore divided between the government, individuals 
and the temples. 1190 
lt was the delegation of responsibility and authority that defined the emerging Egyptian 
state, for these are the issues that lead to the identification of distinctions between the 
government and the rest. In a land such as ancient Egypt, people were probably not 
conscious of the distinctions between government and private activity, and merely conscious 
that the prestige acquired from public activity outweighed that tobe gotten through private 
actions, but some will have observed that financial gains were acquired in inverse 
proportions. 1191 
The repressive threat implicit in the collection of revenues was exclusively the responsibility of 
the state, yet those bearing the actual sticks could have been members of the temple 
bureaucracy, and their ultimate authority will have come from Pharaoh, whose search for 
1190 For the importance of education, cf. J. Baines, "Restricted Knowledge, Hierarchy, and Decorum," JARCE 27 
(1990): l-23. Justice was handled much more loosely, those having acquired education being permitted to 
participate in the process of justice, cf. McDowell, Jurisdiction. lt will be noted that through education, the state 
organs were virtually guaranteed control of society. 
1191 1. e. tomb-robbery did not bring prestige, but having a state job did. Having lands did not bring prestige, but did 
bring wealth, and probably the jobs which brought prestige. High positions probably permitted the office holder 
to substantially improve his financial position, without recourse to illicit activities, although tomb robbery will have 
been one of the few opportunities left in a day of declining resources devoted to economic growth, which 
explains the origins of official involvement. 
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legitimacy required the support of the temples. The authority implicit in divine oracles likewise 
suggests that the temples and their officials could speak justice, but citing the "law of Pharaoh". 
The Vizier inspected the tomb to assure that the Gang was working, and that the temples 
were supplying them. These relationships are decisive for the interpretation of the payments 
made to the temples, or by the temples to the government as "taxes". "Taxesllare generally 
understood to be payments made to the government; rents and corvee labor can be ren-
dered up to landlords or proprietors, but they are not taxes. 
Thus, as Pharaoh was the guardian of justice, it was his responsibility to attend to the gods, 
just as it was his theoretical obligation to assure the well-being of the Egyptian people, and 
his attentions to both people and gods were the ex officio result of his position. In return for 
the attention, the people consented to Pharaoh's rule, and the gods assured its leg itimacy. lt 
was the responsibility of the government to assure that Pharaoh's wishes in this respect were 
carried out. Thus the temples were one actor in the field of economic and political activity, 
and their income and possessions were commensurate with their essential role in society, 
and their wealth guaranteed by the king . 
State lncome 
We have observed that both the inscription of Mes and P. Valen<;:ay I imply that the private 
land owners were obliged to pay a financial tax to Pharaoh, and that the records pertaining 
to this were not maintained by the provincial officials. lt was observed earlier that the 
extensive land holdings of the nmhwcannot have been those of the apportioning paragraphs 
of P. Wilbour, as the latter group is dominated by the members of the state system, while the 
former group is untitled, and lacking in identity. This was not necessarily true of Mes and the 
higher officials of the land, but their plots and possessions will have been scattered about 
the land, and these will have most probably made up the 96 per cent. of the cultivable land 
in the relevant districts that fails to appear in P. Wilbour. 
Not all of Pharaoh's income will have come from the governmental taxation of these fields, 
as he had other fields (aside from the khato- lands), but probably neither Pharaoh nor the 
temples maintained the greater part of the land in the country. Pharaoh will have enjoyed 
some income from his land until the middle of Dynasty XY-, after which time it is difficult to 
estimate whether the administrative system was fa iling or whether the temples had in fact 
acquired substantial control of the "state" fields of Egypt. The suggestion that the donations in 
P. Harris prevented Pharaoh from paying his Gang suggests however that by the end of the 
reign of Ramesses III those gifts impoverished the royal household. This in turn suggests that 
even after those gifts, during the reign of Ramesses V - given the inlerpretation of P. Wilbour 
as a cadaster of temple lands - most of the land in Egypt did not belong to either Pharaoh 
or the temples, but to private people, both high ranking and from the lowest classes. Both 
Pharaoh and the temples received a proportion of the yields of the their fields as income, but 
this was statistically insignificant in terms of the overall Egyptian economy, while decisive for 
its character. Different proportions will have been collected from wholly held fields, tenants, 
small holders, state officials, and ordinary tax -payers. 
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Based on the dato in P. Harris 1, Grandet concluded that the temple dependents will have 
retained a portion of their production and delivered their obligatory portions to the temples. 
According to the model proposed here, the field workers did not deliver their entire production, 
but retained part of it, and submitted part of to the state authorities, and this can be grasped 
as "taxation" or "rent". 
The general implications of the preceding notes suggest that while the ancient Egyptian 
temples were recipients of payments which would be termed both taxes and rent and 
"trading income" in the modern world, the temples also had large land holdi•ngs from which 
they produced. The production of these fields and other articles delivered to the temples 
were obligatory payments which can be termed taxes or "corvee in kind". The temples also 
received some bounty from the king himself, but they were generally kept on a short leash, 
and never developed the capacity to express their economic power in terms of trading 
expeditions, mining, quarrying or construction. In order to maintain their establishments, they 
traded the products which they received, and contributed to the circulation of goods by 
exchange rather than redistribution. In the end, the fiscal system should be characterized as 
a taxation system rather than a redistribution system, as it was the taxation, the forced 
payments, that permitted the growth of the temples and the construction projects. 
This does not however mean that the economy need be characterized as a Revenue Economy, 
but merely that the fiscal system be understood in this fashion. The evidence for the market, 
and the fact that the state used this market indicate that the market was the decisive feature. 
A fiscal system can work most efficiently if it is based on a market economy. 
Returning to the theoretical model of the state, and, having postulated that the government 
has the legitimacy and the power to force the subjects or citizens to render a proportion of 
their income, wealth or labour to the government as revenue, it follows that those obligatory 
payments are taxes, in the sense of fiscal orrangements for the benefit of the treasury of the 
state. Using its force, the government can also compel its subjects to make payments to 
organizations other than the state's officially designated government. Thus, rather than 
collecting the revenues directly and transferring them, the government can oblige them tobe 
rendered directly to a third party. In this sense, such payments should be regarded as taxes, 
because the obligation to pay is (1) forced by government authority and (2) serves the 
purposes of the government directly. 1192 
This accounts for those payments which are a fraction or proportion of wealth, income or 
labour - as from field labourers or cattle herdsmen. lt also accounts for the obligation of the 
smdt to deliver goods to the Gang and of the tenants on temple land to pay their rent. lt 
does not however account for transactions carried out in the name of the temples for which 
the participants were re-imbursed. Where a transaction involves equal compensation, it is 
not a tax. Therefore, the bJkw of the excavation of the tomb was not a tax, because the 
1192 Theoretically, the government could also oblige individuals to fulfill their obligations to third parties in civil or 
comrnercial affairs, but these result from their own mutual relationships, and they are neither ordered by the state, 
nor directly a concern of the state. Taxation must represent an obligation without a tangible reciprocal delivery, 
i.e., taxation is not a fee for services rendered (although b;kw apparently meant both). 
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workers were paid for it. lf boat-builders were reimbursed, this would likewise not be a tax. 
lf they were given the materials, and their labour was demanded, the boot was not a tax, 
but their labour was. 
The temple tenants (e.g., scribes) paying a proportion of their income were paying a rent or 
a tax. lf the title to the plot was intended tobe the remuneration for their official activity, then 
that part which they retained would be their income, and that part which they turned over to 
the temple would be a tax. Their activity would be rewarded at a higher rate than that of the 
peasants who were required to render a higher proportion of the harvest to the temples. 
Since the scribes may have had to employ workers to till their fields, their gain may have 
been partially reduced. 
lt remains to observe that in the case of the monumental inscriptions, the reason for which the 
information was recorded must have been somehow related to the intention of deliberately 
disseminating the information and therefore it is logical that the temples benefited dispropor-
tionately in this genre of material. That the administrative papyri suggest the same conclusion 
can be attributed to the physical position of the temple of Medinet Habu on the edge of the 
desert. This however does not either favour or refute the suggestion that the resources of the 
crown were far greater. And consequently it is impossible to estimate the proportion of the 
taxation and rents that went to the temples as opposed the government. On the one hand, 
the extent of temple and funerary constructions are weil known, while on the other, P. Harris 
indicates that the King had vast reserves at this disposal from which he could supply the 
temples. That the temples occasionally supplied the King need hardly be surprising, but the 
greater part of the transfers went directly from the temple dependents to the temples, and 
from the King to the benefit of the temples, and the means of acquisition correspond to the 
concept of taxation. In this study, we have not covered the issues of corvee labour and 
slavery, but it is certainly evident that there is virtually no evidence of economically 
significant redistribution . 
Temples and Taxes 
On a political level, one point which has attracted a great deal of debate is the question as 
to whether the temples paid taxes. According to the model proposed here, it is suggested 
that the temples received taxes, and therefore it would be relatively logical to suggest that 
they can hardly have been expected to pay them. lt is however not excluded that some of 
the dependents and servants of the temples may have paid taxes to the government, but 
there is no evidence that the temples as such paid taxes, and no reason to believe that they 
should have. The inscription of the High Priest lmn-btp can be interpreted as indicating that 
payments characterized as sJyt, smw, etc. belonging to the Temple of Amonrasonther were 
rendered to Pharaoh, but the context seems to indicate that the actual articles remained 
securely in the magazines of the temple, and thus it is difficult to contend that the payments 
were made to Pharaoh. 1193 lt would be far more logical to suggest that Pharaoh is praising 
11 93 Cf. supra, pp. l 86f. 
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him for having arranged for the supplies for Amonrasonther, as this supports Pharaoh's 
legitimacy. 1194 
P. BM l 0401 seems to record payments made by temples or temple personnel to the "Chief 
T axing-Master" .1195 The title is however that of the official responsible for the compilation of 
P. Wilbour, and the tentative conclusion discussed here is that P. Wilbour is a temple 
document, and thus, there is good reason to believe that the "requisitions" listed in P. BM 
l 040 l could record transactions within the temple administrative system, as Janssen 
concluded. 
The mysterious term tp-g_rt does however appear in both the inscription of lmn-btp and 
P. BM 10401, and this may have been an im post directly related to office-holders (cf. supra, 
pp. 287ff.). This suggests that if the tp-g_rt was a tax destined for the government in the 
modern sense of the word, and the tax was applied to individuals rather than institutions, it 
would confirm the suspicion that temple officials could be taxed, although their institutions 
were recipients of taxes. With the exception of the tp-g_rt, and the possible exception of the 
inw, the inscription of lmn-btp clearly states that all of the other items identified as taxes were 
destined for the temple of Amonrasonther, and this corresponds to the conclusions listed at 
length in this work. This alone would confirm that the ancient Egyptian State during the New 
Kingdom had a very sophisticated fiscal policy indeed. 
Pharaoh's income seems to have been designated as btkw and inw, both within Egypt and 
beyond the borders. The same can be said of the temples, so that both terms designated 
payments made to both sections of the state. lt is thus logical to suggest that both terms 
corresponded to what was actually delivered in order to comply with the assessments, as 
was concluded from the philological discussion. Thus, at least part of the evidence suggests 
that their primary meaning will have been that they represented a proportion of production 
or the fulfillment of a designated obligation, and that private people had to pay this. 1196 
1194 lt could however also be contended that this must be understood in the context of the close of the New Kingdom, 
and that the inwand the tp-Q'rt(although not the other items) were actually considered to have been passed on to 
Pharaoh, which can be grammatically an acceptable translation of the text. As the same text relates that the High 
Priest was responsible for construction projects - which were observed above to have been an exclusively 
Pharaonic responsibility - the context is unusual. Although it is not clear which monuments lmn-btp was referring 
to, the example of the small temple of Khons at Karnak may be taken as adumbrating the peculiar "construction" 
of the temple at Tanis - which consisted of transporting and rearranging blocks and monuments from Tell ed-
Dabo'a, and can hardly qualify as being monumental construction in the style of the earlier New Kingdom 
Phoraohs. Although they were hardly above this type of plundering, on occasion they did actually erect totally 
new monuments. 
1195 J. J. Janssen, ''Requisitions from Upper Egyptian Temples (P. BM 10401 )," JEA 77 (1991 ): 79-94. 
1196 These conclusions emerge from the evidence, reinforcing the conviction thot the mojor part of our documentation 
was derived from temple sources, and that the system of Pharaoh's own system of finance is not weil represented 
in the literature as preserved. lt's overall significance can best be judged by remarking that the temples did not 
seem to have had the resources for major construction projects, and that Pharaoh provided the resources, etc. for 
these, suggesting thot his means were far greater than those of the temples, but far less weil represented in the 
documentation os preserved. -
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These levies on income were taxes, but the remaining payments and deliveries discussed 
were taxes only to a very limited extent, because taxation is a system by which a proportion 
of the total income or wealth is exacted by the government in a system based on private 
enterprise. As the state - T emples and Pharaoh - was one of the main employers in ancient 
Egypt, the state was in effect acquiring certain "products" by imposing a kind of corvee 
labour measured in products rather than time, such as water from the water carriers, fish from 
the fishermen, etc. lt was also collecting a proportion of the grain produced in the fields from 
the cultivators, but probably according to at least two or three different systems. lt was also 
using the same "fiscal" terms to designate trading income, and objects either purchased or 
commissioned. 
In order to compensate or remunerate or pay for these efforts several systems were likewise 
being used: (1) it was paying its employees to carry out their jobs (as at Deir el-Medineh), (2) 
it was acquiring ordered products through exchange, and (3) it was assigning pieces of 
land to servants of the state, who were entitled to retain the major part of their income, but 
to render part of the yield to the state; and (4) it was also collecting a larger proportion of the 
production of the yield from some peasants who were entitled to what remained. This last 
category probably produced the greater part of the grain consumed by the state administration 
in wages and rations for its dependents and employees. lt will be noted that other members 
of the society will simply have been expected to contribute their labour (as the lapidary in 
P. Cairo 58096), 1197 while the scribe will have contributed his labour bJkw in writings, and 
a small proportion of his yield from the plot assigned to him. 
The T emples as Recipients of lncome and as Participants in Exchange 
lt was pointed out that - given the distribution of silver resources exploited in the ancient 
Near East- the dependents of the temples could not have acquired silver by mining. lt was 
concluded that the temples could and did acquire precious metals through the exchanges of 
their traders. lt was pointed out that parts of boats identified with temple activity were either 
being sold or purchased. lt was also pointed out that the temples were exchanging honey 
and clothing at markets. lt was likewise pointed out that vessels both certainly and apparently 
belonging to temples were involved in trading other articles appearing in P. Harris, identified 
in other texts andin P. Harris as inw and bJkw. lt was likewise pointed out that the temple 
dependents were not active full time in order to produce their quotas, and the textual 
evidence indicated that these quotas could only be understood as representing a fraction of 
their production. There is thus no reason to believe that the temple dependents can have 
been generating silver income for the temples except through taxation of commercial activities 
or through exchange or both.1198 The evidence of the commercial activities and taxation is 
clear, if recognized as such. 
1197 Cf. supra, pp. 242f. 
1198 B. Kemp ("Temple and town," in Ucko, Urbanism, pp. 660-66 l drew the same conclusions from different 
evidence), but his argument is marred by the fact that he assumes that the temples were paying laxes to the crown 
(based on a variant interpretation of the khato-land, etc.), and fails to grasp the intricacies of how the Vizier was 
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The implications are that the temples ( l) were acquiring silver either (a) as a type of tax-
revenue on the activities of temple dependents, or (6) from exchange activities, or (c) 60th 
exactions and exchange, and (2) using that silver in order to acquire other products, and to 
restock their stores, and thus that the relevant paragraphs dealing with the annual btri of sJyt, 
b;kw-rmJ might not 6e the income so much as the total turnover, as some of the items may 
have been sold to acquire silver, while others may have been purchased with that silver.1199 
The net result of the analysis of P. Harris sections 116, llc, 1116, lllc, IVb, IVc, V6 and Vc is that 
successive Pharaohs supplied dependents and land, etc. to the temples for their own use, 
and that the temples acquired material from these sources. This material was acquired 
partially in the form of a tax, but pro6a61y also as the assigned activity of the workers in 
question: miners mined, weavers wove, cultivators cultivated, fowlers fowled, herdsmen 
herded, 6oat makers made 6oats, and traders exchanged. 
In several cases we must assume that the workers were remunerated for their efforts, such as 
the miners, but in the case of the garments and boats, there is fragmentary evidence supporting 
the proposition that they were actually paid for the work in question.1200 The income from the 
holders of small plots (such as in P. Wil6our) suggests that the holders turned over a small 
proportion of their income from the plots, and kept the remainder, which is taxation or rent 
(and the opposite of "redistribution"). These small holders pro6a61y received plots ex officio 
to seNe as their source of income, effectively relieving the state of the necessity of looking 
after them - and thus deliberately circumventing the necessity of redistri6ution. Their payments 
responsible for ossuring thot the temples poid the woges of the Gong ot Deir el-Medineh, which was responsible 
to the King, but actuolly also to the temples, os o porticulor bronch of mortuory temples. Realizing the significance 
of the resources offered to the ternples, he failed to realise the restrictions which sei very firm boundories on their 
copocity. 
M . Römer ("Der Handel und die Kaufleute im alten Ägypten," SAK 19 [1992]: 276) fails to indicate the copocity 
in which traders were working for the temples, but does indicote thot traders had unusuol opportunities to engoge 
in exchange on their own due lo their mobility (SAK 19: 277). lt will probobly have been very difficult to keep 
tobs on all their activities, and therefore it moy be assumed that they were charged with certain obligotions to the 
temples with moterials placed at their disposal for thot purpose and that they also pursued their own private goin 
simultaneously, but this is pure speculation . 
The evidence of the Giornale lexl quoted indicotes that in controst to Römer's assumption (SAK 19: 276) the 
temples were also using precious rnetals in Egypt, not just abroad . The suggestion thot traders were shady 
choracters because of their access to precious metals which were intended to be tronsformed into statues, etc. 
(SAK 19: 282) probably exoggerotes the extent to which precious rnetals were an aspect of the relig ious world . 
lt would be difficult to deny thot the Egyptians loved jewelry and obtuse to suggest thot they only wore it in the 
tombs but never in real life. Precious metals and stones were most assuredly a common feature of life in certain 
closses, and could have been os easily stolen frorn private homes as from tombs ond temples. The fact that 
poyrnents in precious metals appear in the Turin Tax Lists - supra p. 145 - and 0 . Gord. 86 - supra pp. 159ff. 
- and probably in the lnscriptions of Mes and P. Volencoy 1 - supra pp. 136; 139 - all confirm thot ordinary 
people had occess to precious metols. McDowell Uurisdiction, pp. 227ff.) points out that theft was a serious 
problem even in Deir el-Medineh, where there was little worth stealing. Under the circumstances, traders will 
hove made themselves simultaneously populor and unpopular - in different constituencies - but not merely be-
couse of the religious connotations. 
1199 The rather bizarre discrepancies in some of the figures in P. Horris I could actually be attributed to book-keeping 
problems, if certoin shipments and deliveries were neglected . As this is entirely speculative, it is not worth 
elabarating on , but, cf. supra p . 280 nn. 1061 and 1063. 
1200 lt is cleorly foolish to drow over-orching conclusions from the Giornale boat text, but the meaning of the sheer 
logic of the situolion remoins: delivering 82 vessels onnuolly (P. Horris 126, 12) to the temple of Amun (90 for all 
the lemples) is not the result of toxotion, but assigned or controcted work. -
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were added to those of the !arger temple plots, and to those of the craftsmen and traders, 
and together these formed the income of the temples. The relevant sections of P. Harris are 
however therefore not merely a list of things acquired by taxation and by order (in the 
commercial sense of the word, rather than the military one) but also the lists indicate up to 
triple entry references to total temple turnover, including both the items exchanged and the 
products acquired. 
Sections lld, llld, IVd, and Vd list the objects which Pharaoh voluntarily relinquished to the 
temples. In lld these are termed inw. Gold, silver, precious stones (carnelian, lapis lazuli, 
turquoise) and myrrh are the import products par excellence, which Pharaoh acquired from 
foreign countries, and the ones which are customarily termed the inw from these countries. 
Garments and fruits are not the type of products one associates with the inw of the foreign 
countries. The lnstructions for the Vizier state explicitly that he was responsible for inw for 
festival offerings, seemingly of internal revenue. 1201 
Larger and Smaller T emples 
The other sections of P. Harris can be understood in the same fashion, as transfers from 
Pharaoh to the temples. 
In P. Harris, the sections concerning the smaller temples fail to employ the terms btkw, styt 
and htri, where these are found in the corresponding paragraphs of the !arger temples (Vc, 
as opposed to llc, lllc, IVc). This is inversely paralleled in the paragraphs of P. Wilbour, 
where the smaller temples receive smw, while the !arger temples do not labe! the grain 
transfers as such. There is a reference to smw in the Bilgai stele, where the religious institution 
is small in size. 1202 The Hermopolis decree of Seti I fails to use any of the conventional 
vocabulary with regard to temple products.1203 
This might potentially indicate that there were administrative distinctions between the major 
temples and the minor temples, and that their income was dealt with differently. Given the 
evidence however, it is difficult to say more. 
Although in the abstract, it is "the btkwof the Two Lands", 1204 "the btkwof Pharaoh", 1205 the 
"bJkw of the goddess", 1206 P. Harris I repeatedly refers to "their annual bJkw' ( 28, 3 ?) , "t h e i r 
annual htri" (686,5), "their inw" (9,3), reminiscent of the Bilgai Stele's "my htri " (vs . 17), 
"my bJkw-rmJ(vs. l 8), "my annual smw(vs. 20). lt seems clear that the obligation to pay is 
what belongs to the individuals in question . In the case of the Coastal Defense Officer of the 
Bilgai Stele, he is responsible for an obligation to pay the works of his dependents. The 
dollars go on, but the buck stops with him. 
120 1 Cf. supra, p. 80. 
1202 Cf. supra , pp. l 83ff. 
1203 KR/ 1: 125-126. 
1204 P. Harris 28,5; p. 210 supra. 
1205 Horemhab, line 32 (Kruchten, Horemheb, pp. l 16ff.); pp. l 88f., supra. 
1206 P Munich 809 2,2 (Allam, HOP Tafelteil, pp. 102-103); p. 238 supra. 
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lt is entirely possible that the text on the Bilgai stele also preserves an unusual instance of the 
relationships between small and large temples. Assuming that the Coastal Defence Officer 
was responsible for an official establishment (the mortuary temple of Siptah?) and a private 
one (the barque shrine), it would explain his anxiety to demonstrate that he had over-fulfilled 
his obligations to the official establishment in order to ovoid accusations that he had wrongly 
diverted official resources from those under his official authority to the private establishment, 
and thus risked the elimination of that private establishment. 
This stele not only throws light on the terms with which this study is concerned, but it also 
throws up two very relevant questions: (1) are any of these figures credible? and (2), if so 
why did he do it? lf our reasoning is correct, then this is the explanation for both questions: 
yes the figures are correct, and his motivation was to demonstrate his fulfillment of his 
obligations to the central administration in order to protect his shrine. 
On the assumption that there were in fact private religious structures, one is obliged to define 
the difference between the state religious organizations, and the unofficial organizations. 
The easiest way to distinguish these is using the categories of the Wilbour and Harris 1 
papyri to distinguish the great cultic centres of Memphis, Thebes and Heliopolis, which it 
was the obligation of every king to support. Just as private people could erect minor chapels 
to the gods of their choice, it was also the prerogative of the kings to build temples for Osiris, 
Hathor, Sobek and any others they may choose, diverting official resources to this purpose. 
This would be the origin of, e.g., the Nauri stele, for we have the unusual case that the king 
is diverting "secular government" funds and resources away from the government and to the 
temple. Under the circumstances, it would be easy for over zealous officials to attempt to 
recover the lost territories. lf this line of reasoning is correct, then it would explain why the 
Nauri stele was in Nubia, for it would have been difficult to have significantly expanded the 
resources available to a minor god within the context of Egypt. 
T HE ANCIENT EGYPTIAN MARKET EcoNOMY 
The evidence of P. Louvre E 3226 suggests that during Dynasty XVIII the state organs used 
grain as a medium of exchange to acquire other goods.1207 Janssen has suggested that the 
implications of various texts indicate that by the end of the Ramesside Period, the state grain 
income had declined lo the extent that the slale actually lurned to the market to acquire 
grain. 1208 lf this is correcl, it confirms that the surface area and yields of fields directly 
available to the king and temples were not increasing during Dynasty XX, as their income 
1207 Cf. Megally, Recherches. 
1208 Cf. J. J. Janssen, ''An Exceptional Event at Deir el-Medina (P. Turin 1879, Verso II) ," JARCE 31 (1994): 91-97. 
The extraordinary conclusion which ernerges frorn this is that the postulated grain rnarket had actually corne into 
existence. The interpretation is however bold, as the underlying assurnption is that the economic chaos led to the 
actions, and thus amounts to circular argumenlation if used as an illustration in this contexl. More serious is 
however the assumption that the metal is being taken from the workmen as individuals rather than from the 
institution of the tomb, as the text would certainly favour the latter rather than the former interpretation. 
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would otherwise have been sufficient to assure regular payments to the Gang.1209 Grandet 
recognized that the state did not actually collect grain and then redistribute it, and that it 
arranged for direct transfers of articles from producers to consumers without the necessity of 
central storage. Janssen has also identified market exchanges of objects other than grain. All 
of this suggests that the market was the primary means by which goods were allocated on 
a large-scale basis. 
The raw figures from P. Harris also give further food for thought. Reckoning that temple 
dependents could conceivably have received 2 khar/month (well below the grain wages of 
the Gang at Deir el-Medineh), the annual btri of 309'950 khar will have been insufficient to 
provide l 3'000 temple dependents with a low standard of living, and l 3'000 is only a 
small proportion of those supposedly attached to the temples, and a minuscule proportion of 
the population of ancient Egypt. The figure suggested by 0. Gard. 86 is far greater. Although 
probably fanciful, taken at face value it suggests that even the production of all the lands in 
the possession of the temple of Amun in the entire Delta was only five and a half times that 
amount, which could not possibly account for even 100'000 temple dependents. 
The agrarian economic system in Egypt was thus based on taxation and rent in which 
people were awarded plots in exchange for services, under the condition that they render 
up part of the surplus to state authorities. In one reference the very justification for issuing 
grain to an individual was the fact that the request was made by someone who did "not 
have a field", 121 0 superficially suggesting not only that (1) people normally got their income 
from their fields, but also that (2) it was usual for private individuals to have fields .1211 This 
suggests that welfare payments were the exception rather than the rule, and this case likewise 
cannot be taken as evidence for "redistribution" because the person in question is not 
"producing" anything, and does not lay claim to the payment on the basis of collective 
production of goods. 
Economically and demographically it can be concluded that (a) the annual btri was a mere 
skimming off of excess production and (6) that this type of income could not possibly have 
supplied the needs of a "wider redistribution system" 1212 based on a "temple-centered 
economy". 121 3 The over-all quantities for all categories of objects listed in P. Harris clearly 
demonstrate that this is a great deal of wealth, but it is certainly not enough to finance an 
entire country. lt is thus clear that the temples and the Pharaoh did not even own a significant 
portion of the land in ancient Egypt, and that their income from this land was not sufficient to 
maintain even the most primitive redistributive system. The evidence adduced here should 
conclusively demonstrate that the redistributive model cannot be supported on the basis of 
P. Harris 1. 1214 
1209 This naturally removes the last evidence supporting the contentions that all the land in Egypt belonged to the King, 
or that the lands not recorded in P. Wilb()ur belonged to the state (cf. supra pp. 61 n. l 18; 167) 
1210 A Erman, ''Ein Unterstützungsgesuch,' 245 38 (1900): 151-152. 
1211 This obviously is another argument against D. Kessler's conclusions ('Tempelbesitz,'' LÄ VI: 369) thot oll of the 
land in Egypt belonged either to the temples or the Crown . 
1212 E. Bleiberg , "The King's Privy Purse During the New Kingdom, 'JARCE 21 (1984) 156 
1213 E. Bleiberg, "The Redistributive Economy in New Kingdom Egypt," JARCE 25 (1988): 157. 
1214 For an interpretotion of P. Harris as representing the illustration of the redistribution system based on reciprocol 
obligations, cf. Grandel, Papyrus Harris II : 70-76. 
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In the absence of a functioning redistributive system, the role of the market becomes crucial. 
Janssen suggests that by the end of Dynasty X:X, the state was using metal to purchase grain 
on the market, indicating not only that the redistribution system did not exist, but also that the 
state was supporting an incipient monetary economy. At the same time, peasants will have 
been turning to the market to acquire metals in order to fulfill their obligations to the state. Put 
together, this is a complete reversal of the claims for a redistribution economy. There is thus 
not only no "redistribution", but the market is the primary means of allocating goods, even for 
state organs. Ultimately, the use of metal completely eliminated the link between production 
and consumption. 
The logic of the redistribution economy would suggest that one expect an increased 
concentration of economic power in the hands of the state officials and an increase in the 
circulation of grain. Such an interpretation would be logical in view of the monuments and 
texts preserved. The evidence of the role of the state in the market, and the use of metals in 
this exchange system seems to indicate that the monuments and texts need not be taken at 
face value, and that a completely different economy then emerges. As state bureaucratic 
structures tend to grow rather than diminish, it is far more logical to postulate that all earlier 
developments were based on an original market economy, from which the state initially 
profited, and finally participated. 
The ancient Egyptian economy would thus be a pre-capitalist market economy in an agrarian 
society in which the state played a significant role not merely as the recipient of income, but 
as a participant in exchange operations. The New Kingdom state would then be merely the 
largest single actor, but not the dominating feature of the whole economic landscape. This 
situation suggests that the economically significant aspects of "redistribution" were the 
construction projects sponsored by the king, where thousands of masons and labourers 
might have been employed - and presumably remunerated with grain on occosion. To the 
extent thot they were ordinary tox-paying farmers paid on a regular basis, their "wages" 
would hove been "redistribution" in a strict sense of the term, but economicolly they would 
fall within the market-exchange system based on asymmetrical relotions with workers ac-
cepting wages or compensation offered by a prospective employer. 
Except for the prevalent use of the word "redistribution", this would ordinarily be classified os 
circulation of taxation paid out as wages in economic terms. And were the word not used os 
an argument in and of itself ogainst the market economy, the redistribution concept would 
have disappeared long ago. 1215 lt will be noted that precisely those products delivered to 
the temples in P. Harris I reappear as payments to the workers at Deir el-Madineh in P. 
Greg. As the workers were state employees they were merely being poid, ond not benefici-
aries of o redistribution system. WhileJanssen has cautiously used the word "wages" for the 
payments made to the Gang at Deir el-Medineh, 1216 Grandet actually uses the word "wages" 
1215 Both Janssen and Müller-Wollermann have found cleor evidence of market, activities, but in each case the mere 
posited existence of the redistribution system is the explicit reason given for denying the relevance of the merket 
e.ach has discovered; cf. Janssen, Markt op de Oever, p. 23; R. Müller-Wollermann, "Warenaustausch im 
Agypten des Alten Reiches,'Jf5HO 28 (1985): 165. 
12 16 Jonssen, Prices, pp. 455-493. 
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for what he assumes was the equivalent of the "redistributed" income which annuls the 
principle of redistribution according to Polanyi, as his definition of "redistribution" depends 
upon the absence of "wage" labour. 1217 
lt is significant that the Gang at Deir el-Medineh (who made the New Kingdom royal tombs) 
was the only group of civil servants in ancient Egypt for whom there is evidence of a long 
term obligation, and yet they do not seem to have been paid regularly. lt must therefore be 
assumed that the state and temple system was not prepared to cope with even small-scale 
payments on a regular basis for years on end. lnsofar as they were paid for services rendered, 
the term "wages" describes their income, as they were not producing anything collectively. 
Others however - such as the smdt- were apparently obliged to work without remuneration, 
and this can be termed corvee labour. lf others were obliged to produce objects without 
remuneration, this can be termed "taxation" . lf the interpretation of the evidence concerning 
construction is correct, except for market activities, economically significant "redistribution" 
did not take place via the temples, and probably not at all. The temples may have channeled 
some "festival offerings" through to the people, but most of their economically relevant 
income will have been troded through the market. 
Together with widespread private ownership of land and the use of metal in exchange, by 
both state actors and private individuals, such a system underlines that the market was the 
basic feature. The significant aspects of the economy were thus "taxation", "remuneration" 
and "exchange", all of which can be characterized as "circulation", and easily understood in 
modern econom ic terms as characteristic of a market economy. 
Economically this could be termed a general equilibrium situation - as postulated by Walras -
in which the prices generated through allocation by means of market exchange were governed 
by theJevons's "law of indifference". The economic role of the temples in "redistribution" was 
probably largely restricted to the circulation of goods through exchange: retailing items 
which they received as income, exchanging them for other goods which they required. 1218 
This exchange capacity will have been mirrored by an uncertain degree of private enterprise, 
but the role of middlemen in these transactions will have been limited, while the resources 
available to the temples may have dwarfed those available to private traders. 
The effects on prices in this context are thus quite interesting, for it could be argued that the 
market might have been seriously impaired by the role of the temples. While the resources 
available to the temples need not have been any greater than indicated in the lists in 
P. Harris, it is evident that even the limited quantities listed in P. Harris reveal a decisive 
ability to influence the market. Furthermore, the temples need not have deliberately 
1217 Grandel, Papyrus Harris II : 59. This confirms that Grandel understood the material, but failed to draw the 
necessary theoretical conclusions. 
12 18 P. Brooklyn 35 . 1453 clearly shows market exchange transaclions of this type (Cf. Janssen, Markt op de Oever; 
V. Condon, "Two Account Papyri of the Lote Eighteenth Dynasty,' RdE 35 (1984) : 57-82) These transaclions 
make it probable that P. Leiden 1 350 vso.; P. Turin 2008 + 2016 aclually demonstrate that the temple received 
articles in order to resell them immediately (evidently with the express goal of acquiring profits, cf. Janssen, Ship 's 
Logs, and supra, pp. 222ff) . This conclusion certainly marginalizes the relevance of Grandet's conclusion (Papy-
rus Harris, pp. 59-60) that redistribution involved administrative instructions directing collection and delivery 
(cited supra, pp. 93ff) . lt effeclively indicales that the principal activilies were taxalion and relailing, as in 
Genesis (cf. supra, p. 95) . 
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endeavoured to make a calculated "profit" because the objects they were selling had been 
acquired without expenditures - as "taxes" - while private entrepreneurs could not afford to 
pursue exchanges without profits, and thus the temple exchanges might have increased 
competition, potentially without increasing motivation. Under normal market conditions in 
the modern world, market type price formation may thus have been inhibited by the fact that 
the temples acquired merchandise by means of taxation, signifying that cost factors in the 
modern sense of the word need not have influenced the prices employed by the temples in 
exchange operations. 
Although this inhibition might account for the seemingly anomalous price of papyrus discussed 
supra (pp. 71 f), it can be argued that the market determined the prices despite this seemingly 
monopolistic situation. The reason is that in the peculiar nature of the Egyptian economy, 
precious metals and textiles, etc. were both "money" and "articles", meaning that in exchange 
operations, the temples will have been circulating both metals and products. This means that 
if the temples aspired to fix any prices independently of the market, entrepreneurs would 
immediately have been able to profit from the opportunity for competition: either by investing 
in metals or textiles, depending upon where the temples were not responding to market 
values. Therefore the temples could not pursue a monopolistic price policy. This implies that 
the prices in ancient Egypt correspond not so much to Jevons's "law of indifference" as to 
Walras's system of tatonnement. Walras actually postulated that in an ideal situation of 
equilibrium, entrepreneurs would be unable to make profits and the consumer would win, 
because competition would reduce profits to costs.1219 The role of the temples need not have 
been great in order to effectively inhibit price competition: the temples need merely to have 
been stronger than any other individual entrepreneur in order to prevent price fluctuations 
from injuring the consumer. This implies that the demonstrated price stability corresponded to 
a "general equilibrium analysis", and that the market ultimately determined prices. Walras 
wrote: 
Thus, in a state of equilibrium in production, entrepreneurs make neither profit nor 
loss. 1220 
Dominating markets and making generous distributions of festival offerings, other actors 
would have been unable to compete with the object of making profits in trade. The equilibrium 
would been supported by state enterprise, and dependent upon it for all facets of economic 
life. Thus, despite the fact that the state may not have dominated the economy, its position 
will have assured that it determined economic activity by influencing the market, rather than 
by decree. Extensive profit-oriented commercial trading was virtually impossible, and price-
formation not dictated by competition between entrepreneurs . lt is evident that under the 
circumstances, being attached to a temple or an administrative position promised great 
advantages. This does not however mean that there were not even greater advantages 
1219 Cf. Wolros, Economie Politique, pp. 24 1-294. 
1220 Cf. Screponti/Zornagni, Economic Thought, pp. 165-169. They quote Wolros, p. 167. 
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when office was combined with private enterprise. These officials could easily have continued 
to acquire wealth by private commercial trading: they merely combined the two. 1221 
Viewed thus, not only are Gutgesell's determined economies eliminated for theoretical reasons 
(since he sought to explain the phenomena without investigating its possible causes), but 
Polanyi's whole system of categories is rendered irrelevant, for the basic guiding force 
would still be the exchange system, which was both inhibited and supported by the state 
economic intervention. As was pointed out at the outset of this study, the Keynesian analysis 
would suggest that the overall economic system was not sufficiently highly developed to take 
up the slack when state demand flagged, so that the very weakness of the market without 
state support demonstrates that the economy was economically dominated by a skewed 
market. At the same time, we have established that state trading may have played an 
additional role impairing the development of competitive markets. This may have guaranteed 
price stability and security but it thus impeded the ability of the market to replace the state, 
when the latter failed . 
Should the logic of compulsory payments in metal for agricultural "tax"-purposes be followed 
however, the evidence of the temple dependents likewise obliged to render their obligations 
in metal 1222 assumes an unexpected importance, as the transformation to a monetarised 
economy with a comparatively retrograde administrative organization can be assigned a 
significant role. These two fundamental imbalances - administrative/procedural and eco--
nomic/ financial - probably contributed more to the collapse than a decline in morals. 
Thus, the increased role of the temples and the diminished role of Pharaoh meant that neither 
a free market economy nor a centrally propelled demand stimulus economy could function . 
At the beginning of Egyptian history an aggressive state investment program had raised 
demand and nurtured private enterprise. When it faltered two millennia later, this perfectly 
balanced system stifled and strangled economic growth. 
In ancient Egypt there was always a very strict palace economy, in which only small 
local market-places existed . After the Amarna period, however, there developed a 
growing trade in Egypt, partly in surpluses of the temples, partly in imports from 
abroad. This trade was in the hands of the temples or of highly positioned persons 
and was carried out by foreign, mostly Syrian, employees. In the end, these Syrian 
merchants sold their merchandise more or less on their own account and directly to 
the people. As there were too many goods offered compared to the marked scarcity 
of "money" in the hand(s) of the people, the moral of the people broke down and 
they tried to obtain "money" by illegal means.1223 
122 1 Cf the important poinl made by Kemp ('Old Kingdom, Middle Kingdom and the Second lntermediate Period, ' 
Trigger, Social History, p. 81) that the mere possession of titles need not demonstrate that one was not deeply 
involved in private economic activity. Although Kemp was referring to the Old Kingdom , D. Rathbone (Economic 
Rationalism, passim) studied the profit-minded private estate management in the Roman period of people who 
were officially known as Councillors of Alexandria. 
1222 As perhaps in the Turin Tax Lists and certainly in 0. Gardiner 86, supra, pp. 145; l 59ff. 
1223 W. Helck, "The Dissolution of the Palace Economy in the Ramesside Period," in Function of the Minoan Palaces, 
p. 17. 
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Although masterly and certainly correct in many details, W. Helck's interpretation of the 
developments is clearly at variance with this understanding.1224 Like M. Römer, Helck 
assumes that a decline in morals accompanied the increase in trade and was related to the 
wealth of the temples, and the practice of theft. 1225 Both models are built on the assumption 
of a declining redistribution palace economy, and take evidence from the materials available 
to support an interpretation corresponding to the discrepancy between pre--conceived ideas 
and the known facts. This approach is not only circular - in finding that the final result is 
related to their suppositions - but also slightly simplistic. 
Not only does this method pre-suppose a transformation where a transformation need not 
be postulated, but Helck's approach fails to distinguish between the spheres of responsibility 
implied by the interpretation presented here, which implies a fundamental imbalance 
between responsibility, authority and capacity. The "Teaching of Ani" seems to support 
Helck in suggesting that the acquisition and expansion of wealth were not negative, but it 
does equally assert that tobe a scribe was among the most important things. 1226 The values 
represented do not seem to vary much from those known earlier, although the sense of 
responsibility does show a perceptible decline in comparison to the Middle Kingdom. lt is 
difficult to estimate the degree to which temple trading could influence morals, as opposed 
to the failure of the authorities to assure that the grain surplus increased, i.e., the problem 
was not the political and economic potency of Karnak, but the political and economic 
impotence of the king combined with the lock of a legitimate means providing Karnak with 
the ability to take up the entire royal role, and the failure to realise this. 1227 
The evidence available today indicates that theThird lntermediate Period did not initiate an 
era of flourishing capitalistic economics, but rather that the temple domination of the economy 
continued unabated. The overall level of wealth did however drop significantly, or fail to 
grow. lt is only due to the utter ruin of the state economy at the end of Dynasty XX that the 
market aspects come to the fore, because evidence from other sectors is lacking. This does 
not mean that these market aspects were not there earlier, and cannot be used to argue an 
increase in the market sector. The presence of foreign traders can hardly be described as 
something new, since the evidence indicates that economically active foreigners were 
significantly involved in Egypt since at least Dynasty XII (and probably contributed significantly 
1224 
"Dissolution," in Funcfion of the Minoan Palaces, pp. 17-19. 
1225 M. Römer, "Der Handel und die Kaufleute im alten Ägypten," SAK 19 (1992): 279-281. 
1226 Cf. Quack, Ani, pp. 101; 107. Cf. supra, p. 102 n. 27 4; pp. 133f. lf Quack's Ramesside date is correcl (Ani, 
pp. 61 f.), it could indicate a change in values, but betrays the fundamental production-oriented antagonism 
based on accumulation and trading rather than production for the acquisition of weolth. 
1227 His assumption that the central organization was solely responsible for wholesale import purchasing during 
Dynasty XVIII is not demonstrated . N. de G. Davies and R. 0. Faulkner \"A Syrian Trading Venture to Egypt, 'JEA 
33 [ 1947j: 45) wrote: 'The bulk of the merchandise discharged [ ... was doubtless [ ... ] for the gronaries of Amun 
under his control, and possibly also for other high authorities.' Their conclusion is possible, but not compelling. 
This must be sei against the much later miscellany text indicating that it was reasonable to suggest that a scribe's 
ship could come from Syria (P. Anast. IV 3, 1 O; LEM p. 38,4; Caminos, LEM, p. 138); and the archaeological 
evidence (cf. Merrillees, Pottery, pp. 173-17 4). Cf. also E. W. Castle, ''Shipping and Trade in Ramesside 
Egypt, 'JESHO 35 (1992): 239-277; and Ouack, Ani, p. l O l. lf the state was not alone responsible for large 
scale Irade before the Amoma period, Helck's argument crumbles (which alone does not demonstrate the veracity 
of this one, of course) . 
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to the rise of the Hyksos, for a variety of reasons) . lt is possible that the role of the state in the 
market economy increased, and that this leads to the impression that the market is appearing . 
lt is more probable however that state involvement in the market accompanied the overall 
decline of the state sector, and thus drew the veil away from the market. 
A supplementary explanation could be sought proceeding from the inscriptions of Mes and 
P. Valen<;:ay I which suggest that even revenues from fields were collected in metal during 
the New Kingdom, and the implication of a development similar to that introduced under the 
T'ang and Sung Dynasties in China should be evident. 1228 Although metal was unquestionably 
collected during the Old and Middle Kingdoms, exacting taxes on agricultural land in metal 
may have been new. These two hints are the only indications supporting a metal-based 
monetarisation of the economy and should not be overdrawn. Combined with Janssen's 
suggestion that the state was actually using meta! to purchase grain, this evidence assumes 
a completely different significance. The ultimate fall of the Empire and Egypt's failure to 
recover can be ascribed to multi-fold fundamental economic dislocations, among which the 
most fundamental will have been state exploitation of the market, combined with the failure 
to sustain the grain based economy which had produced the Old Kingdom. 
The economic implications of this development were that a full-scale grain market was 
called into existence, where peasants would be competing with state officials to dispose of 
their grain: the peasants to acquire the metals to pay the taxes, and the officials to acquire 
desired goods. The existence of the grain market by the end of Dynasty XX would confirm 
that any previously existing redistribution system had utterly failed. 
As demand had previously required that the surplus be at the disposal of the state, the drop 
in construction projects can either be attributed to ( l) the very existence of the grain market, 
since the incentive to work for grain wages would be limited in a world with a market 
overflowing with grain; or to (2) the decline in production due to administrative factors. In 
either case, the economy was destined to decline, with a decreasing supply of precious 
metals available, and a decreasing incentive to produce a surplus, since bumper crops 
would merely result in falling prices, and thus higher taxes and lower income. As the prosperity 
of the earlier period had been dependent upon a system in which over-production had 
1228 Cf. pp. lOlf.; l 36f.; 139 supra . Whether the reference to the sJytof silver and gold refers to Pharaoh's own 
income in the Horemhab Decree (supra, p. 189) is less certain , although in this case, the mere presence of the 
precious metals is significant. lt is clear that the acquisition of gold and silver continued despite Horemhab's edict, 
whatever the original intent of this part of the frogmentary !ext was. The vogue suspicion orises however thot 
Pharaoh started to seek access to the metol wealth of his own citizens rather than that of foreign countries 
somelime after the occession of Amenophis III, ond il is probobly this developmenl which is the cause of the 
symptom of decline idenlified by Helck in his assumplion that private transactions from the time of the Amoma 
period led to the decline of the economy. The primary difference between the two interpretations would merely be 
setting the blame clearly on Pharaoh for curtailing private activity, distorting the grain market, and reducing the 
incentive to produce. For the proportions of gold and silver in Dynaslies XVIII and XX, cf. supra, p . 20. 
Everylhing suggests that an economic development in the direction which the rest of Asia followed until the middle 
of the 18th century AD. (cf. Chaudhuri, Asia before Europe) was in the making, but that the crucial situation of an 
independent market had failed to emerge before the end of the Ramesside period. Strangely enough, it has 
likewise been claimed that China was on the verge of an industriol revolution in the 12th century AD. and one 
wonders whot the ultimate role of finonciol arrangements with low interesl rotes and increasing supplies of silver 
had in the European experience after 1500 AD. 
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resulted in increased income, the tables were now turned on the peasants. The only 
conceivable outlet for excess production under these changed circumstances lay in exports, 
and a half millennium of decline would ensue before the Mediterranean grain market would 
be able to take up the slack: the economy could not save itself under the changed 
circumstances.1229 
Prior to the emergence of the Mediterranean grain market, however, trade will have been 
carried out both internationally and on a local scale. On the international scale one could fit 
the two shipwrecks found off the Turkish coast into a vast web of interlocking markets, as is 
evident from their cargoes. Both the cargoes and the systems of weights present on the ships 
indicated that these traders were internationally active. 1230 lt is however interesting to note 
that it is generally speculated that both ships were victims of bad weather. Both the Cape 
Gelidonya wreck and the Ulu Burun wreck lie off the Lycian coast, and there are complaints 
about Lycian pirates in the Amarna letters, indicating that these ships could equally easily 
have been the victims of foul play. 1231 Such trading ventures will have been primarily 
concerned with prestige goods rather than bulk goods, until political security could be 
established. 
One of the arguments in favour of the state adduced above was the security guaranteed by 
a political organization, and this security was necessarily lacking on the fringes of the 
Ancient Orient (such as the Lycian coast). Within the territories of the major states, however, 
security was guaranteed intimes of peace. lt is evident that the logical conclusions following 
from the preceding notes are that price stability in ancient Egypt can be associated with 
Walrasian general equilibrium analysis, and that this type of price stability corresponds very 
closely to the price systems prevailing among peasant societies. Suchsystems correspond to 
the "market-days" and "market-towns" of the peripheral parts of the modern world. In recent 
years, it has become clear that this was a central element of the world beyond the 
Mediterranean long before the emergence of the trade fairs which characterized the end of 
the European Middle Ages. Such fairs were protected by the local political authorities. 
1229 lt must be repeated that Kemp's postulated ''finite limits of the agricultural surplus" ("Old Kingdom, Middle King-
dom and Second lntermediate Period," in Trigger, Social History, p. 176, quoted supra, p. 125) did not really 
identify the principal difficulty, which was not production, but consumption. As Egypt later exported grain in the 
Eastern Mediterranean and subsequently became the grain supplier for the Roman Empire, the problem was 
clearly markets, not production. 
lt is curious to note that K. Baer ("The Low Price ofland in Ancient Egypt, " JARCE l [ 1962 ]: 25-45, esp. p. 29) 
suspected that the low prices in the Third lntermediate Period were due to the political situation, while this 
explanation would underline the futility of owning land for purely economic reasons. As the political decline is 
being progressively thrown into doubt, the economic factors assume a greater importance. Baer's date for the 
"Stele d'apenage" requires emending, and the units perhaps as weil, but the dato is still valid for its general 
relevance (cf. D. A. Warburton , "Keynes 'sehe Überlegungen zur altögyptischen Wirtschaft," ZÄS l l 8 [ 1991 ] : 
p. 84 n. 26) . 
1230 Cf Bass, Gelidonya, pp. 135-142; 163-167; M .-H. Gates, "Archaeology in Turkey," AJA 99 (1995): 223-
225, for the most recent references to the Ulu Burun wreck. 
1231 The letters from the King of Alasia mention these, cf. EA 38ff. lt would appear entirely possible that the Cape 
Gelidonya ship was actually trying to flee when it foundered 
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Sir John Hicks erected his entire theory of economic development on the principle that these 
trade fairs appeared in the Mediterranean world, and that they had not existed elsewhere.1232 
K. Chaudhuri has however shown that Asian trading cictivities and towns and cities long 
preceded their emergence in the Mediterranean. 1233 Many models have been erected on 
the basis of excluding Asia and the Ancient Orient from the development of market economics, 
although it is now evident that the Europeans learnt the principles of market economics from 
Asia. This reasoning has constantly led to circular logic, which confirms the point of departure. 
lt is more logical to suggest that the temple vessels proceeding along the banks of the Nile 
were stopping at the ancient Egyptian equivalent of trade fairs, and that these trade fairs 
were the basic characteristic of the Egyptian exchange economy.1234 
The Pharaohs and the temples extracted wealth from the land. They used this wealth to build 
monuments and stimulated the economy in an extraordinary fashion and recorded this in 
inscriptions. While these inscriptions detail their own activity, and the role of the temples 
etc., they also imply and explicitly mention and confirm market economic activity, but the 
evidence has been repeatedly denied, because the preconceptions prevented it from being 
recognized . There has also been a tendency to compare different types of evidence, with-
out consciously reflecting on whether this was justifiable.1235 
CüNCLUSIONS 
The birth of the ancient Near Eastern Market Economy can probably be assigned the 
relatively arbitrary date of 2000 B.C. Before this date, the Anatolians were mining tin, and 
1232 Hicks, Economic History, pp. 25 -41 . Sir John actually went so far as to deny that trading-cities could have 
existed along the coasts of the Indian subcontinent (p. 39), as if unconscious of why the British, French and 
Portuguese fought for the possession of the subcontinent. 
1233 Chaudhuri, Asia Before Europe, passim. 
1234 Cf. S. R. Epstein, "Regional fairs, institutional innovation, and economic growth in lote medieval Europe," EHR 47 
(1994): 459-482, for an analysis of the regional - as opposed to international - aspects of these fairs, and a 
lengthy bibliography. There is naturally no reason why foreign merchants could not have participated in the 
Egyptian riverbank markets (as in the frequently discussed scene presented by N . de G. Davies and R. 0 . 
Faulkner, "A Syrian Trading Venture to Egypt, "JfA 33 [1947]: 40-46). 1 would advocate that this scene is the 
ideal portrait of the river-bank market, but this is pure speculation. 
1235 One could note that Helck's observations took several different details and then drew chronologically far reaching 
conclusions which reAected little more than circular logic (assuming a redistribution palace economy which then 
faltered, etc.) 
The same phenomenon guided the speculation about the price of papyrus. Caminos and C:erny assumed that 
because it was reused, it must have been expensive. The explanation for the "seeming scarcity" and the seemingly 
low price is probably easily explained: the administration probably used lots of papyrus for administrative docu-
ments which were soon out of date. This papyrus could be used to make cartonnage for coffins, or it could be 
used to write on. Since there was so much used papyrus around, there was probably little or no motivation to 
purchase new papyri, except for books of the dead , etc. Thus, papyrus could have been cheap, but widely 
reused, because of its abundance. 
The conclusions and the logic are not all part of one consistent argument - different things are being mixed 
together, and the result does not necessarily lead to decisive conclusions. The suggestion made here is possible. 
(There should be little doubt about its relatively low price - accounting for it is another matter.) 
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Babylonia was under the thumb of the Redistributive Economy of the Third Dynasty of Ur. 
After this date, the gold:silver ratio in Egypt changed from 2:1 to 1 :2, and the Anatolians 
stopped mining tin, and the Old Assyrian traders introduced trading profits and fluctuating 
prices. Prices throughout the ancient world were henceforth denominated ultimately in silver 
or copper and the "Theory of Comparative Advantage" dictated economic activity in every 
corner of the ancient Near East. Even if people did not notice the change, it has effected 
every aspect of their lives ever since.1236 
In Egypt, economically we have seen that it was demand which was the crucial factor in 
raising wealth, by creating the surplus and the division of labour which were the prerequisites 
for the circulation of goods. Politically this surplus was taxation, and economically these 
goods were circulated through exchange, rations, and wages, but not redistribution. Politically 
and economically the evidence preserved is heavily weighted in favour of the temples, yet it 
is evident that the temples were only an adjunct to the centrally steered demand economy. 
The role that the temples played in the exchange economy implied both stability and justice, 
but limited the possibility for entrepreneurs to compete with the state, so that entrepreneurial 
skills were lacking when the state declined. Although the system worked well for everyone 
while demand and circulation increased, it went badly for everyone when demand and 
circulation decreased. 
The terminology studied in this work suggests that payments directed to the temples can be 
termed "taxes" and "rents", but that the original objects acquired were re-circulated through 
a market mechanism, by means of which the temples acquired other objects which they 
required. lt was however established that the Pharaohs kept the temples on a very short 
leash, maintaining control of the stone and incense essential for cultic activity. 
In terms of the overall development through Egyptian history, the economic centres were the 
royal court and certain powerful families during the Old Kingdom. Throughout Egyptian 
history, most of the land was in the hands of private land-owners, large and small. Throughout 
Egyptian history there were private craftsmen and traders working on their own account as 
well as with the state. The taxation of these land-owners and craftsmen was introduced or 
formalized during the Archaic period and increased during the early part of the Old Kingdom. 
This created wealth by increasing demand, sharpening the division of labour, and contributed 
to a flourishing private economy. The concentration of wealth will however have given the 
court a central role in exchange, as well as acquisition. 
This central role need not however have been over bearing: it need merely have been 
substantial enough to determine the general level of economic activity. The state exploited 
1236 lt is perhaps worth noting that the crucial developments leading to this international market economy must be 
dated to the transition from the Ubaid Period to the Uruk Period, ca. 4500 - 4000 B.C. (?). The next decisive 
change was the international economy al ca. 2000 B.C., and then the global economy since ca. 1571 A.D. lt 
is very curious that the value of silver determined all economic activity between 2000 B.C. and roughly 1700 
B.C. At this point European interest rotes dropped unexpectedly, precipitously and permanently from c. 30 per 
cent. to 2 .5 - 7 per cent., and the industrial revolution was made possible (because it was now worth borrowing 
money to manufacture, as opposed to borrowing money in order to make trading profits). 
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the possibilities of existing market exchange mechanisms, and was able to maintain a 
relatively "just" price structure. These prices were however determined by self-interest of the 
entrepreneurs because of the Walrasian general equilibrium, and not maintained by decree 
or even deliberately. This implied that when the centrally steered demand economy 
declined, only those geographical areas with the requisite social structure still intact could 
reorganize their own miniature imitations of the state economy, which maintain a high level 
of economic activity, while those more immediately effected by developments were unprepared 
for the assumption of political responsibility, and their situation declined. The Middle Kingdom 
endeavoured to resurrect the system at a different level, which led to an imitation of the 
situation in the Old Kingdom. The Second lntermediate Period was far more complicated 
than the First, and the repercussions difficult to survey and interpret on an equally global 
scale, but the resurgence of the New Kingdom introduced the same centrally steered 
demand economy. 
The essential aspect of this central steering was not redistribution, but "collection" and 
"exchange" of a surplus which effectively increased overall wealth and prosperity. Thema-
terial beneficiaries of this system were the ostentaciously wealthy occupants of the temples 
and palaces. Material benefits also accrued to the population at !arge as the articles 
acquired through taxation were circulated through the economy in market exchange in 
order to acquire other goods. The exploitation of the market mechanism benefited all sectors 
of society, so long as the state's grain surplus was sufficient to stimulate demand and 
circulation. 
During the New Kingdom however, the temples acquired a significance in terms of the 
legitimacy of the Empire and relations with the Kings that was unparalleled during the Old 
and Middle Kingdoms. Although politically significant as independent actors, their economic 
activities were curtailed by a failure to endow them with the equivalent administrative and 
infrastructural support, so that when the royal family failed to produce the powerful leaders 
necessary, the temples were unable to fill the gap, being unprepared for the responsibilities 
which they must have assumed to supplant the Kings. As much of the valuable human 
resources of the country had been incorporated into the administrative structure of the country 
in the course of developments during the preceding millennia, the social structure was not as 
well prepared to assume the responsibilities expected of it, as certain provincial areas had 
been able to at the close of the Old Kingdom. 
The result was that although the b;kw-obligations lay heavily on the population, creativity 
and productive forces had also been supported and developed, but without the social and 
economic transformations required to free them, so that society was unprepared for the slip 
in central demand with the result that external interference could not be adequately resisted, 
and decline set in, without any chance of the Crown recovering the position that it had had 
vis-a -vis the temples at the beginning of the New Kingdom. 
An irreversible shift in the balance of economic power had occurred, and the political 
system was unequal to the task of rectifying it. Economically, the crushing blow was the 
appearance of a grain market in which the state competed with other members of society. · 
Combined with the introduction of a monetarised system of payments for agricultural taxes, 
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this decimated the virtues of using grain and work as the primary elements of state income 
and expenditure. While this inevitably undermined the state economy, it also diminished the 
value of private land-ownership. In the period immediately after the Ramesside period, the 
nmbwfound the obligation to pay taxes a burden which was worth more than the land. As 
a result, they began to seil their land, cyclically driving its price even further down, and 
weakening their social position, as they became tenants on land which they had previously 
owned .1237 Thus after the end of the New Kingdom Egyptian society was changed, as the 
roles of the state and the people were fundamentally transformed. 
During the Ramesside period the commercial role of the temples had discouraged the develop-
ment of an independent market based on competition and profit, so that the private sector 
was economically and socially unprepared and unable to develop freely, without the market-
favoring methods of the temples. The consequence was that politically, the central organiza-
tions of the state became a crushing burden rather than a creative factor. The result was that 
state expenditures overtook income, production plummeted, and the capital of the country 
was expended, and ruin followed, as Ricardo pointed out would inevitably hoppen. As the 
temples had become the guarantors of legitimacy, it was impossible for the ruling family to 
recover its previous independent economic and political power, and the Egyptian state was 
condemned to eternal decline. 
The whole development indicates that economically the goods exchanged and the nature of 
the market did not contribute to the development of a high level of exchange, i.e., an 
economy in which the market mechanism fueled and stimulated an economic take-off leading 
to production for a market dominated by traders, because ( l) at least a !arge part of the sale 
and distribution of the limited spectrum of manufactured goods remained in the hands of the 
producers, even where production was market-oriented and not necessarily motivated by 
specific orders by clients; (2) a sufficiently large part of the independent commercial trading 
was in the hands of the central state organizations which impinged on price competition 
due to the Walrasian equilibrium guaranteed by their behavior; and (3) the saturation of the 
market with grain failed to enable private investments to prosper without an export economy. 
The failure of the market to move beyond th is low level implied that state-sponsored eco-
nomic activity - both taxation and trade with articles acquired through taxation - was 
decisive for the economy, and that the economy rose and fell with the state taxation and 
investment programs. 
1237 Cf. Römer, Priesterherrschaft, pp. 446-451 . 
338 
PART V 
ßlBLIOGRAPHY 

ßlBLIOGRAPHICAL ÄBBREVIATIONS 
N.B. 
This list includes the obbreviations of monographs, periodicols, series ond institutions, etc. of 
immediate bibliogrophical relevance. 
All monographs have been cited in the abbreviated form only. Certain works have been 
abbreviated with author and title (as, e.g., Assmann, ÄHGJ, others merely by title (as, e.g., 
H.O., LRL, etc.). 
Only sources cited in abbreviated form in the text are listed here. 
Articles in periodicols and collective works cited in the notes are in the following bibliography. 
In citing sources in the text the object has been to (1) provide maximum accessibility, while 
(2) indicating the relevance of the source. The text will thus refer to e.g ., 0 . Gard. 86, while 
the notes will refer the reader to H.O. 81-82. References such as "LEM, Caminos LEM" or 
"LRL, Wente LRL" refer to the published text, and the translation. The hope is that the reader 
will recognize the source quickly. 
ÄAT 
ÄgAbh 
AEO 
Ahitw 
AIPHOS 
AJA 
Allam 
Allam 
Allen 
Andrassy 
AOS 
ARCE 
ASAE 
Toponyms 
Grund und Boden 
HOP 
Boolc. of the Dead 
Staat 
Ägypten und Altes Testament. Wiesbaden. 
Ägyptologische Abhandlungen. Wiesbaden. 
A. H. Gardiner. Ancient Egyptian Onomastica. 3 vols. Oxford, 1947. 
S. Ahitw. Canaaniie Toponyms in Ancient Egyptian Documenls. Jersusalem, 
1984. 
Annuaire de /'institut de philologie et d'histoire orientales et slavs. Brussels. 
American Journal of Archaeology. Boston. 
S. Allam (ed.). Grund und Boden in Altägypten. Tübingen: Untersuchungen 
zum Rechtsleben im alten Ägypten 2, 1994. 
S. Allam (ed.) . Hieratische Ostraka und Papyri. 2 Parts. Tübingen: Urkunden 
zum Rechtsleben im alten Ägypten, 1973. 
T. G. Allen. The Book of the Dead or Going Forth by Day. Chicago: SAOC 37, 
1974. 
P. Andrassy .... Unpublished PhD thesis. Berlin, 1987. 
American Oriental Series. New Haven. 
American Research Center in Egypt. 
Anna/es du Service des Antiquites de l'Egypte. Cairo. 
341 
Assmann 
Assmann 
Assmann 
Assmann 
Atzler 
AV 
BA 
Bakir 
Ball 
Ball , etal. 
BAR 
Barry 
Bartl 
BASOR 
Bass 
BD 
BdE 
Beckerath 
Bellamy 
BibAe 
Bierbrier 
Bietak 
BIFAO 
Bib. Not 
BiOr 
Birch 
Blaug 
Blaug 
BMFA 
ÄHG 
Ma'at 
Problems 
Sinngeschichte 
Herrschaftsformen 
Epistolography 
Theory 
Political Innovation 
Theory 
Zwischen Euphrat 
und Tigris 
Gelidonya 
Chronologie 
Theories 
Papyrus 
Tell ed-Dab 'a II 
Facsimile 
Economic History 
Economic Theory 
Bibliographical Abbreviations 
J. Assmann. Ägyptische Hymnen und Gebete. Zurich, 1975. 
J. Assmann. Mo 'af: Gerechtigkeit und Unsterblichkeit im Alten Ägypten. Munich, 
1990. 
J. Assmann, G . Burkard, V. Davies (ecls.) . Problemsand Priorities in Eyptian 
Archaeology. London: Studies in Egyptology, 1987. 
Ägypten: eine Sinngeschichte. Darmstadt, 1996. 
M. Atzler. Unter.suchungen zur Herausbildung von Herrschaftsformen in Ägypten. 
Hildesheim: HAB 16, 198 l. 
Archäologische Veröffentlichungen of the DAI, Cairo. Mainz. 
Biblical Archaeologist. Baltimore. 
A. Bakir. Egyptian Epistolography. Cairo: BdE 48, 1970. 
T. Ball. Reappraising Political Theory. Oxford, 1995. 
T. Ball, J. Farr, R. L. Hansom (eds.). Politica/Jnnovafion and Conceptual Change. 
Cambridge Universty Press: ldeas in Context, 1989. 
J. H. Breasted. Ancient Records of Egypt. 5 vols. Chicago, 1906-1907. 
N. R. Barry. An lntroduction to Modem Political Theory. London, 19953. 
K. Bartl, R. Bernbeck, M . Heinz (eds.). Zwischen Euphrat und Tigrus: Aktuelle 
Forschungsprobleme in der vorderasiatischen Archäologie. Hildesheim, 1995. 
Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research. Baltimore. 
G. F. Bass, et al. Cape Gelidonya: A Bronze Age Shipwreck. Philadelphia : 
Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, vol 57 / 8, 1967. 
Book of the Dead (followed by "Spell" No, cf. Naville Tb.; or Allen, Book of 
the Deod or Hornung Tb.). 
Bibliotheque d'Etude. Cairo: IFAO. 
J. ~on Beckerath. Chronologie des ägyptischen neuen Reiches. Hildesheim: 
HAB 39, 1994. 
R. Bellamy (ed .). Theories and Concepts of Politics: an /ntroduction. Manches-
ter, 1993. 
Bibliotheca Aegyptica . Brussels. 
M . L. Bierbrier(ed.). Papyrus: Struc/ure and Usage. London : BMOP 60, 1986. 
M. Bietak. Tell el-Dab 'a II. Vienna : Österreichische Akademie der 
Wissenschaften Denkschri~en der Gesamtakademie Band IV Untersuchungen 
der Zweigstelle Kairo des Osterreichischen Archäologischen Institutes 1, 1975. 
Bulletin de l'Jnsfitut Fran<;ais d'Archeologie Orientale. Cairo. 
cf. B.N. 
Bibliotheca Orientalis. Leiden . 
S. Birch. Facsimileofan Egyptian Hieratic Papyrus. London , 1876; Wiesbaden 
1982 2. 
M. Blaug. Economic History and the History of Economics. New York, 1986. 
M. Blaug. Economic Theory in Retrospect. Cambridge, 1985 4 . 
Boston Museum of Fine Arts . 
342 
BMOP 
B.N. 
Boorne 
Bothmer 
Botti/Peet 
Brumfiel 
BSEG 
CA 
CAD 
CAH 
Caminos 
Caminos 
CdE 
CDME 
Cerny 
Cerny 
Cerny 
Cerny 
Cerny/Groll 
CG 
Chaudhuri 
Claessen/ 
Skalnik 
Claessen/ 
Skalnik 
Cohen/ 
Service 
Creedy 
DA! 
Dovies 
Duties 
luxor Museum 
Giornale 
State 
lEM 
Tale ofWoe 
Community 
Notebooks 
Paper and Books 
Volley 
Asia before Europe 
EarlyState 
Study of the Stote 
Origins of the State 
Foundations 
Amoma 
Bibliographical Abbreviations 
British Museum Occasional Papers. London. 
Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris (ostraca and papyri in the collection). 
G. P. F. van den Boom. TheDuties of the Vizier. London: Studies in Egyptology, 
1988. 
B. V. Bothmer andJ. F. Romano, et al. The luxor Museum of Ancient Egyptian 
Art. Catalogue. Mainz: ARCE, 1979. 
G. Botti and T. E. Peet. II Giornale della Necropoli di Tebe. Turin: 1 Papiri 
leratici del Museo di Torino, 1928. 
E. M. Brumfiel (ed.). The Economic Anthropology of the State. New York, 
1994. 
Bulletin of the Societe d'Egyptologie, Geneve. Geneva. 
Current Anthropology. Chicago. 
L. Oppenheim, et al. (eds.). The Assyrian Dictionary of the Oriental Institute of 
the University of Chicago. 21 vols. (several still unpublished). Chicago/ 
Glückstadt, 1964-
Cambridge Ancient History. Cambridge. 
R. A. Caminos, lote Egyptian Miscellanies. Oxford, 1954. 
R. A. Caminos. A Tale of Woe. Oxford, 1977. 
Chronique d'Egypte. Brussels. 
R. 0. Foulkner. A Concise Dictionary of Middle Egyptian. Oxford, 1962. 
J. Cerny. A Communityof Workmen at Thebes in the Ramesside Period. Cairo: 
BdE 50, 1973. 
J. Cerny. Notebooks. The unpublished manuscripts maintained at the Griffith 
Institute ot Oxford University. 
J. Cerny. Paper and Books in Ancient Egypt. London, 1952. 
J. Cerny. The Volley of the Kings. Cairo: BdE 61, 1973. 
J. Cerny and S. 1. Groll. A lote Egyptian Grammar. Rome: Studio Pohl Series 
Moior4, 1975. 
Catalogue Generale des Antiquites Egyptiennes du Musee du Caire. Numerous 
vols. Cairo. 
K. N. Chaudhuri. Asia before Europe: Economy and Civilisation of the Indian 
Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750. Cambridge, 1990. 
H. J. M. Claessen and P. Skalnik (eds.). The Early Stole. The Hogue: New 
Babylon Studies in the Social Sciences 32, 1978. 
H. J. M. Claessen and P. Skalnik (eds.). The Study of the Stole. The Hague: 
New Babylon Studies in Social Sciences 35, 198 l . 
R. Cohen and E. R. Service (eds.). Origins of the State: the Anthropology of 
Political Evolution. Philadelphia, 1978. 
J. Creedy (ed.). Foundations of Economic Thought. Oxford, 1990. 
Deutsches Archäologisches Institut. 
N. de G. Davies. The Rock Tombs of EI Amoma. 6 vols. London: Archaeo-
logical Survey of Egypt 13- l 8, l 903-1908. 
343 
Davies Rekh-mi-Re' 
DE 
Decker Leistung 
Deines/ Wörterbuch 
Westendorf 
Demaree/ Gleanings 
Janssen 
DeVore Primate Behavior 
Dittmar Blumen 
DLE 
Dobb Capitalism 
Drenkhahn Handwerker 
Dreze Unemployment 
Equilibria 
EA 
EA 
EHR 
Eisenstadt Political Systems 
EK 
Ellis Agriculture 
Encausse/ Marxism and Asia 
Schram 
Endesfelder Staat 
Erichsen Harrfs 
EU 
Faulkner CT 
Finley Ancient Economy 
Fischer Weltgeschichte 3 
Frank Capitalism 
Frankfort Kingship 
and the Gods 
Bibliographical Abbreviations 
N . de G . Davies . The Tomb of Rekh-mi-Re' at Thebes . 2 vols . New York: 
Metropolitan Museum of Art Egyptian Expedition Publications l l , 1943. 
Discussions in Egyptology. Oxford. 
W . Decker. Die physische Leistung Pharaos . Cologne, 1971. 
H. v. Deines and W . Westendorf. Wörterbuch der Medizinischen Texte. 
2 parts. Berlin, Grundriss der Medizin der alten Ägypter 7, 1961-1962. 
R. J. Demaree and J. J. Janssen (eds.). Gleanings from Deir el-Medfna. Leiden: 
EU 5, 1982. 
1. DeVore (ed .). Primate Behavior: Field Studies of Monkeys and Apes. New 
York, 1965. 
J. Qittmar. Blumen und Blumensträuße als Opfergabe im alten Ägypten. Berlin: 
MAS 43, 1986. 
L. Lesko (ed .). A Dictionaryof Lote Egyptian. 4 vols. and indices. Berkeleyand 
Providence, l 975ff. 
M. Dobb. Studies in the Development of Capitalism. London, 1963. 
R. Drenkhahn_, Die Handwerker und ihre Tätigkeiten im alten Ägypten. 
Wiesbaden: AgAbh 31, 1976. 
J. H. Dreze. Unemployment Equilibria: Essays in Theory, Econometrics and 
Policy. Cambridge, 1991. 
EI Amoma. Followed by tomb number. 
W . L. Moron. The Amoma Letters. Boltimore, 1992. J. A. Knudtzon. Die 
EI-Amoma-Tafeln. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1915. 
Economic History Review. London. 
S.N. Eisenstadt. The Political Systems of Empires: the Rise and Fall of the 
Historical Bureaucratic Scx::ieties. New York, 1969. 
EI Kab. Followed by tomb number. 
M . deJ Ellis. Agriculture and the Stole in Ancient Mesopotamia: An lntroduction 
to Problems of land Tenure. Philadelphia, 1976. 
H. C. d'Encausse and S. R. Schram (eds.). Marxism and Asia. London, 1969. 
Endesfelder .. .. Unpublished PhD thesis. Berlin 1980. 
W . Erichsen. Papyrus Harris I Hieroglyphische Transkription . Brussels: BibAe 5, 
1933. 
Egyptolog ische Uitgaven. Leiden: Nederlands lnstituut voor het nabije Oosten. 
R.O . Faulkner. The Ancient Egyptian Coffin Texts. 3 vols. Warminster, 1973-
1978 . 
M. 1. Finley. The Ancient Economy. London, 1985 2. 
E. Cassi n, J. Bottero and J. Vercoutter (eds.). Die Altorientalische Reiche II: Das 
Ende des 2. Jahrtausends. Frankfurt: Fischer Weltgeschichte 3, 1966. 
A. G . Frank. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in latin America. New York, 
1969. (Numerous editions). 
H. Frankfort. Kingship and the Gods. Chicago, 1948. 
344 
Fried 
FsAlp 
Fs Fecht 
Fuß 
Political Society 
Function of the Minoan Palaces 
Gomer-Wallert Fische 
Gord. 
Gordiner Admonitions 
Gordiner Grommar 
Gordiner Hierotic Texts 
Gardiner Mes 
Gordiner P. Chester Beatty I 
Gordiner RAD 
Gordiner Royal Canon 
Gordiner Wilbour 
Gordner Sterling-Dollar 
0iplomacy 
Gosse Donnees Nouvelles 
Gouthier 0ict. 
Germer Flora 
Gibson/ Biggs Power 
Gillis, etal. 
Gledhill 
GM 
Gödecken 
Trade and Production 
State and Society 
Meten 
Bibliographical Abbreviotions 
M. H. Fried. The Evolution of Political Society. New York, 1967. 
H. Otten, et al. (eds.). Festschrift für Sedat Alp: Hittite and Other Anatolian 
and Near Eastern Studies in Honour of Sedat Alp. Ankara, 1992. 
J. Osing and G. Dreyer. Form und Mass: Festschrift für Gerhard Fecht. 
Wiesbaden: ÄAT 12, 1987. 
Forschungen und Berichte. Berlin . 
R. Hägg and N. Morinotos (eds.). The Function of the Minoan Palaces. 
Stockholm: Skrifter utgivno ov Svensko lnslilutet i Athen/ Acta lnstituti Atheniensis 
regni Suecioe Series 4 35, 1987. 
1. Gomer-Wollert. Fische und Fischkulte im alten Ägypten. Wiesbaden: 
ÄgAbh 21, 1970. 
Gordiner (ostroco from his private collection, published in vorious ploces) . 
A. H. Gordiner. The Admonitions of an Egyptian Sage. Leipzig, 1909. 
A. H. Gordiner. Egyptian Grammar. Oxford, 19573. 
A. H. Gordiner. Egyptian Hieratic Texts. Series l , Port l . Leipzig, 19 l l . 
A. H. Gordiner. The lnscription of Mes. Leipzig : Unters. 4/3, 1905. 
A. H. Gordiner. The library of A. Chester Beatty: Descriplion of a Hieratic 
Papyrus [etc.]. The Chester Beatty Papyri, No. 1. Oxford, 193 l . 
A. H. Gordiner. Ramesside Administrative Documents. Oxford, 1948. 
A. H. Gordiner. The Royal Canon ofTurin. Oxford, 1959, 19872. 
A. H. Gordiner. The WilbourPapyrus. 3 vols. Oxford, 1948. 
R. N. Gordner. Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy. New York, 19692. 
A. Gosse. Donnees Nouvelles administratives et sacerdotales sur l'organisation 
du domaine d'Amon XXe-XX/e Dynasties. 2 vols. Coiro: BdE 104, 1988. 
H. Gouthier. Dictionnaire des noms geographiques contenus dans /es textes 
hieroglyphiques. 7 vols. Coiro, 1925 ff. 
R. Germer. Flora des pharaonischen Ägypten. Mainz: DAI Kairo Sonderschrift 
14, 1985. 
M. Gibson and R. D. Biggs (eds.). The Organization of Power: Aspects of 
Bureaucracy in the Ancient Near fast. Chicago: SAOC 46, 1987. 
Gillis, C., Ch. Risberg ond B. Sjöberg (eds.) . Trade and Production in 
PremonetaryGreece: AspectsofTrade.Jonsered: St-MPocketbook 134, 1995. 
J. Gledhill, B. Sender ond M. T. lorsen (eds.). Stole and Society: the Emergence 
and 0evelopmenl of Social Hierarchy and Political Centralization. 
London, 1988. 
Göttinger Miszellen . Göttingen . 
K. B. Gödecken. Eine Betrachtung der Inschriften des Meten im Rahmen der 
sozialen und rechtlichen Stellung von Privatleuten im ägyptischen alten Reich. 
Wiesbaden: ÄgAbh 29, 1976. 
Goedicke Königliche Dokumente H. Goedicke. Königliche Dokumente aus dem alten Reich. Wiesbaden: 
ÄgAbh 14, 1967. 
345 
Gordon inw 
Grandel Papyrus Harris 
Griffith Kahun Papyri 
Guksch Paheqamen 
Gutgesell Datierung 
HÄB 
Harnmond Cily 
Harmatta Wirtschaft 
Harris Lexicographical 
Studies 
(P.) Harris 1 
Haas Evolution 
Harnmond Cily 
HdO 
Heinen Sowjetische 
Forschung 
Helck Militärführer 
Helck Beziehungen 
Helck Dw:-tftli 
Helck Materialien 
Helck Übersetzung 
Helck Verwaltung 
Helck Wirtschaftsgeschichte 
Helm Essays 
Herold Mind of Napoleon 
Hicks Economic History 
Hinton Fanshen 
Bibliographical Abbreviations 
A. Gordon. The Context and Meaning of the Ancient Egyptian Word inw 
from the Proto-Dynastic Period to the End of the New Kingdom. Ann Arbor: 
University Microfilms International, 1983. 
P. Grandel. Le Papyrus Harris. 2 vols. Cairo: BdE l 09, 1994. 
F. LI. Griffith. The Petrie Papyri: Hieratic Papyri from Kahun and Gurob. 2 vols. 
London, 1898. 
H. Guksch. Das Grab des Benja, gen. Paheqamen: Theben Nr. 343. Mainz: 
AV 7, 1978. 
M. Gutgesell . Die Datierung der Ostraka und Papyri aus Deir el-Medineh und 
ihre Interpretation. 2 vols. Hildesheim: HÄB 18-19, 1983. 
Hildesheimer Ägyptologische Beiträge. Hildesheim. 
M. Harnmond. The Cily in the Ancient World. Cambridge, Mass., 1972. 
J. Harmatta and G . Komoroczy (eds.). Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im alten 
Vorderasien. Budapest, 1976. 
J. R. Harris. Lexicographical Studies in Ancient Egyptian Minerals . Berlin: 
Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin Institut für Orientforschung 
Publication 54, 1961. 
q.v. Grandel, Papyrus Harris; Erichsen, Harris; BAR IV: 87ft. 
J. Haas. The Evolution of the Prehistoric Stole. New York, 1982. 
M. Harnmond. The Cily in the Anceint World. Cambridge, Mass., 1972. 
Handbuch der Orientalistik. Leiden. 
H. Heinen (ed.) Die Geschichte des Altertums im Spiegel der sowjetischen 
Forschung. Darmstadt, 1980. 
W. Helck. Der Einfluss der Militärführer in der 18. Ägyptischen Dynastie. 
Leipzig, Unters. 14, 1939. 
W. Helck. Die Beziehungen Ägyptens zu Vorderasien im 3. und 2. Jahrtausend 
v. Chr. Wiesbaden: ÄgAbh 5, 1971. 
W. Helck. Die Lehre des Dw:-ljtjj. 2 parts. Wiesbaden: KÄT, 1970. 
W . Helck. Materialien zur Wirtschafts-geschichte des Neuen Reiches. 6 Parts. 
Wiesbaden, 1961 ff . = Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur : 
Abhandlungen der Geistes und Sozialwissen-schaftlichen Klasse, 1960ft. 
W. Helck. Urkunden der 18. Dynastie: Übersetzung zu den Heften 17-22. 
Berlin: Urkunden des Ägyptischen Altertums Deutsch, 1961 . 
W. Helck. Zur Verwaltung des Mittleren und Neuen Reichs. Leiden: Probleme 
der Ägyptologie 3, 1958. 
W. Helck. Wirtschaftsgeschichte des alten Ägypten im 3. und 2. Jahrtausend 
vor.Chr. Leiden: HdO 1:15, 1975. 
J. Helm (ed ) Essays on the Problem of Tribe: Proceedings of the 1967 Annual 
Spring Meeting of the American Ethnological Scxiely. Seattle, 1968. 
J. C. Herold (ed.). The Mind of Napoleon: A Selection from his Written and 
Spaken Words. New York, 1955. 
J. Hicks. A Theory of Economic History. London, 1973. 
W. Hinton. Fanshen: A Documentaryof Revolution in a Chinese Village. New 
York, 1966. 
346 
H. 0. 
Hobbes 
Holler 
Holtmann 
Leviathan 
Arbeitsmarktes 
Politik-Lexikon 
Hommages Sauneron 
Hornung Amduat 
Hornung Einführung 
Hornung Tb. 
Hornung Untersuchungen 
Hornung/ Skarabäen 
Staehelin 
HPB 
HPE 
Hughes SOLL 
IFAO 
lnscriptions of Sinai 
lraq 
Jacquet-
Gordon 
Jaeger 
James 
Janssen 
Janssen 
Janssen 
Janssen 
JAOS 
JAR 
JARCE 
JEA 
JESHO 
Jevons 
Noms 
Scarabees 
Menkheperre 
Pharaoh 's People 
LRLC 
Markt op de Oever 
Prices 
Ship's Logs 
Political Economy 
Bibliographical Abbreviations 
J. Cerny and A. H. Gardiner. Hieratic Ostraca. l vol. Oxford, 1957. 
T. Hobbes. Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-wealth, 
Ecclesiastica/1 and Civil/. London, 165 l . 
M. J. Holler. ökonomische Theorie des Arbeitsmarktes. Darmstadt, 1986. 
E. Holtmann, H. U. Brinkman and H. Pehle (eds.). Politik-Lexikon. Munich, 
19942. 
J. Vercoutter (ed.). Hommages a la memoire de Serge Sauneron. 2 vols. 
Cairo: BdE 81 /82, 1979. 
E. Hornung. Das Amduat: Die Schrift des verborgenen Raumes. 3 Parts. 
Wiesbaden: ÄgAbh 7 / l 3, 1963 ff. 
E. Hornung. Einführung in die Ägyptologie. Darmstadt, 1993 4 . 
E. Hornung. Das Totenbuch der Ägypter. Zurich, 1979. 
E. Hornung. Untersuchungen zur Chronologie und Geschichte des Neuen 
Reiches. Wiesbaden: ÄgAbh l l, 1964. 
E. Hornung and E. Staehelin. Skarabäen und andere Siegelamulette aus Basler 
Sammlungen. Basle: Ägyptische Denkmäler in der Schweiz l, 1976. 
Hieratische Papyrus aus den königlichen Museen zu Berlin. Leipzig, 190 l ff. 
History of Political Economy. Durham. 
G. Hughes. Saite Demotic land leases. Chicago: SAOC 28, 1952. 
Institut Fran<;:ais d'Archeologie Orientale. 
A. H. Gardiner, T. E. Peet and J. Cerny. The lnscriptions of Sinai. 2 parts. 
London, 1952/1955. 
lraq. London 
f-:1. K.Jacquet-Gordo_n. le:S Noms des Domains Funeraires sous l'ancien empire 
Egyptien. Cairo, BdE 34, 1962. 
B. Jaeger. Essai de Classification et Datationdes Scarabees Menkheperre. 
Freiburg/Göttingen: OBO SA 2, 1982. 
T. G. H. James. Pharaoh 's People. London, 1984. 
J. J. Janssen. lote Ramesside Letters and Communications. London, Hieratic 
Papyri in the British Museum 6, 199 l. 
J. J. Janssen. De Markt op de Oever. Leiden, 1980. 
J. J. Janssen. Commodity Prices from the Ramessid Period. Leiden, 1975. 
J. J. Janssen. Two Ancient Egyptian Ship's Logs. Leiden: OMRO 42 supple-
ment, 1961. 
Journal of the American Oriental Society. New Haven. 
Journal of Anthropological Research. Albuquerque. 
Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt. Boston. 
Journal of Egyptian Archaeology. London. 
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient. Leiden. 
W. S. Jevons. The Theoryof Political Economy. London, 1871. [Edition cited: 
R. D. C. Black (ed.). Harmondsworth, 1970]. 
347 
JNES 
Jones 
JSSEA 
}WH 
KÄT 
Katary 
Keimer 
Kelly 
Kemp 
Kemp/ 
tv\errillees 
Keynes 
Keynes 
Keynes 
Khalidi 
Kitchen 
Kitchen 
Kloft 
Kroeling 
KR/ 
KRIN 
KRIT 
Kruchten 
KV 
LÄ 
Leftwich 
LEM 
Glossary 
Land Tenure 
Gartenpflanzen 
Critique and Power 
Egypt 
Minoan Pottery 
Consequences 
General Theory 
Works XXVIII 
Land Tenu,e 
Pharaoh Triumphant 
Third lntermediate 
Wirtschaft 
City lnvincible 
Horemheb 
Price System 
Bibliographical Abbreviations 
Journal of Near Eastern Studies. Chicago. 
D. Jones. A Glossary of Egyptian Naufical Titles and Terms. London: Studies in 
Egyptology, 1988. 
Journal of the Society for the Study of Egyptian Antiquities. Toronto. 
Journal of World History. Honolulu. 
Kleine Ägyptische Texte. W iesbaden. 
S. l. D. Katary. Land Tenure in the Ramesside Pericxi. London: Studies in 
Egyptology, 1989. 
l. Keimer. Die Gartenpflanzen im alten Ägypten. Vol.1. Berlin, 1924. Vol. II. 
R. Germer (ed.). Mainz: DAI Kairo Sonderschrift 13, 1984. 
M. Kelly (ed.) . Critique and Power: Recasfing the Foucault/Habermas 
Debate. Cambridge, /v'v:Jss ., 1994. 
B. Kemp. Ancient Egypt: Anatomy of a Civilization. London, 1989. 
B. J. Kemp and R. S. tv\errillees, Minoan Pottery in Second Millennium Egypt. 
Mainz, 1980. 
J. M. Keynes. The Economic Consequences of the Peace. London, 1919. 
J. M. Keynes. The General Theory of Employment, lnterest and Money. London, 
1936. 
D. Moggridge (ed.). Social, Political and Literary Writings . Cambridge: The 
Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes Volume XXVIII, 1982. 
T. Khalidi (ed.). Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East. 
Beirut, 1984. 
K. A. Kitchen . Pharaoh Triumphant: The Life and Times of Ramesses II. 
Worminster, 1982. 
K. A. Kitchen. The Third lntermediate Pericxi in Egypt (1100-650 B.C.). 
Worminister, 19862. 
H. Kloft. Die Wirtschaft der griechisch-römischen Welt: eine Einführung. 
Darmstadt, 1992. 
C. H. Kraeling and R. M. Adams. City lnvincible. Chicago, 1960. 
K. A. Kitchen . Ramesside lnscriptions: Historical and Biographical. 7 vols. 
Oxford, 1975ff. 
K. A. Kitchen. Ramesside /nscriptions: Translated and Annotated: Notes and 
Comments. Oxford, 1993-
K. A. Kitchen. Ramesside lnscriptions: Translated and Annotated: Translations. 
Oxford, 1993-
J .-M. Kruchten . Le Decret d 'Horemheb. Brussels: Universite Libre de Bruxelles 
Faculte de Philosophie et Lettres 72, [ 198 l ]. 
Volley of the Kings (Luxor) . Followed by tomb number. (Cf. P-M) 
W . Helck, E. Otto and W . Westendorff (eds.). Lexikon der Ägyptologie. 
7vols. W iesbaden: l975ff. 
R. H. Leftwich . ThePriceSystemandResourceAllocation. Hinsdale, IL, 19735 . 
A. H. Gardiner. Late-Egyptian Miscellanies. Brussels: ßibAe 7, 1937. 
348 
LES 
Lichtheim literature II 
lipinski Stafe and Temple 
Lorton Terminology 
LRL 
Lucos-Harris Materials 
MÄS 
Moisels Civilizafion 
Morshall Principles 
Moson Peru 
McDowell Jurisdicfion 
McDowell Ostraca 
McKenna Price Theory 
McLeod Composite Bows 
McLeod Seif Bows 
MDAIK 
tV.egolly Recherches 
Melanges Mokhtar 
Meier Methode 
Menger Grundsätze 
Menu Recherches 
Menu Regime Juridique 
Merrillees Pottery 
Mignon Concepts 
Möller lese stücke 
Bibliographical Abbreviations 
A. H. Gordiner. late-Egyptian Stories. Brussels: BibAe 1, 1932. 
M. Lichtheim. Ancient Egyptian literature: A Book of Readings. Volume II: The 
New Kingdom. Berkeley, 1976. 
E. lipinski (ed.). State and Temple Economy in the Ancient Neor fast. 2 vols. 
Lewen: OLA 5&6, 1979. 
D. Lorton. The)uridical Terminologyof International Relations in Egyptian Texts 
through Dyn. XVIII. Boltimore, 1974. 
J. Cerny. lote Ramesside Letters. Brussels: BibAe 9, 1939. 
A. Lucos and J. R. Harris. Ancienf Egyptian Materials and lndusfries. London, 
1962 4 • 
Münchner Ägyptologische Studien. Berlin. 
Ch. K. Moisels. The Emergence of Civilization: From hunting and gathering to 
agriculture, cities and the sfafe in the Near fast. London, 1990. 
A. Morsholl . Principles of Economics. London, 19208. 
J. A. Moson. The Ancienf Civilizafions of Peru. Harmondsworth, 1968. 
A. G. McDowell. Jurisdiction in the Workmen '.s Communily of Deir el-Medina. 
Leiden: EU 5, 1990. 
A. G. McDowell. Hieratic Ostraca in the Hunterian Museum Glasgow (The 
Co/in Campbel/Ostraca). Oxford, 1993. 
J. P. McKenno. A Handbaok of Price Theory. New York, 1972. 
W. McLeod. Composife Bows from the Tomb of Tut'ankhamün. Oxford: 
Tut'ankhamün's Tomb Series 3, 1970. 
W. Mcleod. Seif Bows and other archery fackle from the Tomb of 
Tut'ankhomün. Oxford: Tut'onkhomün's Tomb Series 4, 1982. 
Mitteilungen des Deutschen archäologischen Instituts Abteilung Kairo. 
Wiesbaden ond Mainz. 
M. tV.egally. Recherches sur l'economie, l'administration et la comptabilite 
egyptiennes o la XV/1/e Dynastie d'apres le Papyrus E. 3226 du Louvre. Coiro: 
BdE 71, 1977. 
P. Posener-Krieger (ed.). Melanges Gamal Eddin Mokhtar. 2 vols. Cairo, 
1985. 
Ch. Meier ond J. Rüsen (eds.). Historische Methode. = Theorie der Geschichte, 
Beiträge zur Historik, vol. 5. Munich, 1988. 
F. A. Hoyek(ed.). CorlMenger: Gesammelte Werke. Vol.1. Tübingen, 1968. 
~- Menu. Recherches sur /'histoire ;uridique, economique et sociale de l'ancienne 
Egypte. Versailles, 1982. 
B. Menu. Le regime ;uridique des ferres et du personnel atttache 6 Ja terre 
dans Papyrus Wilbour. Lille, 1970. 
R. S. Merrillees. The Cypriofe Bronze Age Pottery found in Egypt. Lund: S/IM.. 18, 
1968. 
M. R. Mignon. Dictionary of Concepts in Archaeology. Westport, Conn., 
1993. 
G. Möller. Hieratische Lesestücke für den akedemischen Gebrauch. 3 vols. 
Leipzig, l 927ff. 
349 
Montet 
Morenz 
Müller 
ßibliographical Abbreviations 
Geographie P. Monte!. Geographie de l'Egypte Ancienne. 2 ports. Paris, 1957 / 196 l . 
Prestige-Wirtschaft S. Morenz. Prestige-Wirtschaft im alten Ägypten. Munich: Bayerische Akademie 
der Wissenschaften Philosophisch-Historische Klasse Sitzungsberichte Heft 4, 
1969. 
Liebespoesie W . M. Müller, Die Liebespoesie der alten Ägypter. Leipzig, 1899. 
Müller-Winkler Obiekt-Amulette C. Müller-Winkler. Die Ägyptischen Obiekt-Amulette. Freiburg/ Göttingen: 
Müller- Krisenfaktoren 
Wollermann 
Naville Tb. 
Nissen Grundzüge 
North Economic History 
0. 
Obrinsky Profit Theory 
OBO 
OBOSA 
0. Cairo 
O.DeM 
OLA 
OLP 
0 . Michaelides 
OMRO 
Or. 
Osing Nominalbildung 
Ott Preistheorie 
P. 
P. Anost. P. Anastasi 
P. Soll. P. Sallier 
Patterson/ Power Relations 
Gailey 
Peet Tomb--Robberies 
Peet Mayer Papyri 
Petrie Memphis I 
OBO SA 5, 1987. 
R. Müller-Wollermann. Krisenfaktoren im ägyptischen Staat des ausgehenden 
alten Reichs. Tübingen, 1986. · 
E. Naville. Das Aegyptische Todtenbuch der XVIII. bis XX. Dynastie. 2 vols. 
and Einleitung. Berlin, 1886. 
H. J. Nissen. Grundzüge einer Geschichte der Frühzeit des Vorderen Orients. 
Darmstadt, 1983. 
D. C. North. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York, 1981 . 
Ostracon. Followed by name of museum br private collection. 
M. Obrinsky. Profit Theory and Capitalism. Oxford, 1983. 
Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis. Freiburg/ Göttingen. 
Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis. Series Archaeologica. Freiburg/ Göttingen. 
Ostracon Cairo. 
J. C:erny. Ostraca Hieratiques. Cairo: CG Nos. 25501-25832. Cairo, 1935. 
G. Daressy. Ostraca. CG Nos. 25001-25385 . Cairo, 1901 . 
Ostracon Deir el-Medineh. J. C:erny. Ostraca hieratiques non-litteraires de 
Deir el-Medineh. Numerous vols. Cairo: Documents des Fouilles de l'IFAO 
3ff., l935ff. 
Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta. Lewen. 
Orientalia lovaniensia Periodica. Leuven. 
H. Goedicke and E. F. Wente. Ostraka Michaelides. Wiesbaden, 1962. 
Oudheidkundige Mededelingern uit het Rijksmuseum van Oudheden. Leiden . 
Orientalia. N. 5. Rome. 
J. Osing. Die Nominalbildung des Ägyptischen. 2 vols. Mainz, 1976. 
A. E. Ott. Grundzüge der Preistheorie. Göttingen, 1968. 
Papyrus. Followed by name of museum or private collection . 
cf. LEM, Bakir, Epistolography, etc. 
cf. LEM, KÄT, etc. 
T. C. Patterson and C. W. Gailey (eds.). Power Relations and State 
Formation. Washington, D.C. , 1987. 
T. E. Peet. The Greot Tomb--Robberies of the Twenfieth Egyptian Dynasly. 
2 vols. Oxford, 1930. 
T. E. Peet. The Mayer Papyri A and 8: Nos. M. 1 1 162 and M. 1 1 186 of the 
Free Public Museums, Liverpool. London, 1920. 
W . M. F. Petrie. Memphis 1. London: British School of Archaeology in 
Egypt, 15/Egyptian Research Account 14th year 1908, 1909. 
350 
P-M 
Polonyi 
Polonyi 
Polonyi 
Postgote 
P/R 
Powell 
Pribrom 
Guoegebeur 
Guock 
Quirke 
Quirke 
RAD 
Rothbone 
Renfrew 
RdE 
Ricardo 
Rider 
R/A 
Roof 
Roccoti 
Römer 
Rostovtzeff 
Rostovtzeff 
Roth 
Rothenberg 
livelihaod 
Trade and Market 
Transformation 
Taxation 
Labor 
Reasoning 
Shai' 
Ani 
MKS 
Administration 
Economic 
Rationalism 
Theory 
Principles 
Economic History 
Mesopotamia 
litterature 
Priesterherrschaft 
Hellenistic World 
Roman Empire 
Phyles 
Temple 
Bibliogrophicol Abbreviotions 
B. Porter and R. Moss, et al. Topographical ßibliography of Ancient Egyptian 
Hieroglyphic Texts, Reliefs, and Paintings. Severol volumes, vorious editions. 
Oxford, 1927-
K. Polonyi. The livelihood of Man. Edited by H. W. Peorson. New York, 
1977. 
K. Polonyi, C. M. Arensberg ond H. W. Peorson (eds.). Trade and Market in 
the farly Empires. New York, 1957. 
K. Polonyi. The Great Transformation. Boston, 19572. 
J. N. Postgote. Taxation and Conscription in theAssyrian Empire. Rome: Studio 
Pohl: Series /v'v:Jior 3, 1974. 
W. Pleyte and E. Rossi. Papyrus de Turin. 2 vols. Leiden, 1869-1876. 
M. A. Powell (ed.). Labor in the Ancient Near fast. New Haven: AOS 68, 
1987. 
K. Pribram. A History of Economic Reasoning. Baltimore, 1983. 
J. Guaegebeur. le dieu egyptien Shai' dans la religion et l'onomastique. Leuven: 
OLA 2, 1975. 
J. F. Guack. Die lehren des Ani. Freiburg/Göttingen: OBO 141, 1994. 
S. Quirke (ed.). Middle Kingdom Studies. Surry: SIA Publishing, 1991. 
S. Guirke. The Administration of Egypt in the lote Middle Kingdom. Surrey: 
SIA Publishing, 1990. 
A. H. Gordiner. Ramesside Administrative Documents. Oxford, 1948. 
D. Rathbone. Economic Rationalism and Rural Society in third-century A.D. 
Egypt: The Heroninos archive and the Appianus estate. Cambridge, 199 l . 
C. Renfrew, M.J. Rowlondsond B. A. Segraves (eds.). Theoryand Explanation 
in Archaeology: The Southampton Conference. New York, 1982. 
Revue d'Egyptologie. Paris. 
D. Ricardo. On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. London, 
1817. 
C. Rider. An lntroduction to Economic History. Cincinnati, 1995. 
E. Ebeling, et al. (eds.). Reallexikon der Assyriologie. Berlin, 1928ff. 
M. Roof. Cultural Atlas of Mesopotamia and the Ancient Near fast. New York, 
1990. . 
A. Roccati. La litterature historique sous l'ancien Empire Egyptien. Paris: 
Litteratures Anciennes du Proche-Orient 11, 1982. 
M. Römer. Gottes- und Priesterherrschaft in Ägypten am Ende des Neuen 
Reiches. Wiesbaden: ÄAT 21, 1994. 
M. Rostovtzeff. The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World. 3 
vols. Oxford, 194 l. 
M. Rostovtzeff. The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire. 2 vols. 
Oxford, 1957 2. 
A. M. Roth. Egyptian Phyles in the Old Kingdom. Chicago: SAOC48, 1991. 
B. Rothenberg. The Egyptian Mining Temple at Timna. London, Reseorches in 
theArabah 1959-1984 l, 1988. 
351 
RT 
Sobloff 
SAK 
Somuelson 
SAOC 
Sosson 
SBL 
Schoedel 
Schenkel 
Schlögl 
Schneider 
Schulman 
Schumpeter 
Screpanti/ 
Zamagni 
Seaton/ 
Claessen 
Service 
Sethe 
Shanin 
Silver 
Trade 
Economics 
Civilizations 
Listen 
Bewässerungs-
revolution 
Tatenen 
Kulturwirtschaft 
Rank 
Capitalism, etc. 
Economic Thought 
Political 
Anthropology 
Origins 
Lesestücke 
Peasants 
Economic Structures 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 
Sieveking Problems 
Silverman For His Ka 
Simpson Literature 
SMA 
Smith Wealth of Nations 
v. Soden AHW 
Spencer Temple 
Bibliogrophicol Abbreviolions 
Recueil de Travaux Relatifs a la Philologie et a l'archeo/ogie egyptiennes et 
assyrriennes. Paris. 
J. A. Sobloff and C. C. Lamberg-Korlovsky (eds.). Ancient Civilization and 
Trade. Albuquerque, 1975. 
Studien zur Altägyptischen Kultur. Homburg. 
P. A. Somuelson. and W. D. Nordhaus. Economics. New York, 1985 12. 
Studies in Ancient Orientol Civilizalion. Chicago. 
J. Sosson (ed.). Civilizations of the Ancient Near East. ·4 vols. New York, 
1995. 
Society for Biblical literolure: Writing from the Ancienl World Series. Atlanta. 
tJ. D. Schoedel. Die Listen des großen Papyrus Harris. Leipzig: Leipziger 
Agyptologische Studien 6, 1936. 
W. Schenkel. Die Bewässerungsrevolution im alten Ägypten. Mainz, 1978. 
H. A. Schlägl. Der Gott Tatenen. Freiburg: OBO 29, 1980. 
A. Schneider. Die Anfänge der Kulturwirtschaft. Essen, 1920. New York, 
19792. 
A. R. Schulman. Mi![tary Rank, Title and Organization in the Egyptian New 
Kingdom. Berlin: MAS 6, 1964. 
J. A. Schumpeter. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London, 1994. 
(Numerous editions). 
E. Screpanli ond S. Zarnagni . An Outline of the History of Economic Thought. 
(D. Field, Irans.). Oxford, 1993. 
S. L. Seaton and H. J. M. Claessen (eds.) . Political Anthropology: The State of 
the Art. The Hague, 1979. 
E. R. Service. Origins of the State and Civilization. New York, 1975. 
K. Sethe. Ägyptische Lesestücke. Leipzig and Hildesheim, 1928ff. 
T. Shanin (ed .). Peasants and Peasant Societies. Harmondsworth, 1971. 
M. Silver. Economic Structures of the Ancient Near East. London, 1985. 
W . Little, et al. (eds.) . The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 2 vols. Oxford, 
19733. 
G. de G. Sieveking, 1. H. Longworth and K. E. Wilson (eds.). Problems in 
Economic and Social Archaeology. London, 1976. 
D. P. Silverman (ed.). For His Ka: Essays Offered in Memory of Klaus Boer. 
Chicago: SAOC 55, 1994. 
W . K. Simpson (ed.). The Literature of Ancient Egypt. New Haven, 1972. 
Studies in Mediterranean Archaeology. lund. 
A. Smith . An lnquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 
R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner and W. B. Todd (eds.). 2 vols. Oxford, 1976. 
[Originaledition, 1776]. 
W . von Soden. Akkadisches Handwörterbuch. 3 vols. Wiesbaden, l 965ff. 
P. Spencer. The Egyptian Temple: A Lexicographical Study. London, 1984. 
352 
Spiegelberg 
South 
Stein 
Studies Griffith 
Suret-Canale 
Trigger 
TT 
Tufnell 
Turin 
Tylor 
Ucko 
Ucko/ 
Dimbleby 
Unters. 
Urk.1 
Urk. IV 
VA 
Valbelle 
Veenhof 
Venlura 
Verhoeven 
Vincenl 
Walker 
Wallace 
Wallerslein 
Wallert 
Walras 
Wb. 
Wenle 
Rechnungen 
Method 
Early Stoies 
Production 
Social History 
lachish IV 
Paheri 
Urbanism 
Domestication 
Ouvriers 
Trade 
City 
Grillen 
State 
British Empire 
Taxation in Egypt 
World-System 
Palmen 
Economie Politique 
Leiters 
ßibliographical Abbreviations 
W. Spiegelberg. Rechnungen aus der Zeit Setis /. 2 parts. Strassburg, 1896. 
S. South. Method and Theory in Historical Archaeology. New York, 1977. 
G. Stein and M. S. Rothman (eds.). Chiefdoms and Early Stoies in the Near 
fast. Madison: Monographs in World Archaeology 18, 1994. 
S. R. K. Glanville (ed.). Studies Presented to F. LI. Griffith. London, 1932. 
J. Suret-Canale, et al. Sur le "mode de production asiatique'. Paris, 197 4. 
B. G. Trigger, B. J. Kemp, D. O'Connor and A. B. Lloyd. Ancient Egypt: 
A Social History. Cambridge, 1983. 
Theban Tomb. Individual lomb number follows. (Cf. P-M) 
0. T ufnell, et al. lachish IV: (Tell ed-Duweir) The Bronze Age. London, 1958. 
Egyptian Museum Turin. 
J. J. Tylor and F. LI. Griffith. The Tomb of Paheri at EI Kab. London: Egypt 
Exploration Fund l l th Memoir (bound with E. Naville, Ahnas EI Medineh), 
1894. 
P. Ucko, R. Tringham and G. W. Dimbleby (eds.). Man, settelement and 
urbanism. London, 1972. 
P. Ucko and G. W. Dimbleby (eds.). The domestication and exploitation of 
Plants and Animals. London, 1969. 
K. Sethe and H. Kees (eds.) Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Altertumskunde 
Ägyptens. Leipzig. 
K. Seihe. Urkunden des alten Reichs. Leipzig, 1933. 
K. Seihe and '(v. Helck. Urkunden der 18. Dynastie. Leipzig and Berlin: 
Urkunden des Agyptischen Altertums Vierte Abteilung, l 906ff. 
Varia Aegyptiaca. San Antonio. 
D. Valbelle. "les ouvriers de Ja tombe" Deirel-Medineh a l'epoque Ramesside. 
Cairo: BdE 96, 1985. 
K. Veenhof. Aspects of O/d Assyrian Trade and its Terminology. Leiden, 1972. 
R. Venlura. living in a City of the Dead. Freiburg: OBO 69, 1986. 
U. Verhoeven. Grillen, Kochen, Backen. Brussels: Rites Egyptiens 4, 1984. 
A. Vincenl. Theories of the Stole. Oxford, 1987. 
E. Walker. The British Empire. Oxford, 19474 . 
S. L. Wallace. Taxation in Egypt: from Augustus to 0iocletion. Princeton, 1938. 
New York, 1969. 
1. Wallerslein. The Modem World-System. 4 vols. New York, 197 4ff. 
1. Waller!. Die Palmen im alten Ägypten. Berlin: AAÄS l, 1962. 
L. Walras. Elements d'economie politique pure. Paris, 1952. (= Reprint of 
fourth edition, 1902). 
A. Erman and H. Grapow. Wörterbuch der Aegyptischen Sprache. 5 vols. 
and References. Berlin, l 926ff. 
E. F. Wente. Leiters from Ancient Egypt. Atlanta: SBL l, 1990. 
353 
Wente 
WFT 
Winstone 
Wittfogel 
Wolf 
245 
LRL 
Bibliographical Abbreviations 
E. F. Wente. lote Ramesside Letters. Chicago: SAOC 33, 1967. 
Weekend Financial Times. London. 
Bell H. V. F. Winstone. Gertrude Bell. London, 1978. 
Oriental Despotism K. Wittfogel. Oriental Despotism: A Comparotive Study of Total Power. New 
Haven, 1957. 
Kulturgeschichte W . Wolf. Kulturgeschichte des alten Ägypten. Stuttgart, 1962. 
Zeitschrift für ägyptische Sprache. Leipzig and Berlin . 
354 
ßlBLIOGRAPHY OF ARTICLES CITED 
For the abbreviations of journals and collective works (such as JESHO or Trigger, Social 
History), cf. the preceding bibliography 
ALLA/v\, S. 
'Einige Hieratische Ostraka der Papyrussammlung der staatlichen Museen zu Berlin," Fuß 22 (1982) 51-61. 
"La vente dans l'Egypte ancienne (particulierement a l'epoque du Nouvel Empire, XVle-Xle siede avant notre 
ere)," Revue historique du droit fran~ais et etranger 4 ser. 60 (1982): 377-393. 
"Trois Lettres d'Affaires," Melanges Mokhtar 1: 19-30. 
"msw = Kinder /Volksgruppe/Produkte/ Abgaben," SAK l 9 ( 1992): 1- l 3. 
An, A. 
"Eine syrische Bevölkerungsklasse im ramessidischen Ägypten," ZÄS 75 (1939): 16-20. 
BAER, K. 
'An Eleventh Dynasty Farmer's Letters," JAOS 83 (1963): 1-19. 
"The Low Price of Land in Ancient Egypt," JARCE l (1962): 25-45. 
BAILY, F. G. 
'The Peasant View of the Bad Life," in Shanin, Peasants, pp. 299-321. 
ßAINES, J. 
'Literacy, social organization, and the archaeological record: the case of early Egypt," in Gledhill, State and 
Society, pp. 192-214. 
"Restricted Knowledge, Hierarchy and Decorum," JARCE 27 (1990): 1-23. 
BAKRY, H. S. K. 
'The discovery of a temple of Sobk in upper Egypt," MDAIK 27 (1971 ): 131-146. 
BARGUET, P. 
"Tod: Rapport des Fouilles de la saison fevrier-avril 1950," 8/FAO 51 (1952): 81-110. 
ßARNES, J. 
"Three Hieratic Papyri in the Duke of Northumberland's Collection,' JEA 34 (1948): 35-46. 
BERNBECK, R. 
"Die 'Obed-Zeit: Religiöse Gerontakrien oder Häuptlingstümer," in Bartl, Zwischen Euphrat und Indus, pp. 44 -56. 
ßlCKEl, S. 
"Les Domaines funeraires de Thoutmes IV," BSEG 13 (1989): 23-32. 
ßlACKMAN, A. M. 
'Oracles in Ancient Egypt,' JEA 11 (1925): 249-255. 
BLEIBERG, E. L. 
"Commodity Exchange in the Annals of Thutmose III," JSSEA 11 /2 (1981 ): l 07-110. 
"The King's Privy Purse During the New Kingdom,"JARCf21 (1984): 155-167. 
"The Redistributive Economy in New Kingdom Egypt: An Examination of fükw(t),"JARCE 25 (1988): 157-168. 
"The Economy of Ancient Egypt," in Sasson, Civilizations III: 1373-1385. 
ßOOCHS, W. 
"Zur Bedeutung der bikw(t) Leistungen," VA 3 (1987): 207-214. 
ßREWER, A. 
"A Minor Post-Ricardian? Marx as an Economist," HPE 27 ( 199 5): l l 1-145. 
CA/v\lNOS, R. 
"Same Comments on the Reuse of Papyrus," in ßierbrier, Papyrus, pp. 43-61. 
CASSIN, E. 
"Babylonien unter den Kassiten," in Fischer Weltgeschichte 3: 1-10 l . 
CASTLE, E. W. 
"Shipping and Trade in Ramesside Egypt," JESHO 35 (1992): 239-277. 
355 
Bibliography of articles cited 
CERNy, J. 
"Le Caractere des oushebtis d'apres les idees du nouvel empire," B/FAO4 l (1942): 105-133. 
"The Will of Naunakhte and the Related Documents,"JEA 31 (1945): 29-53. 
"An Hieroglyphic Ostracon in the Museum of Fine Arts at Boston," JEA 44 ( 1958): 23-25. 
"Report on lnscriptions," in: Tufnell, lachish IV: 133. 
CHRISTOPHE, L.-A. 
"La Face sud des architraves surmontant les colonnes 7 4-80 de lo gronde solle hypostyle de Kornok," BIFAO60 
(1960): 69-82. 
CIVIL, M. 
"Ur III Bureaucrocy: .Quantitative Aspects," in Gibson/Biggs, Power, pp. 43-53. 
CLAESSEN, H. AND P. SKALNIK 
"The Eorly Stole: Theories and Hypotheses," in Cloessen/Skalnik, Early Stole, pp. 3-29. 
CoHEN, R. 
"Stole Origins: A Reapproisol," in Claessen/Skalnik, Early Stole, pp. 31-75. 
CüNDON, V. 
"Two Account Papyri of the Lote Eighteenth Dynosty," RdE 35 (1984): 57-82. 
CRuz-URtBE, E. 
"A Model for the Political Structure of Ancient Egypt," in Silvermon, For His Ka, pp. 45-53. 
ÜALTON, G. 
"Karl Polonyi's Analysis of Long-Distance Trade and His Wider Parodigm," in Sabloff, Trade, pp. 63-132. 
ÜAVIES, N. DE G. AND R. 0. FAULKNER 
"A Syrion Troding Venture to Egypt," JEA 33 (1947): 40-46. 
ÜAWSON, W. R. 
"An Oracle Papyrus. B.M. 10335,"JEA l l (1925): 247-248. 
ÜIAKONOFF, 1. M. 
"Slaves, Helots ond Serfs in Eorly Antiquity," in Harmotlo, Wirtschaft, pp. 45-78. 
ÜIXON, D. M. 
"A note on cereals in ancient Egypt," in Ucko/Dimbleby, Domestication, pp. 131-142. 
ÜOOLEY, P. C. 
"Volue," in Creedy, Foundations, pp. 124-158. 
EDEL, E. 
"Zwei Originalbriefe der Königsmutter Tüja in Keilschrift," SAK l ( 197 4): l 05-146. 
"GAD.TuGmak/a/ugleich ~t-;-~9? idg, etwa "Mantel, Umhang," in Fs Alp, pp. 127-134. 
EDGERTON, W. F. 
"The Nouri Decree of Seti: o Translation ond Analysis of the Legal Portion,"JNE56 (1947): 219-230. 
"The Strikes in Romesses lll's Twenty-ninth Yeor," JNES l O (195 l ): 137-145. 
EtCHLER, E. 
"Polonyi - Keynes - Warburton," GM 13 l (1992): 25-3 l. 
EtCHLER, S. 
"Untersuchungen zu den Wasserträgern," SAK 17 ( 1990): l 35-17 5 ond 18 ( 199 l ) : 173-205. 
ENDRES, A. M. 
"Carl Menger's Theory of Price Formation Reconsidered," HPE 27 (1995): 261-287. 
EPSTEIN, S. R. 
'Regional foirs, institutionol innovotion, ond economic growth in lote medievol Europe," EHR 47 (1994): 459-482. 
ERMAN, A. 
"Beiträge zur Kenntnis des ägyptischen Gerichtsverfahrens," 245 17 (1879): 71-83. 
"Ein Unterstützungsgesuch," 245 38 (1900): 151-152. 
EYRE, C. J. 
"An Account Papyrus from Thebes," JEA 66 ( 1980): l 08-119. 
356 
ßibliography of articles cited 
"Work and the Organization of Work in the Old Kingdom," in Powell, Labor, pp. 5-47. 
"Work and the Organization of Work in the New Kingdom," in Powell, Labor, pp. 167-221 . 
FAKHRY, A. 
'Une statuette du nouvel empire," ASAE 39 (1939): 91-94. 
F AULKNER, R. 
'Egyptian Military Organization," JEA 39 (1953): 32-47. 
FlYNN, D. Ü. AND A. G1RALDEZ 
'Born with a "Silver Spoon": the Origin of World Trade in 1571,"JWH6 (1995): 201-221. 
fRIED, M. H. 
'On the Concepts of 'Tribe' and 'Tribal Society'," in Helm, Essays, pp. 3-20. 
"The Stole and the Chicken and the Egg; or What Came First?', in Cohen/Service, Origins of the Stole, 
pp. 35-47. 
GABALLA, G. A. 
'Three Acephalous Stelae," JEA 63 (1977): 122-126. 
GAILEY, C. w. 
"Culture Wars: Resistance to Stole Formation," in Patterson/Gailey, Power Relations, p. 35-56. 
GARDINER, A. H. 
"Four Papyri of the 18th Dynasty from Kahun," ZÄS 43 (1906): 27-47. 
"The Stele of Bilgai," ZÄS 50 (1912): 49-57. 
'The Geography of the Exodus," JEA 10 (1924): 87-96. 
"A Lawsuit Arising from the Purchase of Two Slaves," JEA 21 (1935): 140-146. 
"A Later Allusion to Akhenaten," JEA 24 (1938): 124. 
"The word m'gJ and its various uses," JEA 26 (1940): 157-158. 
'Ramesside Texts Relating to the Taxation and Transport of Corn," JEA 27 (1941 ): 19-73. 
"A Protest Against Unjustified Tax-Demands,'' RdE 6 (1951 ): 115-134. 
"Some Reflections on the Nauri Decree,"JfA 38 (1952): 24-33. 
"A Pharaonic Encomium,"JfA 41 (1955): 30 and 42 (1956): 8-20. 
"The Harem atMiwer,"JNES 12 (1953): 145-149. 
GARDINER, A. H. AND H. 1. BELL 
"The Name of Lake Moeris,"JfA 29 (1943): 37-50. 
GATES, M.-H. 
'Archaeology in Turkey," AJA 99 (1995): 207-255. 
GmoN, M. 
'La Resiliation d'une fonction religieuse," BIFAO 76 (1976): 65-89. 
GLANVllLE, S. 
"Records of a Ro-t,al Dockyard of the Time of Thutmosis III: Papyrus British Museum 10056," ZÄS 66 (1930): 
105-121 and ZAS 68 (1932): 7-4 l. 
GLEDHlll, J. AND M. lARSEN 
"The Polanyi Paradigm and a Dynamic Analysis of Archaic Stoies' in Renfrew, Theory, pp. 197-229. 
GOEDICKE, H. 
"Cult-temple and 'Stole' during the Old Kingdom in Egypt," in lipinski, Stole and Temple, pp. 113-131. 
"The Title [imy-r'] in the Old Kingdom," JEA 46 (1960): 60-64. 
GODEUER, M. 
"La notion de 'mode de production asiatique' et les schemas marxistes d'evolution des societes," in Suret-Canale, 
Production, pp. 47-100. 
GOLDWASSER, 0. 
"Hieratic lnscriptions from Tel Sera' in Southern Canaan," Te/Aviv 11 (1984): 77-93. 
"The Lachish Hieratic Bowl Once Again,'' Tel Aviv 9 (1982): 137-138. 
357 
Bibliography of articles cited 
GRIFFITH, F. LL. 
"The Abydos Decree of Seti I at Nauri," JEA 13 (1927): 193-208. 
GuKSCH, H. 
"Das Grab des Benja, gen. Paheqamen : Theben Nr. 343," MDAIK 38 ( 1982): 195-199. 
GuNAWARDANA, R. A. L. H. 
"Social Function and Political Power: A Case Study of Stole Formation in Irrigation Society," in Claessen/Skalnik, 
Study of the Stole, pp. 133-154. 
GuTGESELL, M. 
"Die Struktur der pharaonischen Wirtschaft- eine Erwiderung," GM 56 (1982) : 95- l 09. 
"Die Entstehung des Privateigentums, " GM 66 (1983): 67-80. 
HABERMAS, J. 
"Some Ouestions Concerning the Theory of Power: Foucault Again, " in Kelly, Critique and Power, pp. 79- l 07. 
HALL, K. R. L. AND 1. DEVORE 
"Baboon Social Behavior, " in DeVore, Primate Behavior, pp. 53-110. 
HARARI, 1. 
"Nature de la Stele de donation de fonction du Roi Ahmosis a la reine Ahmes-Nefertari," ASAE 56 (1959): 
139-201. 
HARING, B. J. J. 
"The Economic Aspects of Royal "Funerary' Temples: A Preliminary Survey," GM 132 (1993): 39-48 . 
HELCK, W. 
"Die Inschrift über die Belohnung des Hohenpriesters 'lmn-htp," M/O4 (1956): 161-178. 
"Ramessidische Inschriften aus Karnak,'' 245 82 (1957): 98-140. 
"Ramessidische Inschriften II," 245 83 (1958) : 27-38 
"Der Papyrus Berlin P. 3047, " JARCE 2 (1963) : 65-73. 
"Eine Briefsammlung aus der Verwaltung des Amuntempels,' JARCE 6 (1967): 135-151 . 
"Zum Kult an Königsstatuen," JNES 25 (1966): 32-41. 
"Eine Stele Sebekhoteps IV. aus Karnak,'' MDAIK24 (1969): 194-200. 
"Die große Stele des Vizekönigs St;w aus Wadi es-Sabua," SAK 3 ( 197 5): 85- l l 2. 
"The Dissolution of the Palace Economy in the Ramesside Period," in Funcfion of the Minoan Palaces, pp. 17-19. 
"Anmerkungen zum Turiner Königspapyrus," SAK 19 (1992): 151-216. 
"Wege zum Eigentum an Grund und Boden im alten Reich," in Allam, Grund und Boden, pp. 9-13. 
HUNT, R. C. 
"The Role of Bureaucracy in the Provisioning of Cities: a Framework for Analysis of the Ancient Near East," in 
Gibson/ Biggs, Power, pp 16 l- 192. 
JANSEN-W!NKELN, K. 
"Die Plünderung der Königsgräber des Neuen Reiches, " 245 l 22 ( 199 5): 62-78. 
JANSSEN, J. J . 
"A Twentieth-Dynasty Account Papyrus," JEA 52 (1966): 81-94. 
"Nine Letters from the Time of Ramses II,' OMRO 41 (1960): 31-47. 
"Prolegomena to the Study of Egypt's Economic History during the New Kingdom,'' SAK 3 ( 1975): 127-185. 
"The Early Stole in Ancient Egypt, " in Claessen/ Skalnik, Early State, pp. 213-234. 
"The Role of the Temple in the Egyptian Economy during the New Kingdom," in Lipinski, Stole and Temple II: 
505 -515 . 
"The Price of Papyrus, " Of9 (1987): 33-35. 
"Requisitions from Upper Egyptian temples (P. BM l 040 l ),'' JEA 77 (199 l ): 79-94. 
"The Year of the Strikes, ' BSEG 16 (1992): 41-49. 
"btkw. from Work to Product,'' SAK20 (1993): 81-94 . 
"An Exceptional Event at Deir el-Medina (P Turin 1879, Verso 11),' JARCE 31 (1994): 81-94. 
"Debts and Credit in the New Kingdom," JEA 80 (1994): 125-136. 
358 
Bibliogrophy of orticles cited 
JANSSEN, J. J. AND P. W. PESTMAN 
'Buriol ond lnheritonce in Ancient Egypt," JESHO 11 (1968): 137-170. 
JELINKOVA-REYMOND, E. 
"Rec_herches sur le role des guordiens des portes (iry-':) dons l'odministrotion generole des temples egyptiens," 
CdE28 (1953): 39-59. 
KEMP, B 
'Temple ond town in oncient Egypt," in Ucko, Urbanism, pp. 657-680. 
'Old Kingdom, Middle Kingdom ond Second lntermediote Period," in Trigger, Social History, pp. 71-182. 
KERBLAY, B. 
"Choyonov ond the Theory of Peosontry os o Specific Type of Economy," in Shonin, Peasants, pp. 150-160. 
KHAZANOV' A. 
"Some Theoreticol Problems of the Study of the Eorly Stole,'' in Cloessen/Skolnik, Early State, pp. 77-92. 
K1TCHEN, K. A. 
"Prd > .!:tL= 'Mule' in New Kingdom Egypt?," GM 13 (1974): 17-20. 
'The Greot Biogrophicol Stelo of Setou, Viceroy of Nubio," OLP6/7 (1975/1976): 295-302. 
KOENIG, Y. 
"livraisons d'or etde golene au tresor du temple d'Amon sous la XXe dynastie," Hommages Sauneron 1: 185-220. 
KOROSTOVCEV, M . A. 
'Das alte Ägypten," in Heinen, Sowiefische Forschung, pp. 19-45. 
KRAUSS, R. 
"Detailfragen der oltägyptischen Getreidewirtschaft," in Fs Fecht, pp. 266-273. 
KRUCHTEN, J.-M. 
"L'evolution de lo gestion dominiole sous le nouvel empire egyptienne," in: Lipinski State and Temple II: 517-525. 
"Le verbe btret ses derives jusqu'a la fin du nouvel empire," AIPHOS 24 (1980): 39-52. 
lAPP, J. V. 
"Evidence for Artificial Irrigation in Amratian Egypt, '' JARCE 32 (1995): 197-209. 
lARGACHA, A. P. 
"Relations Between Egypt and Mesopotomia ot the end of the Fourth Millennium, '' GM 137 (1993): 59-76. 
LEGRAIN, G. 
''Deux steles trouves a Karnak," 245 35 (1897): 12-19. 
LEVY, T. E. I ET Al. 
"New Light on King Narmer ond the Protodynastic Egyptian Presence in Canaon," BA 58/1 (1995): 26-35. 
LIVERANI, M. 
"Memorandum on the Approach to Historiographie Texts," Or. 42 (1973): 178-194. 
LORTON, D. 
"What was the pr-nswand who monaged it?," SAK 18 ( 1991): 291-316. 
MASPERO, G. 
"Notes sur quelques points de Grammaire et d'Histoire," 245 19 (1881 ): 116-131. 
MENU, B. 
"Ouelques Ren:iorques a propos de l'etude comporee de la stele juridique de Kornok et lo 'stele' d'Ahmes-
Nefertori,' RdE23 (1971): 155-163. 
"La 'Stele' d'Ahmes Nefertory dons son contexte historique et juridique," BIFAO 77 (1977): 89-100. 
"La notion de propriete privee des biens fonciers dons l'Ancien Empire egyptien," in Menu, Recherches, pp. 
43-57. 
MICHAlOWSKI, P. 
"Charisma ond Control,'' in Gibson/ Biggs, Power, pp. 55-68. 
MoRONY, M. 
"'In a City without Wotchdogs, the Fox is the Overseer': lssues and Problems in the Study of Bureaucrocy," in 
Gibson/Biggs, Power, pp. 7-18. 
MUEllER, D. 
"Some Remorks on Woge Rates in the Middle Kingdom,"JNES 34 (1975): 249-263. 
359 
ßibliography of articles cited 
MüLLER, W. 
"Ein Terminus des Verwaltungswesens, " Z4S 32 (1894): 131 . 
"Viehsteuer," Z4S 34 ( 1 896): 167-168. 
MüLLER-WOLLERMANN, R. 
"Bemerkungen zu den sogenannten Tributen," GM 66 (1983) : 81-93 . 
"Ein Tribut an die Methode," GM 77 (1984): 51-55. 
"Warenaustausch im Ägypten des alten Reiches," JESHO 28 (1985) : 121-168. 
"sw.fiwBouern als Kolonisatoren," VA 3 (1987): 263-267. 
"Präliminierungen zur ägyptischen Stadt," Z45 118 (1991 ): 48-54. 
MUHLACK, U. 
"Von der philologischen zur historischen Methode," in Meier, Methode, pp. 154-180. 
NASH, M. 
"Morket and Indian Peosont Economies," in Shanin, Peasonls, pp. 161-177. 
NEWLANDS, W. 
"Rich Treots await at Carnegie's old home," W FT (5/ 6 August 1995): IX. 
NIBBI, A. 
"Some Remarks on Ass and Horse in Ancient Egypt and the Absence of the Mule," Z4S 106 (1979): 148-168. 
ÜATES, D. AND J. ÜATES 
"Early Irrigation Agriculture in Mesopotamia," in Sieveking, Problems, pp. 109-135. 
"Tell Brak: A Stratigraphie Summary, 1976-1993,' lroq 56 (1994): 167-176. 
O'CoNNOR, D. 
"New Kingdom and Third lntermediate Period," in Trigger, Sociol History, pp. 183-278. 
Pm, T. E. 
"The Egyptian Words for 'Money', 'Buy' and 'Seil'," in Studies Griffith, pp. 122-127. 
PERSHITS, A. 1. 
"Tribute Relations,' in Seoton/ Claessen, Politicol Anthropology, pp. 149-156. 
POKARA, T. 
"China," in Claessen/Skalnik, Eorly Stole, pp. 191-212. 
POLANYI' K. ' 
"Morketless Trading in Hammurabi's Time," in Polanyi, Trode and Market, pp. 12-26. 
PosENER-KRIEGER, P. 
"Les popyrus d'Abousir et l'economie des anciens temples funeraires de l'ancien empire," in Lipinski, Stole ond 
Temple 1: 133-151. 
PosENER-KR1EGER, P. 
"Construire une tombe a l'ouest de Mn-nfr," RdE 33 (1981) : 47-58. 
POSTGATE, J. N. 
"In Seorch of the First Empires," BASOR 293 (1994): 1-13. 
PRICE, D. 
"Wittfogel's Neglected Hydraulic/ Hydroogricultural Distinction", )AR 50 ( 1994): 187 -203 . 
RENGER, J. 
"On Economic Structures in Ancient Mesopotamia," Or. 63 ( 1994): 157 -208. 
RöMER, M. 
"Der Handel und die Kaufleute im alten Ägypten,' SAK 19 (1992): 257-284. 
ROTH, A. M. 
"The Organization and Functioning of the Royal MortuaryCults of the Old Kingdom in Egypt,'' in Gibson/Biggs, 
Power, pp. 133-140. 
"The Practical Economics of Tomb-Building in the Old Kingdom," in Silverman, For His Ko, pp. 227-240. 
SCHARFF, A. 
"Ein Rechnungsbuch des königlichen Hofes aus der 13. Dynastie," Z45 57 (1922): 51-68. 
360 
Bibliogrophy of orticles cited 
SCHNEIDER, T. 
'Zur Etymologie der Bezeichnung ''König von Ober- und Unterägypten,' ZÄS 120 (1993): 166-181. 
SCHULMAN, A. 
"Mhrond Mskb, Two Egyplian Military Ti~es of Semitic Origin," ZÄS93 (1966): 123-132. 
'Cotalogue of the Egyption Finds,' in: Rothenberg, Temple, pp. 114-147. 
SEIDLMAYER, S. 
"Wirtschottliche und gesellschottliche Entwicklung im Übergang von Alten zum Mittleren Reich,• in Assmann, 
Problems, pp. 175-217. 
SJöBERG, B. 
'The Mycenoean Economy: Theoreticol Fromeworks, • in Gillis, et ol., Trade ond Production, pp. 19-32. 
SKINNER, Q. 
"Languoge ond Political Change," in Ball, et ol., Politicol Innovation, pp. 6-23. 
"The Stole," in Ball, et ol., Politicol Innovation, pp. 90-131. 
SMITHER, P. 
"A Tox-Assessor'sJournol of the Middle Kingdom,' JEA 27 (1941): 74-76. 
SPIEGELBERG, W. 
'Varia," RT 15 (1893): 141-145. 
'Ein Gerichtsprotokoll aus der Zeil Thutmosis' IV.," ZÄS 63 (1927): 105-115. 
TRIGGER, B. G. 
"The Rise of Egyption Civilizolion," in Trigger, Sociol History, pp. 1-70. 
VOUTSAKI, S. 
'Value ond Exchange in Pre-Monetary Societies: Anthropological Debates ond Aegean Archoeology," in Gillis, 
et ol., Trade ond Production, pp. 7 -17. 
WARBURTON, D. A. 
'Some Remorks on the Manufoclure ond Sole of Shabtis,' BSEG9-10 [1984-85]: 345-355. 
"Keynes'sche Überlegungen zur oltägyptischen Wirtschatt," ZÄS 118 ( 1991): 'The Economy of oncienl Egypt 
RevisitedYetAgain,' GM 146(1995): 103-111. 
WARD, W. A. 
'Same Aspecls of Private Land Ownership ond lnheritance in Ancienl Egypt, ca. 2500-1000 B.C.", in Khalidi, 
land Tenure, pp. 63-77. 
W1LKINSON, T. J. 
'The Struclure and Dynamics of Dry-Forming Stoies in Upper Mesopotamia,' CA 35 (1994): 483-520. 
WILSON, J. 
"Egypt through the New Kingdom: Civilizalion withoul Cities,'' in Kraeling, City lnvincible, pp. 124-136. 
WOLF,W. 
'Papyrus Bologna 1086," ZÄS 65 (1930): 89-97. 
WRIGHT, H. T. 
"Toword an Explanation of the Origin of the Stole," in Cohen/Service, Origins of the Stole, pp. 49-68. 
YOFFEE, N. 
'The Economy of Ancienl Western Asio," in Sasson, Civilizofions III: 1387-1399. 
YouNG, J. 
'NaturalJurisprudence and the Theory of Volue in Adam Smith," HPE 27 (1995): 755-773. 
361 

PART VI 
IND!CES 

T EXTUAL REFERENCES 
Cairo JdE 28569 191 238 240,255.276 
241-242 219,282 
EA 38ff. 334 259-261 221 
260, 8 268 
Giomale 263, 8 243 
1-3 175ff., 307 266,9 243 
1-7 220,267 299, 11-12 227,247 
40 68,120,255,267 365ff. 239 
H.O. KR/ II: 
17, 3 283 143-146 229 
30 264 147, 9ff 229 
45, 1 103 154, 10-14 229 
47, 2 237 156, 8 229 
58, 1, 4 266 162, 12 229 
65, 2 vs. 2 149 167,7 229 
68, 1 266 171, 6 229,261 
71, 3 238 182, 11 250 
81-82 29, 143ff., 184, 283, 186, 10 250 
306 197, 10 272 
81, 14 268 207, 13 229 
82, 3 283,287 245, 7-9 274 
114, 4 283 246, 13-15 261 
247, 4-6 228 
HPB 111: 31 264,265 253, 10-11 228 
257, 11 228 
KR/ 1: 258-281 228,250,261 
4-58 248 260 250 
6-32 227,250 260, 4-8 231 
16, 14-15 142 267, l; 3 191 
23, 3 151 268-274 251 
41, 3-4 228 271, 9-11 261 
45-58 190,272 283 228,261 
50, l 167 285, 2-7 228 
50, 10 280 286, 16 228 
60-61 271 287, l 228 
65-66 228 289, 15 250 
65-70 250 290, l 228 
79, 11-13 248 294, 11 228 
81-96 271 294, 14 250 
90, 14-16 274 297, 16 250 
114, 4 274 317, 15-16 228 
117, 10 227 318, 7-8 228 
125-126 280,313,325 326, 14 191 
197, 8 151,227 327, 6 250 
201, 5 212, 227, 231, 248 330, 7 250 
205, 3 227,248 332, 8; 15 272 
365 
T extuol References 
(KR/ II con'd) 178 266 
333 167, 248, 250, 272, 305 259, 15 228 
416, l 250 341-343 182lf., 258, 270, 279 
490, 12 228 343, 7-13 285 
514, 14-16 229,261 368, 7 251 
603, 2; 10 228 421 239 
608, 12 228, 231, 250 421, 12 238 
671-672 243 517-522 296 
705, 14 247 539, 3 237 
803-806 136 
894-895 282 KR/ V: 
9, 3 229 
KR/ III: 9, 8-9 251 
9,7 227 27,6 229 
16,6 247 50, 12 251 
21, 9 247 50, 13 272 
29, l0ff. 264,265 65, 14 229 
31, 12 265 68, 10 229 
41-43 265 93,4 229 
45, 13-14 264 97, 3;9 229 
54-55 247 110, 7 229 
91-94 270,274 117, l 3f. 231,251 , 272 
92, 9 268 144, l; 4 229 
136, 7 247 177, l3f. 229 
138-140 143lf., 283 216, 12 229 
145-146 264,265 218, 3 229 
146, 5f. 268 219, 16 229 
158-161 287 221-225 261,274 
160, 1 lff. 144,278,263 225 229 
161 265,268 225, l-3 248,251 
250-25 l 266 239, 12 248,251 
254-255 240 240, 7 229 
260, lO 268 241, 13 248,251 
261-262 283 242, 2 229 
330, 2 247 244, 9 248,251 
499-504 135,239 245, l l 248,251 
509, l; 9 219 280, 2 229 
534, 12 237 284, 3 272 
542, 11 237 302, 14 229 
545 238 317, 5 229 
841, 14 247 318, 5 251 
321, 2 229,251 
KR/ IV: 437-448 152lf., 219 
10, 2 251 437-448 245 
39, 10-12 141 , 285 460 238 
78-81 283 527, 6 238 
81, 2 287,144 536, 14 238 
143-144 270 610, 1 238 
164-165 266, 238 
168 219 
366 
T extual References 
KR/VI: 102-103 237,242,255,259 
3-9 226,249 175-176 283 
66, 6; 7 221 190-191 278 
67, 2ff 221 226ff. 270 
67, 10 269 263-265 237,241 , 267 
67, 11 222 264, 7 256 
70ff 226 265, 9 212 
120, 2 238 266, 8 237 
151 , 1-4 264, 266 268-273 140 
221-225 273 284-285 237 
364, 9 266 292-293 239 
367, 7 238 396, 15-16 226 
368, 2-3 238 455, 5 264 
395-397 222 
399, 6 238 LEM 
409, 1 238 5-6 263,276,278,298 
455-458 1861., 258, 280, 285 , 38,4 332 
289 64-65 133-134, 243, 278, 282, 
517-522 244,255, 304 297 
560-566 l 75ff, 220, 267, 307 75, 14 266 
566,4 238 83 : 10 134 
571, 8 266 87, 16 167 
572, 10 266 87-88 135,263 
580, 7 266 89, 11 213 
581-590 307 105 170 
582, 1; 9; 10 219,238 111 , 2 191 
583, l; 11 219,238 123, 1 200 
590-594 246,267 
590ff. 255 LES 68, 1-3 233 
603, 15 239 
603-604 239,245 Lesestücke 69, 1 213 
603-608 241 
619-624 220,222 LRL 
624, 7 245 47, 3-5 123 
639, 15 239 53 239 
650-652 276 69-70 170 
653-655 245 
653,4 238 Naville, Tb. II: 
653, 12-13 239 89 201 
654, 7-8 245 325 212 
681-684 238,245 
682, l, 10, 11 238,239 0. Berlin P. 
590ff 68 1268 237 
11238 264, 265,268 
KR/VII : 12337 265,266,268 
7, 5 237 
84ff. 238 0. BM 50722 266 
84, 8-16 278 
85, 12 278 0 . BMFA 11.1498 237 
93, 9 279 
367 
T extuol References 
0. Cairo o. Gard 
25241 237 13 264,265 
25271 266 67 237 
25517 266 86 29, 143ff., 200, 268, 
25536 237,239 283,306,331 
25536, verso 219 150 238 
25588, rto. 266 227 283 
25592, 1 266 
25593 238 0. Mich. 66 266. 
25597 255 
25608, 2 266 0. Petrie 
25620, 1 266 14 103 
25620,4 266 47 283 
25632 220 
25633 238 0. Toronto A l l 265,268 
25678 242 
25698, 1 266 0. Turin 57072, l 266 
25698, 7 266 
25722 238,239 P. Amiens 168 
25726 266 
25753 219 P. Anast. 1 10, 6 215 
25763, rto. l 266 P. Anast. IV 3, 10 332 25810 220 
25832 265 P. Anast. V 17, 2; 3 237, 243, 255, 297, 278 
0. Campbell 2, 3 239 P. Anast. VI 42 266 
0. Cemy3 P. Anast. VIII 239 278 
O.DeM P. Ashmolean 1960. 1283 238,266 45 238 
46 vso. 10 242 P. 8. N. 209 243 92 238 
100 265 P. Berlin 3040a 144, 263, 264, 278, 106, vs. 5 209 287,291 
108, 7-8 267 
114 264 P. Berlin 3047 136 139,4 307 
140, verso 307 
142 307 P. Berlin 9784, 4 171 
143 307 P. Berlin l 1239, 2 238 149 255 
165 238 P. Bib. Not. 199, 2 239 249 220 
303 237 P. BM 306 265 10335 279 318, 9-10 209 10401 151, 288, 290, 322 
0. Fitzwilliam 1 10373 1 vso. 2 167 271 10373, vso. 6 143 
368 
T extual References 
P. Bol. 186,7 185 
1086 283,284,306 27, 12 169,278 
1086, 21-26 135, 144f., 184, 263 28, 3 249,254,278 
1094 6, 3ff. 263,276,278,298 28, 3-5 280 
28, 5 249,273,278 
P. Brooklyn 35. 1453 305,329,238,254 32a, 7 259 
32a, 7-9 280 
P. CairoJdE 32a, 9 273 
52002 237, 24 l, 237, 256, 267 326, 5 259 
52003 237 326, 6 249 
52002, vso. 2 212 326, 9 249 
326, 11 278,280 
P. Cairo 326, 14 251 
58056 239,255 48, 2 249 
58057 13,240,276 48,6 251 
58071, 1 134 48, 10 273 
58096 242,243,255,259 516, 3 259 
516, 10 259 
P. EPS 244 516, 11 249 
52a, 1 278,280 
P. Gard 8 238,266 52a, 2 251 
59,6 169 
P. Greg l 52ff., 2 l 9ff., 238, 245, 68a,4 273,259 
267,312,313 686, 4-5; 8; 12 280 
686, 8 280 
P. Gurob l 46ff., 221, 234, 268, 69,4 259 
283,288,290,291 69, 11 278 
76, 9 275 
P. Harageh 173,180 
P. Harris 1 194ff., 234f, 249, 303ff., P. IFAO sans 238,288 
passim 
4,4 268 P. Lansing 170 
4, 5 251 12,4 191 
4, 4- 7,4 268,272 
9, 4-5 169 
11, 4 260 P. Leiden 1 
12a, 1 259 349 266 
12a, 5 280 350 3, 9 167 
12a, 6- 9 273 350 verso 222ff., 235, 305, 239 
126, 2 259 350 vso. 4, 17 269 
126, 3 184,249,259,260 368 282 
126, 6 249,259 
126, 8 251 
126, 9 271,278,280 P. Louvre E 3226 245,255,326 
13a, 5-10 273 
146, 16 280 P. Mallet 221,269 
15a, 3 185 
15a, 14 185 P. Mayer A 9, 20 167 
18a, 11 185 
369 
T extual References 
P.M/#.3569+ 140 P/R 
34, 3 203 
P. Vienna 38[ 3934/ 83A 265 
3937] + 9352 a/b 140 
P. Mook Peasant B 1 , 35 180 
(P. Munich 809) 167 
RAD 
P. Munich 809 167,238,254,296,325 14-18 146ff., 221 
15,7 268 
P. Northumberland II 282 17, 14 268 
19, 3 200 
P. Sall.1 20, 6ff. 288 
8 167 20-21 1491. 
9, 3 263 22-24 221 
22-28 150 
P. Soll. II 8, 9 167 26-27 268 
30-32 283 
P. Soll. rv, vso. 1, 9 213 33 219 
35-44 170ff., 284 
P. Turin 36, 3; 14 169 
1874 159ff., 200, 236, 238, 40,7 267 
254,279,288,289,307 42, 2 298,312 
1879 326 42,4 220 
1894,4 203 45-58 170 
1896 + 2006 170ff., 284,312,313 72-73 136 
1900 220 72, 10 169 
1900+ 222,231,234 
1903 222,265 
1907/8 238 Tomb-Robberies II: 
1923 238 23, A. 7 167 
2003 255 
2007 265 Urk. l: 
2008 + 2016 222ff., 235, 242, 305, 102,17 143 
329 220, 14ff. 41 
2009 + 1999 220,307 
2009 + 1999 vso. 267 
2014/223 246 Urk. W: 
2075 238,245,255,307 4-5 261 
2084 + 2091 239, 241, 245 11, 1 139 
2104/223 265,281 64, 1 266 
2106 [Frag. 387] 284 70, lff. 226,271 
115-116 285 
116,15 138 
P. Valen~ay 136, 137, 169, 284, 304, 118, 10 138 
319 119,2 138 
124,5-10 138 
P. Wilbour 61, 74, 133, 137, l65ff., 163, 13-14 271 
2971., 309ff., 314, 319, 185-186 274 
324 185, 13 249 
370 
T exlual References 
(Urk. IV con'd) 1097, 16 142 
186, 2 249 1098, 3-10 142 
195-196 271 1099, 4-5 142 
288, 13 178 1102, 11-1103, 2 142 
325, 13 214 1103-1117 178ft. 
349, 10 178 1111, 0ff 139 
412, 4 249 1114 269 
436, 6 273 1114, 9; 13, 14 231, 264 
436, 13 246 1115, 4; 12 231, 236 
499,4 285 1116, 2 231 
503, 8 269 1119ff. 137 
530, 11-16 246,269,279 1124, 5 137 
536 281 1126 171 
584, 10 212 1127,3 137 
629-634 273 1128,3 137 
641, 11 271 1130,9 137 
667, 13-14 286 1131,10-12 137 
691, 10-13 236 1132,6 137 
700, 6 274 1133, 1 137 
700, 7 249 1134, 15-17 137 
708, 9ff. 249 1379-1380 269,270 
708, 11 254 1379, 10 226 
709, 3; 12 286 1379-1380 246 
712, 7 236 1380, 1 ff. 225 
734, 2ff. 249,254 1390, 14 191 
734, 10 286 1441-1445 139,274 
744, 7 249,274 1442, 7 249 
745, 5 271 1468-1472 225 
746 271 1550, 18 212 
750-751 274 1554, 11 290 
753, 9 271 1668, 3;5 249 
759 247 1841, 16 285 
925, 5 190 1996, 11 246 
931, 8-10 269 2011 270 
973, 3-4 246 2013, 9 249 
1073, 3 180 2144, 10; 19 271 
1094, 6-10 141, 142 2158, 17 266 
1096, 10-16 142 
371 
EGYPTIAN WoRDS 
;cc (speak a foreign isw-reeds 159 
language) 174 it-m-it 209 
tct-jars 203,211,215 iJn-beam 176 
Jbt-field 179,265,286 idniniw 205 
Jb (fine thing, benefit) 146 idg (dress) 149 
Jbt(goods) 188 c-mw(weir) 179 
iw(come) 220,298 CJ-n-st (Chief T axing 
iwJ-cattle 208 Master) 165 
iwfyt-plant 205 c;m 192 
ipt (measure of cbw-flowers 209 
capacity) 20 cprw 266 
ipt (shrine) 184 cmcm.t-land 173 
ipip(t) 204 cnbw-bundles 208 
ipw-cadaster 167 p; cnbw 259,289 
imy-rc (overseer) 174 crryt (hall, gate) 180 
imy-r pr-wr 180 Cb<-fields, -holdings 135,174,312 
imy-r pr-bfi.-n-pr- c; 244 cbc(w) 147, 263f., 312? 
imy-r btm n p; ym 184 cnb-n-nwt 230 
imy-r sg;wty 180 cgw(t).f n bi; 
imyt-pr-testament 179,199 (hoof-of-ore) 134f., 240f. 
inyt (brought) 28, 152ff., 219f., 222, cqwt (income) 178 
238, 282f., 295, 298, cq;y sp sn 146 
313 cqw-loaves 148, 206f., 221,268 
inw (payment) 28, 141, 142, 148, 149, w;fi_-wr (Red Sea) 214 
151ff., 159, 163, 166, 
wcb(w.)t 67, 188, 247, 271 
180f., 187, 194ff.,219f., 
22lff., 247f., 250ff., 259, web-priest 168 
263, 268ff., 288ff., wb; (forecourt) 212f. 
295ff., 302, 305, 322f., wbnw sd (wounds) 192 
325 wng'w-cattle 160,208 
inb (wall, enclosure) 213 wbyt (harvest) 190f., 285 
inhm (bead) 242 wg 176 
inhmn (pomegranate) 242 wg' (palm) 205 
iry- c; (porter) 170 wg'tt-amulets 203f. 
ir.t.:.fish 175,307 wg;t 215 
ib (cattle) 200 wg'b (circulate) 263 
ibwty (cultivator) 19 btr-freighter 177,216,307 
ibt-field 286 btb-measure 206 
ibt (things) 307 btkw (worked) 207,209 
isw(price) 61 
372 
Egyption Words 
b:kw (payment) 
btkw-rm! 
bit-breads 
bnbn-loaves 
brty 
bf:,w 
bbnt 
27, 28, 134, 135, 139, 
141, 142, 152ff., 160ff., 
178, 188f., 192f., 194ff., 
219f., 227ff, 237ff ., 
258ff ., 268f., 271 ff ., 
278ff., 284, 288f., 295ff., 
304 , 306, 313, 316, 
320, 323,325, 337 
l 83ff. , l 86f., l 94ff., 234, 
247, 258ff., 270, 280, 
284, 295ff., 304f., 324f. 
154ff., 206 
206 
192 
192 
229 
bs 243 
bq 201 
bki-plant 205 
ptypt 176 
pct-loaves 153, 207 
pct-birds 209 
pwtrw (animal tenders) 145 
pr (temple) 184 
pr-CJ (Pharaoh) 32, 67, 178 
pr-nsw(t) ("royal 
household") 32, 67, 178, 1 so 
pr-gt 67 
pryw-estates 135 
pr-vVY-QQ (treasaury) 225 
prrwt (expenses) 178 
p(r)s-breads/cakes 153ff , 161,206 
p/:,w (drainage 
systems, swamps) 143 
p/:,IN'f (ends) 143 
psst-work 188 
ptrw (animals) 144 
pdr-sack 205, 208 
m-grt (through) 152 
mint-field 135, 165 
373 
mt ct (truth, justice, 
divine order) 38, 50, 56, 63, 96, 191 , 
mJwt-land 
301,316,318 
190 
m 'gt-measures 209 
mn(t) (daily wage, 
rations) 147, 150, 282 
mnw/ mnt-jars 160, 163, 183ff., 202ff., 
207,213,258 
mnit 159 
mnit-bird 209 
mnmnwt (herds) 200 
mn.s-barge 177, 199, 212, 216, 
264,307 
mrw 149 
mrw/ t-serfs 272,274 
mrw-bundles 208,211,213, 215 
mhr 210 
m/:,t 155f. 
mb: 207 
m!Jf 176 
ms (bear, interest) 28 3 
msb-jars 203 
mss-garments 202, 201 
msti-sack 204f, 207f. 
msd(m)t-eye paint 244, 288 
msc (army, expedition) 119 
mskbvV"fW 21 o 
mtr 289 
mk-cloth 149,202,216,288 
mgtiw 162 
ncbw-bundle 211, 215 
nb (lord) 179 
nbw n sp sn (re-used 
gold) 201 
nf< 149 
nfr (barley) 190 
nfr nfr 149,244 
nm/:,w ("commoners") 20, 61, 137, 139, 168, 
l 88f ., 247, 253, 271 , 
304, 319,338 
nnyb-wood 204 
Egyptian Words 
nb(b)-land 41 , 190 
nsw-nJrw ("king of the 
gods") 19 
nswt (royal, kingship) 32, 67, 178 
nswtyw 61, 62 
nsdy (lapidary) 242 
ng;-cattle 208 
nkpti-plant 204 
n( (custom) 274 
ndb 208 
r-prw (mortuary 
temples) 152, 220 
p; r-c-bJkw (tomb, site) 152, 231, 241 
rwgw-controller 19, 164, 191,248,278 
rmnyt-domains 
rmL-ist (worker) 
rbs-cakes 
rbyt 
rdi (issue, sell) 
rdiw 
135 
279 
206f. 
248 
222ff., 267 
207 
hmn-garments 202 
b;w (excess) 211 
b;qf (booty, plunder) 28, 141,142, 229,251, 
2611., 295 
bwt 159 
bwt (Mansion, temple) 199 
bmwt (servants) 266, 313 
bmwt-pr-c; (royal 
craftsmen) 67 
bmst (session, term) 178 
bnw-vessels 201 
bnk-measures 209 
et bnkt 188 
br-s; (arrears) 283 
bry-pgt (military 
officer) 191 
brst (carnelian) 203 
bsb (reckoning) 136 
bq;f (measure of 
capacity) 20 
bqq-plant/fruit 205, 208 
btp-basket 206 
374 
btri (levy, assessment) 27, 28, 134, 139, 140, 
146, 147, 150, 151, 
158, 162f., 178, 180f., 
183ff , 187, 188f., 190, 
193, 194ff., 221ff., 237, 
246, 248f., 251, 256, 
258, 260, 263ff., 278ff., 
285, 295ff., 304, 306, 
31 3, 324f., 327 
bsi (money, silver) 201 , 246, 307 
bsi m-if 159 
bt-(n-)tt (khato-
land, q.v.) 264 
bw bnt-ib 201 
bbi-inw 
p; bnty 
bnmt (jasper) 
br (tomb) 
brp (commanded, 
173, 180 
147, 150,151,268,279 
204 
19,266 
administered) 28 
brr 
brs-bundles 
bsbd (lapis lazuli) 
bt-C; 
b:r (khar, sack, 
149 
209 
204 
208 
measure) 20, 144 
brt (obligation) 28 
brt-hrw (daily) 141 
b.rt-rnpt (annual 
obligatory) 249 
5;-p; 149 
r s;tw (to the ground) 178 
s;fw n bnw 178 
scb-cakes 206 
Sem 208 
sw.tjw 62 
sp sn 215 
spd 266 
smw (forage) 188 
smdt (serfs) 20,161 ,255, 257, 258ff., 
268, 2791., 313, 320, 
329 
Egyption Words 
sbt-field 265 gs-pr (workshop?) 225f., 234, 264 
sgnn-oil 265 qm; n mw 212 
sqw 207 q;r-vessel 250 
skty-vessel 177,201,307 qrr-boat 177,307 
sk-flour 207 qrb-boat 209 
styw 176 m qbqb 201 
sf;f (aroura, measure) 20 qdt 200 
stt (trap) 205 qdt (kite, measure) 20 
sdf (endowment) 199 qdy-wood 204 
sg(inflict) 192 k; (soul) 148, 151, 186, 191, 
sgm (official) 188, 247 210f., 251,272 
sgm-eye paint 244 k;wt (works) 237, 250 
sgm-es (servant) 279 (d. also msd(m)t) b-vessel 199, 201, 21 lf., 240f. 
s;yt 27, 28, 134, 183f., 186f., bN-boats 191 
191, 193, 194ff., 233, kb-jars 203 
238, 246, 249 , 254 , kbs-baskets 207 
256; 258, 269f., 271 ff., kf< 188, 191 
278ff., 285, 288, 295ff., krbt-bunches 209 
304, 306, 321 , 324f., kt (safflower) 150 
333 tyt-amulets 204 
s;yw 160ff. tisps-plant 204, 207 
s;w 263f. twtw-breads 153 
sJw.t 144 tp (district) 271 
füw (bedouins) 250 tp-Qrt 27, 28, 149, 151, 159ff., 
s;k;-breads 153 187, 225, 254, 258f., 
s;qw 201 279, 285, 287ff., 295, 
scyt-cakes 148, 206f. 322 
swt (document) 143 tpyw-fish 148, 161 
swyt (documentation) 143 tpyw 208 
smw ("harvest-tax") 27, 28, 135, 141, 161, tpt-piece 176, 204 
172f., 183ff., 186f., 191, trp-geese 205, 208 
219, 234 , 249, 258, tb(b) 41 
270, 276f., 282ff., 295, J;y (basket, sack?) 207,208 
306, 312,321,325 JJrti-skiff 201 
smwps 166,284 JmJm-measure 207 
sn'-fish 175,209,307 Jni (tired) 190 
ssr bqu (corn) 200 Jnfy 188 
sdi (exact) 179,245 L( ') r-vessel 242f. 
sdw-plots 139, 179 Jrb-vessel 243 
sdyt 160,164,238 Js 263f., 278 
g;y-vessel 206,208 Jsw 191 
grg 176 Jsw-prt ("sowing order") 144,263, 2287 
375 
Egyptian Words 
dtiw-cloth 149, 159f., 207f. g'ty-barge, ferry 177,307 
diw (wages) l 52ff., 189, 242, 245, g'ty/w-garments 202,288 
264ff., 313 g;rt 176 
dw-garments 202 g''m-gold 190,274 
dbn (deben, measure) 20, 160 gph-piece 176 
dnit-baskets 206f., 212 grw 206 
ds-jars 153ff. 
PROPER NAMES 
CONVENTIONAL Ramesses V 18,165, 319 (cf. also transcribed writings, infra) Ramesses IX l 86f., 238f., 244, 285, 
289 
Aha 296 Ramesses X 238 
Amenemhat 1 45 Ramesses XI 18, 171,311 
Amenophis III 249, 333 Scorpion 296 
Amenophis IV 272 Seti 149, 221 
Cheops 124, 126 Seti 1 27, 123f., 190ff., 221, 
Dewen 296 227f., 236, 238, 248, 
Djer 296 250, 268, 27lf , 274, 
Hatshepsut 269 280, 302,313, 325 
Herihor 18, 123, 171 Seti II 146ff., 22 1 
Horemhab 133, 139, 188, 193, Siptah 152, 184, 237, 258 
240, 247, 256, 271, Snofru 124, 126 
281, 302, 316, 325, 333 Tawasret 152, 184 
Merneptah 213, 219,270,283 Thutmosis 1 226 
Mes 139, 302, 319, 324, 333 Thutmosis III 81, 200, 21 2, 227, 247, 
Narmer 296 269, 271, 273f. , 286 
Neferi rkare 309 Thutmosis IV 212, 238 
Neshi 139 Wadj 296 
Nsy-Khonsu 315 
Pepi 1 66 
Ptunteamun 136 T RANSCRIBED 
Ramesses 1 240f. 
Ramesses II 18, 123f., 136, 148f., ~st 267 
15 1, 163, 184, 213, lyt 242f. 
219, 228f., 242f., 248, l 'b-ms (sailor) 139, 261 
261 , 272 , 274, 279 , lwty 156 
283, 296 lw. -n-lmn 171 
Ramesses III 18, 105, 140, 149, 152, lpw-wr 26 
158, 171, 194ff., 222, lmn-m-ipt 283 
229, 235, 238, 248, lmn-btp (HPA) 26, 133, l 86f., 225,235, 
261, 272ff., 303f., 308, 236, 247, 258f., 280, 
310,319 288ff., 32lf. 
Ramesses IV 221,303,306 lmn-btp (butler) 244 
376 
Proper Names 
lmn-bcw 154f., 239 Nfr-btp 238 
lntf 246 Nfr-k~-R c-m-pr-lmn 186 
c~-pbty 153 Nht-sw 153 
cb-pt 239 N;y-lmn (scribe) 174 
Wnn-nfr (prophet) 136 Nsy-lmn (attendant) 186 
Wnn-nfr (stripling) 154 Nsy-lmn-m-ipt 174 
Wnn-nfr (treasurer) 265 N:rSbk 170 B~k-n-lmn (fisherman) 154, 156 Nm 183 
B~k-n-wrnr 153 R c::-ms (vizier) 264,287 
B~k-n-Mwt 154f. R c~mssw-nbt 244 
B~k-n-hnsw 136 Rm C 154 
P~-iwl 154f. Rb-mi-Rc 81, 137, 141, 171, 178, 
PHry 240f. 234,290 
P!-ym 154 He. cJ 239 . p1-) 
P~-wr- c~ 173 Hwy (scribe) 136 
P~-6~-s! 183,270,279 Hwy (workman) 152 
P!-bbnw 154 Hwy 156 
P~-n-lmn 153 Hwy-nfr 152f. 
P~-nbsy 143 Hri (vizier) 239 
P!-n-Rnnt 156 f-:iri (prophet) 144 
P!-rn-nfr 246 Hri (dehiuty treasuer) 265 
P!-bry 137f., 246, 285, 288, Hry (fis erman) 156 
306 Hri (mayor) 268 
P~-bq~-mn 180,225 Hr-m-wi! 153 
P~-hni 170ff. 8q~-nbt 118 
P~-brw 148 Hc-m-w!st 282 
P~-s~-nsw 240 H c-m-h !t 285 
P~-Sr (mayor) 148,287 8 c-m-t~i (woodcutter) 154 
P~-sr (vizier) 227,247 lj c-m-tri (fisherman) 156 
P~-sr (scribe) 152ff. lj cy (vizier) 264f. 
P~-tw-i~ 153 Hnsw-ms 170,239 
Pi~y 240f. s~-w~dh 153 
Ptb-m-wi~ 152, 155 s~h-n-n r 284 
My~ 171 S~-n-r (lapidary) 242f. 
Min-iniwy 265 Swnr (overseer) 282 
Min-msw 139,274 Sm 242 
Mn-bpr-R '-snb 269 Sn-nfr 246 
Mry-R' 153 Ss-s~w-nbt 148 
Ms~ 240 Sgw 270,274 
M!n 33, 43, 61 f., 76 Qn-br-bps.f 153, 157 
Ni~ 136 K~-s~ 153 
Nb-pbty-R' 238 Knr 288 
Nb-nfr 264 n-ndmt 246 
Nb-nfr (royal scribe) 268 Twi; 270 
Nb-ntrw 151 Twr 278 
Nb-Re 153 Tnn 240 
Nfr-ir-k~-R' 33 Dw~-r-nhh 225, 269 
Nfr- '~bt 136 Qbwty .. 246,273 
Nfr- 'bt 242 Qbwty-ms (scribe) 170ff., 307, 313 
Nfr-br 242 Qbwty-ms (herdsman) 240f. 
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TOPONYMS 
CONVENTIONAL Punt 20, 14 lf, 214, 216, 
(cf. also transcribed writings, infra) 23~ 261f., 29~ 308 
Saqqara 63 
Abu Simbel 228 Silsile 271f. 
Abydos 124, 190ff , 227, 229, Sinai 68, 105f., 171, 308 
248,272,274,313 Syria 141, 199f., 214, 226f., 
Afghanistan 235 235, 251, 274, 286, 
Amoma 141 296,306,308,331 
Aswan 126 Thebes 151, 171, 178f., 194ff., 
Avaris 124 228, 280, 284, 303f., 
Beth Shan 250 308, 3 l 2f., 326 
Canaan 18 Ulu Burun 274,334 
Coptos 200,269,304 Yarmouth 250 
Crete 141 
Cush 18, 200, 214, 222, 226, 
235, 249, 251, 265, T RANSCRIBED 
269, 270, 27 4, 281, 304 
Dakhla 126 lw-m-itrw 17lff. 
Elephantine 151 lwnw \qy 182 
Esna 172 lwnw rsy 182 
Gelidonya 334 lrty 261 
Hatti 18, 251, 26 lf , 27 4 ';-ri-k; (?Wadi Allaqi) 216 
Heliopolis 124, 195 ff., 273, 278, ';-ti-k; 216 
280, 303f., 309, 326 'nb-nwy (Memphis) 186, 197 
Helwan 63 'gny 172 
Hermonthis 182 W;w;t 18,249 
Hermopolis 280,313,325 w;g_-wr (Red Sea) 214 
Kadesh 229 Mn-nfr (Memphis) 145, 240 
Kanais 228 Mr-wr(t) (Miwr, Gurob) 20, 146ff., 160,288 
Karnak 19, 124, 199, 227f., N;-pr-imw 172 
236, 247, 248f., 261, nwt rsyt (Thebes) 143, 178f. 
270, 273f., 322 T;-nbsy 274 
Lachish 141, 285f. R;-m '-n; 160 
Luxor 199,228 R;-mnn (Lebanon) 249 
Medinet Habu 124, 199, 229, 246, R!nw 18,198,229,249,251, 
251,265,321 274 
Megiddo 286 r-ky-s; (Lachish ?) 141, 286 
Memphis 190, l 95ff., 222, 228, r-ty-s; 141, 286 
235, 240, 243, 249, bwt-k;-Ptb (Memphis) 197,250 
280, 303f., 326 Sb :-n-ly-m-btp 143 
Mitanni 18 Ody 261 
Nahrain 18 Ksks 261 
Nubia 142, 198f , 229,251 , dmi n hwt-k;-Pth 
274,296,326 · (Memphis) 190 
Per-Ramessu 139 
Palestine 69, 141, 250f. 
Phoenicia 198 
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TOMBS CITED 
EA 8 249,270 TT 100 137, 141,171,234,290 
EK 3 137f., 246 TT 106 227,247 
KV 4 171 TT 125 225f., 246 
TT 11 273 TT 188 246 
TT99 246 TT 343 180,225,273 
f OREIGN W ORDS 
EGYPTIAN ARMMIC 
deben 20 (for meaning) blt 192 
hin 202-203 (n. 602, for mskbm 210 
meaning) 
kite 20 (for meaning) 
khar 20 (for meaning) GREEK 
khato-land 32f., 137,140, 165, 168-
169 (for meaning), l 70ff., CX:AAO)'ACOOO"OC 174 
210, 264, 278, 284, aroura 20 (for meaning) 
286, 298, 304, 312, 319 ßapßapoc; 174 
oipe 20 (for meaning) 'teµvro 212 
Accadian 
biltu(m) HEBREW 192 
masbartu(m) 203 brct 192 
nik/qiptu(m) 204 
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Summary 
Combining philological investigation and theoretical reasoning, this 
book off ers a completely new interpretation of the economic role of 
the state in ancient Egypt. The first part provides background outlin-
ing the relevance of Keynes' s General Theory to the ancient Egyptian 
economy. The central part uses ancient Egyptian texts as the founda-
tion of an analysis of words commonly assumed to relate to taxation 
during the New Kingdom (c. 1540-1070 B.C.E.). The conclusions 
summarize the philological results and explore the role of the temples 
in the ancient Egyptian state during the New Kingdom. The result 
places ancient Egyptian taxation and state economic activity in an 
Egyptian economy based on an analysis of primary sources. 
The book is thus directed at a broad audience including Egyptologists 
and all scholars interested in economic history in general and the 
political development of early antiquity in particular. 
